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Holy work

Victor Suvorov (Rezun)

This book avalanche fell on my whole being, it pressed, tormented, tore my soul and body to pieces. To see it was like turning around suddenly at a crossing and feeling with all my being the blinding spotlights of an express train flying out of the gloom at the very moment when there was no time even for a farewell cry.

"Sacred Cause" - the second book of the trilogy "The Last Republic" outstanding writer, historian and military analyst Viktor Suvorov, written in the best traditions of the bestseller "Icebreaker", grandiose historical reconstruction of the events of 1920-1940-ies, when the Soviet Union under the leadership of Stalin implemented a large-scale plan to reorganize the world to achieve its main goal - world domination.

Putting together known and little-known facts and events of those years in a single mosaic, the author tells about the true causes of World War II, which are silenced by official propaganda, politicians and historians in Russia and abroad, how the Soviet leadership led by Stalin tried to fan the fire of the World Revolution and a new world war to conquer Europe the world under the cover of communist ideology. The author dispels numerous myths about the causes and circumstances of the outbreak of World War II and the Great Patriotic War, which for decades have been created, disseminated and supported by false documents by Soviet and Russian historians and official propaganda, falsifying the history of key events of the XX century.

The new, supplemented and revised edition of the book contains several new chapters and more than 160 photographs, including rare images from German and Soviet archives, published in Russia for the first time.

VICTOR

SUVOROV

HOLY CAUSE

Second book of the trilogy "The Last Republic" Second edition, supplemented and revised

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Where the document ends, there I begin. Y. N. Tynyanov

CHAPTER 1. "I'm telling you in great secret..."

Let us hope that we shall succeed in transforming our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army from the bulwark of peace, as it is now, into the bulwark of the liberation of the workers of the capitalist states from the yoke of the bourgeoisie.

И. Stalin. Letter to the cadets of the Nizhny Novgorod Infantry School. March 101925.

"The Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks teaches us: to destroy the danger of capitalist intervention, there is one means - to destroy the capitalist environment. Only then will we be able to say that the banner of the world commune has triumphed throughout the world!

Л. Z. Mekhlis, army commissar of the 1st rank, head of the Political Department of the Red Army, personal Stalin's secretary for "semi-dark affairs." [2] . April 4 1939.

1

Why did Stalin refuse to accept the Victory Parade? This question I asked in my articles and speeches. I put this question in the title of the first chapter of the book "The Last Republic".

The answer, in my opinion, is simple: there was nothing to celebrate. The Soviet Union suffered a crushing defeat in World War II. Yes, for some time after the "Great Victory" it remained afloat, and victory marches rattled on the upper deck, but it was clear to the captain: the music had not been played for long... Colossal natural resources of the huge country allowed to stretch the agony for decades, but any sane person was clear: the wound that Hitler inflicted on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, is fatal.

Stalin unleashed World War II in order to incorporate all the states of continental Europe into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to erase all borders between them, and to use the border posts to enclose extermination and labor camps.

World War II was intended as the first act of the World Revolution. The goal was not achieved. A socialist state is not able to exist for a long time next to normal countries with their healthy economies. In foreseeable history

in the future, the socialist state was going to perish. Stalin understood this better than anyone, that is why he refused to accept the parade.

Some saw Germany's defeat in World War II as a victory for the Soviet Union. And I, in the first part of my book.
"The Last Republic" showed that Stalin assessed the situation soberly and the triumphant enthusiasm of the crowd clearly did not share.

No one argued with me, but suddenly, after the publication of the book, and as if out of any connection with it went shoals of articles that can be summarized by the title: "Why Stalin did not ride the white stallion. Their meaning is as follows: Stalin was determined to personally take the parade, but how could he, clumsy!

The authors of those publications said that the leader secretly practiced in the Manege at night. But the clumsy one didn't succeed. He fell off his horse. And good! Fate it right. Even without Stalin, there was someone to take the parade. There was a much more worthy candidate for this role. The one! The only one! The one who saved the country! To him, the savior, fate and fate has given a great honor: Marshal of Victory to take the Victory Parade! Stalin, said the articles, was not averse to show off in the saddle, but he just did not have the appropriate skill.

All this was repeated many times, on various occasions and without them, in articles, television programs, and then in books. And this flow of information had one, but very authoritative primary source - cavalry colonel Sergei Nikolayevich Maslov, a respected and, I will not be afraid of this word, truly legendary person.

2

In 1945 S. N. Maslov was a major, commander of a cavalry regiment. Almost the entire army knew him. He was also known in the Kremlin. There were legends about him. That's it, a dashing horseman, Stalin invited him to instructors. The job, we agree, fell to Major Maslov was not easy. Stalin never sat on a horse. And his age at that time - 65 years old.

This is not old age, but not young. Stalin led an extremely unhealthy lifestyle: worked in a smoky office with nervousness until midnight and all night long, then dined at 4 a.m. in the circle of associates, drinking copiously and equally copious snacks.

All this did not promote health in any way. In addition, Stalin had one physical disadvantage. Everyone who saw him closely, drew attention to this. Thus, Air Marshal Eugene Savitsky in his book noted: "*So close I saw Stalin for the second time in my life. Machinally noted that the left hand he holds as unnaturally bent at the elbow*" (Savitsky E. A. Half a century with the sky. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988. P. 298). On the newsreel footage one can notice Stalin's mutilation.

The difficulties lay not only in teaching an invalid of retirement age to masterfully steer a horse. First, Maslov had to find a horse. On the one hand, one that would not be ashamed to show to the world, and on the other hand, one that would be calm and docile, given the age and disability of the rider.

Maslov inspected the stables of many cavalry regiments and divisions. He had an outstanding consultant - Deputy Commissar of Defense (that is, Stalin's deputy), commander of the Red Army cavalry Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny. Major Maslov chose a white Arabian stallion for Stalin. Training began, but soon ended. Stalin fell off the horse and never sat on it again.

Cavalryman Maslov took part in the Victory Parade. He also participated in the historic parade on November 7, 1941. And this is quite a rare combination. Even Zhukov, who took the Victory Parade in 1945, was not on Red Square on November 7, 1941. Rokossovsky commanded the Victory Parade, but he was not on Red Square on November 7, 1941 either. Both Rokossovsky and Zhukov defended Moscow. Maslov was lucky to be a participant of these two historic parades. That is why he was later given a certificate of the participant of the Victory Parade number one.

Colonel Maslov, an unwitting witness to Stalin's embarrassment, talked a lot about the war, but did not recall this incident. Only half a century after the incident did he decide that the time had come. His story became the basis for numerous publications. At first, the authors of the articles referred to Maslov, then stopped, and published materials about Stalin's fall as a well-known historical fact that requires neither proof nor references.

Stories about Stalin's fall from the Arabian horse crossed the borders of the Fatherland and rang throughout the near and far abroad. I open, for example, the British magazine The Spectator (April 22, 2006) and read the story about the Arabian horse and the clumsy Stalin.

These publications are not just a rebuke to my misplaced nagging and an indictment of my books. It is an exposé and a complete debunking.

3

Under the pressure of a multitude of articles and TV programs, the concept of my book "The Last Republic" was cracking at the seams like a sinking icebreaker battered by hummocks and its holds inexorably and rapidly filling with ice water. In addition, there was a blow of unprecedented force. The author, who appeared under the pseudonym Vladimir Gryzun, struck me with a chiseled question: had I read Zhukov's memoirs? I should have read them first, and then ask stupid questions! After all, Zhukov briefly but clearly explained everything: Stalin himself wanted to host the Victory Parade, but he failed.

I open Zhukov's memoirs - my goodness! I didn't even notice the horse!

Indeed, Zhukov simply and clearly describes the reason for Stalin's refusal to saddle the dashing stallion. Five or six days before the Victory Parade, Zhukov had a meeting with Stalin:

I don't remember exactly, I think, on June 18-19, I was summoned to my dacha by the Supreme.

He asked me if I'd learned how to ride a horse.

— No, I haven't, and I'm still practicing riding.

— Here's what - said Stalin - you will have to take the Victory Parade. Rokossovsky will command the parade.....

As he said goodbye, he remarked, it seemed to me, not without a hint:

— I advise you to take the parade on a white horse, which Budyonny will show you.

The next day I went to the Central Airfield to see how the training for the parade was going. There I met Stalin's son Vasily. He took me aside and told me a curious story:

— I'm telling you in confidence. My father was preparing to take the Victory Parade himself. But there was a mishap. On the third day, during the ride, the horse carried my father across the arena because of his inept use of spurs. Father, grasping the mane, tried to stay in the saddle, but and fell.

When he fell, he bruised his shoulder and head. And when he got up, he spat and said: let Zhukov take the parade. He's an old cavalryman.

— What kind of horse did he train on? - I asked Vasily.

— On the white Arabian horse on which he recommended you to take the parade. But please don't tell anyone about it," Vassily repeated again.

And I never told anyone until now. However, many years have passed, and I think that now it can be told.... (Zhukov G. K. Memories and Reflections. Moscow: OLMA-Press, 2003. 13th edition. T. 2. C. 354).

Zhukov's testimony toppled The Last Republic right from the first chapter. I was in a very unpleasant situation. Like a chicken in a hatchet.

There are three witnesses against my story. And what a lot! Legendary cavalryman Colonel Maslov, who personally picked up the horse Stalin and was his trainer in riding, Lieutenant General of Aviation Vasily Josephovich Stalin and the greatest military leader of all times and peoples four times Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov Georgy Konstantinovich. In addition, Stalin's deputy Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny was also mentioned.

And everything in these testimonies is clear and lucid, except the Arabian horse.

4

And Stalin looks very foolish in this story. Did he not realize that in a few lessons it is impossible to master the art of horseback riding to such a level and perfection to appear before the eyes of the world at such a solemn moment? Did Stalin, starting to master the basics of horseback riding, did not realize the depth of the risk of disgrace for the entire planet for eternity?

Riding a horse during the grandiose, most important parade of the 20th century is not like playing the violin. Knowledgeable people say that the violin can be mastered quickly. The main thing is to remember that you have to hold it with your left hand, pressing it against your left shoulder, and with your right hand
- bow up and down, up and down, to make it sound beautiful... Some people, according to stories, managed to master this art in a couple of hours. I don't know myself, I haven't tried l[3]. But I do know that with a horse that's not gonna work. And at 65, it's too late to learn this art. C
you have to start when you're a child. And if one arm cannot bend and there is no strength in it, you should not take up such an activity at all. If it is for pleasure, why not try it, but so that under the movie cameras of the whole world, under the thunder of orchestras and the rattle of thousands of horseshoes, you can drive to Red Square....

Was it not clear to Stalin from the very beginning that the issue with the horse would not work? Did he really try to rule the horse with one hand?

Stalin's son in this story is also good. Everyone knows that he was a hustler, a womanizer and a drunkard - but at the same time, not a rascal and not a coward. He could have gone to the Chekist - the work is not dusty, honorable, prestigious: you know how to collect gossip, file other people's teeth, sign torture protocols and shoot in the back of the head; money - suitcases, a happy life, free time as much as you want, and no risk. But no - he went to war, to become a fighter pilot. Voluntarily. He finished the war as a colonel, commander of a fighter aviation division.

That's because he's Stalin's son! That's right. He was protected, he was not allowed to fly, he was lifted up by a mighty arm. (Even the left one - the one that did not bend - had a monstrous force.) But still, Stalin's son did not sit in the rear by his own will. During the war he made 27 combat sorties. He personally shot down two enemy airplanes. By the end of the war he had mastered 17 types of aircraft, including Il-2, Li-2, MiG-3, La-5 and La-7, Yak-1, Yak-7 and Yak-9; he had a total flight time of more than 3 thousand hours.

And two downed airplanes is not a small number. If every Soviet fighter pilot had shot down at least one German airplane at the beginning of the war, the war would have ended with the victory of the Red Army in July 1941.

Vasily Stalin always had many friends - from the head of the flight school, where he studied, to the top leadership of the Air Force. Friendship with him was sought by members of the Politburo, generals, marshals and Chekists from Yezhov, Merkulov, Abakumov and Beria to ordinary guards. In his company you will find combat friends, fighter pilots, soccer and hockey players, artists of cinema, variety, ballet and circus; there were in his entourage a whole flock of acolytes, businessmen and swindlers, and fat herds of girls of not the heaviest behavior. All Moscow talked about the adventures of Stalin's son. And many people knew a lot about him. Memories about him - in abundance, including published. But the strange thing is that this slacker and mischief-maker never blabbed about his father's fall from the Arabian horse to anyone, either sober or drunk. He never said anything about his formidable father at all.

Only to Georgi Konstantinovich alone. Immediately. Calling him aside. Shh-shh-shh! The greatest secret! The greatest secret! Don't let anyone find out!

To the reader, I propose an experiment: entrust a certain secret to one person in confidence and time it by hours, when the gossip bypasses everyone and returns to you in the form of a mysterious whisper: only to you! In great secrecy!

Did Vasily not know his father? But he had executed, shot or simply burned his numerous relatives just for the sake of the stamped lines of the great biography did not lay unnecessary shadow. Rumors about Stalin immediately reported to him personally and immediately brutally and decisively suppressed. This is one of the most important pillars of the real cult of personality: Stalin did not allow anyone to laugh at himself. For jokes about Stalin mercilessly imprisoned, and even shot. The same Zhukov for his attempt to belittle the role of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the leader drove to the Urals to command district, in which were only two .

cadrirov anized[4] (popularly known as castrated) divisions.

Gossip about Stalin could only come from those who were close him. They were the ones who were under special control. Wasn't Vasily afraid of his father? Did not remember his heavy hand? Didn't he realize that a word is not a sparrow? A word to one, and then the gossip couldn't be held back with chains. They'll tell his father next,

he will find out who witnessed the highest embarrassment, and he will lock up his favorite son in some Nerchinsk or Turukhansk.

And he found someone to tell! Zhukov, as you know, was characterized by incredible talkativeness and could not keep secrets. Should Stalin's son trust the secret to the talkative commander? That Zhukov - trepacha, knew the whole army. A year after the war, Stalin will throw Zhukov from high positions just for unnecessary chatter.

This episode would look more or less plausible, if Zhukov and Vasya Stalin were sitting, drinking apartthen Vasya drunkenly would have blabbed. But so that on a sober head to call Zhukov aside and tell ... Why?

5

Yes, and Zhukovsky's talkativeness in this case is strange. The great commander kept the secret until his death. And for another quarter of a century after that. How many opportunities to tell the people the truth about the Arabian horse and Stalin's fall!

After Stalin's death Zhukov told various people a lot of nasty and stupid things about the deceased leader. Told writers, journalists, historians, former colleagues and subordinates, relatives and acquaintances, a gang of "literary negroes" who created and polished his memoirs to a high gloss, for him remembered and for him to think. With the exposure of Stalin Zhukov spoke at congresses and plenums, stigmatized the leader in front of wide and narrow audiences. Zhukov broadcast about Stalin's lack of understanding of the nature of modern warfare and the role of the General Staff, the confusion at a critical moment, the stupidest stubbornness and the most common cowardice, the unwillingness to see the actual picture and draw conclusions from intelligence reports.

But he never a word about the Arabian horse.

Twelve years after Zhukov's death, during the reign of Gorbachev, the second anti-Stalinist wave rolled, and about Stalin remembered many other nasty things. But no one remembered the fall from the horse.

The savvy daughter of the great commander Maria Georgievna found more and more new fragments forbidden by the censorship

the "original manuscript" of the greatest warlord's memoirs, but that piece was nowhere to be found.

The mechanism of the creation of Zhukov's memoirs is fairly well studied. The first meeting between Zhukov and a senior researcher of the Military Scientific Department of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense, Colonel V. S. Strelnikov took place on December 20, 1958. The piquancy of the situation is that the memoirs of the retired strategist - a personal matter, but they were created during the official time of colonels of the General Staff and GlavPUR, employees of archives, academic institutions and many other structures and institutions. And without the leading and guiding role of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, such diligent cooperation was impossible.

Here is an account of the beginning of work on the greatest masterpiece of war memoirism:

Marshal asked Strelnikov to help prepare a periodization of the war. Soon he familiarized himself with two versions of it and approved the first of them. The commander asked his interlocutor to prepare a written plan for his future memoirs. Another meeting took place a week later.

In addition to the plan of the future book, the officer brought from the library of the Frunze Military Academy a draft program of the history of modern military art. Frunze draft program on the history of modern military art ... (Astrakhansky V. S. Library of G. K. Zhukov. History, fate, reconstruction. Moscow: Archival Information Agency, 1996).

We can read the same from other enthusiastic authors, such as V. V. Karpov in his book "Marshal Zhukov. Disgrace" (Moscow: Veche, 1994). All of this is written with emotion: you see, how seriously the commander took the work on the book!

However, the delicate donkey ears could not be completely hidden. The tips stick out. The great strategist "asked" the colonel to help prepare a periodization of the war. The colonel understood the request correctly. Help expressed in the fact that the diligent colonel did all the work. Not just like that, but in different versions. On

of every flavor. The strategist's personal contribution was to choose one of them.

Then the great strategist "asked" to prepare a written plan of his forthcoming masterpiece: well, Colonel, figure out what I should remember, what I should think about.

The colonel was smart. He was quick to make a plan. In addition, he took the initiative. Already without any prompting or request, he brought a draft program, which will be used to study the history of war at the Frunze Military Academy. Then - like at a party meeting. What suggestions? Take it as a basis! No objections? Accepted. What additions and changes will be made?

The main contingent of students at the Frunze Military Academy are company commanders, that is, senior lieutenants and captains. Occasionally, a major flashes by. In 1958, the students of the academy were those who became officers seven or eight even ten years after the war, that is, without exception, all those who did not fight. A colonel from the Military and Scientific Directorate of the General Staff could offer as a basis for the memoirs of the great commander the training program of the students of the General Staff Academy. There are mostly promising colonels, at least regimental commanders. They study the same war, but at a higher level. In 1958, those who mostly went through the war studied there.

But Colonel Strelnikov decided not to complicate the situation and based the memories and reflections of the genius commander on something simpler. Thus, a shining superstructure was erected on the granite base of the training program for junior officers.

Have we deviated from the general course? Absolutely not. The point is that the damned censorship interfered and cut out the fragment about Stalin's fall from the Arabian stallion, and only then, many years later, the historical truth was restored and shone in pristine splendor.

One can agree with this. But one could also argue: the censor with the long, rusty scissors is the last to enter the work. And before he began to diligently cut pages and chapters, the complete and verbatim content of the manuscript of this brilliant creation was

is known to the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff and all subordinate structures - the Institute of Military History, the Military History Department of the Military Science Directorate, and so on. And besides them - Brezhnev's personal secretariat, the chief ideologist of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee Suslov and all subordinate structures, as well as the Main Political Department of the Soviet Army, and so on and so forth. The manuscript was thoroughly studied simultaneously in four departments of the CPSU Central Committee: propaganda, administrative organs, culture, and science. These departments were headed respectively by Comrades Stepakov, Savinkin, Trapeznikov, and Shauro.

You young people cannot understand what lies behind these unassuming names. Let me explain: the Department of Administrative Bodies of the CPSU Central Committee, for example, had full control over the activities of the country's armed forces (the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, GRU, and so on), as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB, and the Interior Ministry; it was subordinate to all courts, starting with the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor's Office, starting with the General Prosecutor's Office, prisons, concentration camps, justice, and all foreign institutions of the Soviet Union - embassies, consulates, trade missions and missions, permanent missions to the UN, and many other organizations.

And don't think that Comrade Savinkin, who kept all this under control, personally proofread the manuscript of "the most truthful book about the war," as some of his admirers often call Zhukov's memoirs. Not at all. For that he had subordinate structures, in which worked very highly paid servants of the people. And everyone had a text on their hands. Not to mention all sorts of "helping" Zhukov colonels, consultants, special editors and others. And if the censorship cut something out, then someone of these ideologists, assistants, editors and co-authors could at the height of so-called "glasnost" could remember: and here in the manuscript contained a very interesting fact about Stalin's fall from the horse .... But no one neither under Khrushchev, nor under Brezhnev, nor under Andropov and Chernenko, nor under Gorbachev remembered about Stalin's chatty son and the Arabian stallion.

And this is not the end of the story. The creation of Zhukov's memoirs involved cohesive and not so cohesive teams, clashes occurred

interests of various individuals, groups, and factions from all sorts of structures - everyone wanted to eat. As always in our country, every big business was incredibly messy and mismanaged. In addition to many copies of the manuscript made for different institutions and organizations, some people made a small business out of it - they made copies of the manuscript themselves and sold them to foreigners. It came to the point that the heads of four departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU appealed to the Secretariat of the Central Committee with a demand to investigate and put an end to this outrage.

The proceedings took place at the level of KGB Chairman Andropov, who reported to the CPSU Central Committee on September 27, 1968:

No measures were taken to prevent the reproduction of the manuscript and the familiarization of unauthorized persons with the text.... The reproduction of the manuscript in such a large number of copies was not necessary.... It is not excluded that copies of the manuscript of G. K. Zhukov could have ended up abroad. The inspection revealed the facts of violation of financial discipline ... (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. M: International Foundation "Democracy", 2001. C. 557).

Let's pay attention to the remark about financial discipline. Let us assume that Zhukov wrote the book himself and spent a certain amount of money in the process
- he didn't buy a vial, he bought a bucket of ink. Who cares about the money in his pocket?

But for some reason this issue is suddenly being dealt with by the KGB. At the level of the KGB chairman, who is also a candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. This means that the creation of the memoirs was not a personal, but a state matter. The state money was allocated for the realization of this grandiose project, and a lot of it.

It follows from Andropov's statement that numerous co-authors of the strategist were embezzling the people's pennies allocated for this venture in noteworthy quantities, and in addition, they also traded manuscripts. The watchful competent authorities failed to see, and therefore Comrade Andropov, summoned to the carpet, softens the picture: it is possible that the copies of the manuscript ... Instead of openly admitting that the Office had made a mistake, the manuscript was gone.

I mean that there were copies abroad, and the most savory passages were published in magazines. And you can't think of a better fragment than this one: stupid Stalin, who was feared by all of Europe, foolishly climbed on a horse and fell off it! And a bad Stalin's son whispered about it to Zhukov, and Zhukov the blabbermouth told the whole world!

That's what the front page should be! That would be a laugh! The circulation would skyrocket!

But there was no such fragment in the original manuscript of Zhukov's memoirs. The manuscript had passed through thousands of hands, including enemy hands, but no one had read anything about the Arabian horse.

But here came "The Last Republic" with a snide question, and only then Colonel Maslov suddenly realized: I was Stalin's riding instructor! Only then the brave cavalryman and remembered in detail the secret lessons in the Manege of the People's Commissariat of Defense (not to be confused with the Manege on Manezhnaya Square) and their sad end. He remembered after five decades of sepulchral silence. But before that, I could not remember it at all.

And then suddenly Zhukov's daughter Maria Georgievna exclaimed joyfully: oh, look what I found! The damned censors have cut it out!

That's when Zhukov's memoirs and appeared in addition: it is time, they say, the time to tell the people the truth.

Let's assume for a moment that this whole story is pure truth. What is it? Under great secrecy, Stalin's son told Zhukov something that no one should tell anyone. But Zhukov told the whole world. Not just like that, but in printed form, translated into all the languages of the world. We know that Stalin is a beast. Stalin

— urka. Stalin is a murderer. And yet he's the Commander-in-Chief of the bloodiest war in human history. Something sacred must remain.

But Zhukov shits vindictively even here, telling a story that was told to him under great secrecy.

If this whole story is true, then it turns out that Zhukov's

— a gossip and a tattletale.

In December 1942, Zhukov personally led an operation near Rzhev. For the grandiose offensive 33 armies were concentrated, including 23 general armies, 3 shock, 1 tank, 4 air and 2

reserves, not counting individual corps, divisions, brigades, regiments, and hundreds of thousands of marching replenishment soldiers. Zhukov threw into battle 3290 of the latest tanks, more than a thousand airplanes, 24 thousand guns and mortars.

Zhukov failed in this operation. Zhukov burned millions of shells and hundreds of millions of rounds of ammunition. Zhukov lost almost all tanks and hundreds of airplanes. Troop losses amounted to 215,000 killed, maimed and wounded. With zero result. This battle by the number of troops and military equipment involved in it and the expenditure of materiel surpassed all the battles that world history has known.

Zhukov was not just a participant, but the main initiator, organizer, inspirer and leader. The great strategist completely forgot about this grandiose battle and his role in it and did not recall it in his memoirs. But Stalin's fall from the Arabian stallion he remembers well and describes it with relish, although he himself did not see the fall.

Here is the price of a masterpiece of military memoirism: the strategist did not tell about the grandiose operation, but to transmit gossip - please.

What is more important to Kremlin propaganda: a battle led by Zhukov or a trifling episode in Stalin's life that is known only through gossip?

Gossip is more important. For it underpins the main pillar of all communist ideology: the Soviet Union supposedly won the war, Stalin supposedly believed in the victory and rejoiced with everyone. On joy he even thought of taking a parade, but he failed a little....

6

In the memoirs, which came out during Zhukov's lifetime and then came out two decades after his death, nothing was said about Stalin's fall, or about the conversation with his son, or that Stalin prompted Zhukov, on which horse to take the parade. But here in the most recent - that is, the most truthful - editions of the memoirs suddenly revealed a new historical truth.

However, the great joy of discovery was overshadowed by a minor inconsistency. According to the newly discovered version of memoirs, Stalin "is not without hinting"

advised Zhukov on a white Arabian horse, the same horse, as it turns out, from which he himself fell off. But everyone knows that Zhukov took the Victory Parade *not on an Arabian horse*. There are plenty of chronicles and pictures of that parade, and everyone can see the difference. Even with the naked eye.

The difference is centuries old. The European knight defended his castle, villages and lands around him. There was no need for him to ride hundreds of miles, so he could protect himself and his horse with heavy armor. The lats of a medieval knight weighed 50-60 kilograms, and the horse was also weighed with armor - and this is another 50-60 kilograms, if not more. In addition to this - the rider's weapons, saddle, harness and so on. To carry such an armored rider, the horse needed to be big, on muscular legs as thick as a good log.

And on the vast expanses of the Arab Caliphate, from Khorezm to Aden and from Cordoba to Kandahar, one had to ride for days and weeks under the scorching sun. Heavy steel armor was not suitable. For such conditions the horse was required quite different: light, fast, enduring. The Arabs defeated the enemy not by the weight of swords, but by the suddenness and swiftness of their attacks. And they defended themselves not with steel armor, but with the quickness of their horses' legs. It's like a fight between a world boxing champion and a world running champion.

Let's look at pictures of the late Saddam Hussein. He liked to show off on an Arabian horse. He was not a large-sized man, but his legs almost reach the ground. It was as if he was a donkey, a kind of thin-legged graceful donkey with a swan's neck.

The graceful, swan-like curved neck is not a poetic turn of phrase, but an official description of the Arabian breed. It also says: small head, narrow skull, concave "pike" profile, large expressive eyes, wide nostrils, small ears, deep well-defined undercheek, beautiful bend passing into the throat, highly planted tail, thin dry slender legs, height at the withers 150-153 cm, chest circumference 177-179 cm, heel circumference - 18.5 cm.

Now let's look at the photos of Zhukov taking the Victory Parade. But under him is a horse of colossal size! They chose him with a notion: know ours! Zhukov's horse does not fit into the standards of the Arabian breed. Not even roughly.

A trifle, a trifle, but behind it some absurdity emerges. So, for Stalin allegedly selected an Arabian horse, then five or six days before the parade, Stalin recommended it to Zhukov. And not just Stalin approved the choice, but, according to Zhukov, consulted with the chief cavalryman of the planet Marshal of the Soviet Union Budyonny Semyon Mikhailovich.

And here a new absurdity emerges. Budyonny was the first in the XX century to create and lead not something, but the First Cavalry Army. During the Second World War and after it, until Stalin's death, Budyonny was the commander of the Red Army cavalry. We in Russia have our own conditions, our own requirements. Under the leadership and patronage of Budyonny in the Soviet Union was bred the best cavalry breed of horses - Budyonnovskaya. Not for jousting and not for the guards of Islam, but specifically for our conditions. For the wars of the first half of the 20th century. For daring raids on the enemy's rear. For open flanks. For swift rushes where the enemy is weak or . For offensive through forests, swamps, ravines and hills. For mounted mechanized groups, in which tankers, motorized infantry, artillerymen, anti-aircraft gunners, mortarmen are not less than cavalrymen.

For parades the horse of this breed suited as well as possible. This is what is recorded in the official description: a large riding horse, many stallions have a withers height of 170 cm!

And here's a task for you: Deputy Commissar of Defense, commander of the Red Army cavalry Marshal of the Soviet Union Budyonny allegedly recommended Stalin to take the Victory Parade not on our native Soviet horse, but on an Arabian horse. Why would that be?

It will be argued that the Budyonnovskaya breed at that time was only being developed and officially approved in 1948. So what? In 1945, the papers had not yet been signed. It is understandable, there was no time for that in the war. But handsome horses already lived, already fought, already reached Elba. One beautiful horse was even presented to General Dwight Eisenhower. And he appreciated the gift.

The main thing is that Stalin himself was directly involved in the breeding of the Budyonnov breed. In 1935, together with Voroshilov and Budyonny, he visited the Budyonny stud farm in Rostov region. Budyonny. And then, and in subsequent years Stalin belly

He was interested in and participated in the establishment and development of horse breeding in the Soviet Union, particularly in the development of new breeds of riding horses for the Red Army.

In 1945, Marshal Budyonny had a choice. He could have recommended a stallion of any other of *our* breeds. Tersk, for example. Or a Russian riding stallion. Don. Akhal-Teke.

All right, Stalin's idea with the horse did not work out, but why do Stalin and Budyonny slip an Arabian horse to Zhukov? Are our native horses of Marxist-Leninist breed not enough? Where did Comrade Stalin get this low worship of the decaying East?

Zhukov, if we believe these ballads, Stalin did not object, but for some reason he did not heed the advice and appeared at the parade not on an Arabian horse, which he was allegedly recommended by Stalin and Budyonny. The strangest thing is that Zhukov did not find it necessary to explain his freethinking neither to Stalin then, nor to his readers after his death

Stalin. One of two things: either the memoirist Zhukov should have avoided the issue of the Arabian horse, not focusing our attention on the details, or, if he touched on the details, should have explained why he acted contrary to Stalin's recommendations and how Comrade Stalin reacted to such a manifestation of free-thinking.

In my opinion, the solution to this inconsistency is simple: two decades after Zhukov's death, this fragment was written in the "most truthful book about the war" by people who had no idea about the existence of Russian and Soviet cavalry horses. They mentioned an Arabian horse for the sake of a red word - it sounds beautiful. They obviously did not master the technique of plausible lies. Meanwhile, the main rule of deceivers is to give fewer details, because it is on details that liars are caught.

7

My critic, hiding under the pseudonym Rodent, is indignant: you should have first read Zhukov's memoirs, and then write
"The Last Republic!"

I totally agree with that. That's exactly what I did. I collected all the editions that were available at the time and read them all. Very good

carefully. But I didn't read anything about an Arabian stallion and Stalin's chatty son.

It didn't happen! And it couldn't have been. For there is a certain mystical contact between The Last Republic and "the most truthful book about the war". Zhukov's memoirs were printed for two decades. Edition after edition. Millions of copies. But there was not a word about Stalin's secret riding exercises. But then The Last Republic came out, and immediately the memoirs of the greatest military leader miraculously transformed, enriched with a new vivid episode.

I threw a question to the masses: why did Stalin refuse to accept the parade? And then the late Zhukov threw the answer to the same question to the masses: because he couldn't ride a horse!

Citizen hiding under the pseudonym Rodent, try to grasp the cause-and-effect relationship: there are billions of people in the world, and everyone is capable of some nasty thing, everyone can come up with a tricky question. Could Zhukov have foreseen all the uncomfortable questions that would be asked many years after his death? Could he have answered them in advance? Could he have answered my nasty question before I asked it? Could he have answered my nasty question before I asked it?

That is why the living Zhukov did not remember anything about Stalin's ill-fated exercises. And in his memoirs, of course, did not write about it. And after his death, no one remembered about this case either. Flip through the first edition of Zhukov's memoirs, and the second, and fifth, and seventh....

But two decades after Zhukov's death, I drew the attention of the esteemed public to a certain strangeness of Stalin's behavior. That's when the late Zhukov got excited. That's when he remembered the details. That's when he hit me!

***

Anyone who reads Zhukov's memoirs inevitably comes to the conclusion: it is a falsification. It was made by lazy illiterate hackers. But there are still some individuals who believe that all this nonsense composed by Zhukov himself. I won't argue. I'll refer to Zhukov. You'll see what comes out of it.

My questions are not exhausted. I am sure that the late Zhukov will still give a worthy answer to my questions. It is good to know that with its leading questions, sometimes non-tactful and

uncomfortable, я и from now on. I will continue to encourage the search ever I will continue to contribute to the search for more versions of the "true manuscript" and to the further development of the "the truest book about the war."

CHAPTER 2. Back to our horses.

I don't either, although Hoffman would love to film me on horseback. However, [5]
an experiment of this kind would cause a significant drop in popularity. People are used to me riding in a car, they would tolerate it if I climbed into an armored car, but if I got on a horse - no, that's out of the question! I'm not a fan of showing off at all. It's very easy to appear ridiculous. Something always happens to horses.

Adolf Hitler. July 4, 1942 (Henry Picker. Table Talks of Hitler. Smolensk: Rusich, 1993. P. 404)

1

Interestingly, when Zhukov was alive, there was and no one disputed a completely different version of the events preceding the Victory Parade. And it was based not on someone's dubious memories, allegedly found after the death of the author, but on documents of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Army General S. M. Shtemenko said: On May 24, 1945, Stalin decided to hold the parade and approved the most important thing - the date of the parade and the two central figures.

The date was exactly one month later, June 24. Zhukov to receive the parade, Rokossovsky to command (Shtemenko S. M. General Staff in the years of war. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968. P. 395).

A quarter of century after the release of Shtemenko's memoirs "clarified" version of Zhukov's memoirs revealed a very different picture: Stalin himself intended to appear on a white horse in front of the troops, but June 15 or 16, there was an embarrassment, and so on June 18 or 19, Stalin entrusted his deputy Zhukov with the duty to take the parade.

Shtemenko's book completely rejects this course of events: as early as May 24, Stalin gave clear orders, who to command the parade, who to receive. In other words, Stalin initially did not reserve a place for himself. He was not going to gallop in front of the troops.

Shtemenko's information is first-hand material. Organization and planning of parades, as well as as and planning of combat parades.

The operational departments and directorates of the headquarters are in charge of operations. The head of the Operational Department of the General Staff during the second stage of the war and immediately after it was Colonel General Shtemenko. He and the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Antonov, were tasked by Stalin to first prepare general considerations, and then detailed planning for this greatest of parades.

In 1968, at the time of the publication of his memoirs, Army General Shtemenko was not only alive, but also held the post of First Deputy Chief of the General Staff. He was ready not only to answer for his words, but also to confirm them with any documents, because he had unlimited access to them. But no one objected to him. In his memoirs, Shtemenko reports:

They tried to report the ritual to the Supreme, but he would not listen.

- This is a matter for the military. Decide for yourselves, - said Stalin (. C. 402).

If Stalin was preparing to receive the parade himself, he had to delve day and night into the procedure of the upcoming grandiose action. After all, receiving the parade had to ride a horse at exactly 10 o'clock on the last stroke of the chimes to appear from the gates of the Spasskaya Tower at the same time as the commander of the parade, who was rushing towards it, to be in the center of the square in front of the Mausoleum, to take a report, to go around all the regiments built on Red Square, to stop exactly in front of each standard, to keep the horse in place, not allowing

him to stand on the freshly lit horn, to wish the regiment good health, to listen to a loud reply, to congratulate them on their victory, and to the answering roar to continue at a gallop, in no way allowing the horse to break away into the

field ha lop[7].

But that's not all. Each time the rider had to touch the horse with his left foot and keep the rhythm. The host of the parade had to ride around the troops, built not only on Red Square, but also on Gorky Street, Manege Square and Sverdlov Square, and everywhere to say greetings. And every time to stop the horse instantly, and every time to gallop from the place, and returning to the Red square, to go uphill trot sprawling, but not

sprawling oy[8]. Having completed the tour of the troops, one should have jumped off the horse. In front of all the honest people. In front of the movie cameras.

This work required a long and very serious preparation.
I mean, you could've gotten off on the wrong .

According to Army General Shtemenko, who planned the parade, Stalin showed no interest in the procedure, he did not even listen to the explanations. Having given general orders, Stalin did not go into details, initially leaving himself the role of an outside observer.

2

But let us for one minute believe the fantasies of the late Zhukov and imagine that Stalin himself was preparing to host the Victory Parade. In this case, Zhukov's role is to command the Victory Parade. Now let's imagine a line on the stairs. If the top rung is vacated, how many people will be promoted? That's right - all of them. The whole line will move up one step.

If, a few days before the parade, Stalin had suddenly released
"top step" in the hierarchy of parade participants and gave up his place to Zhukov, so Zhukov's place would also be vacated, and Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky would have to be placed on it.

In this case, in Rokossovsky's memoirs, we would have to find a passage like this: I was preparing to march in formation ahead of the composite regiment of the 2nd Belorussian Front, and suddenly, out of the blue, 5-6 days before the greatest celebration, I was appointed to command the entire parade. Of course it was an honorable job, but you can't be so irresponsible in matters of national importance! I was responsible for only one regiment, and suddenly, 5-6 days before the grandiose performance, I was appointed chief director, put in charge of 15 parade regiments, a cavalry brigade of three regiments, 9 military academies and 11 military schools, a regiment-sized orchestra, for 1,500 tanks, self-propelled guns and artillery tractors, for an untold number of vehicles, for weapons, clothing and footwear, for engines and fuel, for maintenance and painting of vehicles, for delivery, fitting and adjustment of parade uniforms for 40 thousand soldiers and officers, for

organization of troop movement to and from the square, for discipline and order at the Central Aerodrome before and after the parade, for the preparation of repair and evacuation teams, which, if necessary, will have to clear the square and adjacent streets of emergency vehicles, for the adjusters and linemen, for the simultaneous operation of thousands of radio stations, for the curfew service, for baths and laundries, for medical and veterinary services, for a festive lunch for all soldiers, sergeants, petty officers and officers after the parade, and for many other things!

And Rokossovsky should have protested against Shtemenko's version: say, Shtemenko writes that the roles were distributed initially, but in fact I learned that I was to command the parade, 5-6 days before it began!

But Rokossovsky did not protest against Shtemenko's version, because Shtemenko told the truth. For no one Rokossovsky 5-6 days before the parade did not put Zhukov in the vacated place. For Rokossovsky even a month before the parade clearly knew: Zhukov was to receive, and he was to command. For all the preparations for the parade Rokossovsky decisively and firmly managed from the very beginning.

And one more touch. From the very first day of training, the troops at the Central airfield practiced to respond to the greeting of the parade host by shouting in a single breath: "Zdrav.... Hello... Tov... Mar... Sov... Suze!!!" If it was assumed that Stalin would be the parade's host, the answer in training would be taught differently: "Zdrav... Zhlav... Tov... Stal!!!"

I was interested in this issue. In 1966, Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchyonkin spoke to us, the cadets of the Frunze Higher Combined Arms Command School, and told us about these events. Participants of that parade are still alive. Before it is too late, ask them how they were taught to answer.

3

But that was not all. If a few days before the parade Zhukov suddenly took Stalin's place and Rokossovsky took Zhukov's place, then Rokossovsky's deputy, Colonel-General K. P. Trubnikov, would have had to be urgently summoned from Germany, who for the time of preparation and of the Victory Parade performed duties.

Rokossovsky and was to take his place at the head of the composite regiment of the Second Belorussian Front.

And if Shtemenko wrote nonsense, then not only Rokossovsky had to oppose his version, but also Trubnikov: say, Rokossovsky went to Moscow, and I stayed on the farm instead. I have six armies and seven separate corps in Germany and Poland. Suddenly at the last moment - drop everything, rush to Moscow, get in front of the column of the 2nd Belorussian Front....

But Trubnikov did not protest, for he did not throw his troops in Germany and Poland to the mercy of fate and chance at the last moment. He clearly knew his parade duties back in May. He arrived in Moscow together with Rokossovsky and from the very first day of preparation for the parade was responsible not for the troops in Germany and Poland, but for the parade column of the 2nd Belorussian Front.

In short: on May 24, 1945, Stalin decided to hold a parade, immediately distributed the main roles and further his decision did not change. A few days before the parade, there was no redistribution of roles. And from this it follows that Stalin initially did not leave a place for himself in the parade formation.

Zhukov himself should have protested against Shtemenko's version. He jealously followed any speeches of his former colleagues, mercilessly crushed them in cases where the interpretation of events did not coincide with his point of view. He publicly stigmatized and denounced Marshals of the Soviet Union Golikov, Sokolovsky, Konev, Chuikov, Admiral of the Navy of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov and many others.

Shtemenko's book came out a year before the publication of the first edition of Zhukov's memoirs. This book was read by all officers, generals and admirals of the Soviet Army and Navy, both active and retired. It was the bestseller of military memoirism. Apart from anything else, Shtemenko was the closest general to Zhukov. For the preparation of the coup d'état of 1957, only the two of them were punished: Zhukov was kicked out of all party and military posts, Shtemenko - from the post of chief of the GRU, from colonel-general was made a lieutenant-general and pushed to the post of deputy commander of the Volga Military District.

Interestingly, Shtemenko was a major general only once and only for less than five months (this title was awarded to him in 1942, Shtemenko was 35 years old at the time), but lieutenant general was three times - this title Shtemenko received in 1943, 1953 and 1957. The first time - as a sign of encouragement, the other two times - as a sign of punishment. Colonel-General he was also three times - in 1943, 1956 and 1966, and the rank of General of the Army received only twice - in 1948 and 1968. He became an army general for the second time twenty years after the first time.

After the overthrow of Khrushchev, rising to former heights, Shtemenko issued memoirs. Zhukov read them, appreciated, praised and quoted. But he should have been indignant. About Stalin's embarrassment could not be mentioned, but Zhukov had to declare: Shtemenko - a friend, but the truth is more expensive. Here he writes that Stalin on May 24 ordered me to take the parade, but it was not so. Stalin himself tried on, and only 5-6 days before the parade for some reason changed his mind.

But in his lifetime Zhukov did not protest. He quite favorably regarded the version of Shtemenko that back in May were clearly defined responsibilities of all participants, and no changes at the last moment did not occur, that is, from the very beginning, Stalin did not claim the role of galloping triumphant. And only two decades after his death, the greatest military leader of all times and peoples suddenly rebelled against the version of General Shtemenko.

This sudden change of opinion of the late marshal suits my critics quite well.

I don't.

4

It is not an easy business - to knit plot knots. Decided, for example, some wise comrades to write in the memoirs of the late Zhukov new fragment about how Stalin fell off the horse. It's easy to write it in, but it was still necessary to explain to the reader how Zhukov could know about it.

Stalin's dashing riding instructor was eliminated at once: it was impossible to write in the memoirs that in the summer of 1945 a certain cavalry major broke through the barriers and outposts, jumped through

over the barriers, shoved Zhukov's guards apart, called Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov aside and whispered Stalin's secret in his ear in great secrecy.

We needed a higher-ranking witness. But who could have known about Stalin's secret training and blabbed? Stalin's secretary Poskrebyshev? Burn him with fire, he wouldn't tell. Stalin's chief bodyguard, Vlasik? Also implausible. And Poskrebyshev, and Vlasik for many years were close to Stalin, primarily because Stalin's secrets kept.

The only candidate for Zhukovsky's informant was Stalin's son Vasya. Good thing he's already dead. And the dead, as it is our custom, do not have a shame. It was left to the writers of the story to bring Vasya and Zhukov together. If the writers had thought with their heads, they could have come up with something plausible and put into Zhukov's mouth something like: I am walking down the Kremlin corridor, and Vasily is coming towards me.... Then - according to the text. It could have been even simpler: I met Vasily, we got to talking. Without specifying where and when.

But writers are not accustomed to thinking with their heads. They described Zhukov's meeting with Vasily Stalin at the Central Airfield in Moscow during preparations for the parade. And they miscalculated...

The commander of the 286th Fighter Aviation Nizhyn Red Banner Division of the 16th Air Army of the 1st Belorussian Front Colonel Stalin Vasily Iosifovich had nothing to do there.

How can that be? Wasn't he the Victory Parade?

No. I didn't. And I was not preparing to participate. And I had nothing to do with the parade on Red Square, nor did I have anything to do with the Central Airfield in Moscow, where the preparations were taking place. Everyone can see for himself. The whole parade calculation is known. The column of the 1st Belorussian Front was led by Army General V. D. Sokolovsky. D. Sokolovsky. Behind him in a row - the commanders of the armies. After them

- Standard of the front. Next - the commander of the combined regiment Lieutenant General IP Roslyi with two deputy generals. Two rows of soldiers, flag bearers, followed by seven battalions.

Where would you put Colonel Stalin?

He's not the front commander. He's not a deputy commander. Not commander. Standard of the front carry? There heroes of heroes.

For example, the standard of the 1st Ukrainian Front was carried by Colonel Pokryshkin, three times Hero of the Soviet Union. His assistants were twice Heroes. And in all fronts the same order was followed: the standard of the fronts was carried by the best of the best.

Colonel Stalin didn't have a single Gold Star. My father demanded decorum. He wouldn't allow his son to wear bling for nothing. Should he be a standard-bearer? There are big soldiers wearing soldiers' decorations. An aviation colonel has nothing to do there either. And in other combined regiments? Which ones? The composite regiment of the Karelian front? Or the Leningrad Front? He had nothing to do with those fronts. Even if he had, they still followed the same pattern: the front commander, a line of army commanders, a standard, a general - the commander of the combined regiment with deputy generals, standard-bearers and five-seven battalions.

The names of all those who led the columns of the fronts, who commanded combined regiments, battalions and even companies have long been published and known to all. There is no Colonel Stalin. Where was to attach him? In a regiment of the NKVD? Or in a regiment of the Polish Army?

So, maybe Vasya Stalin was just hanging around at the Central Airfield for nothing? No, he wasn't. He was either lying drunk at his dacha, or he was doing business. And his business was extremely responsible. The great celebration consisted of three elements: the parade of troops on Red Square, air parade over the square and a demonstration of workers.

The air parade over Red Square was as grandiose as the one on the ground. And if they saluted from a thousand guns, brought to the parade one and a half thousand units of armored vehicles, then in the air something appropriate to the moment was going on. There, in the sky, and reserved a place for Colonel Stalin.

In the post-war years it became the highlight of the program - Stalin's son is in the sky! He's the one leading the column! And the whole country can see: there he is - the very first! And then the newsreel would be shown to the people fifteen times: in a helmet, in flight goggles, a sheep's collar, a falcon's look, and a vigorous hand on the steering wheel!

In addition to newsreels, the first government epic was filmed here. It was called "The Fall of Berlin". No color film was spared. It was rare then. And in that epic, Stalin's son, handsome and smart,

leads his falcons into the final and decisive battle over Hitler's capital.

But if Stalin's son is lowered on Red Square and put in formation, who would recognize him? He hasn't been promoted to commander yet, and anyway, they march in rows. Put him in a soldier's line? Then what should the commentators do? Or else shout into the microphone: that's the fifteenth from the right in the tenth row! Yes, yes, the red-haired, plump one! Did you recognize him?!

The first appearance of Stalin's son in the Moscow sky was planned for June 24, 1945. But the weather was unsuitable: it rained, which canceled both the air parade and the demonstration of workers. Of the three parts of the celebration, only one - the parade of troops - was held. But the flight of aviation was being prepared, and was canceled only in the morning of June 24. This is written in the official reports and in all versions of Zhukov's memoirs, starting with the first, published during his lifetime:
"*Called the commander of the Air Force, who said that the weather was not flying at most airfields*." I should add to that: over Moscow, too.

But until the last moment nobody knew whether the air parade would take place or not. That is why the air parade was being prepared until the very last moment. The matter was extremely complicated: hundreds of combat aircraft of different types and different technical characteristics were to meet over the center of Moscow to march in column over Red Square.

On the ground it is easier: if the first battalions of tanks hesitate to enter or leave the square, the rest will slow down. But in the air, what should we do when air regiments and divisions are flying over the Kremlin stars? It was possible to make a mess of things for half of Moscow.

The preparation of the air parade was led by the commander of the Air Force, Air Chief Marshal A. A. Novikov. A. Novikov, and Stalin's son was one of the main actors. By the way, not in vain "landed" all the famous aces. On the one hand, of course, it is right and fair that on the Red Square the standards of the fronts were carried by the heroic pilots hung with gold stars. They are the most honored. Neither tankers, nor artillerymen, nor scouts, nor sappers, nor infantry, nor cavalry were so generously awarded. On the other hand

On the other hand, it was convenient - there was no need to announce to commentators that Pokryshkin was in the air. The sky was cleared, and one could modestly say: Colonel Stalin was leading the column of red-star airships....

5

Wait a minute, wait a minute. Couldn't Zhukov have met Stalin's son at the Central Aerodrome in Moscow? Aren't the preparation of airplanes flying over Moscow and the Central Aerodrome of Moscow connected?

That's right: unrelated. The central airfield has been given to the ground forces. Where would you place the parade regiments during training? They were traditionally stationed at the Central airfield. In the summer of 1945 there was not a tent city, but a real city. Let's estimate: ten combined regiments from each front. In each regiment there were 1465 soldiers and officers, not counting the reserve and servants. In addition, combined regiments from the NKVD, Polish Army, Navy, People's Commissariat of Defense, an orchestra of 1300 pipes and 100 drums, cavalry brigade, separate battalions. Imagine how many tent-baths and tent-canteens alone had to be put up, in which this huge number of people had to be fed three times a day.

That's not all. There is also a pandemonium of military equipment - tanks, armored vehicles, artillery tractors, self-propelled guns, barrel and rocket artillery, infantry vehicles. And all this equipment with calculations and crews. And these calculations and crews also have to live and work here for a month. Field repair bases should be deployed for all combat equipment. There are places for inspection, maintenance, washing and painting of vehicles and so on and so forth. There was nothing for airplanes to do there: the whole field is filled with tents, runways - combat equipment. And the central strip was painted to look like Red Square. It was the scene of endless training from dawn to dusk.

Even if the Central Aerodrome were empty, it would be impossible to use it to prepare for an air parade. Not over the center of Moscow every day hundreds of planes to race. For preparations

There was another place for the air parade - Tushino. And not only that. In order to drive columns of airplanes in a continuous line over Red Square, it was necessary to ensure the almost simultaneous takeoff of hundreds of machines. It was impossible to do this from one airfield, so airplanes were dispersed to all military and civil airfields around Moscow.

It is not a simple matter - to organize the interaction of colossal masses of aircraft taking off from different airfields. It required balletic precision. The Air Force Command, thousands of pilots, technicians, engineers and other airfield people were engaged in this task. Aviation parade was connected with the parade on the Red Square only by time. Therefore, the participants of the grandiose air show had nothing to do where horseshoes rang and caterpillars clanked.

Therefore, the presence of Stalin's son where he was allegedly met by Zhukov is a fiction. Extremely unfortunate.

6

Two decades after Zhukov's death, the daughter of the great strategist found the "authentic" (aka "original") manuscript of the Marshal of Victory's memoirs. In it, in the "original", allegedly and contained a fragment about the Arabian horse. The memoirs were rewritten in accordance with the newly found revelations, and the version about Stalin's fall was officially confirmed by Zhukov.

However, Maria Georgievna should not have been in a hurry. It was not necessary to exclude the possibility that the "original manuscript" was composed by some unscrupulous, illiterate, careless scoundrels, who broke into the apartment at night and put this forgery in an old closet. The strategist's daughter should have had some basic vigilance. She should have just cross-referenced the dates.

The manuscript of "Memories and Reflections" was submitted to the APN publishing house in September 1965. Zhukov reported this in a letter to Brezhnev dated December 11, 1967. But in the "newly found original manuscript" there are references to sources that

appeared after 1965. Consequently, this is not the original, but an already revised, remodeled, refined version.

The dashing fellows who composed the "true original manuscript" were so engrossed in their work that somehow, in between, they missed two dates: December 24, 1968 and June 18, 1974.

The first edition of "Memories and Reflections" was signed into print on December 24, 1968 (Ogonyok. 1988. № 18. P. 20), therefore, in the "original manuscript" could not be references sources that appeared after this date. But there are many of them. It turns out that the book was published first, and then someone composed its "original" manuscript.

The authors of the "original manuscript" should have written on the white ceiling of the office where they created this immortal masterpiece in black paint in huge letters and numbers an even more important date - June 18, 1974. This is the day of Zhukov's death. One had to look at this date every time the eyes of the composers looked upward in search of inspiration. The "authentic manuscript" had to be forged in such a way that this date could not be skipped over in any way.

But the imperishable creation was composed by "our guys for the same salary". They were not interested in the results of their labor, and the result was a standard Soviet hackwork. The real original manuscript was completed by Zhukov and his co-authors in August 1965, and in the "original manuscript" found by the strategist's daughter there are references to the 1st volume of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, signed into print on September 11, 1974. In short, the "original manuscript", which was suddenly found by Zhukov's daughter, was created by some fools not only after the book was published, but also after Zhukov died. And these guys, in order to make their creation more convincing, did not hesitate to refer to books published in 1975, and in 1976, and in other later years.

In my opinion, there is only one decent way out of the stupidest situation. Zhukov's daughter should (simply must!) announce that she was planted a fake. Marshals of the Soviet Union Yazov, Kulikov, Marshal of Armored Forces Losik and other responsible comrades assured us that the real truth is revealed only in the latest editions of Zhukov's memoirs, rewritten according to the
"the original manuscript." These comrades should openly and

honestly declare: we are naive, gullible people, we are so easily deceived, we are , we take it back. The publishers who published this phony story should return the readers' money and apologize.

Henceforth, only what was contained in the very first edition of Zhukov's memoirs, published during his lifetime, should be published. Yes, the great strategist appears as a coward, a sycophant, a sycophant, a sycophant, a opportunist. But there are no other memoirs . All of them.

the rest of the editions are unbelievable nonsense, falsehoods and stupidity [9(])].

And to my critic, hiding under the pseudonym Gryzun, I inform you: it was not me who showed inattention and absent-mindedness while reading Zhukov's masterpiece. It was you, dear comrade, who were planted the "original manuscript" with Arabian tales about an Arabian horse sewn with rotten twine. And you turned out to be a rotoser of the same caliber as some of our marshals, generals, admirals, academicians and hero-writers.

***

Colossal public funds were thrown into the creation of Zhukov's memoirs. Huge teams of the country's most highly paid officials up to the heads of departments of the CPSU Central Committee and the top leaders of the KGB spent their precious time not on building a brighter tomorrow and not on catching enemies of the people, but on sorting out the financial scandals that invariably accompanied the creation of the greatest masterpiece of military thought. With the appearance of each new edition, the people's money is again spent to knock out of the people's consciousness the memory of all previous editions, which automatically go into the category of "malicious". The magazine "Rodina" (1997. № 7) reports on the work done: "*In Russia of the 90s even schoolchildren are warned - use editions from the 10th grade onwards*". The magazine ridicules me: even schoolchildren know that the first nine editions of Zhukov's memoirs are nonsense and nonsense. Today we are told to believe only what is published today. And you, you fool, are out of touch with life - you are still clutching at old editions.

Dear Russians, starting from school age, are quite deliberately turned into morons. It turns out that and magazine
"Rodina" plays not the least role in this process. The editor-in-chief and his deputies should pay attention to the following

that the "original manuscript" of Zhukov's memoirs is a fake, and that the tenth edition of "Memories and Reflections" is much sillier than the first. But a magazine with a pretentious title that does not match its content requires its readers to believe all this nonsense.

And I propose: let us submit to the demands of Homeland magazine for a few moments Let's believe the last one
the "most truthful" editions of the great strategist's memoirs. But then the situation turns out to be even more terrible.

From the first nine editions it follows that Zhukov did not know even approximately how many tanks, airplanes, guns, divisions, corps, armies he had under his command - or for some reason did not want to tell about it. And from the newest editions,
"It follows that the old cavalryman Zhukov, who served in the cavalry for a quarter of a century, was not even well versed in his cavalry science - he could not distinguish the Arabian breed from the Terek breed.

CHAPTER 3. Speaking of the fall.

Nowadays everyone has a mind of his own. There's an awful lot of special minds nowadays.
Ф. M. Dostoevsky. Devils

1

The process of fooling the people has gone so far that no one notices the clumsy work of the Kremlin's ideological servants.

Much has been written and told about the horse on which Zhukov took the parade. Here is one of the notable details, which is quite often glimpsed in these tales: after a long search in Moscow, in a separate cavalry regiment of the KGB, they found a white stallion of amazing beauty. Maria Chernitsyna and Alexander Dobrovolsky wrote about the KGB cavalry regiment (Moskovsky Komsomolets. June 24, 2004), Inna Sukhodolskaya (Util. 2005. № 3), Nikolai Golovkin (Russkaya Liniya. December 2006) and many others.

Who are these amazing ballads aimed at? After all, any normal person knows that in 1945 there was no KGB cavalry regiment in Moscow. Where would it come from? And there were no cavalry regiments in the vicinity of Moscow either. Nor, indeed, in the entire Soviet Union. Such a regiment not only did not exist, but could not exist. Because there was no KGB then.

The Committee for State Security under the USSR Council of Ministers was established by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 13, 1954. One year, one week and one day after Stalin's death.

In short, in the KGB cavalry regiment, which did not exist, they found an Arabian horse, which was not Arabian. That's what Stalin fell off of.

2

Role Zhukov in war it is customary describe in the same way in the same way, as the role of Alexander Nevsky or Dmitry Donskoy: he stood on a hill, looked over the

He looked at the upcoming battlefield with a piercing gaze and made the only decision that was right for the situation.

In my previous books, I likened Zhukov's role to that of Heinrich Yagoda in the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal. The role is, understandably, key. However, what would Heinrich Grigorievich Yagoda do without thousands of engineers, who in their blown and frosted cells in the light of smokes drew, calculated, drew and calculated something? Yagoda himself did not go into these trifles. He was above such trifles. He only shot those who failed to meet the quarterly plan.

And Zhukov did not go into details either. His memoirs show that, as Chief of the General Staff, he had no idea even remotely how many tanks, airplanes and artillery were under his command. Just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was even officially confirmed that Zhukov really had no idea about the Red Army. Not even an approximate one (Lieutenant General N. G. Pavlenko. Voenno-historicheskiy zhurnal (hereinafter - VIJ). 1988. № 11. C. 26).

How can you plan the use of troops, if you do not know how many of them? Zhukov didn't plan anything. Neither before the war, nor during the war. These trivial things were handled by others: something there to calculate, draw and calculate. That was the job of the headquarters. And staff work, as evident from the characteristics and attestations of the great strategist, he could not stand the spirit.

However, it is impossible to be a strategist and hate staff work. A military commander who hates staff work is like an architect who despises drawing and painting, or a grandmaster who disdains playing chess.

What is a headquarters? For lack of others, I will refer to my extremely limited experience. In addition to troops, I personally had the opportunity to serve in large headquarters. Even in peacetime, a military district headquarters is a huge and complex mechanism. There are hundreds of generals and officers in the district headquarters. From the outside, staff work seems simple and easy. But it is only from the outside. The headquarters works around the clock, day and night, without weekends and holidays. On the contrary, on weekends and holidays the level of readiness increases. The district commander, even a very businesslike and savvy one, even in peacetime, does not at all

is able to manage the armies, corps, divisions and brigades of his district, if there is a major failure in the work of the headquarters, if the topographical department did not provide the necessary maps to the performers, if the communicators did not establish communication with their subordinates, if the organizational department did not perform some calculations, if on the desk of the commander at the right moment operators or scouts did not put working maps with the situation.

And I can't imagine the workings of the General Staff. I've only served in one of a dozen General Staff Directorates. The Second. In my time, they were long corridors, nine floors above ground alone. Huge teams of senior officers and generals worked there. So this is only the central, visible part of only one Main Directorate of the General Staff. And in Moscow and the Moscow suburbs scattered countless branches invisible to the outsider's eye. And all over the country - all the way to the frontiers. And abroad, too. All over the world.

And here we are told that Zhukov was enough to look at the map once to understand and assess the situation. Such statements caress the ear. However, the cartographic factories of the Main Topographic Department of the General Staff print maps that show forests and mountains, lakes, seas and rivers, towns and villages, roads and bridges, but there is no information about their troops or the enemy on these maps. Before Zhukov plunged his eagle eye into the working map, someone on it had to display the emerging situation. And constantly update it based on the rapid flow of messages. And someone had to bring together a variety of data - from the wind speed at 5,000 meters and the degree of wear and tear of tires in the motor pools to the blood supply in medical units and laurel leaf in regimental and divisional warehouses.

Behind it all is the work of giant teams. You can't just look down a hill. My point is, a general without a staff is a head without a brain. It's an engine driver without a locomotive. It's a general commissar of state security on the construction of a canal with a Nagan revolver in his hand, but without a design bureau.

And now let us remember that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union Stalin I. V. managed the war on the basis of the entire informational, intellectual and analytical power of the General Staff. V. managed the war, relying on the entire informational, intellectual and analytical power of the General Staff. Commanders of fronts managed their own

the troops, relying on the headquarters of the fronts. And between Moscow and the command posts of the fronts circulated Zhukov, who had... had no headquarters of his own. Therefore, to play an independent role in the management of troops and the war as a whole Zhukov could not. He did not have a tool in his hands.

It was the lack of a working tool that turned Zhukov from a strategist into an overseer with a stick. Zhukov himself describes his duties in exactly the same way: he arrives at the place where a strategic operation is being prepared, checks whether the commanders and their staffs have correctly understood the task set by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and whether everything has been done to fulfill it accurately and on time. Zhukov's duties in the course of the operation are to control and "hit" the commanders: give, you bastard, Sychevka!!!

Could not Zhukov without his own headquarters, even being thrice brilliant, to manage such masses of troops in the vast territories.

Zhukov is a drive belt.

Zhukov is the tsar's eye.

Zhukov is a nickname.

But Zhukov was drifting. And even carried. He fancied himself a military genius, a decisive and guiding force. Zhukov told others that Stalin was jealous of his glory and wanted to add to it. Here is another sycophant asks why Stalin after the war sent Zhukov to command a military district in the Urals.

Zhukov calmly replied:
- Envy of my glory (Ogonyok. 1988. № 18. P. 19).

Stalin (if we believe Zhukov) wanted to add to the glory. If only there was something to add to.

3

All this is what I'm telling you. The unsightly story about Stalin's alleged fall from his horse has a backstory. After a somewhat long introduction, we are returning to it.

After the war, Stalin, unable to withstand Zhukov's boasting and thievery, exiled the "Marshal of Victory" to command first Odessa

and then the Ural Military District. And here on May 1, 1951 in the central square of Sverdlovsk happened the most unpleasant mishap. Zhukov took the parade of troops of the Ural Military District. On a thoroughbred stallion named Boy, he rode around the troops. But the horse under him suddenly began to gallop and dance on the spot. Zhukov held him back. But in the next moment the horse stood on a pant and toppled over on his back. Zhukov crashed to the asphalt. Rising up, he shouted: "It's not the rider's fault! The horse is to blame!"

Ordinaries and aides rushed to the strategist, and an arrived. The horse was caught, subdued and taken away. Zhukov was shaken off and sent to the podium.

It happened not somewhere in the arena during a night training, but at the parade. And it was seen by thousands of people.

The horse was immediately sent into exile - to the 5th repair plant of the Ural Military District. The horse of excellent beauty was put on a collar and pulled into a cart. Until his death, he carried not the most flavorful substances.

Let's believe Zhukov: the rider is not to blame, the horse is. But let's ask a question: who chose whom? The rider the horse or the horse the rider? How could it happen that the old cavalryman Zhukov took a completely slack attitude to the preparation for the parade? And after all, this is a matter of national importance. If the horse is young and hot, could not pick up another? If the horse is not trained enough, it must be trained hard. Or give it up. Who was supposed to do it?

Things happen in life. Let it be the horse's fault: he got scared, jumped up. But was it worth it to take revenge on a horse?

Zhukov himself did not remember or reflect on this case. But thousands of people remembered. People's memory is stronger than archives. Four decades later, a documentary film about this case was made in Yekaterinburg - "A Clamp for a Red Horse". This movie was sent to me by my old friend, Urals journalist Andrei Kulik. I recommend that the movie be seen by the masses.

4

Let us now turn to "Memories and Reflections," this one.
"the truest book about the war." Let's not lose sight of that,

that Zhukov himself once collapsed to the ground in front of all the honest people during a solemn parade of troops.

About his fall Zhukov decided to the masses did not notify the masses. In the first edition of memoirs, which came out during Zhukov's lifetime, about Stalin's fall from the horse - also not a word. It is understandable: the obscurantist Suslov commanded to "cut to the bone", throwing out of the masterpiece "the most-most".

After Zhukov's death, eight more editions were published. But even in them about Stalin's fall - not a single hint. And then Zhukov's daughter Maria Georgievna suddenly found the "original manuscript", and the tenth, "the most truthful" edition was published, which included everything that the obscurantists had cut out. Now the "very-most" has finally been restored to the text. Among this "best" was the story of how Stalin fell off his horse during training.

We are gullible people. Let's agree that this episode was not composed by Zhukov's nosy daughter and her passable co-authors after the strategist's death, but written by Zhukov himself in the first half of the 1960s. Or at least - recorded from his words.

Then what does that make it? Then it turns out that Zhukov is a scoundrel. Zhukov fell off his horse during the parade. History records it. There are thousands of witnesses. Stalin fell during training. But there are no witnesses to training and fall. And Zhukov himself did not see Stalin's fall. Zhukov has only one source of information - Stalin's son Vasily. The source is extremely convenient. When the first edition
"the most truthful book about the war" was published, Vasily Stalin was already seven years in another world and therefore could not object.

And when a group of advanced writers had just begun composing Zhukov's "Memories and Reflections," Vasily Stalin was still alive, but was out of reach. He was in prison. And not in any prison, but in Lefortovo. Then he was released, but "as an exception to the current legislation" put in exile, where he died.

So the question is: What should an honest person talk about in his memoirs? About what happened to him personally, or about what happened to someone else? About what he himself experienced, or about what he himself did not see, referring to the only witness who could not object and refute?

Zhukov about his fall from the horse is silent, and about Stalin "it is time to tell ..." And he tells, knowing that his book will be published in millions of copies and translated into all languages of the world.

Every reader is obliged to recognize that in this situation either the strategist's daughter turns out to be a liar and a hack, or her father is a scoundrel. It is possible to recognize both possibilities at the same time. For the first does not contradict the second.

5

Some continue to believe: the strategist's daughter would not demean herself to forgeries! What she found was the real original manuscript of Zhukov's memoirs.

All right. Let's keep that way. Then I'll repeat a piece from my memoirs. This is supposedly the story of Basil Stalin:

The inept use of spurs caused the horse to carry my father across the arena. The father, grasping the mane, tried to stay in the saddle, but and fell. When he fell, he bruised his shoulder and head. And when he got up, he spat and said: let Zhukov take the parade. He is an old cavalryman.

Let's imagine that it is Zhukov himself is sitting in a cozy office, outside the window howling blizzard, in the fireplace burning logs, and he with feeling inscribes in his memoirs Stalin's words, which he himself did not hear. Stalin, if you believe Zhukov, said: where am I. clumsy, on the

to ride a horse. Let old cavalryman Zhukov ride horse.
I mean, there's no way such an accident could happen to him.

Here are childish complexes in their purest form: the beaten boy in his vengeful dreams sees himself as a winner, and the offender - in blood and snot. The disgraceful fall of the old cavalryman from his horse at the parade did not give rest neither to himself, nor to his family, nor to the priests of the personality cult of Zhukov. Therefore, the truth about Zhukov's fall in their dreams was transformed into an untruth about Stalin's fall. These dreams were then broadcast to the world as "the most important thing", as the holy truth, which the great genius of strategy obscurantists did not allow to express in his lifetime.

6

Any words can be attributed to the late Zhukov, referring to Stalin's already deceased son. But what about Colonel Maslov, who in 1945, as a major, personally picked up a horse for Stalin? Maslov was a mentor in horseback riding and an unintentional witness to Stalin's downfall. That witness is alive. And he remembers, and he claims. And his authority is unquestionable.....

Young lieutenant Maslov was a participant of the historic parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941. Straight from the parade - into battle. In the heat of the battle. That autumn German tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery tractors, cars and motorcycles were bogged down in mud and snow, but the Soviet cavalry acted in spite of everything! Neither mud nor snow could hinder it (Krasnaya Zvezda, March 21, 2003).

The cavalry corps of Major Generals P. A. Belov and L. M. Dovator were especially distinguished. For their outstanding contribution to the defense of Moscow, Belov's corps was transformed into the 1st Guards Corps, Dovator's - into the 2nd Guards Corps. Belov finished the war in Berlin as Colonel-General, commander of the 61st Army, Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of ten battle orders, including three orders of Suvorov of the first degree and one order of Kutuzov of the first degree. And Dovator died near Moscow. Posthumously was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. It was they, Generals Belov and Dovator, who had Lieutenant Maslov as a liaison.

The cavalry corps operated deep behind enemy lines, so it was a matter of extreme responsibility and danger to deliver reports to them. For the feat committed near Moscow in 1941, Lieutenant Maslov was presented to the Order of Glory, III degree. The award found the hero only in 1968. And the Order of the Red Star did not have to wait long. Back then, in the distant 1941, the commander of the 33rd Army Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov removed the order from his chest and hung on the chest of the brave officer. By the end of the war Major Maslov commanded a regiment. Is it possible to doubt the truthfulness of the story of this honored veteran?

You can.

Let's hear from a witness who is no less credible. His name is Igor Fyodorovich Bobylev. Colonel. Professor. Head of the Horse Breeding Department of the Moscow Veterinary Academy. For more than forty years, until his death, he was a member of the

Presidium of the USSR Equestrian Federation and Vice-President of this organization. For more than 20 years he was a member of the Bureau of the International Federation. His authority in this field was recognized not only in our country, but also far beyond its borders. His opinion was considered by the International Olympic Committee. Colonel Bobylev's military service took place mainly in Moscow, in the Manege of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR (hereinafter - the Military Ministry and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR). It was he, Colonel Bobylev, who was responsible for selecting horses for Moscow parades. He wrote an amazing book about his service, "Riders from Red Square" (Moscow: Fedorov, 2000).

From this book we learn many curious facts. Including:

• and Zhukov and Rokossovsky began training in the arena at the end of May 1945, both initially knew their place in the parade formation, that is, Stalin from the very beginning did not leave for himself a role in the upcoming celebration;

• from 1944 to 1953, Stalin never visited the Manege;

• The cavalryman Colonel Maslov, who allegedly picked up Stalin's horse, is not mentioned in the book.

And this last fact makes us take a closer look at Colonel Maslov.

7

To begin with, let's pay attention to the most obvious inconsistencies in what we are told about Maslov. First of all, the certificate of the participant of the Victory Parade is number 1. No 213 or 1341. This "first number" gives away not only impudence, but also stupidity - such prestigious numbers were usually reserved for top command staff. You should work more carefully, Comrade Colonel.

All right, it's trifles. But here is more serious: in 1941, Lieutenant Maslov was presented to the Order of Glory, III degree. But the order is a soldier's order. It was awarded to privates, sergeants and petty officers. There was one category of officers who were awarded this order: junior lieutenants in aviation, "privates of the sky". And Maslov was not a junior lieutenant, and served not in the aviation.

And more: in December 1941 our cavalry hero was presented to the Order of Glory, which was established ... November 8, 1943.

With the Order of the Red Star there was also a misunderstanding. Lieutenant General Maslennikov, commander of the 33rd Army, did not remove this order from his chest and did not hang it on the chest of Lieutenant Maslov, because Maslennikov never commanded the 33rd Army and had nothing to do with it.

These small inconsistencies are visible to anyone - it is only the little things that need a closer look. Sergei Buturlin, a veteran of the war, a front-line soldier, a machine gunner, decided to dig deeper, and figured out the following[10].

1. The highest military rank of "Colonel" Maslov is lieutenant. He was deprived of this rank in 1945 by the sentence of the military tribunal of the Group of Soviet occupation troops in Germany. Simply put, he is not a colonel or even a lieutenant.

2. Maslov was not a participant in the parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941. From September 1941 to April 16, 1942 he was in the Urals.

3. In 1941, Maslov was not at the front. He did not fight near Moscow. He did not serve in the 1st and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. He did not deliver reports to Generals Belov and Dovator.

4. He was at the front for three months, from May to August 1942, after which he was missing in action.

5. He was not awarded with governmental awards. The Order of Glory of the III degree No. 763027 does not belong to him. And the Order of the Red Star, which Maslov boasted about, is not his either. This order also never belonged to Army General Maslennikov, who allegedly took it off his chest.

6. The certificate of the participant of the war of series 3 No. 092488 with the stamp of the Odintsov military enlistment office was received by the military enlistment office, but was not issued to anyone, disappeared from the military enlistment office unfilled, - so to speak, disappeared without a trace. Maslov himself filled in this certificate in his own name, as well as the certificate of the participant of the Victory Parade under number 1.

7. The legendary cavalryman Maslov, "who was known by almost the entire army, who was known even in the Kremlin," was not lucky enough to become a participant in the Victory Parade on Red Square. There was a certain

an intervening circumstance. At this time, the daredevil rider was serving his time "ten." He took his "Victory Parade" on the benches or under them. And the most interesting thing is that having served his sentence "from bell to bell", citizen Maslov was not rehabilitated, his criminal record was not removed. This fact brings us to a new depth of understanding of the situation. Of the five million Soviet soldiers and officers who were taken prisoner, about two million survived by the end of the war. One and a half million managed by deception and force to return to the Soviet Union put in camps. After Stalin's death, all those who survived and this, were released and rehabilitated, that is, the criminal record was removed. And our hero served his time, but was not rehabilitated.

This implies that he was not imprisoned for being captured, but for something more serious. He earned his "ten" honestly.

My longtime worthy adversary, Colonel Moroz Vitaly Ivanovich, deputy editor-in-chief of Krasnaya Zvezda, set the record straight by publishing a ringing, slapstick-like article about this rogue:

No, Stalin was not preparing to take the Victory Parade riding a white horse. It is S. N. Maslov invented a legend that he allegedly personally selected for him a docile horse and became an unwitting witness to the Supreme confusion (Krasnaya Zvezda. March 21, 2003).

And the argument, I remind you, is not about whether Stalin fell off his horse or not. That's a trifle. The dispute is about something else: did Stalin in 1945, whether Stalin realized that his case is finally and irrevocably lost, or not?

It was not about the ability to drive a horse, but about the lack of a cause for celebration. At that time, parades could do without horses. On September 7, 1945, a military parade was held in Berlin with the participation of not only the Red Army units, but also the troops of the Allies - British, American and French. The parade was hosted by Zhukov. Without a horse. Somehow it was inconvenient at the end of the first half of the XX century in front of American cars on a horse to gallop. Not those times.

And on June 24, 1945, at the parade in Moscow, without in any way downplaying the moment - on the contrary, emphasizing it, - problem

The lack of riding skills could be solved radically by permanently excluding horses from the repertoire of military parades.

***

Without getting into an argument on the merits, my opponents used indirect evidence: Stalin was eager to host the parade! He prepared! He tried! And if so, then it follows inexorably that he shared the joy of victory with all his deceived, intimidated, crushed, mutilated people.

But this evidence has a slight flaw: primary sources.

There are two of them - the living witness and the document.

The witness, "Colonel" Maslov, turned out to be an impostor, a fraud and a swindler.

And the document - the "original manuscript" of Zhukov's memoirs - was written by the same brazen and stupid crooks and swindlers. They are also impostors. Maslov pretended to be a colonel, and the colonels who composed the "original manuscript" of Zhukov's memoirs pretended to be marshals.

CHAPTER 4. Hold the forger!

Many pages of the front chronicle were distorted by the efforts of the Stalinist-Brezhnev ideological team beyond recognition. Suffice it to say that for many years the figures on prisoners and dead people taken from the ceiling were taken on faith. We still do not know their exact number.

Colonel-General of Justice A. I. Muranov. I. Muranov, Colonel of Justice V. E. Zvyagintsev. Dossier on the Marshal: from the history of closed trials. Moscow: Andreevsky Flag, 1996. C. 135

1

So, it's not about the horse and the inability to control it, but about Stalin's realization in the victorious spring of 1945 of the historical doom of the Soviet Union.

If you look at the situation from a log cabin bell tower, the victory is there: Hitler was a villain, the Red Army crushed him, the greatness of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is undeniable.

However, if you go up to the belfry of Ivan the Great, the picture is not so cheerful. Yes, Hitler was crushed. But not for the same Stalin brought Hitler to power to then just strangle him. Not for the same after the First World War, he secretly strengthened and multiplied German military power, so that this power and collapsed on him. Not for the same in August 1939, Stalin let Hitler off the chain, to then run from him to the walls of Moscow and Stalingrad. With the hand of Molotov, Stalin signed in Moscow the pact to start World War II. Was there any point for Stalin to "save the world from the brown plague" if he himself nurtured and nurtured this plague, if he himself let this plague on Europe, if he himself triggered the detonator of the Second World War?

From the very moment they seized power, the Bolsheviks "fanned the fire of the world", but they themselves burned in it. Stalin hoped to take advantage of the results of the coming German campaigns and plunder: let Hitler clear the way for us, let him crush and conquer all his near and far neighbors, let him waste and disperse his forces. For two decades Stalin prepared the Red Army and the whole country for victorious liberating throw in ruined

a war-torn and destroyed Europe. Monstrous resources were spent on this preparation, for the sake of it tens of millions of citizens of their own country were exterminated. In August 1939, Stalin managed to push Germany with Great Britain and France. It remained to wait for the moment when the European jackals will tear each other to shreds. This is how Pravda wrote in those years: jackals tear jackals to shreds.

But two years later, the war, contrary to the ingenious designs and plans, broke into Stalin's domain, and the leader of the peoples had to fight against that diabolical filth, which he himself had created in his own image and likeness. In this war, Stalin had to expend truly incredible resources and put new tens of millions of his slaves into the ground. The result of the scheme: a ruined, devastated, exsanguinated country, several generations of men completely exterminated, the vitality of the nation forever undermined, and the inevitable prospect of collapse, final disintegration, degradation, and extinction of the people.

According to Stalin's plans, in the course of the war Europe was to receive a mortal wound, and all its countries - as "republics" to become part of the Soviet Union. But it turned out the other way around. Only the Soviet Union received a mortal wound. Poland, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy - here they are. And the Soviet Union? Where is it? Where has it disappeared to? Where is the Red Army? What's left of it? Where are the victorious Soviet people?

Stalin was building the Palace of Soviets in Moscow to admit new republics, including the most recent one, into the USSR. But it happened that the new republics within the USSR were not added as a result of the war. On the contrary, during the post-war rotting of the Union, all the republics fell away, and Russia was left alone.

The communists' dream came true in reverse. At the time of Stalin's death, Moscow was the capital of a union of 16 republics. As a result of decades of brutal struggle and continuous "victories", only one republic remained under the Kremlin's rule. The last one. And no one knows what awaits it tomorrow.

And the same question is still before us: how did it happen that Germany, catastrophically unprepared for war, was able to deliver a fatal blow to the mighty Soviet Union and its Red Army?

Army? How can we explain such a disgraceful ending to World War II for the Soviet Union after such a brilliant entry into it?

2

Our marshals and academicians did not give answers to these questions. They have no time to deal with trifles. They have a much more important task - to fight against those who are trying to pervert our glorious history and denigrate our great victories.

Nowhere in the world is the battle against the falsifiers of the history of the Second World War waged with such fury, with such ferocity, fierceness and scope as in our country. If you leaf through overseas military-historical magazines, it is rare that a colonel will speak out on this subject. But in our country... We have the masses rising up to fight. We have generals marching in phalanxes, smashing and crushing scofflaws with angry articles and speeches. What about the generals? We have incalculable forces to fight. Let us bow our heads before their might: the General Staff! The Academy of Sciences! The Academy of Military Sciences! And together with them, institutions of all colors and calibers, the press, radio, television, legions of fighters of the invisible front on the Internet are tearing off all sorts of masks. The State Duma did not stay aside, people's elected representatives expressed themselves clearly and extremely categorical: to falsifiers - fight! Falsification will not pass! Let's protect the truth of history! Legislatively!

What about academicians and generals! What about the elected representatives of the people and engineers of human souls! Our armed forces have been raised to fight the falsifiers of the history of war. Our watchful bodies are concerned about this problem. The scope of the struggle is such and the intensity of passions is such that imperceptibly for the fighters themselves their holy and righteous cause has already become the national idea of the new free democratic Russia. Politicians and philosophers were looking for the national idea in dusty textbooks, and it suddenly shone above their heads. We again have a Great Goal, and it is to protect our bright past from vilification. The Great Goal is good because it is close. All we have to do is write a new ten-volume book! One more conference to gather! Strengthen patriotic education! Book lucid to release! Film to shoot yes to promote!

Open the archive document and nail the bastards to the wall of shame with it!

And at the same time, the Great Goal is unattainable. No matter how many conferences are held, there is no escaping the fact: that war was not a war of liberation. Communist cannibals and thugs, who exterminated tens of millions of their own citizens, could not give anyone any freedom. Simply because there was no reason for them to kill freedom in their own country and immediately bring it to neighboring nations. It was no use for them to drive their own people behind bars and barbed wire with one hand and to break the shackles of neighboring nations with the other. There was no reason for them to keep their own men in collective farms and reward foreign farmers with land and the right to free creative farming.

And no matter how many popular articles and books you publish, you cannot blur the fact that Comrade Stalin entered the war as an ally of Hitler, and that together they divided and tormented Europe.

3

So, the Great Goal - to crush the falsifiers - is both close and fundamentally unattainable. Like a carrot on a string in front of a donkey's face. That's the beauty of it. One can fight for the truth of history forever. Fighters for the Idea are guaranteed bread positions, honorary titles, airtime and new billions for patriotic education. I look at myself, a petty enemy, with pride: how many generals I have provided with work! Citizens of generals, if it were not for me, how could you not fall into despair! And so - no despair: prizes, orders, circulations, hospitable symposiums and lifetime job security.

There is one more reason that will not allow the falsifiers of the history of World War II to be struck down with the iron fist of state ideology. It lies in the fact that the main fighters against falsification are at the same time the main falsifiers. This is the way it is in our country: thieves, not small thieves, but center thieves fight against theft, and the most corrupt officials fight against the venality of officials. And the truth of history is defended by those who are supposed to pervert it. Colonel-General D. A. Volkogonov, for example, was the chief Soviet military historian. A little earlier, he was the head of the special propaganda department of the GlavPUR,

the chief illusionist of the Soviet Army. For 40 years Volkogonov taught Marxism-Leninism, and then he was thrown into military history. It was believed that the one who was ideologically savvy was the one to whom the cards were dealt.

Both before and after Volkogonov, our military historical science was ruled not by strategists, but by agitators and mouth-breathers. Lieutenant General P. A. Zhilin, for example. He is a doctor of sciences, and professor, and member, and laureate of all kinds of prizes. And before heading the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, this scientist husband held a high position of vice-rector of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee - the school of Marxist verbiage.

Military history in our country has been classified as agitation and propaganda. In normal countries, military history is the lord and mother of all military sciences, but in our country it is the beauty of an ideological brothel. Under the leadership of the , Zhilins and Volkogonovs, entire generations of illiterate generals and marshals grew up in the country.

In the Soviet Union, books about the war were written by people who knew little about it. Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev Ivan Stepanovich, for example, shocked the world with the statement that the German tank "Tiger" was armed with a 100-mm gun (Konev I. S. Forty-fifth. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966. P. 123). Since the day of the Stalingrad break the Red Army was advancing, and the most terrible beast that met on its way was the "Tiger". This predator was capable of stopping Red Army armored avalanches, sometimes quite powerful and numerous. To fight this beast, it was necessary to know where its strength and where its weakness lies. Every soldier at the front was obliged to remember the basic tactical and technical data of the "Tiger". The first and main characteristic of the tank, like any other weapon, is the ability to kill. First of all, it was important for front-line soldiers to remember by heart, for whom and at what distances this beast is dangerous - that is, to know the characteristics of its cannon. And the main characteristic of any gun is its caliber. Every soldier was taught the caliber of the gun.

"Tiger, 88 millimeters. And every sergeant. And an officer. And a general. But the commander of the front in the main strategic direction of the war Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev did not know this.

They object to me: he didn't write his memoirs! No need to object. I myself know that he didn't write them. The question is different: why didn't he even read them? Was it not interesting for the Marshal at least to familiarize himself with his own memoirs?

And another question: how did this nonsense pass the inspection of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense and the Military History Department of the General Staff? And how could the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense print such a thing?

And this is not a typo. On the same page, the people who wrote Marshal Konev's memoirs dumbfounded progressive mankind with the discovery: *"'Royal Tigers' were even more powerful"*. Because in the story about the "Tiger" was mentioned only one of its characteristics - the caliber of the gun, the phrase about the "Royal Tiger" is perceived in the sense that it had a gun of even greater caliber. However, any normal person who independently studies the history of that war knows that the so-called "Royal Tiger" had a gun of the same caliber - 88 millimeters.

On the previous page, the outstanding commander Konev shocked readers with the news that the Soviet T-26 tank was a fast-moving tank. In other words, the people who wrote Marshal Konev's memoirs had no idea not only about German tanks, in particular the most powerful ones, but also about Soviet tanks, in particular the most massive ones as of June 22, 1941. But any schoolchild who is interested in the history of the war knows that the maximum speed of the T-26 is 30 km/h.

It is forgivable if, having won war, you know nothing about German tanks, but how can you forgive ignorance of your own equipment, which is armed with your subordinate troops? And if you don't know, you should have kept quiet. Why did you allow me to write memoirs in your own name?

These are only three examples on two pages. However, Marshal Konev's entire book consists of such examples. All this is translated into foreign languages and causes a cheerful revival among readers. But in our country no one reacts to it. On Konev's memoirs for 40 years readers' conferences are held in all military academies and schools, and no one is indignant, does not protest, does not build refuting articles, books and dissertations. And after all, the level of ignorance in memoirs

Zhukov is incomparably higher than in Konev's memoirs. But my numerous critics seem not to notice this. And ignorance of the basics breeds new and deeper ignorance.

And here is the result. In April 2005, a grandiose scientific conference was held: stripes, epaulettes, academic titles, reports, discussions, champagne. An epochal speech was made by the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Chief of Armaments of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Army General A. M. Moskovsky. M. Moskovsky. And the horror was not that he spoke gibberish, but that no one objected. For example, he told that two years before the German attack on the USSR in the Soviet Union "125 new divisions were formed". The army general's interest is understandable. He was ordered to lie that our country was not preparing for war at all. Or it was prepared after a bit of fumbling.

But the Soviet Union was preparing. And quite seriously. And the next speaker, Deputy Chief of the Air Force, Colonel-General AA Nogovitsyn could have objected: not for two years, but only from early June 1940 to early June 1941, that is, for one year only in the Air Force was formed 79 new aviation divisions. But Colonel-General Nogovitsyn, deputy chief commander of the Air Force, apparently did not know much about aviation, so he did not object.

And someone here could add: 61 tank divisions were formed in the same year. Total for one year alone - 140 air and tank divisions alone. But most of all formed infantry divisions. And also motorized. In the airborne troops formed new brigades (this is less divisions) and corps (this is more divisions), but there were no divisions as such. But that doesn't mean that the Airborne Forces should be discounted. And in addition, air defense corps and divisions, NKVD divisions and so on and so forth.

Army General Moskovsky is a thinker of Zhukov's caliber. He doesn't just speak and think like Zhukov, but does so with stunning precision, down to the commas.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov:

From January 1939 to June 22, 1941, the Red Army received more than seven thousand tanks. In 1941, the industry could already give about 5.5 thousand tanks of all types. As for the KV and T-34,

then by the beginning of the war the factories had managed to produce 1,861 tanks (Memories and Reflections. Moscow: APN, 1969. P. 205).

Army General Moskovsky:

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These figures have long been disproved. I recommend to General Moskovski and all those who applauded him, "Statistical Compendium № 1", issued by the Ministry of Defense in 1994: as of June 21, 1941, the USSR had 711 KV tanks and 1400 T-34 tanks. The handbook is good because it indicates who, when and how many tanks were produced, which factory, when, to whom and how many were shipped. Figures from the "Statistical Compendium" are substantiated and confirmed by archival data, while General Moskovsky's data were written off from the false memoirs of the illiterate Marshal of Victory.

4

Next, Army General Moskovsky announced that during the war Soviet industry had produced 490,000 artillery pieces. The history of this matter is as follows: in the 1960s this figure was the official one. It was it that Zhukov wrote in "the most truthful book about the war". In 1974 Zhukov died, and meanwhile the figure was announced different: during the war Soviet industry produced not 490 thousand guns and mortars of all calibers, but 825 thousand. The difference, as you can see, is not insignificant - 335 thousand guns. A third of a million. At the same time, the figures for the production of airplanes, tanks and other armaments were revised. The new figures were written in "Soviet Military Encyclopedia". And it was signed by Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet S. Gorshkov, Air Chief Marshal P. S. Kutakhov, Army Generals A. A. Epishev, S. P. Ivanov, N. V. Ogarkov, I. G. Pavlovsky, I. E. Shavrov. A. Epishev, S. P. Ivanov, N. V. Ogarkov, I. G. Pavlovsky, I. E. Shavrov, I. N. Shkadov, a platoon of colonel generals, a legion and a half of academicians, professors and doctors.

What should the late Zhukov do? Should he insist on incorrect, obviously understated figures, slipped to him by someone's enemy hand? No, of course not! The late Marshal of Victory in the 13th edition of "Memories and Reflections" (M: OLMA-Press, 2003) resolutely corrected his mistake. And in order to avoid unwanted conversations, there is a footnote: this figure is not taken from the ceiling, but is copied from the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia" (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976. Vol. 2. P. 66). This is another example
"awakening" the memory of the general, who died two years before the publication of the book he cites.

The trouble for Army General Moskovsky is that he thinks in terms of the first edition of Zhukov's memoirs. But time is passing. No one disputes that at one time the first edition of Memories and Reflections was "the most truthful book about the war". But it didn't last long - until the second edition came out, which completely refuted the first. And then came the third edition, which refuted the first two. Zhukov's memoirs are good in that at any given time they are fully consistent with the official line of the current day. There are new facts, new interpretations of history, new documents and figures, and in accordance with them, Zhukov's views change.

General of the Army Moscow did not understand the simple truth: "Memories and Reflections" is the basis of all the basics, but one should not refer to the first edition that comes to hand, but only to the one that is currently the latest. At present
"acts" thirteenth edition, and only it can be considered a
"the truest book about the war." All the previous ones are nonsense, nonsense and lies. The late Zhukov kept pace with the times, and the living General Moskovsky did not keep up with the rapidly changing views of the Marshal of Victory.

And the big officials are sitting in the hall, beating their hands. They don't give a damn about 490,000 guns and mortars or 825,000. I wonder, when it comes to their personal incomes, are they as indifferent to the difference of 335 thousand?

5

Although another option is also possible. Military-historical science has simply come to an irrefutable conclusion: the original figure of 490,000 guns is still correct, and 825,000 is a fabrication of Marshal Grechko and those who joined him, Epishev and Ogarkov. If so, it will be interesting to see how the late Marshal Zhukov will react to the new (that is, to the old) figure. Will he really go back to the original figure in the next edition? First indicated 490 thousand, then after his death - 825 thousand, and after that - again 490 thousand?

Meanwhile, the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, the central organ of the Ministry of Defense, made it clear: *during the war years, "the front received 300,000 guns"* (May 7, 2005). The same newspaper in the same issue reported: *"During the war, the toilers of the home front gave the front 96,000 tanks, 108,000 airplanes, about two million artillery pieces and mortars of various calibers*."

I understand that the Secretary of Defense doesn't know the intricacies of the military. But this is not about subtleties! In my opinion, the Minister of Defense should read the central military newspaper. I admit the Secretary of Defense doesn't know anything about green guns. Forgivable. But let him imagine some other green objects. I wonder whether the Minister is able to grasp the difference: 300,000 or 2 million?

If someone were to say: we used to think this way, but now we think differently - then it's a different matter. But no. Different figures are neighboring in the regime of peaceful coexistence: 300,000 guns and mortars, 490,000, 825,000, and "about two million".

I think even a drunk could figure out that there's something wrong. Only one of these numbers could be correct. But all four cannot be correct at the same time. The most amazing thing is that we are talking about official figures, uttered to the whole world by very responsible persons (I mean their positions, but not their deeds).

The discrepancy in the official aviation and tank statistics is not so impressive, but it is also interesting. Here, too, very different figures, officially announced by the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, coexist peacefully. They are announced not just in the same year, but, as we have seen, on the same day in the same newspaper. True, on different pages.

The Soviet Union produced 108,000 combat airplanes during the war. Or maybe 112,000. Or 134,000. Or 136,000. Or 137,000.

Tanks and self-propelled artillery units based on them were produced 96 thousand. Or 102,000. Or 108.2 thousand.

Everyone can choose any number for themselves. And each will be correct. And each has an official confirmation of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

6

Against the background of these examples, everyone can imagine what is going on in other areas of Russian military-historical science. For example, in the question of human losses in the war. It is easy to calculate how many divisions there were in the Red Army on the eve of the war. Today, any schoolchild, using open sources, is able to make a list of all divisions with the name of the commander, location, subordination, and combat composition. But the Minister of Defense, his deputies, commanders-in-chief and all the lower structures, in whose hands are all the secret and top secret archives, are not capable of this. They do not know the number of divisions of the Red Army on June 22, 1941 even approximately.

They have no idea even remotely how many and what kind of weapons the army had on the eve of the German invasion and how many it received in the course of the war. And it would be forgivable if they stuck to one line. Then it would be clear - people are wrong and misguided. But they don't. Our strategists give the most different figures at the same time.

It is easy to count how many tanks, guns, and airplanes the industry produced before and during the war, for not all military archives have been burned yet. For by Stalin's order, beginning in October 1938, every evening every director of a military plant personally reported to Moscow on the fulfillment of the day's plan. If you cheated, you were shot. It was impossible to cheat, because there was a customer - the army. Industry, for example, reported for the delivery of a hundred tanks, and the army received ninety. Where are the rest? So, having all these statistical data, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is still with full confidence.

confidently operates on the same day with the data that the army received 300,000 guns and at the same time - "almost two million guns". Imagine what happens in the field of calculating human losses, where the count goes into the tens of millions, where statistics are confused, contradictory, unreliable, or even not conducted at all during the battles?

The paradox is this: our generals are unable to harmonize even among themselves the most basic statistical information about the state of the Red Army in 1941. But the most fierce struggle for historical truth is waged by these very generals.

And the story of war at each new historical stage appears in a completely new, different, but always seductive way.

***

The amazing thing is that a lot of books have been written against "Icebreaker", a lot of doctoral dissertations have been defended. I've been accused of everything, and I've been picked on everything. But for some reason no one wants to notice the armor-piercing, zubodrobic ignorance of our generals multiplied by their megaton negligence.

CHAPTER 5. "Europe has not known anything like this since the demise of the Roman Empire."

It was the Soviet Union's way of doing things, and it was mostly crap that came to the top. Cowardly and stupid shit.

Yulia Latynina. Specialists. Viruses rule us. "Novaya Gazeta". January 17, 2005.

1

Honored test pilot, Hero of the Soviet Union A. A. Shcherbakov, son of a candidate member of the Politburo, secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b), crushed me playfully. I once mentioned the German airplane Me-209 in passing, then he accused me of ignorance: there was no such airplane! And having defeated me in the field of military history, he added as a free supplement something about my moral character, about the atrocities I had committed. And immediately a whole horde of screamers clung to me: there was no such airplane! Hooray! "Icebreaker" is disproved!

The Icebreaker's board is being hit with more and more exposé books. Like torpedoes. The number of books refuting me is already over a dozen, and the number of articles is unaccountable. In each new book I am stigmatized and denounced. The key argument: you are lying to us about Me-209, and there was no such airplane! How can you believe "Icebreaker" if you're talking such nonsense?

I get caught up in the minutiae. You'd think, what difference does it make whether there was such an airplane or not? The history of this airplane is not part of my system of evidence. Just once (just once!) along with a lot of facts, I named this unfortunate Me-209. Let's say it didn't exist. Let's say I made a mistake. What does that change?

But no. It's not a word. You can't twist it, you can't dodge it. If you are confused about such trifles, the critics triumphantly declare, how can we believe your writings? If you once said such a thing, answer me!

I answer: I don't get confused about the little things! Shibko literate experts have found a lot of errors in my books. I don't respond to a lot of nags and remarks. Because it is impossible to answer all of them. And it seems that I have nothing to object, since I don't argue with screamers. And I do not respond to many comments for another reason. Simply because the vast majority of comments and nags are stupid. Like this one about the Me-209.

Before accusing me of ignorance, the honored test pilot was simply obliged to read the relevant reference books, magazines and books. I think an honored test pilot would be interested in learning something about aviation. Wouldn't he?

In "Icebreaker" - it's about the Second World War, more precisely, about its beginning. So, at the time of the outbreak of World War II, the Me-209 didn't just exist, it was the most famous airplane of the world. Sort of.
"Concorde in 1970.

Before World War II, the race was for range, altitude, maneuverability, and payload. But the main race was for speed. Both Stalin and Hitler paid the most attention to this parameter.

On April 20, 1939, Germany celebrated Adolf Hitler's birthday. He turned 50 years old. And so on April 26, test pilot Fritz Wendel as a gift to the Fuhrer set a world speed record on the Me-209 - 755.138 km / h. On planet Earth, Wendel became the man who traveled the fastest. Until September 1, 1939, his record was not broken. I emphasize that this *is the official* world speed record.

If some man on the street doesn't know about Gagarin and the ship.
"Vostok", there's nothing wrong with that. If you're talking about Gagarin and "Vostok" has never been heard by a certain cosmonaut, then it is already more serious. But as long as he keeps silent, it is also tolerable. What is scary is if a certain cosmonaut suddenly rushes to prove vehemently that there was never Gagarin and Vostok. And not just to his friends in a close circle, but to ring the bells for the whole world.

This is exactly the behavior of the honored test pilot Shcherbakov, who does not have even an approximate idea about aviation,

who not only had not heard of Wendel and the Me-209, but had rushed into the "Military History Journal" to deny its existence.

The learned comrades from the "Military History Journal" could have told the honored test pilot: don't embarrass yourself, aviation is not your subject. But for some reason they didn't. And now the whole world is laughing at us. "Military History Journal" arrives in the libraries of all civilized countries, and people there are hysterical: if the Russians trust modern weapons to militant ignoramuses, then we must be prepared for all sorts of surprises.

2

The fat herds of my critics responded to citizen Shcherbakov's revelations with an outpouring of enthusiasm. The editors of the "Military Historical Journal" were not flooded with refutations and protests. On the contrary. A horde of official nisprovergators gathered, who picked up the revelations of test pilot Shcherbakov and carried them to masses as an argument, completely crushing the "Icebreaker".

The story of the Me-209 was publicly used by Army General M. Gareev, Colonel-General Y. Gorkov, Major-General Y. Solnyshkov, Y. Mukhin, G. Baranovsky, G. Ivanitsky, A. Lanshchikov as a killer "anti-icebreaker" argument. And the whole scientific army shouted: there was no such airplane! Consequently, the "Icebreaker" was crushed!

Let me remind these serious historians and equally serious military leaders that the Me-209 was studied in detail by Soviet aircraft designers in its time. It was flown by our glorious test pilots, among them S. P. Suprun. P. Suprun. Those were different people. They knew aviation, they loved it.

How could a top secret German airplane be studied by our designers and pilots? Very simply. Stalin, I repeat, paid special attention to the speed of airplanes.

So he ordered to buy 36 of the newest airplanes of 12 types in Germany. The great leader of the world proletariat could not pass by the machine that flies the fastest in the world.

And the naive Hitler, as we know, trusted Stalin infinitely (up to a certain point). Hitler took and sold his most

the best airplanes. Including the Me-209. And he sold them not for combat use by the Red Army, but for detailed study. Simply put, Hitler wasn't selling airplanes, he was selling secrets.

And Hitler traded aviation secrets in 1940, when Germany was already sucked into the mire of World War II. There was no way out of that quagmire for Hitler. He was screwed. To what extent was it necessary to believe Stalin, to what extent was it necessary to need strategic raw materials to sell their military and technological secrets during the war in exchange for oil and bread!

It is said that Hitler did not consider Russians as people and did not believe that they could adopt or copy anything, that's why he was not afraid. That's right. But another possibility should not have been excluded. Comrade Stalin could share Hitler's secrets with Churchill and Roosevelt, which, incidentally, he did. Formally remaining Hitler's ally, Stalin was secretly forging an anti-Hitler coalition. At the Soviet testing grounds and airfields thorough study of the latest German military equipment was conducted not only by the Soviet, but also British experts, to whom Stalin opened access to all the secrets that he bought from Hitler. With this step, the genius of all times and peoples not only reimbursed his expenses for the purchase of German airplanes and tanks, but also brought Hitler's end closer. By revealing German technological secrets to Germany's enemies, Stalin increased their ability to resist.

But Hitler no choice. He even had to trade in naval, aviation and other secrets.

Tests of the latest German airplanes, including the Me-209, were conducted near Moscow at the Flight Research Institute, which now bears the name of the outstanding test pilot Gromov. I wonder if citizen Shcherbakov has ever heard of Gromov and the Flight Research Institute? Or will he also rush to vehemently deny their existence?

3

In recent years, our country has made a truly giant leap in the study of military history. True, there are still some shortcomings... The study of history is conducted by enthusiasts.

The state is out of the picture. But the question arises: why is it needed at all, military history?

It is impossible to be a military man without it. Military history is the foundation and basis of all military sciences. Here is a rule without exception: a general who does not know military history is not capable of waging a modern war.

Example: Zhukov killed two Guards tank armies in Berlin: the 1st and 2nd. But this was never mentioned in our military schools and academies. Military history in the Soviet Union was studied on heroic examples: hurrah! Forward! And they did not remember that throwing large tank units and formations to storm cities was a crime against their own army. Why rake up the past? As a result of such training, a certain Russian Defense Minister heroically moved tanks into Grozny exactly as Zhukov had moved them into Berlin. With exactly the same result.

And here is the question: who is currently in charge of our native military-historical science? The answer is: the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff. What do we ask of the Minister of Defense? He has other things to worry about. Under such circumstances, the first deputy minister of defense, the chief of the General Staff (from 2004 to 2008 he was Army General Y. N. Valuyevsky), should take the reins in his calloused hands. He should have assessed the situation, made the appropriate decision and given the order.

But the situation is very simple: we are the only country in the world where the history of World War II is not studied at the state level. For 60 years of hard work, the Military History Department of the General Staff, the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense, and many departments in military academies and schools have not even bothered to count the divisions that were in the Red Army on June 22, 1941.

If so, the solution is simple: ban any speeches by officials on issues related to the history of the Second World War, ban Krasnaya Zvezda and other military newspapers and magazines from publishing materials about the war.

When elementary order will be established in military-historical science, when the fundamental information about the war will be collected, processed and verified, then the ban can be lifted.

Otherwise, the Secretary of Defense, his direct and immediate superiors and his subordinates look the silliest in the eyes of the world.

What does the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Valuyevsky, do? He does exactly the opposite of what the situation demands. He encourages grandiose gatherings of merry generals, admirals and academicians from military history. Army General Valuyevsky himself is not averse to publicly shine with his knowledge of military science. And the result is like Zhukov in Berlin. Here is a small piece from a huge article by Valuyevsky in "Krasnaya Zvezda" of May 7, 2005. The general describes the grandiose Vistula-Oder operation of the Red Army in January 1945:

It is impossible to describe everything that happened between the Vistula and the Oder in the first months of 1945. Europe had not known anything like it since the demise of the Roman Empire.

The Vistula-Oder operation is the pinnacle of military art and a matter of special pride for our military leadership. General Valuyevsky does not express his own opinion. He quotes a German general (the source of the quotation will be discussed below) and emphasizes: you see how Hitler's general assesses the strategic skill of the Red Army's top command staff!

This quote has had a long and happy life. Not a year goes by without it ringing out dozens of times in official military writings:
"*...since the demise of the Roman Empire"*. Such statements fill the hearts of participants in grand conferences and symposia with pride.

But it would be quite good if our strategists themselves read books, prepared their own reports and chose quotations for them, instead of relying on what they were given by careless referents. I am sure that in this case none of the responsible military leaders would have repeated the quote of a German general about the Vistula-Oder operation.

In every sphere of our activity we have long established a stock of government wisdom, which should be uttered on solemn occasions from high tribunes. But if our generals were trained to penetrate into the essence, to pay attention to details, a set of quotations,

they juggle in front of an honorable public would have been updated long ago.

In this case, one of the first things that would have been permanently expunged from the service stock of our strategists, I am sure of it, would have been the passage that Europe has not known anything like this since the fall.... However, dozens of other similar quotations would also have been long and firmly forgotten.

The background is as follows.

4

Stalin realized that the truthful history of the war between the Soviet Union and Germany can not be written: too much history of this came out too unseemly and indecent. It remained either to keep silent, or to lie immensely, boundlessly and limitlessly.

Stalin chose silence.

Under Stalin there were no attempts to write a history of the war. The eagerness of some strategists to compose and publish their memories and reflections was firmly suppressed. Instead of scientific research and general memoirs came out a collection of speeches of Comrade Stalin: Brothers and sisters ... I appeal to you, my friends!

And that's .

And after Stalin, a whole coterie of leaders - the collective leadership - climbed the throne. By the fall of 1957, after a continuous series of fierce battles at the top of the power remained two - Zhukov and Khrushchev, two boots to the pair (upon closer examination it turns out that these figures even had essentially the same surnames: Khrushch is a May beetle).

So these two bugs decided to make up a war story, knowing up front that the truth cannot be told. But if the truth is out, what's left?

The monumental Khrushchev-Zhukovsky (or, more precisely, Zhukovsky-Khrushchevsky) work was to confirm the main idea for centuries: the war was led not by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, but by his deputy - George on a white horse, whom Khrushchev inspired and blessed for feats and accomplishments.

On September 12, 1957, work began on the major five-volume History of the Great Patriotic War. At the same time were issued and other books, main purpose

which was to underpin and develop the Kremlin mythology. On September 24, 1957 the book "Tank Battles" by German General Mellenthin was signed into print (Mellenthin F. Tank Battles 1939-1945. M: Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1957). The editor of the book was the deputy chief of the GRU, Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant-General of Tank Troops A. P. Panfilov. Here in this book and contained an assessment of the Vistula-Oder operation of the Red Army: "*It is impossible to describe everything that happened between the Vistula and the Oder.... Europe has not known anything like it...*"

According to the admission of Hitler's beaten general, at the final stage of the war, the troops of Zhukov and Konev demonstrated a level of military art that Europe had not known in the last thousand and fifteen hundred years. This phrase clearly states that the commanding talent of Soviet marshals and generals in the last months of the war reached such a blossom and level, which can not be compared to Bonaparte with Kutuzov and Cromwell, or Frederick the Great with Turenne and Conde. The phrase is flattering. Actually, the book was translated and published because of this quote.

The book has not yet reached the printer, but it has already begun to be quoted. On October 8, 1957, Zhukov, speaking before the great leader of Yugoslavia during a visit to that country, for the first time read a passage from it. "Voiced", as the new-age zealots of fine diction would put it today. And while the strategist was relaxing in the circle of Yugoslav and Albanian comrades, the Kremlin chiefs organized a ruckus and kicked the great commander out of their gang.

This was the end of Zhukov's reign, and the work on the grandiose historical study was completed accordingly. Instead of the failed five-volume book, a six-volume book was published three years later, with a different main idea: the war was won by Khrushchev.

The phrase that "Europe has not known anything like this since the times of..." was also written into Khrushchev's history of the war (History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945. In 6 vol. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960-1965. T. 5. C. 91), but Zhukov's name was mentioned in passing.

However, Stalin was not too complained about in this official six-volume history of the war. Here's an example of the attitude of the

historical truth. In 1945 the medals "For Victory over Germany", "For Victory over Japan", "For Valorous Labor in the Great Patriotic War" were established. On the front side of these medals - the profile of Stalin. And it is understandable - he was the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, as well as throughout the war the head of the government. The creators of Khrushchev's six-volume book placed the images of these medals on a color inset. A whole page was not spared for the three medals. But these images did not have Stalin's profile!

I am an avid collector of military decorations. I have been fascinated by them since childhood. And here's the situation: my father has on his uniform, among other awards, two medals with Stalin's profile - for Germany and for Japan. When the last volume of Khrushchev's official history came out, not even two decades had passed since the end of the war, so most men in the Soviet Union aged forty and up, and many women - one or even two such medals. And on holidays, all those who fought and all those who worked hard in the rear, went out into the streets with these medals. Millions of people have Stalin on their chests. And here comes the official history of the war, and in it - visible to all brazen falsification.

If the sycophants who invented the history of the war and the central figure in it declared Khrushchev, did not want to remember Stalin, then the images of these medals could simply be omitted. It would be unfair and unfair to tens of millions of people who earned such medals with blood and sweat. But in this case at least there was no falsity and impudence. But ours "serious historians" published false images. From that moment on, I became very cautious about the Soviet official history of the war and the works of "serious historians".

Speaking of military honors. The cult of personality Zhukov is gaining strength today. Order of Stalin in the USSR has never been. (There was in the project, but was not established.) But the Order of Zhukov is. And Zhukov's medal. We don't pay attention to small details. We won't. But here the detail is not small at all, but blatant: on the Order of Zhukov the strategist is depicted in a uniform, which was canceled in 1945, with four Gold Stars, the last of which he received in 1956. The same fake image is on Zhukov's medal.

If under Comrade Stalin someone had depicted Lenin in a turban, Admiral Ushakov in a and cap, and Bohdan Khmelnitsky
- in a tank helmet, things like that would be noticed. And conclusions would be drawn.

And now you can.

But back to Zhukov. His visit to Yugoslavia ended sadly. The strategist departed on a cruiser to the thunder of salute. With an escort of the newest destroyers. He was escorted by a guard of honor, the national anthem rang out. Zhukov was a powerful member of the Politburo. He was still sharing power with Khrushchev, but many people had already realized that he would soon devour Khrushchev, as he had devoured the much bigger Beria, Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and other Stalinist leaders.

Khrushchev was the weakest in the cohort of Stalin's associates. At the party's merry party festivities, he was a skomorochka. And now, after Stalin's death, all the Kremlin mammoths have been eaten. Nikita is the last of the Mohicans. But it was he, left alone with Zhukov, prompted the strategist to make a voyage on a cruiser in the Mediterranean. And during the absence of the commander threw him off all the posts.

Zhukov returned home as a pensioner with no one to care for him. He was summoned to the showdown and said everything they thought of him. Strategist, beating himself in the chest, fawning and humiliated, and to prove his merits said: "It is impossible to describe ... Europe has not known since the time of the destruction..."

5

Zhukov repeated this quote many times from year to year. For example, here is an excerpt from a letter to Khrushchev dated April 18, 1964:
"*The Vistula-Oder operation, as you know, is one of the grandest operations. The Soviet troops carried it out brilliantly, which earned them the admiration of all. Even the enemies and those were forced to recognize* ..." (Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents).

And Zhukov, like a trump card from his sleeve, throws on the table a quote that Europe has not known anything like this since the demise of the Roman Empire. Following Zhukov, our generals, marshals and academicians have been using this quote for decades. And whoever repeated these words!

As soon as one speaks of outstanding military accomplishments, Mellenthin comes to mind, "It is impossible to describe..."

Here we are in the new millennium. And the Red Army is long gone, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army, Army General Y. N. Valuevsky gibbering like a clockwork: "It is impossible to describe ... Europe has not known anything like this since the times of..."

Everything seems to be great: the beaten Hitler recognized the incredibly high level of strategic skill of the Red Army's top command staff at the final stage of the war, in particular Zhukov and Konev, who at that moment commanded the troops of the two fronts on the main strategic direction. Why not repeat such flattering words for our military ego?

Yes, because it is not a praise, but an accusation. In the German original and in all translations except the Russian, it is not about the brilliant victories of the Red Army at all:

It was a tragedy on an unprecedented scale. In the old German lands of East Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia, the Russians showed beastly cruelty. It is impossible to describe everything that happened between the Vistula and the Oder in the first months of 1945. Europe had not known anything like it since the demise of the Roman Empire.

Immediately after the war, the unkilled Hitler accused the Red Army of barbarism, vandalism, aimless and mass destruction of people and material values, theft, looting, violence, looting.

Our generals and marshals should have either responded to the accusations or kept silent. But the Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General of Tank Troops A. P. Panfilov, in order to please "the greatest strategist of all times and peoples", like a petty cheat, twisted the card: in the Russian translation, the words about animal cruelty fell out, and the accusation turned into a hymn.

By evading the answer with a vile thieving trick, Lieutenant-General Panfilov thereby recognized the accusations as justified: we have nothing to say. We have only one way out: to distort the meaning of the accusations and turn them into exaltation. And for half a century we have been indulging ourselves in false praise, which our commanders themselves created

with deft hands and long scissors. For half a century no officer, no general, no marshal, professor or academician has bothered to read this book in the original or in translation into any language other than Russian. No one saw the falsity.

I'll say more. The Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, Army General Valuyevsky, has not even read this book in Russian. And there is proof of that. Some time ago, about thirty years ago, someone mistakenly misspelled the initial of the German general - O. Mellenthin. That's how it stuck. Mellenthin's quote is not copied from a book, but from each other. The guys who composed the article of General Walujewski wrote exactly like that - O. Mellenthin. And this is a proof that the quotation was copied from someone else's article or report, for if they had copied the quotation from a book, albeit falsified, they would have written Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin.

6

It will be objected: in this case, General of the Army Valuyevsky became a victim of cheats, liars and ignoramuses, who ruled our science half a century ago and in 1957, to the delight of the greatest military leader of all times and peoples, released a falsified translation of Mellentin's book, molding a candy out of inhomogeneous material.

To this I object: Army General Valuyevsky is obliged to know what serious military-historical science was during the reigns of the outstanding military leaders Zhukov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Andropov. Therefore, having taken the high post of Chief of the General Staff, he was obliged to order the verification of the correctness of translations of all military books published by the Academy of Sciences and Voenizdat. And until this book has passed such a check, one should refrain from quoting it publicly. At least, without checking all the books, it was possible to check at least those quotations which the General himself decided to repeat in his public speech.

I do not at all insist that every general, marshal, professor and academician of ours should read military books in foreign languages in the original. But I cannot consider normal the situation when for half a century, thousands of times strategists of the highest level have repeated the same old, old and old

and none of them had bothered to read the book in German or in translation into any language other than Russian. And, as it seems, not everyone who was supposed to read the book in Russian had read it.

7

Military-historical barbarism was rampant in the Soviet Union. After the collapse of communism, the Russian state has done nothing to combat this evil. On the contrary, the state has fostered this ignorance.

Since 1917, our people have been systematically beaten out of interest in history in general and military history in particular. Meanwhile, one cannot learn modern military science without constantly and persistently studying the experience of past centuries and millennia, just as one cannot comprehend integral calculus without knowing arithmetic.

In the XX century Russia suffered a crushing defeat, not using the opportunities given to it by history. It squandered it. Missed. Comrade Stalin put it even more coolly. One of the main reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union is the military savagery of the country's top strategic and political leadership. The worst thing is that ignorance of elementary basics of military sciences and military history in particular does not scare or outrage anyone. But knowledge seems strange and suspicious.

Citizens of criticism, expose me, denounce and refute me. But don't forget to criticize our strategists, whose epaulettes bear the stars of the first magnitude. If I make a mistake, it's no big deal. It will not hurt anyone. But their irresponsible attitude to military history and their public speeches shows an equally irresponsible attitude to the fulfillment of their direct official duties. The fate of Russia is in their hands.

***

The study of military history has been substituted by grandiose gatherings and empty speeches with the repetition of trite, hackneyed "revelations". The materials of these gatherings are widely published, demonstrating to the world incredible and outrageous

degree "ignorance" (as to quote Alexander Suvorov) of the top command staff of the Russian army.

Europe had not known such military ignorance since the demise of the Roman Empire.

CHAPTER 6: Why do we need Spain?

The struggles of the Spanish and Chinese peoples are the first rumblings of the thunder of the newly emerging world revolution.

JI. Z. Mekhlis, army commissar of the 1st rank, head of the Political Department of the Red Army. April 4, 1939.

1

And now, having slightly touched on general issues, let us return to the origins of the Second World War. Strange as it may seem, these origins can be found even in Spain. However, they could not spill over into a mighty river.

On July 18, 1936, the radio station in Ceuta (Spanish Morocco) transmitted several times the conditional phrase: "Cloudless skies over all of Spain." This was the signal to start a military mutiny against the Spanish Republic. General Jose Sanhurjo was at the head of the mutiny, and after his death, General B. F. Franco.

In the first moment, the rebel generals' mainstay was the troops that were in the colonies. The rebels needed to move these troops from North Africa to Spain urgently. Hitler came to the aid of General Franco. He allocated twenty military transport planes Ju-52, which for almost three months almost continuously made flights from Morocco to Spain and back (Vodopyanov M. V. Friends in the Sky. Moscow: Soviet Russia, 1971. P. 147).

In all, between July 28, 1936 and the end of August, Ju-52/Zt transported 7,350 soldiers and officers, artillery pieces and machine guns from Africa to Spain. The airplanes flew
461 flights, often overloaded. Another 5,455 were transported in 324 flights in September.

In October ... carried another 1,157 men in 83 flights. Hitler later remarked, "Franco should erect a monument to the Ju-52. The victory of the revolution in Spain owes to this airplane" (Wings of the Luftwaffe (combat aircraft of the Third Reich).

Vol. 4. Moscow: Scientific and Technical Information Department of TsAGI, 1995. C. 20).

It was the first mass airlift of troops in history. This air bridge saved the rebellion in its initial - that is, most critical - stage. After that, military units of the Spanish army began to move to the side of General Franco. "*On the side of the rebels were 80% of the armed forces - 120 thousand officers and soldiers and a significant part of the Civil Guard*" (Spain. 1918-1972. Moscow: Nauka, 1975. P. 210).

General Franco was supported by the dictators of Germany, Italy and Portugal - Hitler, Mussolini and Salazar. On the side of General Franco fought 50 thousand German, 150 thousand Italian, 20 thousand Portuguese and 90 thousand Moroccan soldiers and officers. As foreign military aid, General Franco received 2,700 guns, 1,150 tanks and armored vehicles, 1,650 aircraft (Vizh. 1986. № 7. P. 85).

2

The Soviet Union could not stay away. V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko arrived in Spain. In 1917, he was one of the key figures at the time of the seizure of power by the Communists and in among leaders "stormed" the Winter Palace and personally arrested the Provisional Government. Having overthrown the legitimate government, Antonov-Ovseenko joined the illegitimate government, which was not recognized by Russia's allies, but was recognized by the enemies with whom Russia was at war.

And so in 1936 Stalin appointed Antonov-Ovseenko to the post of Consul General of the Soviet Union in Barcelona. At first glance, on the scale of the great Soviet Union and Europe - a modest position. But this man had a leading role in the creation of the Soviet bridgehead in Spain. Immediately, Soviet ships with weapons and "volunteers" began to arrive in Barcelona. The main military adviser to the Republican Army of Spain, Stalin appointed Jan Karlovich Berzin, head of the 4th Department of the General Staff of the Red Army. All o in Spain was sent to the Red Army 2065 commanders of different ranks: 772 pilots, 351 tankers, 100 artillerymen. 222 all-arms

Counselor, 77 military sailors, 339 other military specialists and 204 interpreters (Vizh. 1971. No. 7. P. 77).

In addition, several hundred Soviet diplomats, intelligence officers, counterintelligence officers, saboteurs, journalists, agitators, party workers, and military industry specialists were sent to Spain through the NKVD, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and other agencies. The total number of volunteers, including civilian specialists, amounted to about 3,000 (History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. In 12 vol. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973-1982. T. 2. C. 55). Stalin transferred 648 combat troops to Spain

planes, 347 tanks, 60 armored cars, 1,186 artillery pieces

guns, 20486 machine guns, 497813 rifles (ibid. V. 2. P. 54).

By the way, in 1987 I bought one of these rifles with the number JU2949 in a Spanish mountain village and hung it on the wall in my office. The economical Spanish men appreciated such a good thing and were very reluctant to part with it.

In addition to rifles, machine guns, tanks and airplanes, the Soviet Union sent ammunition, shells, aviation bombs, military equipment, food, fuel and lubricants, and medicines to Spain. Only for three months of 1936 in Spain from the USSR was transferred four billion rounds of ammunition (A. P. Yaremchuk. Russian Volunteers in Spain. San Francisco: Globe, 1983. C. 12). All this cost money. To this we should add the cost of transportation to the ports of Spain from the factories of Moscow. Leningrad, Ukraine, and the Urals.

In addition to supplies of Soviet arms, Stalin bought tanks, airplanes, artillery, vehicles, guns and mortars, ammunition, food, and medicine from France, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia and paid for their delivery to Spain. The arms shipments could have been much larger, but Spain was blockaded. Soviet merchant ships were leaving Black Sea ports. The Soviet Union had no navy or naval bases in the Mediterranean. Defenseless merchant ships were sailing to the shores of Spain across the entire Mediterranean Sea. From the Black Sea straits to the ports of destination, they were watched by airplanes and warships of Italy and Germany, and on the approach to Spain they were already waiting for surface ships, airplanes and submarines of General Franco. And yet, despite the

blockade, Stalin was able to transfer a huge amount of strategic cargo to Spain by any standards.

The People's Army was created from the remaining parts of the Spanish army that remained loyal to the Republic. Volunteers from all over the world rushed to the defense of the Spanish Republic. Seven international brigades were formed from among them. According to the calculations of one of the heads of interbrigades Karol Swierczewski, the total number of internationalist volunteers amounted to no less than 42 thousand (Journal "Historical Archive". 1962. № 2. P. 172). Volunteers from 54 countries fought in the Republican Army (VIZH. 1986. No. 7. P. 87).

Stalin financed the creation and maintenance of international brigades. Communist propaganda all over the world urged both naive enthusiasts and criminals of all shades and colors to go to Spain. And they came from the United States and Britain, from Germany and Sweden, from Austria and Australia. Stalin armed a new army of half a million Communists and their accomplices and for two and a half years supplied them with everything they needed.

Why?

3

To understand the seriousness of Stalin's intentions, let's evaluate some of the commanders he sent to Spain. At that time they were lieutenants, captains, colonels. However, these were the most promising commanders of the Red Army, which Stalin outlined for promotion. Spain for them was the last test. Most of them after returning from Spain rapidly rose upwards. Here are the peaks reached by some of the Soviet military advisers who visited Spain a few years later.

Р. Я. Malinovsky became Marshal of the Soviet Union, Minister of Defense of the USSR.

К. А. Meretskov - chief of the General of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Г. I. Kulik - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union.

H. G. Kuznetsov - Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Minister of War and Navy of the USSR, member of the Supreme Command Headquarters.

throughout the Great Patriotic War.

H. N. Voronov - Chief Marshal of Artillery, Commander of the Artillery of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

M.I. Nedelin - Chief Marshal of Artillery, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, since 1959 - Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces.

Ф. A. Agaltsov - Air Marshal, Commander of the Long-Range Aviation, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

K. P. Kazakov - Marshal of Artillery, commander of missile troops and artillery of the Ground Forces.

П. V. Rychagov - Lieutenant General of Aviation, Head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.

Х. У. Mamsurov - Colonel-General, first first deputy chief of the GRU.

П. P. P. Vechny - Lieutenant General, Stalin's military aide-de-camp.

I. I. Proskurov - Lieutenant General of Aviation, Chief of GRU.

П. I. Batov, DG Pavlov, VY Kolpakchi, NG Lyashchenko - army generals.

A. И. Rodimtsev, P. L. Romanenko, G. M. Stern, M. S. Shumilov,

V. A. Yushkevich, T. T. Khryukin - Colonel Generals.

B. A. Alafuzov - Admiral, Chief of the Main Naval Staff. N.E. Basisty - Admiral, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet,
First Deputy Secretary of the Navy.

A. G. Golovko - Admiral, throughout World War II he commanded the Northern Fleet, after the war - Chief of the Main Naval Staff, Deputy Minister of the Navy.

Of those who fought in Spain, more than forty people later became lieutenant generals, vice-admirals, major generals, and rear admirals.

Some of those who fought for various reasons did not receive general ranks, but held very high positions. Among them is Professor Colonel I.G. Starinov. In Spain, he led saboteurs. During World War II, Marshal K. E. Voroshilov was Commander-in-Chief of the guerrilla movement, and Colonel Starinov was his deputy in charge of sabotage.

4

However, despite Stalin's best efforts, a Communist victory in Spain was impossible. There were many reasons for this. First, on the side of the rebels were more than 80% of the soldiers and officers of Spain
- this is recognized even by Communists, and it shows that the mutiny was neither "upper class" nor "general". The officers and soldiers of Spain had a choice, and they in their majority opposed the Republic. This in turn shows that not everything in the Spanish Republic was right.

Secondly, Spain was far away from the USSR. Stalin could not transfer any of his divisions there. And even if he had, it would have been impossible to supply it.

Third, the Spanish Communist Party was very weak and had to ally with other parties. The main ally of the communists was the anarchists. In the areas where they seized power, money was abolished and the property of the citizens became common property. Dolores Ibarruri, general secretary of the Spanish Communist Party, described her allies in the war as follows: "*The anarchists organized a kind of kingdom of plunder*" (National Revolutionary War of the Spanish People. Questions of History. 1953. №11. C. 11). Marshal of the Soviet Union Meretskov, who fought in Spain, called the anarchists "merry thugs". If the Communists were angels themselves, they were doomed to defeat with such allies.

Without allies it was impossible to win, with allies like these.
- even more so.

On March 28, 1939, Madrid, the last bastion of the Republic, fell. As a result of nearly three years of war, General Franco won. Soviet military advisers were evacuated.

Personally, I was confused by the coincidence of time in this whole story. The war in Spain was a kind of prologue to the Second World War. The fighting in Spain was over, and five months later a new war began, which first engulfed the whole of Europe, then the whole world.

Was there a connection between the Spanish War and World War II? And if there was, which one?

5

So, why did Stalin want Spain? Why did Stalin spend an incredible amount of money to support the Republicans? Didn't we have enough problems at home? What difference did it make to us whether Spain was ruled by a president, a king, a colonel, a general, a marshal or a generalissimo?

It is said that Stalin wanted to extinguish a possible flashpoint of World War II. But why extinguish it? After all, Stalin constantly repeated that we benefit from situations where "capitalists are fighting like dogs". So let them fight!

If a war broke out in a capitalist country far away from our borders, how can it harm our socialist fatherland? On the contrary, everyone will see the difference: the capitalist country is lying in ruins, while the socialist Soviet Union is prospering. The worse for them, the better for us.

Since when did Comrade Stalin become concerned about keeping the peace in the capitalist countries? Why would he do that?

And there was no hotbed of world war in Spain. Spain's geography is the best it could be. The country is almost completely surrounded by water. Spain is separated from its nearest neighbor, France, by a mountain range. The only country to go to war with is Portugal. But there's no reason to. Spain was left out of World War I. When World War II broke out and almost every country in the world from Canada to New Zealand was drawn into it, Spain again stayed out of the war. So Comrade Stalin was worried for nothing in 1936, 1937 and 1938.

They say that our "volunteers" fought in Spain against the dictatorship, they carried freedom to the people of Spain. That sounds like a lovely tune. But why didn't our "volunteers" carry freedom to their own people? Many of them took a direct part in the extermination of the peasantry as a class in Russia, Ukraine and other republics. On their bayonets stood the anti-people regime. Here is a typical "liberator" - V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko. In 1921 he was chairman of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to combat banditry in Tambov province. Under bandits here

was understood by all the people. Everyone in Tambov province rose up against the Communists. Antonov-Ovseenko personally shot and personally chopped off heads, burned villages together with their people, drove the population of villages into swamps and slowly drowned them there.

Antonov-Ovseenko came close to Tukhachevsky in terms of atrocities. Together with Tukhachevsky, he signed orders to use poisonous gases against his own people, to take and mass shoot hostages.

And here's this war criminal appeared in Spain. Yay! Turns out he brought the torch of freedom.

Antonov-Ovseenko and his companions carried freedom to the Spanish people in 1937-1938, while at the same time their comrades in the Soviet Union were being exterminated by the thousands. Many of the "volunteers", returning to the homeland of the world proletariat, would go under the heavy proletarian axe. The first was Antonov-Ovseenko.

Could these men fight for someone else's freedom if they themselves were slaves and, at the same time, executioners of their own people?

We are amazing people: Generalissimo Franco was a terrible dictator, he had to be hated, he had to be fought! we soon had our own generalissimo. The country spent colossal funds and shed human blood in the struggle against the tyrant Franco, and meanwhile in February 1938 in Sevzheldorlag alone more people died than in the whole of Spain during all the years of Franco's rule.

The reign of Generalissimo Franco ended with Spain becoming a free and prosperous state without any upheaval or revolution. So why were our fighters eager to overthrow such a power?

But if the Communists had won under the leadership of comrades from the NKVD and Comintern, terror in Spain would not have been avoided. And Spain would not have been left out of the Second World War. And now, on the ruins of communism, sunny Spain would be something like sunny Georgia of Shevardnadze's time - in holey pants and with portraits of their favorite leader at every crossroads.

6

In Spain, Stalin did not extinguish the likely hotbed of World War II, but fanned it. By his calculations, General Franco's side

were supposed to be Hitler and Mussolini. That's almost what happened. Except it didn't quite. Italy and Germany didn't declare war, instead of this they supplied to Spain weapons, "instructors" and "volunteers." But officially they remained on the sidelines of the war.

The situation was quite simple: Great Britain and France feared the strengthening of Germany and Italy, so they had to oppose Hitler and Mussolini. That's what Comrade Stalin needed. But that didn't happen either. Stalin's propaganda stigmatized Great Britain and France: How can you stand aside! How can you remain neutral! Children are dying there!

Our beloved country has just had a famine, artificially organized by the Communists. Millions of people died of hunger; first of all, children died. But our propagandists did not remember this. They remembered only the suffering of the Spanish children and called on the whole world to intervene. But no one responded to these appeals.

Great Britain and France were stigmatized by Comrade Stalin himself for their indifference. March 10, 1939, in a report to the XVIII Congress of the Party, he denounced the governments of these countries: "*In fact, however, the policy of non-intervention means connivance with aggression, unleashing war - therefore, turning it into a world war*" (I. Stalin. Questions of Leninism. M., 1945. 11th ed. P. 570).

And after Stalin, our propagandists could not forgive Britain and France for their behavior. "*The policy of "non-intervention" was, in fact, a broadly conceived sabotage against the world, a policy of provoking the Second World* War" (History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945. T. 1. C. 109).

No, dear comrades. The non-interference of Britain and France in the affairs of Spain precisely led to the fact that the Second World War did not break out in 1937-1938, and in 1939-1945 this most terrible of wars bypassed Spain.

***

And Stalin became convinced that Europe could not be set on fire from the western periphery. What to do? The answer is one: to set fire c from the east on the east side. Your

position he made clear among his closest associates:

It is in the interests of the USSR, the Motherland of the workers, that war breaks out between the Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc. Everything must be done to make this war last as long as possible in order to exhaust the two sides. It is for this reason that we must agree to the conclusion of the pact proposed by Germany and work to make this war, declared once, last the maximum amount of time (Stalin's speech at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) on August 19, 1939).

CHAPTER 7. "That the land in Grenada should be given to the peasants....".

No matter how we evaluate the Soviet system, another thing seems indisputable: no power in the history of mankind has set itself such grandiose goals and no power in history has piled up so many corpses on the way to its goals.

Ivan Solonevich. Russia in a concentration camp. M., 1999. C. 114

1

I was taught from childhood that Soviet people helped the people of Spain to fight for freedom and democracy. That's what the books said: "*Spain was becoming the front line of the struggle for democracy*". This was written by Colonel Ilya Grigorievich Starinov, the main Soviet saboteur (Starinov I. G. Mines are waiting for their hour. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964. p. 65). Here is how Starinov describes his profession:

Since long ago, there has been an opinion that a saboteur is a grim, ferocious man without conscience or honor. No argument, the scum coming out of the intelligence schools of bourgeois states are such beasts. But in armies fighting for the people's cause, the best, selfless and humane fighters become subversives (ibid. P. 81).

This is how this "human fighter" fought in Spain. In April 1937, it was decided to capture the monastery of Virgen de la Cabeza. But how to do it? The monastery has strong walls and strong gates. "Human fighter" Starinov came up with a way. They caught a mule, which was let out of the monastery to graze, and loaded it with crates.
"One of the boxes loaded on the mule contained explosives: twenty kilograms of dynamite covered with nails and pieces of iron. This box was equipped with a locking device" (ibid. p. 134). The mule went to the gate of the monastery. He was let inside. And there it rumbled... This is how the "human fighter" Starinov fought for democracy in Spain. This is only one of many episodes, about of which he

tells without embarrassment. It's something he's proud of. It's what he was allowed to talk about. But not everything the chief saboteur was allowed to talk about.

The experience of "human fighters" has become international. From the XX century it came to the new millennium. How simple it is: to cover dynamite with nails....

And here's another fighter for freedom and democracy in Spain. The most important. His name was Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko. As we remember, he was the first to arrive in Spain and took up the key position of Consul General in Barcelona. He began by recommending to the government of the Spanish Republic that the country's gold reserve be safely hidden. Where? Moscow. Where else?

Spain's gold reserve was taken to the USSR and never returned. They say anarchists are robbers. There's no disputing that. But the huge gold reserve of Spain was taken away not by anarchists, but by selfless communists. They say that Spain's gold reserve was payment for arms shipments. The shipments were indeed huge, but Spain had been hoarding gold since Columbus and even earlier. No matter how great the supplies were, they could not have been worth more than the gold the country had been saving for centuries. And if indeed Spain's gold reserve was payment for the military supplies, then it should be so declared: the Soviet Union was fighting not out of noble motives, but for the sake of the gold that Antonov-Ovseenko took away.

By 1936, Spain's gold reserve exceeded 600 tons. At the time of the military mutiny, the vast majority of it was in the vaults of the Bank of Spain in Madrid. After consultations with Soviet representatives, the Spanish government approached Moscow with a proposal to "accept for safekeeping" the gold of the Republic.

Formally, this was explained by the threat of the rebels' seizure of Madrid in October 1936. On October 15, Prime Minister Largo Caballero and Finance Minister Juan Negrin sent the Soviet government an official document on this issue.

Stalin promptly decided to carry out an operation to export the gold reserve of Spain. Here is an excerpt from the minutes № 44 meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) on October 17, 1936: "*Item 56. Question of t. Rosenberg. Decision. To instruct Mr. Rosenberg to reply to the Spanish Government that we are ready to accept for safekeeping*

gold reserve, and that we consent to the shipment of this gold in our vessels returning from the ports."

After the political decision was made, the work boiled over - on October 20, Spain received a telegram agreeing to accept the gold, and on October 22-25, it was already loaded on Soviet ships in Cartagena. A total of 510 tons of gold were taken on board (Khrapachevsky R. Spanish gold of the Kremlin. Russian Focus. № 7. May 14, 2001). For comparison: in December 2002, Russia's gold reserve was 387 tons (report Russian news agency .
"Interfax, January 4, 2003). At the end of 2006, Russia's gold reserve amounted to 420 tons (Krasnaya Zvezda. April 4-10, 2007).

Here is some additional information about Antonov-Ovseenko, this fighter for freedom and democracy. He had a lot of experience in such a struggle since the Russian Civil War in 1918-1922:

While occupying major military posts, Antonov-Ovseenko, who had no military talents, remained primarily a political leader. During the command of the In troops in the territory subordinate to him widely used shootings of hostages, as well as mass repression ... In February-August 1921, the chairman of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to combat banditry in Tambov province... Antonov-Ovseenko undertook massive and inadequately brutal repressions against the participants of the uprising, as well as against the "accomplices" and members of their families. In fact, the whole province was drenched in blood. On June 11, 1921, he, together with Tukhachevsky, signed an order providing for immediate execution without trial for "citizens who refuse to give their name"; "if hidden weapons are found, shoot on the spot without trial the senior worker in the family"; in addition to families who harbored members of family or property.
"bandits," were declared bandits with immediate execution, etc. (Stalin's Empire. Biographical Encyclopedic Dictionary. Compiled by. Zalessky K. A. M.: Veche, 2000. C. 29).

This is how Antonov-Ovseenko acted in his own country. He was an executioner and a war criminal. And so Stalin sent him to Spain. Here Antonov-Ovseenko sent not only work

Soviet military advisers, intelligence officers and Chekists, but also essentially commanded the government of the Spanish Republic.

And second in the hierarchy of Soviet military advisors in Spain was Jan Berzin.

2

Once upon a time, when I was a cadet, a book by Chief Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov was recommended to all of us. The book is interesting. Voronov commanded the Red Army artillery during World War II. He was one of the developers of the Stalingrad offensive operation and one of the first in liberated Stalingrad questioned Field Marshal General Friedrich Paulus. In the entire history of Germany Field Marshal Generals have never taken prisoner. Paulus is the first. Apart from this episode, there are many interesting moments in Voronov's book. The book is written vividly and simply. Voronov also fought in Spain.

And suddenly one phrase in this book didn't just hit me, it scratched me right up:

The events in Spain deeply excited the Soviet people. In Moscow and other cities crowded meetings and rallies of workers were held. Soviet people expressed their fraternal solidarity with the Spanish people who fought against the vicious gangs of fascism. In a short time, workers and collective farmers contributed tens of millions of rubles to the fund to help the Spanish fighters (Voronov N. N. At the service of the military. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963. P. 80).

It shocked me. In 1936, the Soviet people excitedly followed the events in distant Spain, expressed indignation at the actions of the rebels, workers in factories and peasants in the fields collected labor pennies to help the Spanish people. But three years before that, a monstrous famine was raging in the Soviet Union, accompanied by cannibalism, corpse-eating and open trade in human meat. And the Soviet people did not care about it in any way. And they did not hold rallies, and they did not collect money to help the starving. And the Soviet people were not outraged by a simple fact: their brothers,

sisters, neighbors are starving to death by the millions, and the Communists are exporting bread abroad by the millions of tons.

Our concerned people in those years made themselves responsible for the fate of all people on Earth with complete irresponsibility for their own fate. In 1936 in Spain there were no concentration camps, hostages were not shot yet, but the Soviet people were terribly excited and indignant. But in the Soviet Union, slave labor was flourishing, millions were sitting in concentration camps and prisons, and Soviet people were not worried and outraged.

Internal passports were introduced in the Soviet Union on December 27, 1932, without which it was impossible to get a job, find housing, or move around the country. Internal passports were introduced at the height of the famine in order to more effectively combat the flight of peasants from famine-stricken regions to the cities or more prosperous areas of the country. Internal passports were issued only to city dwellers. Peasants, who made up the majority of the population, were not entitled to passports. The Soviet peasant was put in the position of a slave who could not go anywhere from his master. Formally, the peasant was not a citizen of his country. Let us evaluate the situation: the overwhelming majority of the country's population are not citizens.

And so Stalin's military advisers, future generals, admirals and marshals, instead of fighting for the freedom of their own people, rushed to fight for the freedom of the Spanish peasants, who, unlike the Soviets, were free and had the right to go wherever they liked, even to America.

3

Everything I read about the war in Spain surprised me. Here is a little-noticed at first glance fact. The chief adviser to the Republican Army of Spain was Jan Berzin, head of the 4th Department of the Red Army General Staff.

What kind of governance is the Fourth?

In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union was overwhelmed by a wave of hysterical praise of the Soviet spy Richard Sorge. Films and TV programs were made about him, articles and books were written, lectures were given, streets and squares were named after him, and there was widespread discussion about him.

the designs for the monument. And it was announced that Richard Sorge was found and sent to intelligence by Jan Berzin, head of the 4th Department of the General Staff of the Red Army. And the people were immediately explained what this 4th Directorate was doing: in the 20's and 30's of the XX century was called the military intelligence of the Red Army. Now this organization is called the GRU - the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff.

I was dumbfounded and amazed: so, in the Republican Army of Spain Stalin sent two thousand Soviet military advisers of very high qualification, but the most important advisor put the head of Soviet spies. Why? What was the spy chief Berzin doing in Spain? Why the chief military adviser Stalin sent not a combat commander from the battlefields, and the master of the Order of the Knights of the Cloak and Dagger?

A lot is currently known about Jan Berzin. Here is some information about him:

Berzin Jan Karlovich (real name and surname Peteris Janovich Küzis), party , one of the founders of the Gulag... In 1907, he was sentenced to 8 years' hard labor for killing a policeman, but was released in 1909... With the outbreak of World War I he was drafted into the army, but deserted and entered a factory (Petrograd)... Since December 1917 he worked in the staff of the RSFSR NKVD, headed the personal guard of Lenin and members of the government, formed in the vast majority of Latvians and Estonians....

In March 1924 - April 1935 he was the head of the 4th (Intelligence) Directorate of the Red Army Staff, in fact he created the system of military intelligence of the USSR... In 1936 he was appointed chief military adviser to the Republican Army in Spain. In June 1937, he returned to the USSR and again took the post of head of the Intelligence Directorate (Stalin's Empire. P. 55).

Everything about this biography is striking. Tsarist Russia is usually portrayed as a horrible repressive regime, but here is a historical fact: Jan Berzin received 8 years for killing a policeman, but he served only two years and was released. Then, during World War I, he deserted from the army and during ... he joined

a factory in the capital of the empire! And the factory is Putilov's, the most important military enterprise in Russia! And they didn't check his papers?! And no one was surprised that the young lazy bum wasn't at the front in wartime?! Would he have tried to run away from the army under Comrade Stalin? After the collapse of the Russian Empire, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia became independent states. Latvian Jan Berzin was a foreigner in Russia. Lenin, Trotsky and other communist leaders knew that the Russian people hated them, so they staffed their personal guards with foreign mercenaries: Chinese, Latvians, Czechs, Hungarians and so on. Berzin and others like him are foreign legionary mercenaries.

And so, in 1936, Stalin sent to Spain as chief military adviser a murderer, a deserter, a mercenary who had never been to war a single day, who had run away from the war. What could Jan Berzin teach the Spanish Communists? How to desert from the army? How to build concentration camps and what kind of regime to set up in them? Or how to kill policemen?

4

During the war, several thousand children of Spanish communists were taken to the Soviet Union. They were used to train fighters for the secret front. This is a special topic, big and gruesome.

No less interesting is the fate of foreign volunteers who came to Spain to fight for the Republicans in interbrigades - Americans, Canadians, French, Swedes and others. Upon arrival in the country, their passports and other documents were first of all taken from them. Ostensibly for safety. And escape from an international brigade was punishable by firing squad.

And where to ? If you go straight, it's the ocean. Go left and it's the ocean. Back is the Mediterranean Sea. Ports under control.

The border with France is closed. All around is the front. Bare sun-scorched plains and mountains. Nowhere to hide. Not a penny in my pocket, no passport. Once in an international brigade, a volunteer ceased to be a volunteer. He turned into an armed slave who was almost impossible to escape.

It happened that in buildings where personal documents of volunteers were kept, for some reason more often than usual there were fires, a

the vehicles that carried these documents were more often than not hit by gunfire. Most of the fighters of the International Brigades were left without any documents, while Soviet military intelligence obtained real passports and other personal documents for tens of thousands of young men from 54 countries.

The bloody dawn of the Communist tomorrow was already rising over Spain, and some had awakened from that dawn. Having escaped from Spain after the defeat of the Republic, the volunteers had overwhelmingly remained true to their ideals, but they had not realized anything. But at least one of them had an epiphany. His name was George Orwell. He came to Spain to fight for freedom and democracy. And suddenly realized that under the mask of freedom could hide a monstrous criminal regime. He made his name famous with two books: "Animal Farm" and "1984".

In the first book, he described a farm where the animals rebelled against man. The rebellion ended in complete victory. But at the head of the free animal community were the pigs. And they set up their own pig rule. Amazing: George Orwell described a British farm and Berkshire pigs, but in the Soviet Union those who found this book were given a full prison sentence. And that surprised me too. If George Orwell had described Soviet Communist pigs, the reaction of the authorities would have been understandable. But why were they so offended, why did they react so nervously when they read about the power of Berkshire pigs? What is it? Pig solidarity?

5

Antonov-Ovseenko was recalled from Spain to Moscow, arrested and shot. Jan Berzin returned from Spain to his post as Chief of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army General Staff, but was soon arrested and shot as well.

And military advisers who actually fought in the war, rather than engaging in politics and espionage, rose rapidly to the heights of military power. Some of them later fell under Stalin's axe, but not for Spain, but for other misdeeds and mistakes.

What follows from this, I do not know. We can, however, assume that Stalin from some point no longer counted on the military

victory in Spain, realizing that it was impossible under such conditions. Therefore, he had no complaints to his commanders. They did their best. Stalin appreciated this and elevated many of them. But the executioners, spies, political figures, such as Antonov-Ovseenko and Berzin, somewhere did not work out and Stalin's hopes did not justify. And Stalin shot them.

What was Stalin hoping for? What did he want?

There is no mystery here. It is enough to look at the actions of Stalin's diplomacy and propaganda in those years. Three states with totalitarian regimes - Germany, Italy and Portugal - helped General Franco. And the Spanish Republic was helped at the state level only by the Soviet Union. Great Britain and France pursued a policy of non-interference in the affairs of Spain. Soviet propaganda was simply indignant: children were suffering in Spain, and Great Britain and France did not react in any way! Soviet propaganda ridiculed Britain and France for their cruel indifference to the fate of Spanish children. How could they stand by and watch the torment of the Spanish people?! How could you stand by?!

But this was clearly not about children: in the Soviet Union, the caring Communists introduced a law on April 7, 1935, which extended the death penalty to children from the age of 12. Stalin's main ambition was expressed quite clearly and openly: to drag Britain and France into the Spanish War. If this plan could be realized, in the far west of the European continent on the land of Spain in the bloody battle would clash Germany, Italy and Portugal on the one hand, Britain and France - on the other. And the Soviet Union would remain far removed from this skirmish. Stalin's advisors and "volunteers" would also fight, but the war would in no way touch the territory of the Soviet Union. Stalin had only to add kerosene to the fire of the flaring military conflict.

Internationalist volunteers from 54 countries are part of the same plot. Stalin's agents all over the world agitated honest young men to go to Spain. Stalin spared no money on agitation, paid for the travel and maintenance of volunteers, armament of international brigades. The plan is simple - to involve the citizens of the world in the war. First individual citizens, then groups

citizens, and then the governments of different countries would be forced to rescue their people in distress. And this would have meant conflicts with the governments of Franco, Hitler, Mussolini, Salazar.

But the war in Spain never got beyond its borders. The efforts of Stalin's executioners, diplomats and spies were not enough to fan the Spanish fire across Europe. That is why their heads flew.

And Stalin changed course abruptly.

6

As soon as it became clear that the war was dragging on in Spain, that from a spark the flame is unlikely to ignite, Stalin shifted the attention of European diplomacy to another area - Czechoslovakia. His new plot was to bring Czechoslovakia and Germany together. The flame of a great fire had been smoldering there for a long time.

The essence of the conflict was в was, that в 1918 in 1918. Germany lost World War I World War the First World War, и Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, THE UNITED STATES и other countries imposed The United States and other countries imposed on Germany the plunderous, ruinous and humiliating Treaty of Versailles, under which a number of German-populated lands were ceded to other countries. After the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the German-populated , which was part it, was given to Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia - is artificial formation. At the At the end of the First World War, the Czech Republic was not an independent country. state for four centuries, and Slovakia for nine centuries.

A unified state under the name of Czechoslovakia never existed in all previous history. And so such a state was created, and it was cut off, among other things, from the lands inhabited by Germans.

Not even two decades after the end of the First World War, Germany became stronger and demanded the right of nations to self-determination. If the Sudetes are inhabited by Germans, if the Sudeten Germans want unification with Germany, then historical justice must be restored.

Soviet intelligence cautiously intervened in this still quiet conflict. The Czechs were planted with "indisputable evidence"

of Germany's preparations for invasion, and to the Germans, of the Czechoslovak army's preparations for the massacre of the Sudeten Germans. The conflict was heating up.

An enchanting prospect loomed: the Sudeten Germans demanded unification with Germany, the Czechoslovak army subdued the Sudeten Germans, in response Hitler struck Czechoslovakia, Great Britain and France, in accordance with their commitments, declared war on Germany. The scenario of 1914 was repeated: word for word - to the world catastrophe, after which a revolutionary situation arose in many countries of ruined Europe.

This is exactly what Comrade Stalin wanted. It was this scenario that a year later would be played out by Stalin in Poland: a relatively small territorial dispute between Germany and Poland was turned by Stalin's efforts into a war between Germany and Poland, and Great Britain and France responded to Germany's actions by declaring war on it. This is exactly what Stalin wanted in Spain. This is what Stalin wanted in Czechoslovakia.

But Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany were prudent in deciding the fate of the Sudetenland. The leaders of these countries met in Munich in September 1938. There was nothing terrible in their actions. The Sudetenland was inhabited by Germans, so it must go to Germany. That's what they decided. That's it!

Later, in March 1939, Hitler invaded all of Czechoslovakia. But that's another story. Great Britain and France did not give Hitler their consent to such actions. In September 1938 in Munich it was decided to give Germany only the Sudetenland. People who call themselves serious historians are indignant: the Soviet Union was not invited to the negotiations Munich!

Let's ask the question: who is to blame for this?

In 1919, Britain, France, Italy and others imposed the abominable, unjust, humiliating Treaty of Versailles on defeated Germany. In 1938, the leaders of Germany, who demanded the principle of self-determination of peoples, and the leaders of Great Britain, Italy and France, who for two decades had been obstructing for two decades, met in Munich.

to unite the German people. That is, the offenders and the victim met.

What does this have to do with the Soviet Union? In the Sudetenland confrontation, the Soviet Union was neither among the victims nor among the Versailles villains who artificially created the problem of the Sudetenland. Even the United States and Japan had more grounds and rights to decide the question of the Sudetenland, for they took part in the Versailles Conference. And Russia voluntarily withdrew from the First World War. It was not among the victors. Russia deprived itself of the right to decide the fate of the world after the First World War.

On what grounds should the Soviet Union have been invited to Munich? The issue of revision of the Versailles agreements was decided there. Russia had nothing to do with these agreements because Lenin did not want his country to win the First World War, because Lenin called for the defeat of his own country and did everything possible to make Russia lose the war.

If the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the whole affair, why should anyone take Comrade Stalin's opinion into account?

7

The Czechoslovak government may or may not have agreed with the decisions taken at Munich. The Soviet Union strongly supported Czechoslovakia in its unwillingness to return the Sudetenland. The Soviet Union spoke out in the strongest possible terms right up until the crisis. But when the crisis broke out, all the leaders of the Soviet Union suddenly disappeared. In Moscow, the Czechoslovak ambassador tried to find any contact with the Kremlin leaders, but he ran into an impassable wall. Even People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov was ill: bronchitis. No one in Moscow responded to the cries for help.

The Czechoslovak government tried to get an answer to the question: what would the Soviet Union do if Czechoslovakia did not obey the decisions taken in Munich, if it resisted Hitler? There was no answer from Moscow.

On September 28, the country's president, Edward Benes, directly asked for military assistance from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union replied that help should be sought from the League of Nations.

On September 30, 1938, at 12:20 p.m., the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow informed Prague that "there is no news," which meant that Moscow would not side with Czechoslovakia. Ten minutes later, at 12:30, the Czechoslovak government decided to agree to the terms dictated in Munich.

And only on October 3, 1938, 61 hours and 30 minutes after the Czechoslovak government had submitted to the demands of the four powers, the Soviet answer came from Moscow to Prague: you should not have surrendered, but fought, we would have supported you under any conditions!

Anyone interested in this problem will find in Igor Lukes' book "Czechoslovakia between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Benes in the 1930s" (Lukes, Igor. Czechoslovakia between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Benes in the 1930s. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) hundreds of facts and documents that refute the official Kremlin version the Soviet Union was supposedly ready to stand up for Czechoslovakia. Comrade Stalin's "fraternal aid" to that country was provided by planting false information to foment conflict, and when it arose, the Soviet leaders hid behind the Kremlin wall.

It is understandable: it made no sense for Stalin to get involved in the war early. If Great Britain and France had clashed with Germany over Czechoslovakia, then the Soviet Union would have gotten involved. It would have gotten involved at the final stage, waiting, as Comrade Stalin taught, until all the belligerents had exhausted themselves in a grueling war.

This is where I will be reminded that the Soviet Union did not have a common border with Czechoslovakia, so it simply could not help. Objection: it would have been much easier to maintain "international brigades" in Czechoslovakia, than in Spain. And "volunteers" and
"advisors" can be moved anywhere. There are different ways to do it.

Arms transfers (if desired) could be organized through Romania. It was just a matter of paying someone correctly. It was also possible to fly by air. To get from the Soviet Union to

Czechoslovakia, it was necessary to fly 160 kilometers in the airspace of Poland or Romania.

Now let's ask serious historians if they have any information that the Soviet Union tried to negotiate with Romania or Poland to move Soviet aircraft across their airspace or to organize an air bridge?

A year later, in August 1939, Stalin demanded corridors for his troops to pass through Poland. Oh, give me, give me corridors!

We will get to those corridors yet. But did he demand corridors from Poland and Romania in 1938 for the passage of his troops into Czechoslovakia? Did he even demand air corridors for the passage of aircraft?

So: the Kremlin leaders did not plan to transfer aircraft to Czechoslovakia and did not intend to organize any air bridge. All their formidable statements about their readiness to support Czechoslovakia were just a hollow sound. But it was possible to organize a mass flight of Soviet aircraft to Czechoslovakia without any permission. Who could have prevented it? If the Soviet armada had flown at high altitude, how could Romania have resisted it in 1938, except for empty protests?

But war between the countries of Central and Western Europe did not break out over Spain or Czechoslovakia. So Comrade Stalin turned his gaze to Poland. This is where Great Britain and France fell into Stalin's trap.

Let's note the proximity of the dates.

On March 28, 1939, General Franco's troops entered Madrid. The fire of the war in Spain was extinguished. In Spain, Stalin had nothing else to rely on. Anticipating the imminent end of the war in Spain, he ordered the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov to prepare an anti-Hitler conference.

On March 18, 1939, Litvinov made proposals to convene a conference with the participation of the USSR, Great Britain, France, Poland, Romania and Turkey. Under the pretext of ensuring "collective security," Stalin was preparing the isolation and blockade of Germany.

On April 17, Litvinov made a proposal for an Anglo-French-Soviet treaty. At the same time Stalinist diplomacy

began intensive work to prepare the ground for an alliance with Hitler: either sign a pact with me or be strangled by a blockade.

May 5, Stalin removed Litvinov from the post of People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs and put Molotov in his place. Even then, the most astute observers realized the reason for this. Litvinov was a Jew, and Hitler would not deal with him. If Stalin put in this post Russian, the second most influential man in the Soviet Union, while leaving him the post of head of government, it follows that some epoch-making accomplishments in the field of foreign policy.

Stalin's calculation was simple: if Britain and France agreed to provide "collective security" in Europe under Stalin's scenario, then Stalin would make an alliance with them against Hitler. If not, then Stalin would "secure" Europe by making an alliance with Hitler against Britain, France and the rest of Europe.

Soon negotiations began between the USSR, Great Britain and France on "curbing the aggressor".

It was a trap. It was a bait hook that Britain and France swallowed without noticing.

CHAPTER 3. Why Stalin needed collective security.

Artificially induced famine led to cannibalism. In the hunger strike of 1933, about three million children alone died.
Russian Thought. 2004. №4

1

In 1933, Hitler came to power in Germany, and immediately Soviet diplomacy launched an intense struggle to forge an anti-Hitler bloc: let's protect Europe from Hitler! Let's ensure collective security!

The struggle for collective security is a matter of special pride for the Communists: they were supposedly the first to recognize the danger and did everything possible to keep Europe out of war.

The USSR's struggle for collective security went through several successive stages. The first step on this path was the proposal of the Soviet Union sign an agreement on the definition of aggression and aggressor (attacker), put forward on February 6, 1933 at the International Conference on Disarmament (History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941- 1945. T. 1. C. 82).

This is how we have a clear-cut system. On January 30, 1933, Hitler became Chancellor, and exactly one week later the Soviet Union took the first step towards collective security in Europe! The Soviet Communists, of course, were not satisfied with this.

The struggle was just beginning! An avalanche of proposals came from the Kremlin to the governments of Europe: regional pacts, general disarmament, a pan-European security system!

On December 12, 1933, the Central Committee of the Communist Party made a special decision to launch the struggle for collective security. A lot was done. A lot, in fact. There is

something to remember. In the Soviet Union and now in Russia, professors with tears in their voices (and GB certificates in their pockets) tell students about those distant days: be proud of the deeds of our leaders and diplomats! How much they did to keep Europe safe from war and Hitler!

We will ask those academics: Why did the Soviet Union need collective security? Why did the Kremlin clowns play this whole comedy for?

2

It's really strange. Stalin secretly trained German tankers, pilots, artillerymen, sappers, and chemists on Soviet territory. In violation of the Treaty of Versailles on Soviet territory German designers created tanks, submarines, combat aircraft, tested poisonous substances and heavy artillery.

On April 15, 1925, an agreement was signed to establish a top secret aviation school near Lipetsk to train German military pilots, which was attended by Hermann Goering, who later became Reich Minister of Aviation of the Third Reich. Even the Russian Ministry of Defense was forced to acknowledge the fact of Goering's training in the Soviet Union (Krasnaya Zvezda, February 15, 2003). "Military History Journal" (1993. № 6. P. 42) proudly reports: "*It was at the aviation school near Lipetsk that the first German fighter-bomber was created*".

On the basis of the air combat training in Lipetsk, the Germans developed The graduates of the Lipetsk aviation school became prominent figures in the Luftwaffe, drafted the "Fighter Aviation Manual", compiled the "Bomber Aviation Manual", created and tested instruments and devices for targeted bombing. Many graduates of the Lipetsk Aviation School became notable figures in the Luftwaffe. Here are just a few of them:

• Air Force Colonel General Hans Jeschonnek, who served as Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff from February 1, 1939 to August 19, 1943;

• Colonel General Kurt Student of the Parachute Forces, creator of the airborne forces of the Third Reich and one of the most

of the famous military leaders of World War II;

• Air Force Colonel General Otto Desloch, from 1935 to 1939 was the head of all aviation schools in Germany, in 1943-1944 he commanded the 4th Air Fleet, that is, all the aviation of the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.

In 1926, a Reichswehr tank school was established near Kazan. German tankers wore Soviet military uniforms without insignia (Krasnaya Zvezda. November 25, 1990).

The Germans managed to train several hundred pilots, tankers and chemical warfare specialists. Subsequently, they formed the backbone of instructors for mass training of these specialties in the Wehrmacht. It is also significant that, bypassing the Versailles restrictions, the Germans were able to develop and improve many means of conducting the upcoming war (Krasnaya Zvezda. November 25, 1990).

The development and production of chemical weapons was organized at the Soviet-German company Bersol in Ivashchenkovo (now Chapaevsk) near Samara. There, the daily production of mustard gas, infamous during World War I, reached 3.3 tons, and phosgene - 2.6 tons. 5.9 tons a day is more than 2,000 tons a year. The "Bersoli" loading stations had to "shell" 500,000 shells of mustard gas and phosgene each year.

Joint chemical weapons tests were conducted at the Tomka test site near the town of Volsk, Saratov Region
- "Krasnaya Zvezda" writes about it:

An agreement was worked out on the establishment in Russia of production structures of the German military industry disguised as Soviet-German enterprises and concessions. The beginning of such a practice was laid by Juncker. In 1922, the firm began construction of a plant for the production of metal airplanes and aircraft engines in Fili near Moscow. Since 1924, the plant has already started to produce several hundred airplanes annually. Following Junkers, Friedrich Krupp (guns, shells, tanks) and BMW (tank engines and aircraft engines) took root in the Soviet Union,

"Bersol (poisonous substances), Karl Walter (small arms) and others. The shipyards of Nikolaev and Leningrad mastered the production of submarines and other warships for Germany. The reconstructed factories of Tula, Leningrad and Zlatoust began to produce hundreds of thousands of artillery shells for the Reichswehr every year (Krasnaya Zvezda. November 25, 1990).

Stalin ensured Hitler's electoral victory - this was recognized by the Nazis themselves. Joachim von Ribbentrop believed that the enemies of Hitler's party - i.e. the Communists and Social Democrats - "*had the full opportunity to destroy it*". He wrote: "*Had our enemies been united in 1932, they could have defeated us...*" (Novoe Vremya. 1994.
№ 37. C. 43).

But at that moment the Nazis could not be defeated because there was no unity among Hitler's opponents. Stalin divided all of Hitler's opponents. It was he who ordered the German Communists to oppose the Social Democrats instead of the Nazis. That's why Hitler was the winner.

Hitler realized that he came to power thanks to Stalin and was grateful to him. May 21, 1940, the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army Lieutenant General of Aviation AI Proskurov sent a message to the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union SK Timoshenko under the cover of "Secret", which contained a statement of the German military attaché in Moscow Aschenbrennera: "*I was at Hitler, who told me: "Remember that Stalin did a great thing for us, which we should never and under any circumstances should not forget*" (Bushueva T. Cursing - try to understand. Novy Mir. 1994. № 12).

And here is the question: why in 1933 Stalin led Hitler to power with one hand, and with the other hand he immediately formed a bloc of European states against Hitler?

If Stalin had not brought Hitler to power, no danger would not have arisen, and then all this fuss with the provision of "collective security" would simply be unnecessary. By clearing Hitler's path to power, Stalin made World War II possible and almost inevitable, and Stalin's cutthroats Koltsov, Ehrenburg,

Henry and their like called on the peoples of the world to build solidarity and vigilance.

If Stalin really wanted "collective security," he should not have trained German pilots and tankers in the Soviet Union, he should not have allowed Goering, Manstein, and Guderian to use our territory to develop new methods of warfare, and he should not have helped Hitler in the elections. If Stalin had not done this, World War II simply could not have begun. Now that would have been the true security of Europe.

3

Let's ask another question: what, in fact, did Comrade Stalin have to gain from "collective security"? Did he really count on the fraternal help of Belgium or Luxembourg in case Hitler attacked the Soviet Union? And who but Hitler could attack us? Estonia? Latvia? I don't believe it. Poland? Hungary? Finland? Romania? What are their chances of reaching Khabarovsk, Vladivostok and Magadan victoriously?

Even Tukhachevsky realized that our people should be frightened by a real enemy. But on the western borders of the USSR before the Moscow Pact of 1939 there were no states capable of successfully waging an offensive war against the Soviet Union. Therefore, Tukhachevsky, back in the early 1920s, invented a Polish-German coalition, which was supposedly ready to claw at the throat of the Soviet Union at any moment.

Tukhachevsky wrote about this mythical Polish-German coalition from the Civil War until his arrest. And after his arrest, in Yezhov's penitentiary, Tukhachevsky wrote a treatise on the Polish-German aggressive bloc that is preparing an attack on USSR. Tukhachevsky's fantastic scenario is not worth dwelling on even briefly.

In the years when Stalin and his loyal associates were engaged in a heroic struggle for "collective security", the Soviet Union had no common borders with Germany. The country was separated from the powerful powers of Europe by a barrier of neutral states, so a sudden attack by these powers on the USSR was excluded. In , the

Stalin had a huge territory that could not be conquered. And even if anyone could conquer it, they would not be able to control it for sure. So why would he need "collective security"?

The war could have been between France and Germany. Or between Poland and Germany. But a German attack on Poland automatically involved France and Britain in the war. In either case, the Soviet Union could become a victim of aggression in the very last resort. Why did Stalin care more about "collective security" than anyone else?

Comrade Stalin has mass extermination and starvation and cannibalism in his country. Does he have to worry about the well-being of satiated Denmark and slutty Holland? In the 1930s, Stalin's empire, as we remember, produced more tanks, cannons, airplanes and submarines than all the rest of the world combined. And so Comrade Stalin was concerned about the "collective security" of Europe: no matter where the war broke out, no matter how much suffering it caused, no matter how to save the Polish and Norwegian bourgeois from the hardships of war.

In the Soviet Union, entrepreneurs were completely exterminated. Merchants, bankers, industrialists - all those who did not manage to escape - were exterminated. Because the bourgeois is the enemy of the proletariat. It was not enough for Stalin the big bourgeois. He started to take care of the small ones. If you have two cows, you're a kulak. A kulak is a petty bourgeoisie. Send them to the taiga and the tundra! To death! If you have two cows, you can have a third. And from three cows to a multibillion-dollar fortune. So nip the fist in the bud! Exterminate them as a class!

And at the same time it turns out that Comrade Stalin does not sleep at night and is always thinking about how to protect the Parisian and London bourgeois from Hitler, how to ensure their safety, how to preserve peace and quiet for them. Explain to me clearly, why Stalin needs to keep the bourgeois safe?

No one has yet come up with an answer to this question. Therefore, we are told that it was not Stalin who invented "collective security". Not his, they say, it not his hands, not his mind. They say that
"collective security" is the work of the loyal Leninist Commissar of Foreign Affairs Comrade Maxim Maximovich Litvinov. Allegedly, it was he who fought for the cause of peace in spite of the villain Stalin.

Stalin killed members of the Central Committee, marshals and commanders in battalions, while a member of Stalin's Central Committee, Comrade Litvinov, at the same time, ostensibly ignoring bloody Stalin, bent his line on general and complete disarmament, on the establishment of good-neighborly relations in Europe and throughout the world. Such a good comrade was found in the Kremlin.

And in my opinion, if Comrade Litvinov had said a word contrary to Stalin's will, he would not sit in the chair of the Commissar of Foreign Affairs for a single minute after that word, but would burn with a bright flame in the crematorium of the Donskoye cemetery together with Comrade Tukhachevsky and other comrades.

Without Stalin, none of Comrade Litvinov's initiatives, including "collective security", could not be not only officially proclaimed, but even discussed in the closest circle of leaders of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. For all of them would have been immediately accused of leftist right-wing bias and would have been shot like bunnies in a clearing.

And the question remained unanswered: why would Stalin want to protect the peace of the bourgeoisie?

4

At first glance, the oddities in Stalin's foreign policy are numerous. First of all, Stalin sought an alliance with Britain and France. He found with whom! It was these countries that obediently retreated under the onslaught of Hitler's diplomacy, agreeing to all the demands and demarches of Germany.

On March 16, 1935, universal conscription was introduced in Germany. This was nothing but the official termination of the Versailles Peace Treaty. For Britain and France, this move by Hitler was the reason and excuse to go to war. But Britain and France did nothing to curb Hitler.

On March 7, 1936, Hitler introduced troops into the Rhine Demilitarized Zone. Under the terms of the Versailles and Locarno agreements, Germany had no right to keep its troops in this zone. Any violation of this prohibition qualified as aggression. France and Britain were supposed to respond to aggression by declaring war on Germany. But they did not even move.

In 1938, Hitler annexed Austria to Germany. This was a new blatant violation of the Treaty of Versailles. Britain and France should have stepped forward. Once again, they did nothing.

In March 1939, Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia and dismembered it into pieces. Again, no action on the part of Britain and France.

Question: why did Stalin seek an alliance with these countries, which did not keep their word and were clearly incapable of defending even their own interests? Maybe Stalin expected that Britain and France, who did not want to defend themselves, would rush to defend the Soviet Union?

In my opinion, Comrade Stalin was no more stupid than we are. He obviously did not count on the help of these countries. Why then did Comrade Litvinov make a fuss? Why did he call for "collective security" if he knew that he could not rely on an alliance with Britain and France?

The treaty with Britain, France and the United States was completely unnecessary for Stalin. If the rulers of these countries would find it profitable for themselves to help Stalin, they themselves could take the initiative and sign any treaty. Or they could help without any treaties. 's exactly what happened later.

If they thought that helping Stalin was not beneficial to their interests, they could find hundreds of thousands of reasons to avoid fulfilling their obligations. And no treaty would help. This also happened later. It was agreed to open the Second Front 1942. But the Western Allies thought it would cost them dearly. It was profitable for them to land in France only when the German backbone will be finally broken, when the outcome of the war will be decided. And so they did.

If we understand this, did Stalin not understand it? Why did he fight for "collective security" for many years? Why did he strive to conclude a treaty with Great Britain and France? After all, the experience of millennia has no exceptions: if your potential ally at the moment is not profitable to support you, he will find a reason to avoid fulfilling their obligations. And vice versa, if it is favorable for someone to support you at the moment, he will do so even without any prior treaties.

In short, the presence or absence of a piece of paper on mutual assistance does not change anything. Why did Stalin need such a piece of paper?

5

From the moment Hitler came to power, Stalin's personal envoys tried to talk Hitler into a fraternal alliance. At the same time, Stalin's envoys in Warsaw, Prague, Paris, and London frightened of the German danger and called for the organization of "collective security".

Stalin was rocking the boat. Hitler was frightened that he would unite with Britain and France, and Britain and France were frightened that he would unite with Hitler.

Stalin made Hitler understand: if there is no alliance between us, then I will raise the whole Europe against you. And Stalin frightened Europe in another way: the Soviet Union is terribly weak and terribly fearful - if you do not start a war against the ogre Hitler, then I will be forced to make an alliance with him.

There was a game of promotion. Information about contacts with Hitler Stalin planted in all European capitals. There arose anxiety and a desire to prevent collusion between Moscow and Berlin. Negotiations began in Paris, London, Prague. Information about this Stalin planted Hitler: look, I will strangle....

In those years, there was a very serious overproduction of agricultural products in the United States. Communists liked to show outraged viewers horrible images of American farmers pouring milk directly on the ground, burning crops, killing cows and covering their carcasses with chlorine.

In the Soviet Union, the problem of overproduction was solved in a more radical way. Red Army units under the leadership of their valiant commanders cordoned off entire districts. Those peasants who produced the most, together with their families in the middle of winter were driven into cattle cars, driven many thousands of kilometers to Siberia, the Urals, Kazakhstan, and there in the cold thrown out in the bare steppe. This grandiose operation was carried out by order of Stalin. Molotov was directly in charge. Many years later, he was asked a question: how many people were transported to the wilderness?

uninhabited areas? Molotov replied: "*Stalin said that we evicted ten million. In fact, we evicted twenty million*" (Chuev F. I. Molotov. Semi-powerful ruler. Moscow: OLMA-Press, 2000. P. 458).

In those years, Ivan Solonevich, the son of a Belarusian peasant, was imprisoned in a concentration camp. He was one of the few who managed to escape first from the camp and then from the country of the victorious proletariat. He left an amazing testimony of what he experienced. Here is his assessment of that period:

The Soviet regime is organized not for the needs of the country, but for the world revolution. It is essentially indifferent to the needs of the country. I cannot imagine that from any other point of view one can explain both the epic of collectivization and the tragedy of the camps. But if you stand on this point of view, then the whole Soviet life - both in trifles and giants - receives a logical and exhaustive explanation (Solonevich I. L. Russia in the concentration camp).

6

Stalin held the keys to World War II in his hands. He didn't needed to to conclude any agreements и pacts. Stalin could provide "collective security" in Europe by his own forces. It was necessary to announce to Hitler loudly and clearly: you can attack whoever you like in Europe, but I will not give you oil. That's all. The Second World War after such a statement could not take place.

But Stalin acted differently. He told Hitler: attack whoever you want, and I will provide you not only with oil, but also with bread, cotton, nickel, manganese, chromium, copper, tin, vanadium, molybdenum, tungsten. Attack, and I will supply you even with what I do not have, what I . I will buy rubber over the distant seas at three times the price, I will overpay myself and give it to you for nothing. Just attack me!

And when the war finally broke out, Pravda, the central newspaper of the Communist Party, slightly lifted the veil on the true feelings of the Kremlin occupants. Communist writer Wanda

Vasilevskaya was accepted by Comrade Stalin (which one knew about at the time) and afterwards burst out with a powerful article along these lines:

The foundations of the world are shaking, the ground is slipping from under the feet of men and nations. The glow of the flames and the rattle of guns shake the seas and continents. Powers and states are blown away like fluff in the wind.... How magnificent, how wonderfully beautiful it is when the whole world is shaken in its foundations, when powers perish and greatness falls (Pravda. August 4, 1940).

This is the real truth. This is the true attitude of Comrade Stalin to the "collective security" of the European states.

***

At first glance, Stalin's policy lacked logic: he prepared the Germans for war, pierced Hitler's road to power and at the same time showed a touching concern for the safety of the British and French bourgeoisie. But there is no paradox in this, and the logic is ironclad: Stalin was preparing Hitler to crush bourgeois Europe, and bourgeois Europe raised against Hitler.

CHAPTER 9. Why the Red Army needed corridors through Poland.

The Red Army was a tool of an aggressive totalitarian despotism that sought to enslave the entire world.

Alexander Gogun. Between Hitler and Stalin. Ukrainian Rebels. St. Petersburg: Neva, 2004. C. 213

1

Stalin's policy was extremely simple: if Germany failed to clash with Great Britain and France in Spain, no big deal, they can clash in Czechoslovakia. If it does not work here, we will clash in Poland.

And so, at the end of 1938, Stalin abruptly changed all of his propaganda attitudes. The anti-Hitler propaganda in the Soviet Union suddenly became silent. Now Stalin's main task was to appease Hitler: grab whatever you like in Europe, I will not interfere with you.

Hitler demanded a revision of the Treaty of Versailles, under which East Prussia was separated from mainstream Germany and the city of Danzig was declared a free city. Hitler demanded that he be given a corridor in Polish territory to build a highway and railroad between East Prussia and mainstream Germany. In addition, the city of Danzig was to become part of Germany.

The Polish government refused to comply with Hitler's demands. Great Britain guaranteed Poland's security. Mutual aid agreements were signed between Poland, Great Britain and France. The British and French governments decided to bring the Soviet Union to their side.

This was a monstrous and inexcusable mistake. As soon as Britain and France agreed to negotiate the

"collective security", war in Europe became inevitable. The fact is that the negotiations between Britain, France and the Soviet Union worried Hitler very much. He believed that "collective security" is a policy of encirclement of Germany (Vizh. 1963. № 12. P. 25). It is a threat of raw material blockade. Hitler believed that Germany was being driven into a corner, and frantically searched for a way out of this unpleasant situation.

Meanwhile, Stalin's diplomats demanded the immediate arrival of the British and French military missions in Moscow. The governments of these states agreed. But the Kremlin comrades are hurrying: hurry up!

To this day, no one has explained why this haste was necessary. Subsequently, even official Soviet historians were forced to admit that there was no reason to hurry. "*It is hardly possible now, having studied the main state and military documents of Japan and Germany, to agree that in August 1939 the Soviet Union was in real danger of a war on two fronts..... We now know that Japan did not dare to attack the USSR even in the most critical moments of 1941 and 1942, when our country was in a desperate situation. And Hitler's Germany in 1939 did not have a specific plan for waging war against the USSR*" (VIZh. 1988. № 12. P. 59).

But Stalin was in a hurry: time is of the essence! Hurry to Moscow!

Delegations from Britain and France arrived in Moscow. They were met at the highest level. And the comedy began.

Stalin's trap worked without fail. One of two things: either Stalin would force Britain and France to attack Germany, or he accuse them of disrupting negotiations, condoning aggression and blame them for the outbreak of war in Europe.

Stalin's tactic was quite simple - to put forward unacceptable demands: let's, gentlemen, make a deal like this - you start to subdue Germany both in case of direct and in case of
"indirect" aggression.

It was "child's playmate." After such a proposal, the British and French delegations found themselves in a foolish position. If they signed a treaty that they were ready to attack Germany in the event of "indirect" aggression on its part, and then Stalin in front of the whole world will claim

to fulfill that obligation. The term "indirect" aggression can be understood to mean anything. And Stalin would be right to demand that Britain and France declare war on Germany in response to any of its actions.

If you don't sign the treaty, then Stalin will declare that Britain and France are accomplices of the aggressor, that they are unwilling to rein in Hitler.

2

So, on August 12, 1939 in Moscow began negotiations of military missions of the USSR, Great Britain and France. In full view of everyone, the head of the Soviet military delegation, People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov, was ranting about how to "curb Hitler". But in the shadows, something else was going on.

On August 11, that is, even before the negotiations with the British and French delegations began, Stalin decided to begin negotiations with Germany on the partition of Poland. This decision was formalized in the form of a telegram from Molotov to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Germany, Georgy Astakhov. The telegram was received by the latter on Saturday, August 12. On the same day at 17:30 the content of the telegram was transmitted to Hitler, who at that moment was negotiating with the Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano. After some thought, Hitler informed his interlocutor about Molotov's telegram with the following words: "The Russians agree to the sending of a German representative to Moscow for political negotiations". Ciano left the following note on this occasion:

Russian-German contacts are proceeding very favorably, and just in these days there was a Russian proposal with an invitation to send a German plenipotentiary representative to Moscow to negotiate a friendship pact (Fleischhauer I. Pact. Hitler, Stalin and the Initiative of German Diplomacy. 1938-1939. Moscow: Progress, 1991. C. 237-238; Rozanov G. L. Stalin - Hitler. Documentary sketch of Soviet-German diplomatic relations 1939-1941. Moscow: International Relations, 1991. C. 84-86).

Stalin, openly demonstrating to the whole world the determination to stop Hitler's aggression, at the same time (and even earlier) was secretly extending a hand of friendship and help to Hitler.

These maneuvers Stalin secured himself from failure in any event. The conflict between Great Britain and France on the one hand and Germany on the other. Stalin maintained (overtly or covertly) friendly relations with all participants in the coming conflict and all incited to more active actions.

On August 14, 1939, during negotiations, Marshal Voroshilov raised the question of whether the Polish government was ready to provide corridors for the passage of Red Army units through Polish territory in the event of a conflict with Germany.

This question was answered in the negative.

"Ah so! - said the Kremlin comrades. - Then we'll make a pact with Hitler and together with him divide Poland into parts." And they did. And they did.

3

Poland's refusal to allow Red Army troops to pass through its territory became for Kremlin propaganda a universal argument of all-destroying power. When asked why the pact with Hitler was made, the immediate answer is: because Poland refused to give us corridors! We were ready to defend her, but she did not want to.

The logic is literally murderous: let me into your house, I'll protect you. If you don't, I'll tear you to pieces. Comrade Voroshilov, from behind whose back Stalin's moustache protruded, put the question in this way: either the Polish State lets the Red Army onto its land, or the Red Army together with Hitler destroys the Polish State.

It's a typical Mafia arrangement: we take your restaurant under our protection, under our warm wing. You don't agree? Then we'll take it by force or burn it down.

Looking at those events from the new millennium, we are forced to recognize that the Polish government's decision not to let the Reds onto its land was certainly the right one.

Let's start on the purely ethical side.

If the Soviet Union intended to defend Poland against German aggression, it should have negotiated not with Great Britain and France, but with Poland. If the security of Poland and the Soviet Union was at stake, what had Great Britain and France to do with it?

Britain and France had their own interests, which may or may not coincide with the interests of the Soviet Union. And Poland's interests in this matter coincided completely with the interests of the Soviet Union: to keep Germany out of the East!

So if it came to stopping Germany's movement to the East, the first thing to do was to invite Poland to the negotiating table. But Comrade Voroshilov did not think of that. Comrade Stalin thought for him, and he reasoned in the Stalinist way: not to invite Poland, to solve the questions of Polish security behind her back, to demand answers to questions of vital importance to the Poles not from the Polish Government, but from the British and the French. And demand an immediate answer!

To put it simply, questions of the security of Poland were decided without her participation, as if she were not a sovereign state, as if she had already been written off, as if not in Warsaw but in Paris and London the question whether to let the Red Army onto Polish soil or not should be decided.

We must regretfully admit that the British and French delegations were not staffed by the most intelligent people. As soon as Voroshilov raised the question of corridors through Poland, the representatives of Great Britain and France should have immediately, amicably and sharply replied: we have no right to decide this question, we are not authorized to discuss it. But the British and French wise men fell into Stalin's trap and were drawn into the discussion.

Stalin's calculation was precise. To put up for discussion a problem which concerned the sovereignty of Poland without inviting the Polish delegation to the negotiations was a deliberate open and insolent diplomatic insult. If the Polish government had responded positively to the question posed, it would have been a national disgrace and humiliation. Imagine that what-

people behind closed doors decide amongst themselves whether or not to let strangers into your house. They don't invite you into their company. When they agree among themselves, they stick their heads out from behind the door: "Hey, man, how about it, do you agree?

I would send such wise men away. And the Polish government did exactly that. It could not do otherwise, and it had no right to do so! In any case, a policy of principle is the only correct policy. The Polish government in this case has shown deep principledness. Honor and praise to it!

Subsequent events fully confirmed the correctness of the Polish Government's decision. A few months later Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia allowed Red Army garrisons to be stationed on their territories. It is clear that these units were placed for the sake of "ensuring security against German aggression". The Red Army could not provide any security to the Baltic States: in the summer of 1941, Hitler knocked out the Soviet "defenders" from the Baltics in a couple of weeks.

But such "ensuring of security" already in the summer of 1940 turned into "revolt of the masses", overthrow of legitimate governments, "voluntary entry into the fraternal family of nations", collectivization, mass extermination of people and occupation, which was planned for eternity.

If in 1939 the Polish government had agreed to let the Red Army into its territory, there would have been a "socialist revolution" in Warsaw in a very short time.

Poland could not dare to take such a step. And rightly so. Finland, most of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Bessarabia were once part of the Russian Empire. After the collapse of the empire, they were not subordinate to Moscow. At the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet Union tried to bring all these lands back under its control. Poland and Finland resisted, and as a result, they retained their independence after the war, albeit in a reduced form (for example, the deputy head of the *Polish* government was Marshal Rokossovsky of *the Soviet Union*). And all those who accepted Soviet troops in 1940 without resistance were incorporated into the Soviet Union after the war.

The Polish government refused to let Soviet troops through its territory because it realized how it would end. And this--

feat. With this step, the Polish government has ensured that its people will be able to revive the country in the distant future. At the beginning of the new millennium, Poland's economic development is the fastest in Europe. One of the main reasons is that Poles have always resisted communism, including in the summer of 1939.

4

In 1920, Stalin and Voroshilov were rushing through Poland to Germany to light the fire of the World Revolution. And were beaten by Pilsudski.

From 1920 to 1939, Stalin and Voroshilov did everything possible and impossible to overthrow the government of Poland and establish a communist dictatorship in that country. It came to the point of sending terrorist gangs of Chekists under the leadership of I. Nekhvedovich, S. Vaupshasov, V. Korzh, K. Orlovsky and the like into Polish territory to launch a "partisan war".

"Partisan warfare" didn't work out. Stalin and Voroshilov had to bring all these heroes back home and use them in their basic vertuhai-firing specialty. Vaupshasov, for example, went to command a concentration camp and then went abroad again, this time to Spain, to build a happy life using his abundant experience as a terrorist and prison warden.

Orlovsky has exactly the same biography: from 1920 to 1925 he led a gang of terrorists on the territory of Poland, then he was a major boss at one of the most famous construction sites of the Gulag - the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal. After that he rendered "fraternal assistance" to the people of Spain.

Study the biographies of Korzh, Nekhvedovich and other "heroes" of Soviet international terrorism, and you will be surprised to find the same sequence: "partisan warfare" in Poland, a major position in the NKVD, then Spain.

And so, in 1939, all these Waupshasovs and Orlovskis again gathered in Moscow and waited for a new job. And Comrades Stalin and Voroshilov at that moment suddenly became inflamed with the desire to defend Poland, and therefore demanded that their troops be allowed into Polish soil. It is clear that this demand was unacceptable to the Polish Government.

Stalin and Voroshilov knew it very well. That's why they made such a demand.

Poland refused to let Soviet troops through its territory. That's what Stalin wanted. Refuse to let them through? Then negotiations with Britain and France are over. Then we make a pact with Hitler!

And immediately it was concluded.

5

Communist ideologists insist: the Soviet Union had no choice - either we defend Poland like a sister, or together with Hitler we kill it and tear it to pieces. There was no other choice. And we will pay attention to the proximity of the dates.

The question of corridors for the passage of Red Army units through Poland was first raised by Voroshilov on August 14, 1939, and already on August 19 Molotov gave final consent to Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow for the partition of Poland.

Simply put, the Kremlin's fighters for collective security put the question of corridors in such a way that it could only be answered in the negative. In addition, no time for reflection was given.

If the government of Poland, contrary to common sense and the national interests of the country, did change its decision and allowed the passage of Red Army units through its territory, it would still be impossible to change the situation: in the Kremlin they were already flying corks into the ceiling and raising glasses to the fraternal friendship of Stalin and Hitler. And Comrade Voroshilov announced:

The USSR concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany as a result, incidentally, of the fact that negotiations with France and England had reached an impasse due to insurmountable differences (Izvestia. August 27, 1939).

The logic is amazing. Great Britain and France do not want to attack Germany in case of "indirect aggression" on its part, and therefore we, the USSR, become not "indirect" but direct and real aggressors, murderers and cannibals, we become

an ally of Hitler, we will supply him with everything necessary to crush Europe, and together with him we will torment Europe.

6

The most common explanation for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact given by Communists is that the Red Army was completely unprepared for war. Stalin supposedly needed to buy time and delay the outbreak of war. Stalin supposedly delayed the war in both 1939 and 1940. But even after that he was still completely unprepared and did everything possible to ensure that the war did not start in 1941, but at least in 1942 or 1943.

That's a very sensible explanation. But how do you reconcile it with the requirement to provide corridors?

Voroshilov demanded corridors from August 14 to August 18 1939 inclusive. During these days the Red Army was ready to go into battle immediately. But on August 19, both Stalin and Voroshilov suddenly realized that the country and the army are not ready for war, and began to delay the war - is that how it turns out?

And a week later Voroshilov lamented: Ah, if only I had been given corridors! I would have fought Hitler, but these evil Poles did not give me such an opportunity. These are Voroshilov's words:

The Soviet military mission believed that the USSR, which had no common border with the aggressor, could assist France, England and Poland only if its troops passed through Polish territory, because there were no other ways to come into contact with the aggressor's troops (Izvestia. August 27, 1939).

It follows unequivocally that neither Voroshilov nor Stalin, who stood behind him, at the end of August 1939, the Red Army was not considered helpless and was ready to immediately throw Soviet divisions and corps into battle. They only lacked corridors.

Why, then, did they suddenly decide to "delay the beginning of the war"? Why did they sign a criminal agreement with Hitler for the sake of "delaying"?

***

It is long past time for historians to make up their minds:

• or recognize that the corridors through Poland were necessary for Voroshilov and Stalin only to disrupt negotiations with Great Britain and France and to find justification for the criminal conspiracy with Hitler,

• or recognize as false the thesis that the pact with Hitler was concluded for the sake of "delaying the outbreak of war".

Otherwise 's not good: the Red Army is not ready for war at all, the next few years will not be enough for it to prepare, so give us immediate corridors through Poland, we are ready to subdue Hitler right now!

CHAPTER 10. "The fate of Europe would have been different..."

Had the governments of England and France in 1939 wanted to join their military forces with the Soviet Union against the aggressor, as we suggested, the fate of Europe would have been different....

Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov. Memories and reflections. MOSCOW: APN, 1969. C. 188

1

Reading memoirs Zhukov - is an occupation is tedious. It requires effort. The style alone is worth it: the fate would be different....

Destiny is what? Different.

Would be what? I'd be different.

Why don't you just write that the fate would have been different? It would have been easier to read.

And what a strange dependence it is: the later the edition of Memories and Reflections was, the more grammatical, stylistic, orthographic and syntactic errors it contained. And semantic ones.

In Soviet times, the so-called "Quality Mark" was invented. Theoretically, it was supposed to mark those goods that met world standards. In practice, things looked somewhat different.

The publishers of "Memories and Reflections" remembered the native Soviet nationwide struggle for quality. Instead of conscientious work on the mistakes in the memoirs of the great strategist, they embossed on the title page of "Memories and Reflections" the praise of Mikhail Sholokhov, who certified that the quality of this book was in good order. The classic of socialist realism expressed himself in the sense that it was not easy for professional writers to compete with such literature.

Here, at first glance, is Sholokhov's self-deprecation in its purest form. At in fact before we have an example of self-glorification and self -

I, Sholokhov, am so great, but even I, who am very talented, cannot easily and simply compete with Zhukov in literary skill.

In order to appreciate Sholokhov's literary gift, I highly recommend a book that Ze'ev Bar-Sella wrote. The book is called
"Literary Cauldron. The Writer Sholokhov Project" (Moscow: RSUHU, 2005). "Literary Cauldron" is like opening our eyes: after reading it, you feel like a newborn puppy who has just sprouted eyes. You clap them, scratch the back of your head: how could I not have noticed all this before?

But back to Zhukov's immortal masterpiece. It's also a hymn to himself. What one phrase is worth: "*If the governments of England and France... wanted to unite... as we suggested...*"

Do you see the level? On one side are the UK and French governments, on the other side are us.

We're who?

In March, April and May 1939, Stalin and Molotov, through their most trusted men, were engaged in intense behind-the-scenes negotiations with the British and French governments to curb Germany. At the same time, Kommdiv Zhukov was swinging a saber in the Belorussian Special Military District. He himself did not propose anything to the British and French governments, his opinion was not asked at that time.

The consequence of the behind-the-scenes activity of Stalin and Molotov was the negotiations of the military delegations of the USSR, Great Britain and France in August of the same year. Komkor Zhukov at that time was fighting in Mongolia. He had nothing to do with the negotiations of the three powers, and he has nothing to remember about these negotiations.

So why not write: Stalin and Molotov proposed .... Or: the Soviet government proposed.... Or: members of the Soviet military mission, headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov, proposed....

Why is it "we"?

2

And isn't it time to deal with the fact that *we were* the ones suggesting it?

At one time I had the opportunity to work in Geneva. At that time, negotiations on security and co-operation in Europe were taking place there. Then the agreements reached in Geneva were signed in Helsinki.

Why Helsinki? Because it was convenient for Comrade Brezhnev to travel by train from Leningrad to Helsinki. But it was not convenient to go to Geneva by airplane. Therefore, the signing was moved from Switzerland to Finland. And the delegations of 34 other countries of Europe and North America obediently went where it was convenient for Comrade Brezhnev.

But all the many years of preliminary work was done in Geneva. And I had an opportunity to see the mechanism of decision-making from the inside. In Geneva, in addition to the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Semyonov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and head of the Soviet delegation, was permanently present. Together with him in the best hotels of Geneva for years lived a whole tabor of employees of the Foreign Ministry. They worked like blacks on cotton plantations. From dawn to dawn. They fought for every comma.

For many years, serious people from many countries engaged in idle chatter. Moscow kept a vigilant eye on every word uttered, every letter written in the protocols. Any small slip, any unfortunate phrase could cause a terrible scandal. Cipher messages flew from Moscow, and Comrade Semyonov was taken with a heart attack to a posh hospital, which was affordable only to Arab sheikhs and proletarian leaders.

As soon as success was imminent, and as a result of years of verbiage the Soviet Union managed to pull the blanket over itself, Comrade Gromyko, Politburo member and Foreign Minister, appeared in Geneva, followed by two planes of consultants.

At the same time in Geneva, other delegations were conducting many other negotiations: on maritime boundaries and territorial waters, on the law of the sea, on the distribution of radio frequencies, on strategic arms reduction, and so on. The approach is the same: we will not give an inch of our land to our enemies! The diplomatic battles, I can assure you, are in no way inferior to tank battles in terms of heat.

The toughest diplomatic battles are not between adversaries trying to reach an agreement, but between partners,

who don't trust each other.

An exception to these rules were the negotiations of the military missions of Great Britain, France and the USSR in Moscow in August 1939.

3

When negotiating a political-military coalition, each side seeks to commit itself to the minimum and to commit its partner to the maximum - and a little more than that. That is why passions are running high.

Nothing before the Moscow talks of 1939 portended surprises. Germany was surrounded by adversaries. On one side were Britain and France, and on the other were Poland, Romania, and Turkey, which at that moment were allies of Britain and France. In any case, whether Hitler would have gone west or east, Britain, France and Poland were forced to fight against him. At the same time, in any case, the Soviet Union remained out of the war, as it had no common borders with Germany.

The British and French Governments set their delegations the task of getting the Soviet Government to make the following commitments in the coming bitter diplomatic battle:

- in the event of German aggression, the Soviet Union should do nothing against Poland, Romania and Turkey;
- during the war, the Soviet Union must ensure the transit of goods for these countries through Soviet territory;
- If in the course of the war Poland, Romania, or Turkey find it necessary to buy arms from the Soviet Union to fight against Germany, the Soviet Union will grant their requests.

The French delegation had an instruction: "Do not ask more from the Russians" (1939: Lessons of History. Moscow: Mysl, 1990. P. 314). The British demands were even more modest.

The British and French delegations prepared for a grueling struggle, but the head of the Soviet military delegation, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov, immediately accepted all conditions with one phrase: "The proposals of Great Britain and France raise no objections."

The delegations of Great Britain and France achieved everything in just 7 minutes: 6 minutes for the presentation of their position and 1 minute for reflection and response of the proletarian marshal. No nervousness, no struggle for formulations and their interpretation. No paralysis or heart attack in the heads of delegations. Simply and clearly: all your demands, gentlemen, are accepted.

What would the Soviet delegation demand from the potential allies as payment for their incredible concession?

Comrade Voroshilov did not demand anything from Great Britain and France! On the contrary, he urged Great Britain and France to strengthen their demands on the Soviet Union:

I believe that Mr. Dumenk, in outlining the plans for the defense of the western front.... will not limit himself only to the west, but will express his assumptions, how, in his opinion, the defense should be organized, the retraction of the aggressor's forces in the east (USSR in the struggle for peace on the eve of the Second World War (September 1938 - August 1939). Documents and Materials. Moscow: Politizdat, 1971. C. 218).

The British and French delegations outlined their war plans. The Soviet delegation listened to them patiently and did not raise a single objection or wish.

I suspect that if the British and French delegations had come to the talks with much tougher demands, they too would have been accepted by Moscow without objection or discussion.

Voroshilov's tactic can be expressed as follows: Why do you gentlemen take on all your responsibilities? Why don't you take these responsibilities on the Soviet Union?

4

August 15, 1939 during the negotiations in Moscow, the Soviet delegation laid the cards on the table: if German aggression will be directed against Britain and France, the Soviet Union will put up "*63 infantry divisions, 6 cavalry divisions with the appropriate amount of artillery, tanks, aircraft, a total of about 2 million people*" (G. K. Zhukov. Memories and Reflections. Moscow: APN, 1969. P. 185).

No one asked the Soviet Union for such participation. The Soviet Union could quietly live a peaceful life and watch the all-European carnage from its safe distance. But for some reason Comrade Stalin was ready to throw a mind-boggling number of tanks, artillery and aviation to fight for the freedom and independence of French and British capitalists, exploiters, bloodsuckers and oppressors of the working people. And to throw from the very first moment of the war, not remembering that the beginning of the war for the USSR he had to delay.

If Hitler turned his troops against Poland, the Soviet Union intended to field "*120 infantry divisions, 16 cavalry divisions, 5 thousand heavy guns, 9-10 thousand tanks, from 5 to 5.5 thousand combat airplanes (without auxiliary aviation), that is, bombers and fighters*" (ibid. P. 184). Each Soviet division was to have a strength of 19 thousand soldiers and commanders. Under the second option, the Soviets fielded twice as many fighters as under the first. To this was added:

The participation of the USSR in the war can be only when France and England agree with Poland and, if possible, with Lithuania, as well as with Rumania on the passage of our troops.... (ibid. P. 185).

The dumbfounded delegations of France and Great Britain joyfully reported to Paris and London that the Russians were offering absolutely incredible help, demanding nothing in return. The only condition: give corridors through Poland. If there were no corridors, there would be no participation of the Soviet Union in the war.

The documents of that meeting were made public under Stalin as proof of the Soviet Union's readiness to curb Hitler and prevent World War II. Kremlin propaganda has reprinted the minutes of this meeting many times in multi-page folios with titles like
"The Soviet Union's Struggle for Peace on the Eve of World War II."

Books with similar titles and standardized content were printed by the Academy of Sciences. This did not seem enough, so abundant pieces from the minutes of the Moscow meeting were also squeezed into the memoirs of Zhukov, who had nothing to do with those events, but proudly announced: we proposed!

5

The military delegations of Great Britain and France then, and the singers of Stalin's peace-loving foreign policy now, should have paid attention to a small detail, unremarkable at first glance - to the Soviet justification for the demands to provide corridors: "*The USSR's participation in the war can be only when France and England agree with Poland...*".

This phrase clearly shows that the Kremlin leaders did not consider the participation of the Soviet Union in the coming war to be obligatory at all. If Great Britain and France manage to persuade Poland, then we will participate. If not, then we will not participate in the war.

It turned out that it was not Hitler, and not Stalin, who determined the Soviet Union's participation in the war, but Poland's position. And that evil Poland opposed the Soviet Union's participation in the war in every possible way. If Poland did not want Poland, the unfortunate Soviet Union would remain out of the war and would not be able to join it.

For Poland's refusal to grant corridors to the Soviet Union, the P o l i s h should have given the P o l i s h people a treat! They should have set up tables along the entire Soviet-Polish border: eat, drink, be merry and fight Hitler yourself, but don't call us to fight. We have no opportunity to fight Hitler. We beg you, don't give us such an opportunity! We'll live without war somehow.

And here is a question to which no one has yet given an answer: if the Kremlin leaders thought it possible to stay out of the war, why did they want to fight? Why did they propose the participation of their armies of millions in the war, if participation for the Soviet Union was not obligatory at all? And why did they organize a meeting in Moscow at all, if the Soviet Union needed to stay out of the coming war as long as possible?

If the participation of the Soviet Union in the war was due only to the position of Poland, which did not want such participation, this position should have been encouraged and supported in every possible way.

Serious historians tell us that Stalin tried by all means to avoid participation in the war. At least, he tried to buy time and delay the Soviet Union's entry into the war. And these same serious historians tell us that Stalin

terribly wanted to obtain corridors through Poland and to ensure the Soviet Union's participation in the war from its very first day. It was only the wicked Panes who prevented him by their stubbornness.

6

My friend, the translator Misha Shauli, once remarked that judging the history of the war by those editions of Zhukov's memoirs that were revised after his death is like writing a history of the Civil War, passing off anecdotes about Chapaev as his memoirs.

The latest, "most truthful" editions of Zhukov's memoirs are indeed anecdotal; however, the first edition, which was published during Zhukov's lifetime, is also full of ridiculous inconsistencies and absurdities. Zhukov's desire to make himself look like a participant in key events turns against him. He announced that in August 1939 *we proposed to* move through the corridors in Poland directly to the borders of Germany 9-10 thousand tanks.

One must think that the Soviet Union did not intend to move all its tanks to Poland. Something had to remain on its own soil, i.e., in the summer of 1939 the Soviet Union had not 9,000-10,000 tanks, but more.

It must be assumed that if the leaders of the Soviet Union insisted on corridors, the tanks they were going to move to the German lines were capable of fighting against the German army. Apparently, they were repaired, the drivers had experience in driving, and the commanders had all the necessary means to control such military masses in battle.

At least, neither Marshal Voroshilov then, nor Marshal Zhukov 30 years after those events did not call these tanks either "light" or "obsolete", and did not state that in August 1939, the tanks in the vast majority required repairs, that the drivers were inexperienced, and commanders - the means of control. Neither said a word about the decapitated army. Both are extremely categorical: the Soviet Union was determined to rein in Hitler right in August 1939. It had all the capabilities, forces and means to do so, including thousands of tanks ready to move at the first command to the German borders through the corridors in Poland.

Zhukov said that the pact with Hitler had to be signed in order to gain time and delay the beginning of the war.

Why, explain to me, should it be delayed if the Red Army is ready to enter the war immediately?

Zhukov said that in 1941 Hitler threw 3,712 tanks against the Soviet Union, and explained the reason for the defeat of our troops overwhelming and multiple numerical superiority of the German army, "especially in tanks, aircraft and artillery."

And where did those 9-10 thousand tanks, which in August 1939 *we proposed to* move through the corridors, go?

And these tanks, it turns out, are suddenly light. They were obsolete. They needed repairs. They were a fire hazard. They didn't have radios. Drivers didn't know how to drive tanks. Commanders had lost the ability to manage their troops. And suddenly there were very few tanks in the Red Army.

I have a question: why was it necessary to buy time and delay the start of the war, if in the time that was won, the Red Army's tanks suddenly became obsolete and lightweight?

7

If the British and French military delegations had been staffed by more experienced people, they should have thought about the question: Why is Comrade Stalin so generous? They did not ask this question, but we will ask it to ourselves and think about possible answers. It turns out to be some nonsense. If Hitler turns to the west and will fight against Britain and France, such a war does not bode well for him. Because Hitler can't beat the British navy. He doesn't have such forces. And he has no strategic aviation. In any case, the war will be protracted and therefore extremely unfavorable for Germany. If we take into account America, which will not look at all this indifferently, we have to admit that for Hitler this scenario will end in defeat. Sooner or later he will lose this war.

Question: why would Stalin send 2 million of his fighters to foreign lands through some corridors to die? Why commit himself? Let the damned capitalists in Europe fight among themselves. What do we care about that?

The position of the Soviet Union in the case of the second scenario was even stranger: if Hitler moves in the eastern direction, then the Soviet Union will put up 4 million soldiers.... Here the wise British and French generals should have asked the question: why is Comrade Stalin so stingy? Why does he put out in this situation only 4 million?

If Stalin regarded a possible German attack on Poland as a threat to the Soviet Union, there was no need to bargain, no need to negotiate in advance the number of divisions, artillery, airplanes and tanks to be used against Hitler. For in such a case the whole Soviet power should be displayed, not just 4 million!

Stalin had a population of 170 million. The mobilization resource is 17 million. That is why it should have been declared: if Hitler attacks Poland, I will be forced to carry out a general mobilization and fight in full force until the victorious end, regardless of what Britain and France will do.

And not only Britain and France to state this, but the whole world, including Hitler.

The Red Army did not need corridors through Poland even in this case. Let Hitler first break through Poland, and in the meantime we will prepare and meet him properly.

All great generals put light forces in the first echelon to start the battle. As the enemy moved forward, the resistance did not weaken, but on the contrary, increased, because in the second echelon of the defenders there were heavily armed warriors and in much greater numbers.

In 1939 fate itself determined the role of the Polish Army to be that of an advanced detachment, and that of the Red Army to be the main force. It would seem: let the Poles die in the first echelon, and the Red Army will stand in the second. Stalin that, Stalin suddenly felt sorry for the Poles? So let the Poles take the first most terrible blow, let the Germans waste their strength, let them stretch their communications, and then let them without any pause meet the main forces of the Red Army away from the German borders and supply bases.

But for some reason Stalin wanted to put the best, most combat-ready part of the Red Army in the first echelon. For this purpose he demanded corridors through Poland, through which he intended to bring out

millions of their fighters, armadas of planes, heavy guns and tanks to the west, almost a thousand kilometers from their borders to the Oder and start the war right on the Polish-German border.

What's it for him? What's the benefit? Why expose yourself to the first blow when Poland is determined to take the blow for itself? Why should the Red Army rush into the first echelon, especially since it is not allowed to go there?

This position becomes even more ludicrous if we take into account that Kremlin propaganda is hammering into our heads the idea that the Red Army is completely incapable of fighting and that Stalin is wildly afraid of the imminent threat from the West. If you are afraid, then hide behind the back of Poland! Why are you in the front row?

***

It seems to me that the surprising generosity of Stalin in the development of events under the first scenario and the same surprising stinginess in their development under the second is explained by the fact that no one in the Kremlin neither to the first nor to the second scenario was not taken seriously and was not going to fulfill the obligations imposed on themselves. All they had to do was to demonstrate their determination to repel the aggressor under any circumstances. And demand corridors through Poland. And get a refusal.

After that, one could put a clean hand on a hot heart and say brokenly: we were eager to defend you, but you did not agree. After Poland's refusal, one could hang a red flag with a swastika in the Moscow airport and take bottles out of the cellars to meet Ribbentrop.

CHAPTER 11. How do you envision these corridors?

The plans could not have been more noble, humane and freedom-loving than their initiators. The world was already facing the ominous rivalry of Auschwitz and Majdanek with Katyn, Kuropaty, Kolyma.

Jan Zamoyski. Russia in the XX century. Historians of the world argue. Moscow: Nauka, 1994. C. 428

1

When it comes to Marshal Voroshilov's demand to let Red Army troops through Polish territory, i.e. corridors through Poland, I patiently listen to the arguments of the venerable academicians, and then, looking down, I ask: how do you imagine these corridors?

Let me explain the meaning of the question. For this purpose, let me come from afar. From 1812.

In that year, the situation for the Russian state was dire. Bonaparte leads a huge army to Moscow. Kutuzov and his army are retreating. The Tsar, the elite of society and all the people demand a general battle. Kutuzov alone realizes that a general battle could ruin both the army and Russia. It is Bonaparte, after all. Bonaparte's main hope is just to crush the enemy in a general battle. He has no equal in general battles. He's never lost such a battle.

To fight with Bonaparte - a beautiful idea, of course, but you can really get into trouble. That's why Kutuzov evaded the general battle as much as he could. But this cunning commander realized that the screamers, who do not go into the meaning of what is happening, are also right in their own way - the general battle was necessary to raise the morale of the army and the people. But not everyone is born a great commander.

The public grumbled. And the army was angry. The old men grumbled: "Why are we going to winter quarters? There were rumors. Kutuzov was accused of cowardice. It could have resulted in his dismissal. Instead of Kutuzov.

The sovereign could put a brave man who would undoubtedly have rushed into battle and in that battle would have broken the neck not only of himself, but of the whole army. Therefore, in order to ward off accusations of indecision and cowardice, Kutuzov gave battle at the gates of Moscow. He chose the place near the village of Borodino, on a river with an unusual, strange and terrible name - Voina.

A lot of blood was spilled that terrible day. FOUR MILLION soldiers clashed in mortal combat in a rather narrow area. 1200 cannons from both sides from dawn to dusk nailed with cannonballs and buckshot. More than 100,000 men were killed and maimed, and no fewer horses.

Both Bonaparte and Kutuzov declared the Battle of Borodino their victory. Looking at that meat grinder from the twenty-first century, we recognize that the battle ended in the same positions as it began. Neither side managed to overturn the other.

Why did Kutuzov declare this battle a victory? Because Bonaparte failed to crush, overturn and drive the Russian army and force Russia to surrender. By giving battle at the gates of Moscow, Kutuzov secured himself from reproaches of cowardice and ensured himself the opportunity to continue to act as he saw fit.

After the battle, Kutuzov decided not to take any more risks and not to continue the battle the next day. He gave the order to withdraw, leaving Moscow to the French. It is clear that Bonaparte declared this battle his victory. How could it be otherwise: it was a battle after which the Russians surrendered Moscow.

Kutuzov's army withdrew to Moscow, passed through it and moved southeast. Bonaparte took Moscow. And Kutuzov, having broken away from the pursuit, turned *westward*!

Kutuzov led his army south of Moscow and established a fortified camp southwest of the city. Here Kutuzov replenished his army, preparing it for new battles and Bonaparte did not disturb. Bonaparte worried himself. Kutuzov was at his back. At any moment he could block all the roads that connected Bonaparte's army with Europe. This Bonaparte did not like it very much, and he decided to leave.

Although it wasn't winter yet. Although no one had chased him out of Moscow.

Kutuzov's marching maneuver is a brilliant example of the use of indirect action strategy: Kutuzov and his army sat in the

in a fortified camp and did nothing! And Bonaparte himself ran away from Moscow!

Kutuzov is still accused of surrendering Moscow. There is a psychology at work here. Everyone understands the role of Moscow, but they miss a very unremarkable detail: at that time the capital of the empire was NOT in MOSCOW.

Giving Moscow, Kutuzov risked nothing. The administration of the state was not disturbed for a minute. It is not Kutuzov who should be blamed, but Bonaparte. So far, no one has explained the strange choice: why did he go to Moscow, if the capital of Russia was St. Petersburg?

By giving Bonaparte Moscow, Kutuzov prepared the death of the conqueror's huge army and ensured the Russian army a victorious movement to Paris and its capture. And Paris was the capital of the empire. And not only - Paris was then the capital of all continental Europe. By sacrificing Moscow, giving up his queen, Kutuzov eventually put the enemy on checkmate.

Here again it is worth reminding the difference between the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The Russian army came to Paris, did not catch Bonaparte and returned home. And Comrade Stalin, if he had captured Paris, under no circumstances would never have left it voluntarily.

2

Now let us imagine that all Stalin's readiness to curb the aggressor in August 1939 was not contrived, not a joke, but the very real. Let's imagine that the British and French governments would have managed to persuade harmful pans, and those corridors to Stalin would have been provided. All is well, all is wonderful. Comrade Stalin advances to the Polish-German border, almost to the Oder, two or even four million soldiers and commanders of the Red Army with the appropriate amount of artillery, tanks, airplanes, strategic reserves and the like.

How can all this stuff be housed?

It was good for Zhukov in Mongolia. Steppe and steppe all around. Not a single living soul. Land your planes wherever you like. There's an airfield everywhere. Dig whatever trenches you want. Stuff your men as you see fit.

But Poland is not Mongolia. It's densely populated Central Europe. 5,000 combat planes is 100 full-blooded air regiments. 5,500 airplanes is 110 regiments. During the war it was recognized that 50 planes in a regiment is too much. After the war it was established: a fighter regiment - 40 airplanes, tactical bombers - 30.

Each regiment needed at least three airfields: a main airfield and two reserve airfields. When the Red Army entered Poland, at least 300-330 airfields had to be deployed immediately.

But 5,000-5,500 airplanes are only fighters and bombers. Where should we put reconnaissance planes? And transportation planes? And it is necessary to maintain and improve the flying qualification of pilots and navigators. Therefore, is necessary to have enough training airplanes. And airfields for training flights not at the borders.

By the way, where would we place our air force so that our peacefully sleeping airfields would not come under the first sudden crushing blow one fine Sunday morning? Fighters are better kept 100 kilometers from the borders. And bombers should be placed 200 kilometers from the borders. For the stability of the aviation grouping, it does not hurt to have rear airfields at least 300 kilometers from the borders. So that, if something happens, the air force will have a place to bounce back to.

But if so, Soviet airfields would have to be built throughout ALL of Poland. Take a map of Poland within the 1939 borders. To the west is Germany, to the north is East Prussia, to the south is German-occupied Czechoslovakia. Take a circular and from different points of the Polish border draw circles with radius corresponding to the distance of 100 kilometers on the map - only the center of the country and the eastern regions will remain unoccupied. Here, in the center of Poland, and place airfields for fighters. Pull roads and communications here as well. And for such number of airplanes deploy colossal warehouses and storages of aviation fuel, bombs, shells, ammunition, spare parts. And you can't do without a repair base. These airfields, if they are a hundred kilometers from the borders, must be protected not only by anti-aircraft artillery, but also by field troops.

3

A mere attempt to draw on a map of possible airfields for the Soviet air force and their combat support, security and defense systems is enough to understand that Stalin was cunning in demanding corridors. As soon as the issue of corridors would be resolved, the issue of airfields would immediately arise. You can not take millions of soldiers into a foreign country and leave them without air support and aerial reconnaissance!

But it is impossible to deploy aviation without airfields! Is it possible to leave airfields without access roads, without anti-aircraft cover, without warehouses and storage facilities, without communication centers and command posts, without aviation hospitals and repair bases, without two or three chains of air observation posts, without security and defense? That's right.

Now let's try to place bombing aviation so that the borders are at least 200 km away. Let's twist a circular and whistle. The Warsaw area is not suitable for bomber aviation basing - after all, it is just over a hundred kilometers from the borders of East Prussia. Here we'll land our fighters, and we'll pull back the bombers. The areas of Krakow, Poznan, Lodz, Lvov and Tarnopol are not suitable for them. Airfields for bomber aviation would have to be built in the area of Brest, Rivne, Lutsk, Kovel.

If we needed to have a few airfields 300 kilometers away from the borders with Germany and occupied Czechoslovakia, we could find such a piece in the area of the town of Sarny near the Soviet border.

When one does not get into the essence of the matter, the mention of corridors through Poland conjures up images of Soviet troops marching westward to the borders of Germany. But when you think about it, you realize that these corridors were to be immediately transformed into permanent garrisons of Soviet troops all over the country from the very borders of the Soviet Union to the borders of Germany.

There are many questions about the deployment of aviation. Here is one of them: did the Red Army intend to drive the Polish men off the ground on its own or in cooperation with the Polish authorities? If in cooperation, then from the establishment of this cooperation and

had to begin. The Polish government should have been negotiated with. Not with the British and French.

Well, there's also tanks. 9,000 or 10,000. Has anyone ever wondered how such a huge amount of military equipment can be deployed in a foreign country? Mongolia had no such problems. Mongolia was completely dependent on Moscow. What the Soviet comrades wanted, they did in Mongolia. Moreover, a treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and Mongolia, according to which the Red Army assumed the obligation to defend Mongolia from aggression.

But Poland was a sovereign state. Well, the Poles would have given the corridors. What then? Would the Soviet divisions have frozen in the corridors in columns, waiting for the war to start? We should not talk about corridors, but about whether it was possible to deploy millions of troops on a foreign land 700-800 kilometers from the Soviet borders and 170 kilometers from Berlin, so as not to leave them in the fields for autumn and winter, along with many thousands of units of military equipment and strategic reserves of millions of tons.

It was not in London or Paris that the answers to all these questions should have been sought, but in Warsaw. But Moscow made no attempt even to put all these questions before the Polish Government. Before the military delegations of Great Britain and France, the Soviet delegation put the questions about the corridors through Poland as if there were no longer any government in Poland. As if it were an empty land on which no one lived and which was not governed by anyone.

And now someone is trying to prove that Stalin's thoughts in 1939 were as pure as water in a forest stream!

4

Why did I mention Bonaparte here, you may ask? Don't be
in a hurry. I'll explain.

Thousands of years before Bonaparte, military leaders knew the most important rule of war - you must cut off the enemy's supply lines and protect your own supply lines from enemy attempts to cut them off. Bonaparte held fast to this principle.

Zhukov had a good time in Mongolia. He had 57,000 troops. To supply this grouping required a Herculean effort. All

the necessary had to be transported by car. Tens of thousands of tons - hundreds of kilometers away. This was enough for a short operation.

Now imagine a grouping of two or even four million soldiers with a colossal amount of weapons and military equipment. In the event of war, they were to conduct not a short-term operation, but a long, grueling war. Neither tens nor hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies will do. The account will go to millions of tons of ammunition, fuel and lubricants, food, engineering equipment, spare parts and so on and so forth. Such a quantity of cargo could be delivered only by railroads.

The granting of corridors through Poland meant nothing less than the transfer of all the railroads of Poland under the control of the Red Army. This, in turn, meant the transfer of the entire economy of the sovereign state under the control of the Red commanders.

How could it not be?

Here, for example, is the commander of a Soviet rifle corps. He has 60,000 soldiers. (Let's not forget that Comrade Stalin threatened to put divisions of 19 thousand soldiers.) He needs to urgently give his corps three railroad echelons with 122-mm howitzer shells. But he cannot explain to the stationmaster what and where he is taking them. And he can't wait for the railroad cars to be given to him. Here some capitalists are doing their business, and the Soviet commander has a combat task. If he fails to fulfill his task, he'll be shot. So will he wait for the damned bourgeois to unload his wagons? It would be easier to shoot the bourgeois and throw his cargo out of the wagons than to put his own head under a Chekist revolver.

And these corps are not one, but many. 60 rifle divisions is 20-25 corps. 120 divisions - 40-50 corps. There are also cavalry corps. And aviation corps. And tank corps. AND AIR DEFENSE. And they all need transportation urgently.

Are there any other variants of relations between Soviet commanders and Polish railroad workers in wartime conditions? Let's imagine: Red commanders sit and wait for the Pans to solve all their transportation problems, and then one day they will remember about them, poor people, and allocate steam locomotives with cars. A

because that moment may never come. Railroad transportation is always overloaded. Steam locomotives and railcars are always in business.

Or, for example, the Pans have started repairs on a certain line. Did they ask permission? We have no right to reveal our plans. That's why it's not us who have to coordinate with them, but they have to coordinate with us where, when and what can and must be repaired. And we should also tell them where and in what places the throughput capacity should be increased, where the passes should be developed, where unloading areas for tanks should be built. How can we do without all this?

So, whether we like it or not, we will have to put a Soviet military commandant at each station, who, if necessary, could stop traffic, demand that any trains be unloaded and any cargo be dumped under the slope, and that the rolling be immediately delivered to the specified place at the specified time. And that all the tracks be immediately cleared for our echelons. And in order that the commandant should have the appropriate authority, a garrison should be planted at each station.

So that's not all.

An uncle is sitting at the station, hammering something with a key: ti-ti-ti-ta-ti-ti-ti-ti-ti.... We can't understand what he's saying. And to whom.

It's not right. We need to put our own people in jail. Because otherwise we can't regulate traffic.

Railroads could not do without telegraph and telephone at that time. Therefore, along with the transition of the railroads under the control of the Soviet administration, all communication lines had to go under the same control. But along the railroads there were not only wires for railroad needs, but also all the state lines. And it was impossible to separate one from the other: they were connected to the same communication centers.

If we have taken control of the railroad communication lines, we must also take control of the communication centers. And they are common with the state communication system. We have taken control of the communication centers and, whether we like it or not, the entire state communication system is in our hands.

And with it, all state power.

5

The transfer of the Polish railroads to Soviet control meant another aspect which should not be forgotten. In the event of war, the trans-loading of thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands and millions of tons of war cargoes from broad gauge wagons to narrow gauge wagons would have sharply complicated the supply of the warring units of the Red Army. Such overloading would slow down the supply, which is always and everywhere the primary problem. Moreover, the places of overloading would have been extremely vulnerable. Therefore, the introduction of a million-strong Soviet military contingent into Poland for the purpose of fighting against Germany would inevitably have required that the Polish railroads be converted to the Soviet standard.

Have you ever tried unloading boxes of shells from one boxcar, hauling them and stacking them in another boxcar? How many soldiers would you need to do that and how long would it take?

It's good if the cars next to each other. But what if you have to unload them here and carry them over there? There were no containers then and no loading equipment either. And between the unloading place and the loading place there were endless rows of echelons. Or (even worse) the echelon has to be unloaded urgently, and the empty truck has not been loaded yet. So we haul it over there. And then tomorrow from there to the place of loading.

But you have not just one railroad car, but thousands. And after such overloads, some rifle division will inevitably receive navigation equipment for airplanes instead of 76-mm shells, and some tank regiment will inevitably receive horse horseshoes instead of caterpillar tracks.

Have you ever had to fill a tank from an iron barrel? The pump has a handle like the one on a meat grinder. You twist it, and the fuel pours from the barrel into the filler neck through a tube with a gurgling sound. Twist it for 20 minutes and your arm falls off. And there's hardly any more in the barrel. Now imagine pumping gasoline, diesel fuel and other things from the tanks of one echelon to the tanks of another. And you can't count on any pumping devices. And in the sky enemy bombers are walking. Nearby soldiers carry boxes of ammunition and shells, roll barrels of herring and sauerkraut, carry, like ants, bales of hay ...

In peacetime, wagons are lifted on jacks and wheels are changed. This requires a huge expenditure of effort and time. In times of war, it takes

there's neither. And no one would allow to throw tens of thousands of soldiers to overload an echelon. That is why in 1941 the Germans, advancing deep into the Soviet Union, were forced to remake the Soviet track to the European standard. And after that the Red Army, advancing, was forced to remake the gauge to the Soviet standard again - first to the very borders of the USSR, and then to Berlin.

In the event of the introduction of millions of Red Army fighters into the territory of Poland and the Polish railroads coming under the control of the Soviet military administration, the Soviet command would have been compelled to begin immediately the resurfacing of the Polish railroads without waiting for war. Otherwise, at the outbreak of war, the most combat-ready units of the Red Army would have found themselves far from their supply bases without the possibility of receiving everything they needed to fight.

6

Now let's look again at the map of Poland in the 1939 borders. What do we see? We see German lands, which embraced Poland on three sides. And we see railroads.

The Soviet-Polish border was crossed by six railroad lines.

One direction goes along the border with Czechoslovakia: Proskurov - Lvov - Krakow. The Red Army command would have to defend this highway with all its might. It would be enough for the enemy to blow up a bridge in one place, and the entire southern flank of the Soviet-German front would be without ammunition and everything else.

This highway could be threatened not only by saboteur detachments, but also by powerful enemy formations. Let's imagine: a German division struck from the territory of Czechoslovakia, cut and saddled the highway, erected a field fortified area, mined the approaches to it with millions of mines. How will you repel the captured area? And how long will it take you? And if the German division is not one, but three? In order to prevent capture of this highway, the Red Army would have had to

along the entire border with Czechoslovakia to put very large forces in defense.

Now let us look at the other highways. All other highways from the east bundle up to Warsaw, and from it fan out to the west. Let's assume that Stalin received the corridors and through them advanced the bulk of his troops to the eastern borders of Germany. What would happen? It would be a terrible situation. Over the most important hub of all our highways, Warsaw, overhangs East Prussia just as Kutuzov's camp overhangs over all Bonaparte's communications. The Red Army with its main and best forces would have reached the frontiers from which it was possible to start the Berlin operation, and behind, 300-400 kilometers behind its back, would have remained a powerful German grouping in East Prussia.

What would any strategist, even if not the smartest, do in this situation? He would either not bring his troops to the approaches to Berlin and, therefore, would not require corridors through Poland, or he would bring his troops almost to the Oder itself, but would deploy a whole front of at least a million men to the north to prevent blow to the rear of his troops from East Prussia. In addition, he would have to deploy another front of the same size facing south to protect himself from a blow from Czechoslovakia.

Poland in 1939 was like one big corridor from east to west. If it was used to move westward, it was necessary to protect its troops from attacks from both north and south. Simply put, Stalin, even if he was not an ogre, would still have been forced to deploy not one front in Poland, but three: to the west, to the north and to the south. The entire territory of Poland would have become one powerful bridgehead. And in the vicinity of Warsaw, Stalin would have been forced to build a super-powerful fortified area to secure the main hub of all communications, on which depended on the supply of his army.

Corridors through Poland would instantly and inevitably mean the transfer of control of the country into the hands of the Soviet fighters for European security. I repeat: even if these fighters had been guided by the purest of intentions.

***

Hitler demanded one corridor through Poland - not for troops, but for the construction of a highway and railroad line to East Prussia. Depending on which route would be chosen, the length of this corridor could be from 46 to 93 kilometers.

Stalin demanded many corridors from the borders of the Soviet Union to the borders of Germany. The length of these corridors ranged from 600 to 800 or more kilometers. However, as we have seen, these corridors were inevitably to merge into one large corridor the length and width of the whole of Poland.

Hitler is an ogre. Who can argue with that?

But Comrade Stalin is the defender of Europe. If only these malicious pans would have given Comrade Stalin the opportunity, he would have saved all of Europe from war. Then the fate of Europe would have been different.

CHAPTER 12. Buy time!

If we accept Germany's offer of a non-aggression pact with her, she will, of course, attack Poland, and the intervention of France and England in this war will be inevitable. Western Europe will be subjected to serious unrest and disturbance. Under these circumstances we would have many chances of remaining out of the conflict, and we could hope for our favorable entry into the war.

И. V. Stalin. Speech at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) August 191939.

The more eagerly we must now await the unfolding of the events of the armed struggle in Western Europe, where the war in September 1939 had just begun....

Combrig G.S. Isserson. New forms of struggle. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1940. C. 75

1

A long time ago, I was taught: when you read an agent's message, memorize it completely, relax deeply, dissolve like an ice flake in a lake. Loosen up and blur in volume, so that nothing disturbs you, so that problems and worries go aside, so that external sounds pass you by, so that you forget everything, so that there are no thoughts in your head, none at all - only the picture (and feeling!) of a quiet, clear, deep forest lake. Learn to relax instantly and inordinately deep. And then, having touched the bottom, come back little by little. At the moment of returning to this world, when everything in your memory is restored, try to express the message you read in one word.

If you 't do one, express with two.

And so it is with any kind of information. If you have worked a day with a pile of papers, by evening stretch sweetly, yawn blissfully and dissolve. And let the lake be clear and clean. And let the sand at the bottom be white. Let the reeds rustle Let a yellow leaf float on the water. Let the playful brook murmur, falling into the lake.

After a week of work, forget everything again, step away from the stacks of numbers and facts, disconnect. Then try to express everything in one word or a short phrase. But so that this phrase expresses the whole meaning, the whole volume of work for the whole week. You may not even use a phrase. After all, we do not think in words, but in images, without formulating them: you understand the situation, but you can't immediately express it in such a way that you can also

to the other became clear. In this case, the main thing is to keep the conclusion short for yourself. And there is nothing wrong with the fact that, when explaining to others, you may have to use several sentences.

Simply put, the challenge is to grasp the most important, the most essential, and to concentrate that essential into a point.

So, at one time I had the chance to work in the German military archives in Freiburg. Every day I made a conclusion for myself, putting it into one image, one phrase, one word. And every week I made a general conclusion. Worked. The work was finished. I was about to pack my suitcase in the evening... But the conclusion shone through before I even dived into the lake. The conclusion was astonishing: *they Germans don't swear at our weapons*!

During two months of rather persistent work, I did not meet a single German negative review of Soviet weapons. Neither in the summer of 1941 nor later did German soldiers, officers, and generals give negative evaluations of Soviet weapons.

They did not just laugh at Soviet tactics, but mocked, mocked, mocked, mocked. At the mental abilities of the Russian man, too. At first. And what in those archives you will not meet! You can find posters with unshaven faces of degenerates and the inscriptions
"Untermensch," and reports of many defeated Soviet divisions, reports of unthinkable trophies, eyewitness accounts of NKVD atrocities, complaints about bad roads, dust and heat, then - about rain and mud, snow and frost. Everything bad, everything wrong. Except for Soviet weapons.

All the tales about one rifle for three, about obsolete tanks and airplane coffins are later, post-war creations of communist propaganda. Example: the airplane, which the Kremlin smart guys from Agitprop contemptuously call "Ishak", the Germans called "Rat". And every German fighter pilot was given a strict warning in the official instruction: "Don't corner the Rat!" To put it simply, in an air battle with a Soviet I-16 fighter, you can get badly hurt.

The Germans were equally respectful of Soviet tanks, which we tend to call obsolete, the three-line rifle, 45-mm anti-tank cannon, even about uniforms clothing.

of the Soviet soldier. In the opinion of those who fought against the Red Army in the fields, in the forests, in the ruins of cities and in the trenches, rather than in the capital's offices, the uniforms of Soviet soldiers were simple, light, comfortable, extremely adapted to the conditions of war.

Summarizing what I've read, I'm once again convinced that swimming in a cold forest lake is sobering.

Now let us apply this simple but quite effective technique to the subject of our conversation. Let's try to understand how communist propaganda paints Stalin's aspirations in the pre-war period and the first two years of World War II. To do this, let's stack books, newspapers, dissertations, which stamped the official ideological machine, and select everything we can find on the subject. Then relax and try to express all of Stalin's plans and designs (as they are painted by propaganda) in one word.

The word is: REMOVE.

2

On August 23, 1939, a treaty was signed in Moscow between Germany and the Soviet Union for the destruction of the Polish state and the partition of Polish territory. But Poland was bound to Great Britain and France by mutual aid treaties, so the partition of Poland inevitably led to a European and therefore a world war. Indeed, eight days after the signing of the pact, on September 1, 1939, World War II broke out. It was a direct and inevitable consequence of the agreement reached in Moscow.

In the same month the war spread to the Atlantic, in a few months it smoothly covered Finland, Denmark, Norway, then Belgium, Holland, France, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, reached Yugoslavia and Greece, and crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Africa. In the summer of 1941, World War II broke into the territory of the Soviet Union.

It is explained to us: in August 1939 the Soviet Union had no choice, the Pact had to be signed in order to save the country, to buy time and to delay the war. Poland had to be torn apart for this purpose.

At first glance, it looks good: if the Soviet Union was not ready to defend its country in June 1941, then in August 1939 it was not even capable of defending itself, that's why Comrade Stalin was forced to give an order to Comrade Molotov to sign the pact. In order to delay...

Interesting how Comrade Stalin delayed it. He signed a pact with Hitler, and a week later the worst war in the history of mankind broke out. Stalin signed a pact with Hitler, and from that moment they both rushed to torment Europe.

Hitler to Poland. Stalin to Poland.

Stalin to Finland. Hitler to Norway and Denmark.

Hitler to Belgium, Holland, France. Stalin - to Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia.

Stalin to Romania. Hitler - to Yugoslavia and Greece.....

The crowd, mouths open, believes the explanation: since September 1, 1939, Hitler had been fighting World War II, and what were we doing at that time? We were delaying the war.....

Amazing procrastination - signed a pact with Hitler, and immediately an order from the Kremlin to the NKVD: prepare camps to receive hundreds of thousands of captured soldiers and officers.

The war, which arose as a result of the pact signed in the Kremlin, inevitably spilled over to the Soviet Union, which ultimately suffered the most.

Citizens of serious historians, who among you, where and how did you manage to detect the delay? Let us at least sometimes turn on the most ordinary common sense: if the Pact had not been signed, the Second World War would not have broken out, therefore, it would not have reached us. And it would not have been necessary to collect soldiers' bones in the forests and swamps of Russia in five, six decades and more.

But the Pact was signed, and the possibility of war became an inevitability. The signing of the Pact did not postpone the war in time and space, but brought it closer. It approached inevitably and rapidly.

No one in the Soviet Union ever concealed the fact that Hitler could only attack Poland if Stalin gave his consent. Stalin gave Hitler such permission. He opened

the gates of war, opened the floodgates. It's not me who says this, it's what our outstanding military leaders believe. Army General A. M. Mayorov:

When planning an attack on Poland, Germany was most of all afraid of the Soviet Union, not of England and France. That is why the fascist leaders were in a hurry to conclude non-aggression treaty with the USSR (Vizh. 1989. No. 5. P. 35).

Army General Mayorov expressed his thought clearly: Hitler was in a hurry to unleash war. And only the Soviet Union could prevent him. But he did not do it.

We know from German and Soviet sources that Hitler was indeed in a hurry. Ribbentrop told amazing things: on August 23, 1939, the German delegation left Berlin without even having a draft treaty with the Soviet Union. Already in the airplane on the way to Moscow, Ribbentrop and his legal advisor Friedrich Gaus sketched this draft (Joachim von Ribbentrop. Between London and Moscow. Moscow: Mysl, 1996. p. 140).

The delegation arrived in Moscow in the afternoon.

At 3:30 p.m. Ribbentrop was received by Stalin in his office. The meeting lasted three hours. After that Ribbentrop contacted Berlin and received final approval.

At 22:00, the second meeting in Stalin's office began and ended with Ribbentrop and Molotov signing the pact.

From the rough draft of the most important international treaty
It took only a few hours before it was signed. The whole process took the afternoon.

That was Hitler's rush. That's how Stalin helped him. No unnecessary chatter, no bureaucratic approvals. No procrastination.

Hitler was in a hurry to get Danzig and the roads to East Prussia. And where was Stalin in a hurry? Hitler had to sign the pact urgently, and who was hurrying Stalin, who was forcing him? So he would have chattered at the negotiations. He would have bought time. He would have delayed it.

Even more precisely the meaning of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was expressed by the chief of the GRU, Army General P. I. Ivashutin: "*With this pact Hitler untied his hands for aggression*" (VIZh. 1991.№ 6. P. 11). Peter

Ivanovich Ivashutin, as a true military intelligence officer of the highest rank, spoke out in such a way as to leave no room for misinterpretation: signed the pact - untied Hitler's hands. If they had not signed the pact, Hitler would have been tied up.

Without the Pact, there would not have been Hitler's aggression. There would have been no partition of Poland, no World War II, no attack on the Soviet Union. By signing the Pact, Stalin let Hitler off the chain.

If I had said such a thing, I would have been immediately accused of working for British intelligence. But it wasn't me who said it, it was my former direct superior, Army General Ivashutin. A man I hold in high esteem. What kind of intelligence was he working for?

3

The treaty between Germany and the USSR is commonly referred to as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This name is misleading and does not reflect the essence of what happened. The pact signed in Moscow is a conspiracy between Hitler and Stalin to wage a joint war of aggression in Europe. Therefore, this treaty was essentially a Stalin-Hitler pact. In addition, in international practice as the names of pacts and treaties are much more often used not the names of statesmen who concluded the agreement, but the names of places where the documents were signed: the Munich Agreements, the Warsaw Pact, the Baghdad Pact, the Geneva Accords. Therefore, in accordance with generally accepted diplomatic norms, the most accurate name of the pact is the Moscow Treaty of 1939 on the outbreak of World War II.

Eight days after the signing of the Treaty of Moscow, World War II broke out. And that's when Comrade Stalin began to delay. That's where he pulled back.

German troops invaded Poland, while the Red Army troops stood at its borders, did not wage war, did not cross the borders. They agreed in the Kremlin to tear Poland apart brotherly. But Hitler was tormenting, and Comrade Stalin was delaying. The official explanation of the Soviet government is that the time has not yet come for the Red Army to act.

As a result of this procrastination, all the blame for starting World War II fell on Germany, Hitler and his entourage. They

have gone down in world history as the main and only perpetrators of World War II.

In September 1939, the German government repeatedly reminded the Soviet government of its allied duty and demanded that Red Army units enter Poland in accordance with the Moscow Treaty on the outbreak of war.

The Soviet government responded with a refusal, not immediately, but with a delay of two or three days. For example, the head of the Soviet government and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov responded to the German demand of September 3 on September 5:

We agree with you that at the appropriate time, it will be absolutely necessary to initiate concrete action. We believe, however, that that time has not yet come. We may be wrong, but it seems to us that excessive haste could be to our detriment and contribute to the unification of our enemies.... (USSR-Germany. 1939. Documents and materials on Soviet-German relations in April-September 1939. Compiled by Yuri Felshtinsky. Y. Felshtinsky. New York, 1983. C. 81).

The German government again repeated its demands and was again refused.

The Red Army units started fighting in Poland only two and a half weeks later - on September 17. This is exactly how Comrade Stalin planned to further delay: Hitler was crushing Europe, and behind his back Stalin was waiting for a convenient moment, playing with an axe.

Hitler eventually got fed up with this. He realized that Stalin will delay as long as it is profitable, but then can and cut. Hitler did not wait for this moment. He struck first.

4

And that's when everything went wrong. Of all the possible options for collusion with Hitler, Stalin chose the one that was most consistent with the Soviet plan to crush Europe, but least in the interests of the defense of the Soviet Union. Hitler took advantage of this. And a political, economic, ideological and military catastrophe unprecedented in world history unfolded.

The Soviet people were completely incomprehensible why the war was being fought on their native side, while they were preparing to fight in enemy lands. What happened? The answer before all the people was forced to keep Stalin himself. And he answered: "...Brothers and sisters, I am addressing you, my friends!"

In his speech on the radio on July 3, 1941, Stalin called Hitler and Ribbentrop perverts and cannibals. Comrade Stalin explained to all his brothers and sisters the reason for our defeat: "The fact *that Nazi Germany unexpectedly and treacherously violated the non-aggression pact was of great importance here*.

That's it! According to Stalin it turns out that the Red Army is defeated and loses huge territories because of the fact that the monsters and ogres attacked suddenly. And the ogres achieved surprise by putting our vigilance to sleep with the pact. Not only that, the pact resulted in a common border with Germany.

there been no pact, we would not have let our guard down.

There would be no common border - there would be no surprise attack, and therefore no catastrophe.

So it's all the pact's fault. Right?

No. Not like that. Comrade Stalin thought differently. He continued:

How could it happen that the Soviet Government went to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with such treacherous men and perverts as Hitler and Ribbentrop? Was there not a mistake on the part of the Soviet Government here? Of course not!.. What did we gain by concluding the non-aggression pact? We secured for our country peace for a year and a half and the possibility of preparing our forces to fight back if Nazi Germany had risked an attack on our country in defiance of the pact.

And so Germany took a chance. Where is the response? Why does the army flee, abandoning mountains of weapons, airfields, industrial centers, districts, cities, towns, regions, republics? And where is the logic?

Stalin says: We made a pact and saved ourselves. The Pact allowed us to prepare to fight back!

And there's no fight back? Because we made a pact.

5

Any treaty of peace, mutual aid, non-aggression is meaningless. If we are friends, why do we need a treaty? And if we are enemies, a treaty will not stop the strong and will not save the weak. If you and I understand this, did Comrade Stalin not understand it? But thousands of experts repeat like clockwork: by signing the pact Stalin won almost two years!

But the experts are talking nonsense. Stalin did not win anything. Until September 1939, Hitler could not attack the Soviet Union - there was no common border. In September 1939 Hitler was busy - fighting in Poland. And to attack the Soviet Union, when October has already come, there is no sense, because - a dull time.

In addition, during the blitzkrieg in Poland, the strategic reserves of the German Army's most used ammunition were used up, and the tanks had to be returned to the factories for overhaul and replacement of the main units. After the defeat of Poland, the German Army for several months was in a state in which the conduct of major offensive operations was impossible.

Hitler could not attack the Soviet Union in 1940 either. Britain and France had declared war on Germany in 1939 and were already at war. Call that war strange, but it was still a war.

And with Stalin, peace. In the first half of 1940, Hitler believed in Stalin's peacefulness. By the way, he was not alone in this belief. Even in the XXI century there are people who believe that except for evading war and delaying, Comrade Stalin did not think of anything else. So why would Hitler attack the Soviet Union, which is at peace with Germany and which supplies Germany with strategic raw materials, when France is at war with it? To attack the Soviet Union without first defeating France meant for Germany a two-front war and a repetition of the disastrous scenario of World War I.

So in 1940, France was first in line. It was necessary to spend one more summer on its defeat. After the defeat of France repeated the story of the previous year: ammunition supplies are exhausted, tanks require repair. And then there is Great Britain across the strait looming....

The situation was complicated by the fact that the rulers of Britain and France knew that if Hitler defeated the Soviet Union (Berlin, Paris and London believed that this was possible), then Germany would become the master of the continent. Britain and France could not allow this. In this case, Hitler would recall all the humiliation suffered by Germany at Versailles through the fault of Britain and France. He would have gotten even. Therefore, if Hitler had gone east after Poland, Britain and France would have been forced to defend themselves against the coming German domination in Europe, that is, the British and French fleets would have had to blockade Germany. In other words, if Hitler would have gone further eastward immediately after Poland, the whole pattern of World War I would have been repeated: Germany and Russia would have tormented each other, and then Britain and France would have organized a new Versailles. This time - fatal for Germany.

Hitler himself and his generals understood this. Following the logic of war, in 1940 Hitler had to defeat France first of all and wage air and naval war against Britain. Which he did. Therefore, 1940 was not suitable for an attack on the Soviet Union either.

Neither January, nor February, nor March, nor April were suitable for an attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. Frost, snow and impenetrable mud were contraindicated for a blitzkrieg. The earliest date was mid-May 1941.

All these incomplete two years Hitler had no opportunity to attack the Soviet Union. He was held back by the strategic situation in Europe, and not by a piece of paper signed in the Kremlin, which Hitler spit on like all other such pieces of paper.

To summarize: whether there was a treaty or not, Hitler still could not attack the Soviet Union before May 1941. In any case, Hitler needed at least two warm seasons: the first on Poland, the second on France. Or vice versa: the first warm season on France, the second on Poland. The Pact of 1939 did not delay the war for a year and a half, because Stalin had time until May 1941 anyway.

6

Stalin's statement that the Soviet Union by signing the pact bought time to prepare for war, picked up thousands of generals, marshals, serious historians of all sorts of directions and views. And no one caught citizen Stalin on his word. And in fact, citizen Stalin spouted deliberate nonsense.

Let's come at it from this angle. The Pact was signed on August 23, 1939 for ten years. But not two years later, on June 22, 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Did the Pact protect the homeland of the world proletariat on that day?

No. I didn't. There was a pact, but Hitler attacked. Explain to me, dumb and unintelligible, explain to me on your fingers, what was the benefit of the pact that day?

Let's go back a day earlier. Could Hitler have attacked on June 21? He could have.

Would a pact have stopped him? No. He didn't care about those pacts (and that's putting it mildly).

Could he have attacked on June 20th? It could have been the 20th.

Could you have done it in May? I could have done it in May. That was my plan at first. The pact is no obstacle.

Could he have attacked in March? He could not - the weather was not right. And if the weather was acceptable and the roads and airfields were not muddy, the existence of the pact could not stop Hitler. If the June 22, 1941 pact was a piece of paper that did not guarantee Germany's non-aggression, could that piece of paper guarantee non-aggression in all the preceding days, weeks and months? If the pact did not protect the Soviet Union from attack in 1941, why should we believe that it was a reliable guarantee of the Soviet Union's security in 1939 and 1940?

Hitler didn't take those pacts seriously! Neither did his partner. After the attack, Stalin began to repeat that he had foreseen Hitler's perfidy, he knew that sooner or later Hitler would attack. Stalin's thought was taken up by the followers: was it not clear to all of us that Germany would attack sooner or later? Yes, we knew it!

And here you and I will note the complete loss of logic of both Comrade Stalin and his followers.

Let's pretend we're on a cannibal island. There's nowhere to run. We have signed a ten-year pact with the ogres. We realize quite clearly that the ogres will try to eat us one day. With or without garnish. Without waiting for the pact to expire. So do we sleep better with a pact than without one? What difference does it make whether we have a pact or not if it doesn't protect us? If we don't know when the High Contracting Party is going to eat us: in a year or tomorrow at dawn?

How can we say that Stalin won a year and a half thanks to the pact, if the pact did not restrain Hitler? I express Stalin's thought in other words: the Soviet Union won a year and a half, hiding behind the pact, which did not provide security, which did not limit Hitler in his plans and actions. Simply put, for a year and a half, or even almost two years, we covered ourselves with something that did not and could not cover us.

7

But serious (at first) people are speaking, and it's all about the same thing. Marshal of the Soviet Union VG Kulikov:

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact gave some delay to the war. I have read the Barbarossa plan and I know that the attack on the USSR was prepared much earlier, I think the consequences of the first strike would have been even more deplorable (Krasnaya Zvezda. June 22, 1996).

So, - if we believe the Marshal of the Soviet Union, - even before Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow, that is, before August 1939, German generals were preparing an attack on the Soviet Union, and Comrade Stalin, with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, postponed this attack. Otherwise there would have been disaster. Apart from the paper signed by Hitler's wily ogre, we had nothing to defend our homeland with.

Allow me, Comrade Marshal, to disagree with you on this point. Before the Pact, Hitler had no plans to attack the Soviet Union. And could not have been. The main striking force of the Wehrmacht in the summer of 1941 - four tank groups: Kleist, Guderian, Gotha and Göpner. And in 1939 Hitler did not have a single tank group. Hitler had only six panzer divisions.

How could Hitler's generals in 1939 plan the use of tank groups if there were none? And without tank groups there could be no "Barbarossa" plan - even in bold plans and drunken delirium. And how could German generals before the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact plan an attack on the Soviet Union, if there was no common border, if between Germany and the Soviet Union lay Poland? Did the generals place their airfields and their six armored divisions on maps on Polish territory that had yet to be conquered?

***

So, Comrade Marshal, Hitler had no plans to attack the Soviet Union before the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Therefore, it turns out that in August 1939 Comrade Stalin delayed the war, which Hitler had not yet planned.

CHAPTER 13. Why Comrade Stalin was in no hurry to open a second front.

In connection with this treaty, it turned out that Hitler started the war. This was favorable to us from the military and moral points of view. By such actions he would provoke France and England to war against him, having directly confronted Poland. We would remain neutral.

H. S. Khrushchev. Memories published in the magazine "Ogonyok" (1989. № 30. P. 10)

1

If the Soviet Union was interested in preserving peace in Europe, it would not have needed to negotiate with Britain and France. Stalin could solve the problem of security in Europe by his own efforts. It was necessary to explain to Hitler simply and clearly: if you hit France, you will fall into a deaf blockade. I will provide you with it. Britain will help you. Make up your mind.

And with France Stalin could not start long negotiations, but simply said: if Hitler goes not to the west, but to the Soviet Union, and if we will be tight, then he will get to you. You'get it too. He'll remind you of Versailles, read "Mein Kampf". How you behave in such a situation is up to you. There was even less reason to negotiate with Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Finland.

If Hitler had a choice on whom to attack first - Poland or the Soviet Union, in this case Stalin should have concluded a treaty with Poland: if they attack you - we help, if they attack us - you help.

But Hitler could not attack the Soviet Union without first crushing Poland. Poland by its geographical position is the first on Hitler's path. In this situation, the task of Soviet diplomacy was simplified to the extreme. It was necessary to say to the Polish government: there have been many bad things between us, but in the face of a common threat we shall forget our former offenses.

By defending their country, the Poles were also protecting the Soviet Union from the coming invasion. Therefore, there was no need to conclude any treaties. It was necessary to help Poland. First of all, it was possible to help by publicly warning Hitler: we regard an attack on Poland (as well as on Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania) as an attack on our country. With all the ensuing consequences.

The Polish government was unwilling to enter into a military alliance with Stalin. There were reasons for that. If we understand it, it was even advantageous for the Soviet Union: fight first, and we will fight after you.

It should have been simply explained to Hitler that an attack on Poland would be the signal to put the Red Army on full alert. After the defeat of the Polish state, the people of Poland will continue to resist, they will accept any help, provided that this help is from the bottom of their hearts. The Soviet Union will give unlimited assistance.

It was necessary to announce to Hitler that in the event of aggression against Poland the Soviet Union would give shelter to Polish refugees, take in children and the wounded, form Polish partisan detachments on its soil, arm and provide them with everything they needed. In addition, Polish regiments, divisions, and then corps and armies would be deployed on Soviet soil and thrown into battle. From the moment of the attack on Poland, Germany will have as its adversary also the Soviet Union, with the whole world on its side. The actions of the Soviet government and people will be understood by all mankind. In this situation, Germany's strike on the Soviet Union will not be sudden, and the war cannot be lightning fast. Such a scenario is doom for Germany.

That's how you should have talked to Hitler. This scenario should have been announced to the whole world. In the summer of 1939 it was necessary to remind Hitler that in Spain Soviet pilots, sappers, tankers, artillerymen and saboteurs fought, among other things, against German military specialists. There the war stretched for almost three years. It is difficult to transport people and weapons to Spain. But Poland is not Spain. Poland is close by. The Soviet Union can send to Poland any number of volunteers - even five million, even ten million - and any number of tanks, airplanes and artillery.

Stalin could have said to Hitler: I sent 648 airplanes and 347 tanks to Spain. Because Spain is far away. In Poland I will send ten, twenty times more. In Spain there were 40,000 foreign fighters in seven international brigades. For the defense of Poland, I'll send a million.

2

Aside from this course of action, Stalin had many other possible options.

The second option. Tear up Poland, but not to the end. Here you, Hitler, a piece with Danzig and the "Polish corridor", and this is for me: Rivne, Lvov, Tarnopol. Fraternally. But between us, let a neutral, cut-down Poland prosper.

If there were 300 to 400 kilometers of Polish land between Germany and the Soviet Union (even 100 kilometers!), then a surprise attack would be impossible. Then there would be no need to worry about how not to give Hitler an excuse to attack. Then in 1941 the advanced units of the Red Army would not have been hit by German artillery in the first minutes of the war. Then there would have been time to pull up their pants in their sleep and get ammunition.

The question is not whether Hitler would have agreed to that option or not. Clearly, he would have. After all, he justifiably feared a blockade of Germany and demanded only Danzig and roads to East Prussia. He did not ask for more. He himself would sleep better under such an arrangement.

The question is another: why did Comrade Stalin not propose such an option? Why did he offer to break Poland completely and establish common borders between Germany and the Soviet Union? Why did he need Hitler in his neighborhood?

Third option. Sign a treaty with Great Britain and France without requiring corridors through Poland. Why do we need corridors? Let Britain, France and Poland fight against Hitler. Why should we rush through the corridors? When our turn comes, we'll fight then. Why should we go before Poland?

Fourth option. Do nothing at all. Let them fight in Europe, and we will not give Hitler neither oil, nor grain, nor cotton, nor chrome.

we will. Neutrality! Let Hitler fight without our tungsten and vanadium.

There were many options. All of them favorable. Except for one - the one Stalin chose. The one that created a common border with Germany. Why would he do that?

Stalin offered no other options. And he gave Hitler more than he asked for.

I gave it away without bargaining.

3

Stalin knew what he was doing. For the partition of Poland, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany...

Here I will pause for a moment. For at this point in the story, another Kremlin song is immediately included. It was performed many times as a solo, and duet, and quartet, and multi-voiced choir. Here is a solo performance of one of the most prominent Kremlin scoundrels. His name was Alexander Sergeevich Yakovlev. Rank - colonel-general. Aircraft designer. Deputy Commissar of Aircraft Industry. Winner of the Lenin, State and six Stalin prizes. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor. Stalin's advisor on aviation issues. Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Strangler of the most promising areas of development of Soviet aviation. By Mark Solonin's definition: a rat king. Details - in Solonin's remarkable book "On Peacefully Sleeping Aerodromes" (Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 2007).

Here's the aria of the rat king:

England and France have declared war on Germany. They did. But they didn't fight, despite the very favorable military situation. The whole world was waiting from day to day when England and France would start military action.... (Yakovlev A. The Purpose of Life. Moscow: Politizdat, 1968. P. 213).

They declared war, but did nothing! And the situation is favorable!

С that we would agree. However. let's try и to try to understand "bad guys" to understand.

Great Britain had a small army, mainly focused on the defense of the colonies. At that time, it was not expected to win any grandiose victories. At the same time, Britain had a huge navy. So the navy fought. It fought with such tension that the Soviet Union's fleet had never had to fight with in its entire history.

Hitler taxed Britain with submarines that mercilessly sank British merchant ships. These are just some of the casualty figures.

In October 1939, 21 British merchant ships were sunk, in November - 73, in December - 79, in January 1940 - 72, in February - 45, in March - 46, in April - 58. Further in the same vein. The total displacement of lost British ships by month: then 158 thousand tons, then 226 thousand, then 189 thousand, then 214. Very quickly the total losses reached a million tons. And then more. And every ship was carrying something - something valuable and vital to Britain.

Britain's navy was thrown into the defense of the sea lanes on which the country depended entirely. From September 1939 to May 1940, i.e. during the so-called Strange War, the British Navy lost the aircraft carrier "Corages" and the battleship "Ark Royal", the battleships "Nelson" and "Barham", cruisers were seriously damaged battleships "Nelson" and "Barham"
"Belfast, Ajax, Exeter, Suffolk. Let's not mention destroyers and other trifles.

Britain's Royal Navy suffered huge losses, but it accomplished the two main tasks for which it was created:

first, blocked German shipping in the Atlantic;

Secondly, and most importantly, he did not allow his country to be strangled by a naval blockade.

Some may call that war "strange". I personally do not see anything strange about it: it was an intensified pugilistic war. The German Navy was also badly hurt in that brawl. Here are just some of its significant losses:

• On April 9, 1940, the German cruiser Karlsruhe was sunk by a British submarine;

• On April 10, the cruiser "Koenigsberg" was lost;

• On April 11, a "pocket" battleship was very seriously damaged "Lützow." It was brought to Kiel on a tugboat. Recovery and repairs took more than 6 months.

(This is not the "Lutzow" that was sold to Stalin, but a different one. "It was "Deutschland" in its maidenhood. But someone told Hitler that if "Deutschland" was sunk, it would not turn out well, so they gave it another name).

• On April 13, near Narvik, the British fleet sank eight German destroyers and one submarine.

And on land? On land, it was mostly quiet. How could it not be? France had invested its entire budget in building a defense line along the border. The calculation was: if war breaks out, we'll sit in the fortifications, we won't let the enemy into our land. And so the war came. And the French army is ready only for what it was prepared for: to sit in fortifications.

Then Germany defeated France. But that's another story.

4

These Frenchmen are not good, of course: they declared war on Hitler, while they themselves were sitting in fortifications, drinking tea. Shame on the Frogs for all eternity!

But it is not for us to blaspheme them. If the Soviet Union had declared war on Germany in September 1939, and had done something about it, then we could have blamed others: we were shedding blood, and you were hiding in fortifications!

The rat king Alexander Sergeyevich Yakovlev should have turned to himself before reproaching others for inaction. He should have asked: what did the Soviet Union do in those glorious times? How did it fight Hitler? Why did the Soviet Union not open a second front after Great Britain and France declared war on Germany?

They will say: we have friendship with Hitler!

And who forced you, citizens of the Communists, to be friends with ogres? And if you got involved in friendship with Hitler, you could have corrected this mistake. After all, we were friendly with Japan, and then they tore the paper to shreds and thumped it.

sledgehammering Japan in the back of the head. Why didn't they break friendship with Hitler?

I agree: in August 1939 it was difficult to predict the development of the situation. But Hitler attacked Poland, and immediately Britain and France declared war on him. The situation became very clear. Here the Soviet Union should have come to its senses: we signed the pact with Hitler - a mistake. I'm sorry. We're breaking the pact. And following Great Britain and France, we also declare war on Hitler.

We didn't have to look for a reason. It should have been announced: Hitler and I signed a non-aggression pact, but we did not agree to attack Poland. If Hitler attacked Poland, it means that we are declaring war on him and opening a second front!

By the way, the Kremlin propaganda, until the very collapse of the Soviet Union, persistently maintained: we had only agreed with Hitler on non-aggression, but there was no secret collusion, Poland was not divided, no secret additional protocols were signed, and what some clever people are rubbing in our noses is false. The favorite of the West, Mikhail Gorbachev, putting his hand on his good heart, without blinking his honest eyes, firmly stood his ground: Molotov and Ribbentrop signed only a non-aggression pact. There are no additional secret protocols and there never were!

How could you not believe an honest man? And they did. And those clever people who found copies in German archives were poked with a question like a bear with a slingshot: where is the original document? The logic is impenetrable: if the criminals did not present the document about their crimes to the public, then there is no such document. So there never was!

And the document was in the Politburo archive. And Gorbachev personally requested it from the archive, read it and returned it to the place where no one except him and his entourage had access.

All this is to say that the Soviet Union in September 1939 had no reason to look for a reason to declare war on Germany: Hitler had attacked Poland, and that was a good enough reason to go to war.

But Comrade Stalin was in no hurry.

5

We could have been prudent and not declared war. Remain neutral.

Britain and France, propagandists tell us, declared war but did nothing. But they didn't. Britain and France, sitting in fortifications, blocked the supply of strategic raw materials to Germany across the Atlantic. And in the south Hitler has the Alps, beyond them - the Mediterranean Sea, the entrances to which are controlled by the same Britain. You can't get supplies from the south either.

To the north was the Baltic Sea. From Sweden and Finland came flows of strategic raw materials, but of a very limited range: nickel, iron ore, wood. Everything else came from the east. And here Comrade Stalin should keep his neutrality: do you, Adolf, need cotton for military needs, and tungsten for armor-piercing shells? I'm sorry, my dear, I don't have enough myself.

That's all. That would have been the end of the Third Reich.

But Stalin did not open a second front. Unlike those who, according to Yakovlev, declared war but did not fight, Comrade Stalin did not declare war, but did a lot. Too much. He supplied Hitler with everything Germany needed to wage war.

Not only that, on September 28, 1939, a treaty was signed in Moscow "On Friendship and Frontier." At that moment, even Canada, Australia, India and South Africa had already joined the coalition against Germany. And the United States could not stay away. They were also soon to oppose Hitler. Why would Stalin in September to aggravate what was created in August?

In August 1939, a non-aggression pact was signed, and in September, another one - friendship! Why did Stalin need such friendship? And if, as historians tell us, the situation for the defeat of Germany at that time was favorable, why not open a second front?

And if you didn't want to go to war, you could at least not sign up as Hitler's friend.

6

Let us repeat for ourselves: in 1939, Stalin had many options. All but one of them were more or less morally pure. Choosing any but one of them would have resulted in strengthening the security of both Europe and the Soviet Union.

But there was one exception. There was one extremely dirty option: to tear Poland apart and establish a common border with Germany. This option made Stalin an ally of Hitler. Choosing this option guaranteed the defeat of Poland and the outbreak of war in Europe, and also drastically reduced the security of the Soviet Union because it created a situation in which war between Germany and the Soviet Union became possible. In addition, Germany could now launch a war against the Soviet Union in a surprise attack.

Comrade Stalin chose this one, the dirtiest of all possible options, and immediately signed the agreement leading to it, without putting forward any additional conditions, without discussing any other options.

All the disadvantages of this option were offset by two advantages: the choice of this option really led to a clash between Britain, France and Germany, and in addition gave Stalin the opportunity to strike a surprise blow to Germany.

***

Stalin did not delayed beginning World War II world of the Second World War. He was he was bringing it closer. Stalin was only delaying the moment of entry of the Soviet Union in this war. Therefore, he was in no hurry to open a second front.

The explanation of his actions is found in the diary of the General Secretary of the Comintern, Georgi Dimitrov (entry of September 7, 1939). There was a conversation in his own circle. These revelations were not intended for publication. Soviet comrades were long ago accustomed not to leave traces. And the Bulgarian comrade inexperiencedly recorded such things.

In the presence of Comrades Molotov and Zhdanov, Comrade Stalin explained the essence of his foreign policy line to Comrade Dimitrov, the official leader of the Comintern:

The war is between two groups of capitalist countries. But we don't mind them having a good fight and weakening each other. It is not bad if the position of the richest capitalist countries (especially England) will be undermined by the hands of Germany. Hitler, without realizing it himself and without wanting to, is undermining, undermining the capitalist system. <...> We can maneuver,

to push one side against the other to better tear them apart (Bezymensky Lev. Hitler and Stalin before the fight. Moscow: Veche, 2000. C. 290; War and Politics. 1939-1941. M.: Nauka, 1999. C. 38, 97).

That's the whole solution to Stalin's policy. When they bite each other half to death, then Comrade Stalin will open the second front.

CHAPTER 14: On the Vicious and Immaculate Concepts in Tank Building.

To all these questions, "science" does not answer us and cannot answer them without committing caste suicide. For to answer means to admit that it, "science", has lied to us consciously, deliberately and systematically.

Ivan Solonevich. People's monarchy. Minsk, 1998. C. 131

1

"*The density of minefields reached four thousand mines per square mile*." This is how the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, the central organ of the Russian Defense Ministry, on April 22, 2006, described the preparation of Soviet troops for defensive operations at the Kursk Bulge in the summer of 1943.

Let us ask the Russian Minister of Defense: why the hell did it become necessary to measure the density of mines per unit area, and even to use the square mile as such a unit? A minefield is a linear barrier. Imagine that we are ordered to block access to a square area of one square kilometer. 100 tons of barbed wire. One side of this area is a kilometer long, the second, third and fourth sides are also a kilometer long. The entire perimeter is four kilometers. Divide 100 tons by the size of the perimeter of the plot and we get 25 tons of barbed wire per kilometer of perimeter. But will some minister who is not completely out of his mind braid the entire interior of this plot with wire like a spider's web?

Now let's imagine that the order is to hold a section of the front stretching, say, 10 kilometers. Appropriate funds have been allocated for this. Question: will you braid a square kilometer of the area with barbed wire?

Of course not! You will build barbed wire barriers to stop the enemy.

Mines are also a means of creating a barrier. This is what is called - mine-explosive barriers. Difference with barbed wire

The only difference between mines and wire is that mines are not visible as rows of wire on stakes. In addition, mines not only stop the enemy, but also tear off their arms and legs, tear off tracks, break the bottoms of tanks, and tear cars, wagons, and motorcycles to shreds.

And here we are tasked with holding a 10-kilometer front. Let's assume that we have been allocated, among other things, 4,000 anti-tank mines and 12,000 anti-personnel mines. Let's pick a square kilometer somewhere and stuff it with mines. And another one.

And then we think: why should we waste such a good thing if we need to hold the front? And what enemy fool would climb this square kilometer? As soon as the enemy sappers have found a minefield, they will immediately try to determine its boundaries. The borders will be marked with signs, the chiefs will put them on maps and will avoid them.

So, minefields are strips. They can be wide or narrow, continuous or with gaps, straight or broken, dense or sparse, in front of the front line or in the depths, but in any case their purpose is to be a barrier, a barrier, an obstacle.

Let's imagine: a division holds a front of 20 or even 30 kilometers. On the right flank we've mined a square kilometer. And on the left flank. And another one in the center. We can mine a square kilometer in our rear. What's the use? Will these square kilometers stop the enemy? Or do we intend to hide behind these squares? But a square mile is even more...

Wait, why the mile all of a sudden? The Germans at Kursk thought in kilometers. So did the Red commanders. If any of them a dashing horse from the Civil War, they thought in versts. Where did miles come from?

When I read this in my favorite military newspaper, my first thought was that they had a salty-eyed sailor: meter-long claws, all painted with anchors and mermaids. This one, of course, measures the Kursk arc by sea miles. It's no other way they mined square miles in the navy. But why would they? Even in the navy mines are a barrier weapon: not to let the enemy in or not to let him out.

from there. And at sea, you still have to overlap some line from point A to point B. You can have one row. You can do 20 rows. But we'll still get something like narrow or wide stripes. Or segments of strips. Or am I missing something?

Let's see if anything has changed since then. So we need to find a handbook that was published shortly after the war. The knowledge collected in it is closer to the concepts of those times. The best that I was able to find - "Marine Dictionary" (in 2 volumes. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1959): "*Minefield (minefield) density - the average number of mines per one mile of minefield along the front*."

That's : along the front. And there are no square miles.

So why does Russia's main military newspaper talk nonsense about square miles at the Kursk Bulge? I was terribly interested in this question. And the box simply opened. The editorial staff of Russia's central military newspaper reads the materials of completely illiterate authors, taken from foreign sources, including American ones. The central military newspaper publishes this nonsense, sometimes giving a whole spread to the overseas morons. The Minister of Defense is unable to stop this outrage. That is why various nasty things appear in Russia's central military newspaper.

In this case (which is very rare) Americans praise us: stupid Russians sometimes also tried to fight, here at Kursk Bulge they managed to put 4 thousand mines per square mile.

To me, praising an idiot is worse than insulting him. Let's get to the bottom of this overseas compliment. A mile is 1,609 meters. A square mile is 2,588,881 square meters. Let's put 4,000 mines per square mile. It turns out that one mine falls on 647 square meters, that is, on an area of about 20 by 32 meters.

It's not fat. And very silly.

This is how the highbrow overseas historians portray us. And the Ministry of Defense dutifully prints all this in its central organ.

American history is written like this: the stupid underdeveloped Russians were completely incapable of fighting. The Germans dealt with them playfully. And the wisest and bravest Americans calmly defeated the Germans.

The American interest in this interpretation of history is understandable. Is it really on orders from America that the Russian Ministry of Defense is imposing this version on its army, its people and the whole world?

2

This is how the fictions of American clever people are spread throughout the country at the expense of Russia's military budget. These fictions are only praiseworthy in some places, like these revelations about square miles at the Kursk Bulge. Otherwise, it looks like a cheerful mockery of an inferior race that is completely incapable of doing anything.

I am interrupted: The Russian Ministry of Defense has nothing to do with this. What kind of demand can be made of the Russian Minister of Defense and his subordinates? We should quarrel not with the Russian Minister of Defense, who publishes all this, but with the Americans! After all, they are the ones who write such nonsense. It is the Americans who should object.

All right. Let's object to the Americans.

On March 25, 2006, in the central military newspaper of Russia in the article "Tanks of the Red Army: Myths and Realities" by one L. Levin from Chicago ridicules the Soviet multi-tower tanks T-28 and T-35. However, in 1939 the Soviet Union finally abandoned attempts to create new multi-tank tanks, realizing the complete futility of this direction. At that moment America had no tank troops at all. U.S. tank troops were created only on July 10, 1940. And on August 28, 1940, the United States began to create a . In April 1941, the first result appeared: a prototype of the M3 medium tank. Its production began in August 1941.

Already the very name of the tank indicates the irredeemable stupidity. In the first half of the 1940s in the U.S., in addition to the medium tank M3 light tank M3 was produced. And the wheeled, two-axle M3 armored personnel carrier. And the M3 half-track armored personnel carrier. And the M3 75-mm self-propelled gun. And the 75-mm M3 tank gun. And the 37-mm M3 anti-tank gun. And *dozens* more samples of military equipment and equipment with the same index.

And so it is with everything.

There were at that time in the United States the M2 light tank, and the M2 medium tank, and the M2 armored personnel carrier, and the M2 large caliber machine gun, and the M2 75mm tank gun, and the M2 155mm gun. There was the M1 rifle, the M1 tank, the M1 81mm mortar, and the M1 76mm tank gun. And in my day there was an M60 machine gun on an M60 tank in the US. Now instead of that tank, it's an M1 tank again. It's not the one then, it's the one now....

When it comes to Soviet weapons, it is enough to name the index: BTR-60P, AKM, IMR. And if we are talking about American equipment, we must also explain what we are going to talk about. But in conversation you can still quickly get oriented, but in the documents.... "M2 on M2" - what is this about?

But let's not be picky about names. Here's the gist.

We are talking about the American tank M3 - not the light tank, but the medium tank. The one that went into production in August 1941. Weight 27 tons. Six-man crew. The design is prepotent, extremely unsuccessful. Some people think it's the most inept tank of the Second World War. I beg to differ. It is the most talentless tank of all time. The arrangement of armament - in three tiers. In the hull of the tank is a 75-mm gun of Puteau and Dupont model of 1897 with an angle of horizontal guidance of only 32 degrees. Above the hull is a turret with a 37-mm gun and machine gun, and above it another turret with a machine gun. Machine guns are of the 1919 model. The total height of the tank is 312 centimeters. Three meters. That's a lot. Shoot at it, you can't miss. And you can't hide a giraffe like that. Armor is weak. Armor plates are fastened with rivets. Specific pressure on the ground - 0.93 kg per square centimeter. Soviet heavy armor
This figure is much lower - 0.78 kg/cm^2 on the T-35 and 0.77 kg/cm^2 on the KV.

Due to the too high specific pressure on the ground, the M3 tank at the
The gun was always buried in sand, mud or arable land. And without turning the entire hull, it was impossible to aim the gun. The engine
- Wright Continental R-975, an aviation star-shaped engine, extremely sensitive to the quality of fuel and lubricant. On the last samples, to somehow reduce the extreme tendency to spontaneous combustion, instead of one aircraft engine, an assembly of five automobile engines with a total output of 370 horsepower was installed, running on low-octane fuel. Caterpillars - rubber-o

metal ones. They were constantly falling off. A special danger for the tank was the contact of the caterpillar with fire - in battle the rubber burned out and the caterpillar collapsed. This miracle of tank construction was produced until December 1942.

You don't look a gift horse in the mouth. The Red Army received these tanks as that very horse. Soviet soldiers called this masterpiece abbreviated SS (self-propelled latrine) or BMSH (mass grave of six). In any characteristics, except for the impressive height and excessive specific pressure on the ground, the M3 was not superior to our T-28 and T-35, which were discontinued two years ago.

The M3 tank was replaced by the slightly less ugly M4 Sherman. In the Red Army tankers for criminal offenses were not sent to the penal colony - they took care of personnel. Cadres decide everything. So, the cadres caught raping their compatriots were sent to fight on Shermans.

The Sherman, like the M3, was powered by the same R-975 star-shaped aircraft engine. The Shermans were produced with this engine until November 1943. Then, due to the shortage of aviation star-shaped enginesthe Shermans were fitted with other engines
- from a V-shaped carburetor engine (modification M4A3) to an assembly of five automobile engines (modification M4A4).

American citizens, should you declare the T-35 and T-28 obsolete? You're not the one the teeth, are you?

3

With the heavy tank, the comedy was even more amusing. American designers were never able to create a heavy tank before or during World War II. In early 1945, the M26 Pershing medium tank appeared. The tank was good - in the view of the Americans. The engine, however, was gasoline. The tank had a 90-millimeter gun with a long barrel. For a medium tank of the final stage of the Second World War it was very good.

However, the tank's turret was poorly shaped and did not reflect shells well (Christopher Chant. Tanks: Over 250 of the World's Tanks and Armored Fighting Vehicles. 2004. C. 71).

The problems did not end there. When designing the turret, mistakes were made that resulted in a weight imbalance. The turret was so shaped and positioned on the hull that the long-barreled cannon turned the turret out of the hull with its weight. In order to balance the cannon, a cast iron counterweight of one and a half tons had to be welded on the rear side of the turret.

Because of this, the weight of the machine exceeded 40 tons, and "Pershing" became heavy tank. Hooray! It turns out that the Americans are also capable of creating a heavy tank!

But the Americans' joy was premature. Let's consider: some not very strong uncle had a sandbag put on his back, he was weighed together with the sandbag and declared a heavyweight. Let us consider: did this unnecessary weight add strength to him? Did the extra weight make him stronger? Did this unnecessary weight make it easier for him to run, jump and fight?

The tank designer tries his best to save every gram of weight so that these grams can be used to increase armor protection, gun and engine power. Tank designers save on small things to such an extent that the engine cylinder block of Soviet tanks was made of aluminum. But here is a case when they hang unnecessary weight on the tank.

Mistakenly placed in the heavy tank category. "The Pershing was not comfortable in this company. A 90mm gun would have been fine on a medium tank at the time. But not on a heavy tank.

The German Tiger had a slightly smaller caliber, but a longer barrel. So the Pershing had neither the armor nor the firepower to
"The Tiger not up to it. Not even to the Soviet tank IS-2.

During the war, for lack of anything better, the Pershing was declared a heavy tank, but immediately after the war it was reclassified as a medium tank. The US failed to create a real heavy tank comparable to the Soviet and German models at that time.

4

Was there something created before and during the war that would have made American tank designers proud?

It was! The M3 light tank and its later version, the M5. This tank had many modifications and was produced from 1941 to the end of 1944

The different variants of this tank weighed from 13 to 15 tons. Different versions of this tank weighed from 13 to 15 tons. There were produced 13,859 M3 and 8,884 M5 tanks, as well as a large number of various vehicles based on them - engineering, repair, flamethrower, anti-aircraft, commander and others.

In order not to leave a spoonful of tar for dessert, first let's talk about the shortcomings of this tank. There are many. First of all - the engine. There was a good aircraft engine Continental W-670 for light airplanes in the USA - seven cylinders with a star. The engine was noble. It was put on other airplanes. They put it on a tank.

And that's not good. And here's why. First, the fuel for the engine was high-octane gasoline, which burns too well. Then there's the dimensions. It is good when the cylinder block is located horizontally, as on the Soviet light tank T-26, - then the height of the power compartment, and the entire tank can be made very small. A low hull requires little armor. This saves weight.

With the American light tank M3 everything was the opposite. The engine is a star with seven rays. The rays stick out in all directions. Such an engine is good on an airplane: all cylinders are in plain sight. But in a tank, the engine is hidden in the power compartment. There was no access to the cylinders, which rested on the bottom. For a simple check, the entire engine had to be dismantled.

A large engine size meant a large power compartment, and the whole tank hull had to be made large. A large volume requires a lot of armor. And this means a lot of weight. If the entire weight reserve was spent on the hull, it means that the turret could be very small, and the cannon could be a toy, 37 mm caliber. The Soviet Union gave up such guns many years before the Second World War, and the USA produced them almost until the end of 1944. In the 1930s this gun could still have some use, but from the beginning of the war German tanks slowly but steadily received more and more powerful armor. Starting in 1940, the 37 mm gun was completely useless in tank duels. To put it simply, these tanks were almost unarmed. This tank could fight against motorcycles, cars, but nothing more.

The lower the height of the tank, the better. Here American designers obviously did not apply their mind and skills. The height of the light tank M5 was 240 cm, like the Soviet medium tank T-34-76. In the last days of the war appeared Soviet heavy tank IS-3; its height was 245 cm. Ours were able to accommodate incredible power in such a height, and the Americans at almost the same height could only make a very light tank with a toy gun and "plywood" armor.

The specific ground pressure on the American light tank M3 is 0.79 kg/cm^2, on the M5 - 0.88 kg/cm^2. I will explain the meaning of these figures: Soviet medium and even heavy tanks could walk freely where the American light tank fell through the mud. The Soviet monsters ISU-122 and ISU-152, armed with 122mm and 152mm guns, respectively, had lower specific ground pressure than the American M5 light tank armed with a 37mm gun. Add to this the anti-bullet armor and the rivets used to attach the armor
on all American tanks until the end of 1942. Well, also specific power: on the M3 - 17.6 horsepower per ton of weight, on the M5 even lower - 14.1 hp / ton.

5

After all of the above, can a good word be said about American light tanks?

You can. And you should.

For the sake of this, let's go back to 1812. Consider the tactics of the Don Cossacks. Bonaparte is heading for Moscow. An invincible army. Hundreds of thousands. Next to it, in the shadow, to the right and left in large and small detachments - Cossacks. Exactly - a shadow. You go to them, they come from you. You from them, they follow. They don't fight. They avoid fighting. Their horses are swift, their weapons light. They don't wear shining cuirasses. They're walking side by side. A little farther than a rifle shot. They trot lightly. Like wolves.

The Bonapartist army has a victorious spirit. But every soldier has a sweet little cat scratching at his heart: if dysentery strikes.
- the great army will not wait for you, and the Cossacks will kill you. Their callous souls in those glorious times were not at all burdened with humanism.

In the Battle of Borodino the Cossacks followed the same line. While the two great armies were fighting to the death, Uvarov's and Platov's Cossacks maneuvered around the fighting masses to the place where Bonaparte's convoys stood. A move by horseback. Pure and simple. The letter "G". Before their wagons Bonaparte did not allow them, but also the best part of his army in the battle cautious to enter the battle. If you throw the old guard into the battle, the Cossacks will plunder the defenseless rear....

Bonaparte entered Moscow, and the Cossacks were on the prowl. If any courier from Moscow to Paris with a triumphant message, they would seize him on the way, strip him naked, and hang him on a birch tree. And where to put him? It's burdensome to carry him with us. It's an unnecessary burden. It hinders maneuverability. It's like a cast-iron chuck on an American tank.

Meanwhile, Bonaparte sent out foraging parties in all directions. He has a lot of horses, and what to feed them with when the White House is in flames? And the soldiers also want to eat. The fate of those foragers is unenviable. They have outlandish boots and pants. The Cossacks liked foreign rags terribly. They traded in them like shopkeepers on Khreshchatyk. And where to put the naked foragers? Again - on birch trees. With garlands.

The main thing is that the Cossacks spoiled the blood of the French to the highest degree, and their losses to the lowest. Because the Cossacks did not foolishly get into a fight.

Without forage and food, what could Bonaparte do? They say the cold and winter killed him. It didn't. Frost and winter killed him. But Bonaparte ran from Moscow before the snow, before the cold, before the frost. Hunger is not a woman. You want to eat, and here Kutuzov with a regular army is hovering over all the roads.

So Bonaparte had to leave. And the Cossacks followed him again, and again next to him. Here they had a lot of fun. They almost seized Bonaparte alive, but they stole Bonaparte's goods, and rushed to up Bonaparte's wagon. What's the use of the captured Bonaparte, but the good, that's it!

6

But our story is about American light tanks M3 and M5. And I only mentioned the Don Cossacks to use them as an example

to show the benefits of evasive tactics.

American and British tankers who fought on M3 and M5 light tanks may have heard something about the Cossacks. But they had no idea about their tactics. The tankers of the XX century, of course, with their minds reached a simple idea: if the enemy is stronger, then you should evade the battle, but always stay close to him. At a safe distance. Light tanks with all the weakness of their armor and weapons had a wonderful ability to keep up with the enemy, and if necessary - to bounce to a safe distance without taking the fight.

For the first time this ability was clearly demonstrated during the battles in North Africa. The Germans, realizing the threatening danger, were rapidly retreating, and frisky M3s were hanging on their tails, not allowing them to catch their breath or take intermediate positions, killing the weak and laggards. Then in the course of the war they acted in this way: bite and bounce.

This is all very cool, but we are not even talking about American tanks, but about the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941. Isn't it time to get back to the subject?

It's time. So, the American authors, at the expense of the Russian military budget, through the central military newspaper of the Russian army, tell the world about these reasons. The main of the reasons, from their point of view, is that the tanks in the Soviet Union were good for nothing.

American clever people have suggested that light Soviet tanks should be excluded from the statistics altogether: what good are light tanks? Not only are they weak, but Russian fools managed to put aircraft engines on them! This is stupidity! "*No aviation engine was suitable for a tank!*" (Krasnaya Zvezda. March 25, 2006) This revelation is written with an exclamation mark. By the way, our magazine Rodina does the same thing. One gets the impression that the slander is fabricated centrally and then spread through various channels: these Russian fools are such fools, they thought of putting aircraft engines on tanks!

Let us timidly object to the overseas experts. The use of aircraft engines was a common phenomenon in the world tank construction of those years. Let us recall the epochal British aircraft engine engine "Merlin" and not so epochal tank.

"The Cromwell, which was powered by a Meteor engine. Then we will try to understand what connection connected these beauties. In 1945, what engine did the Germans put on their super-heavy tank "Maus"?

But the true and unrivaled kings of using aircraft engines on tanks were the Americans. Nowhere else in the world had they put so many aircraft engines on tanks.

But there was one important difference. Soviet tanks were equipped with V-shaped aircraft engines. For such an engine, you don't need a high power compartment. If you have such an engine, access to important mechanisms and units is quite free.

The Americans used to put star-shaped engines on their tanks. Because of this, the armor on the high power compartment was wasted, the whole tank turned out to be tall, ugly and vulnerable. The star-shaped engine had a lot of features that were an advantage on the airplane, but a glaring disadvantage on the tank. If it was necessary, for example, to change the plug in the lower cylinder, it was necessary to adjust the crane, disconnect the engine from the hull, power transmission, power supply systems, etc., pull the engine out of the hull, perform a trifling operation to replace the plug and then return the engine in reverse order.

The difference is also that the Soviet Union had abandoned aircraft engines on newly developed tanks before the outbreak of World War II. In August 1941, due to extreme need and lack of tank diesels, as an exceptional measure and only with Stalin's personal permission, it was decided to temporarily put aviation gasoline engines on some T-34 tanks. But as soon as the relocation of the industry was completed, as soon as the production of tank diesels was deployed at the new locations, this practice was abandoned.

In the United States, it was just the opposite. There aircraft engines were put on tanks almost until the end of the war. Because of the shortage of star-shaped aircraft engines, in some cases automobile carburetor engines were used, and sometimes diesel engines, but again - not special tank engines, but low-power automobile engines.

During the war, as soon as in early 1942 the working rhythm of Soviet tank production was restored, all medium and heavy Soviet tanks and all self-propelled artillery units on their base, as well as heavy artillery tractors were produced only with diesel engines, and not with simple ones, but with special ones - high-speed tank engines.

The Soviet T-60 and T-70 light tanks were produced with automobile engines that willingly consumed low-grade gasoline. At this time, ugly light M3s, medium M3s and M4s were arriving from America, mostly with aircraft engines that required expensive high-octane gasoline.

And now American historians are mocking us. And the Russian Minister of Defense does not object. And the entire top leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense tucked their tails and kept silent.

7

Serious overseas scientists are not relenting:

All historians unanimously assert that the Soviet pre-war tanks were weak. Their very concept was flawed. The thin anti-bullet armor was penetrated by all kinds of German anti-tank weapons. Artillery armament was insufficient either to support infantry or to fight enemy tanks (Krasnaya Zvezda. March 25, 2006).

About "all historians who are in one voice..." is a slight overreaction. I personally know at least one historian - though not a professional, but an amateur - who did not want to howl with this bunch in one voice. And having run my eyes over the bookshelf, the titles of books about the war and the names of the authors, I declare in all seriousness: there are many of us!

Corrupt overseas experts on the pages of the central newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Defense accuse the leadership of the Soviet Union that in the pre-war period it foolishly chose a flawed concept of tank development. But let us remind the wise strategists from the Russian Ministry of Defense that Hitler conquered Europe in a year and a half with tanks, the combat weight of which was rarely

exceeded 20 tons. They were light tanks. They were tanks with anti-bullet armor and weak armament. Why do not "all historians in one voice" declare this concept flawed?

A little later, when Hitler rushed into the vast expanses of the Soviet Union with a ridiculous number of tanks and against a strong enemy, his entire strategy and all his concepts, starting with the design of tanks, proved flawed. And for the capture of Central Europe all the way to the shores of the Atlantic all these tanks were very suitable.

Stalin was preparing something similar. For such conditions, for such actions, our BT tanks would be quite suitable.

Now let's compare the vicious Soviet tanks to the immaculate American tanks.

The first BT-2 produced in 1932 had a specific power of 36.4 hp per 1 ton of weight. After 12 years, by the end of the war, the U.S. produced light tanks M5 with a specific power of 14.1 hp per 1 ton of weight - that is, two and a half times weaker!

The BT-2 tank had a 37-mm gun. In 1933 the production of these tanks was discontinued. Instead, in the same year the BT-5 with twice as powerful 45-mm cannon went into production. This concept was declared vicious. But America was producing tanks with useless 37-mm guns until the end of 1944.

In the summer of 1941, the Soviet 45-mm gun could successfully defeat any German tanks. By the end of the war, all these tanks were covered with powerful armor. Against whom, explain to me, at the end of the war could the immaculate American 37-mm gun be used?

American historians claim that Soviet light tanks had "thin anti-bullet armor that was penetrated by all types of German anti-tank weapons. And the American tanks, presumably, did not have thin anti-bullet armor at all.

Soviet light tanks "had insufficient artillery armament to support either infantry or enemy tanks". That's for sure. We can't fight with 45-mm cannon! But at the end of the war the American 37-mm tank gun was quite suitable for infantry support, and it could kill Panthers and Tigers like nuts. Only the tails of those beasts were left. Terrible power!

With weak armor and ridiculous armament, the American M3 and M5 tanks had the only advantage - mobility. But Soviet pre-war BT tanks remained unrivaled by these characteristics. I do not remember about speed - everyone can compare it himself. Here are the highest indicators of power reserve on the highway: American tank M5 - 200 km, Soviet tank BT-7M on tracks.
- 600 kilometers, 700 kilometers on wheels.

The most interesting thing is that the Soviet Union produced about 8,000 "vicious" BT tanks and stopped their production before the war. After that, mass production of much weaker "immaculate" tanks was launched in the USA. And they were produced almost 23 thousand of them.

Our people are mocked by belligerent, arrogant, self-righteous profiteers who, if they had their way, would lay minefields by square miles. These oafs are unable to comprehend not only our history, but also their own history.

***

In 1812, Prince Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov could have given the Cossacks the same order that Zhukov gave to the troops on June 22, 1941: "to attack the enemy forces with all forces and means and destroy them in the areas where they have violated the border".

Imagine that the Cossacks would have fought with French cuirassiers at the border. They would have fallen there. Meanwhile, Bonaparte would have deployed cannons against the Cossacks, and those of the Cossacks, who miraculously survived the battle with the cuirassiers, would have fallen to the wall of buckshot. And now some very literate discoverer would tell us about the flawed concept: the Cossacks had very light weapons, and they had no defense - not like Bonaparte's cuirassiers.

But back from the war with Bonaparte to the war with Hitler.

Zhukov declared that Soviet tanks were light and outdated, and "the enemy was stronger". If so, here, strategist, is an example from history: don't get into the fray, don't drive the Cossacks to the cartridge, and there is no reason for them to fight with cuirassiers.

Zhukov ruined the tank troops of the Red Army in brainless counterattacks, and blamed it on the Soviet people: say, not such tanks

they gave him. And now Russia's top military leaders, as well as "all historians in one voice" agree with the talentless strategist: Soviet tanks were weak....

If tanks were bad, look closer at the ones Zhukov never had but passionately wished he had.

CHAPTER 15. How Zhukov produced Tukhachevsky into "giants of military thought".

With the advent of Soviet power, the artillery began to be run by energetic dilettantes. One of them was Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky... He was educated at the Alexander Military School, which he graduated from in 1914. He did not study anywhere else, but only taught others... Combat experience of the lieutenant was close to zero. He got to the front at the end of September 1914, and already on February 21, 1915 he was captured.... In civil wars, as a rule, generals do not become strategists, but cutthroats who can only shout slogans....

Shirokorad AB Genius of Soviet artillery. The Triumph and Tragedy of V. Grabin. MOSCOW: ACT, 2002. C. 33-34

1

There is one very popular explanation of the disaster of 1441: we had the greatest genius of strategy Tukhachevsky, but Stalin ruined the genius. For this, in June 1941, the country had to pay for it with a lot of blood.

Legends of Tukhachevsky's incredible talents were strengthened in part by the efforts of another greatest genius of strategy and his "the truest book about the war."

In M. N. Tukhachevsky felt a giant of military thought, a star of the first magnitude in the pleiad of outstanding military leaders of the Red Army (Zhukov G. K. Memories and Reflections. Moscow: OLMA-Press, 2003. Vol. 1. P. 114).

Let us turn to the works and accomplishments of Tukhachevsky. Having evaluated the views of the "star in the pleiad", we will form an opinion about Zhukov, as long as he chose for himself a role model. Zhukov is fascinated by the foresight and insight of the giant of military thought:

Back in the 30s, M. N. Tukhachevsky warned that our number one enemy was Germany, that it was intensively preparing for a major war

and certainly primarily against the Soviet Union (.).

During Khrushchev's time, the myth of "warnings" of Tukhachevsky was created and widely circulated. By order of Khrushchev.
Tukhachevsky's "outstanding" works were published in huge editions. In every regimental library, in every House of Officers stood these new volumes. They remained new forever, for no one ever took them off the shelves. Why take them off? If the lecturer of the political department says from the rostrum that Tukhachevsky warned, it means that it was so. Is there any point in reading the genius creations of a military commander after that?

But lecturers are people, too. Just like everyone else. Soviet. They haven't read those volumes either. Someone told them that Tukhachevsky was a genius. They didn't bother to read Tukhachevsky's masterpieces themselves.

And so went. And it went on and on.

Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, talking about Tukhachevsky's "warnings", obviously, he himself did not read them. But he had a powerful ideological service. They, the creators of "the most truthful book about the war", should have looked at the original source. But they, too, turned out to be Soviet people: if everyone says that Tukhachevsky was a genius, it must be so.

In the old days, collectors of oral folklore used to go to villages and record songs, tales, sayings and bylinas. This layer of folk folklore has always remained inexhaustible - while writing down old legends, new ones appear. Under the Communists, the creation of legends was put by the state on a stream. A lot of them were invented. They were widely circulated. The creators of Zhukov's memoirs, so as not to bother themselves much, actually collected together the gossip about the war, which went to the people, and published them under the name of Zhukov: here you have a stupid Stalin, and his desire to delay the war and a reason to attack Hitler not to give, and obsolete tanks, and forty thousand ruined commanders, and the brilliant Tukhachevsky, and his wise warnings, and more "forty barrels of prisoners.

"Warnings" Tukhachevsky I already dealt with in book "Purification." I recall that in his first "warning" Tukhachevsky spoke of the insidious designs of the "ministers of America,

England, France and other capitalist countries". Among the enemies of the Soviet Union Tukhachevsky named all future allies of the USSR in World War II. But for some reason the great predictor did not include Germany among the enemies. It is possible, of course, to assume that by saying "and others", Tukhachevsky meant Germany, but no evidence of this bold assumption has yet been found.

And in the second "warning" Tukhachevsky spoke of the German military threat to France, Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria, but for some reason did not mention the threat to the Soviet Union. The bold idea that Tukhachevsky warned of Germany's intensified preparations "for a major war, and certainly primarily against the Soviet Union" is put forward by Zhukov and/or his co-authors. But Tukhachevsky neither spoke nor wrote about anything of the kind. To be sure, one should open the "Military Bulletin" No. 4 for 1935. The central libraries of Moscow have this magazine. One can also look at the "masterpieces" of this "giant of military thought" published under Khrushchev. There, too, nothing is said about Germany's preparation for war against the Soviet Union.

But Zhukov could not be deterred: "*His bright patriotic speech, he supported his serious analysis and figures of German armament and its aggressive aspirations. However, the voice of M. N. Tukhachevsky remained "a voice crying in the wilderness*" (Ibid. Vol. 1. P. 115).

Here I simply have to object: Tukhachevsky never made patriotic speeches, because he was not a patriot and did not consider himself one. Tukhachevsky considered himself a Marxist, a communist, an internationalist. He believed that the national interests of the Soviet Union should be sacrificed to the interests of the world proletariat. He stated this in every speech he made.

Anyone interested in this can see for themselves. Again, primary sources are abundant. And Tukhachevsky also called himself an occupier in his articles. And was proud of it. And wrote scientific treatises on how to organize and maintain the regime of occupation of his own country. By the way, it is strange that after 70 years of communist rule, which cannot be called anything other than occupation of the country, in

Russia has not yet opened a single museum of occupation. This is how we treat our history.

And with the "serious analysis" of Tukhachevsky not everything is so simple. Anyone who has bothered to read Tukhachevsky's works himself does not share Zhukovsky's enthusiastic assessment:

A contemporary analysis of Tukhachevsky's article for Pravda shows that it overstated Germany's military capabilities. In fact, Tukhachevsky misinformed both Stalin and the public, significantly exaggerating the potential of the German Navy and Air Force. Thus, the Germans in 1935 did not have any tank units, as well as the tanks themselves. As for the then existing two hundred "with a tail" German T-1 tankers with anti-bullet armor, they did not pose a serious threat. It is possible that by presenting erroneous information to the Deputy Commissar of Defense, someone was simply framing the ambitious military commander, wishing to demonstrate his incompetence and unprofessionalism to the whole world (Krasnaya Zvezda. May 15, 2003).

The whole world laughed at Tukhachevsky. "The giant of military thought" showed his complete illiteracy and professional unsuitability. And Zhukov, as he himself says, "listened like a mesmerized" stupidest calculations of the said giant. And three decades later, praising the delusions of Tukhachevsky, Zhukov showed the whole world his own "incompetence and unprofessionalism.

2

So, if we believe Zhukov, Tukhachevsky demanded to prepare for war, to forge weapons, but "the voice of a crying man in the wilderness" was not heard. It turns out that our beloved country languished in an unforgiving pacifism and did not forge weapons.

Zhukov, as always, was wrong. Since 1927, the Soviet Union built nothing but concentration camps and military factories.

And here, they say, the Dnieper! That's right. There was also the Dnieper. It was built in order to provide energy for the largest aluminum plant in Europe. And aluminum went to first turn to the

production of combat airplanes and tank engines. So Dneproges is no exception. It is a purely military enterprise.

The Soviet Union produced more weapons than anyone else in the world. Tens of millions of people were exterminated in peacetime for the sake of weapons production. The country paid such a huge price for total militarization that at first the cadre Red Army simply refused to fight for the Soviet power, abandoning in the fields, forests and swamps all the weapons produced by this power.

And Zhukov resents: after all, Tukhachevsky demanded to produce weapons, but they did not listen to him, we had no weapons!

Remembering in the early days of the Great Patriotic War M. N. Tukhachevsky, we always paid tribute to his mental foresight and the limitations of those who could not see further than his nose, so that our leadership failed to timely create a powerful armored forces, and created them in the process of war (Zhukov G. K. Memories and Reflections. Moscow: OLMA-Press, 2003. Vol. 1. P. 114).

The wise Tukhachevsky, it turns out, was proposing programs to create new weapons, but he was prevented by someone who "could not see further than his nose". Who was he, the villain who did not want to arm himself?

This hint Zhukov deciphered without difficulty. Anyone with a little interest in the war knows that Stalin personally wrote resolutions on Tukhachevsky's insane projects. It is Comrade Stalin, it turns out, suffered from pacifism in a severe form, it is he did not want to hear the appeals of Tukhachevsky. Because of this, it turns out, "our leadership failed to create powerful armored forces in time, and created them already in the course of the war".

Goebbels was the first to sing the song about the fact that the Red Army had no tank troops before the war. In 1943, when the Red Army, having turned the course of the war in its favor, moved westward, Goebbels lucidly explained to the good burghers the reasons for the inexplicable at first glance victories of the "inferior race": it is Russian monkeys copying German experience. Monkeys, what can you take from them.....

The explanation was liked. It was picked up. After the war, it was repeated countless times. Overseas historians also liked it: the Russians themselves are not capable of anything, all wisdom came from the Germans.... And we, the wise Americans, beat even the Germans.

Neither in the first nor in many subsequent editions of Zhukov's memoirs is there any revelation that before the war the Red Army did not have powerful armored forces. But here Zhukov's lucky daughter has found The "original manuscript" of my father's memoirs, and suddenly it turned out that the Soviet Union was ruled by some fools who could not see further than their own noses and did nothing to prepare for the war - not even to create tank troops. And we had to create these troops during the war.

The circulation abroad must have jumped immediately. That's what Goebbels used to say. It turns out he wasn't lying. Zhukov said the same thing: there were no powerful tank troops in the Red Army, they had to create them in the course of the war, that is, to adopt German experience.

So the magazine "Rodina" rushed to defend Zhukov's (or rather Goebbels-Zhukov's) ideas: here it is, the real truth about the war! Read it! Even schoolchildren are advised to believe only the latest editions, starting from the tenth, checked with the original manuscript. And Marshal of Armored Forces O. A. Losik is also here: only now the truth has been revealed!

Comrade Marshal of Armored Forces, I strongly recommend to read military-historical literature for youth, for example, the book by V.D. Mostovenko "Tanks (sketch from the history of origin and development of armored vehicles)" (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1958) - in it the history of development of Soviet tank forces is briefly and quite accessible even for marshals. I am sure that the marshal of armored forces will learn a lot of new and interesting things about the Soviet tanks of the 1930s-1940s. And I recommend the editor-in-chief of the magazine "Rodina" to read once again Zhukov's revelations that we had no powerful tank forces before the war, and then turn three pages in the same book....

3

Let us turn over three leaves of "the most truthful book about the war" and turn from page 114 to page 121. On this page Zhukov tells us about the history of the creation of mech corps, "emphasizing", as he himself put it, "the priority of our army in this matter":

In 1929, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR (on the report of V.K. Triandafillov) approved a decree.... In pursuance of the decree that year an experienced mechanized regiment was formed. This regiment already in 1929 took part in all-army exercises in our Belorussian Military District. The exercises were led by K. E. Voroshilov, B. M. Shaposhnikov and V. K. Triandafillov. K. Triandafillov (ibid. Vol. 1. P. 121).

Here we should pay attention to the names: not according to Tukhachevsky's report, but according to Triandafillov's report. And it was Voroshilov, not Tukhachevsky, who led the exercises. But let's not get distracted:

In 1930, the regiment is deployed into a mechanized brigade, which is immediately practiced in district exercises. In 1932, the world's first mechanized corps was created, each of which included two mechanized, one rifle and machine gun brigades and a separate anti-aircraft artillery division. The corps included more than 500 tanks and more than 200 armored cars. By the beginning of 1936 there were already 4 mechanized corps, 6 separate mechanized brigades and the same number of separate tank regiments, 15 mechanized regiments of cavalry divisions, more than 80 tank battalions and companies in rifle divisions (ibid.).

Further on in Zhukov's text here and there there are hints that the Red Army did have tank troops. And not weak at all. Here Zhukov recalls his service in Belarus in early 1939:

In the event of war I was to take command of a cavalry-mechanized group consisting of 4-5 divisions of cavalry and 3-4 separate tank brigades (ibid. P. 158).

Let us not laugh at the horse-mechanized groups. In the course of offensive operations they have fully justified themselves.

until August 1945, when they participated in the Red Army's lightning strategic offensive operation in Manchuria. They would have continued to justify it, but the war was over.

Now let's figure it out. Each Soviet cavalry division had its own tank regiment - 64 tanks. Each separate tank brigade had 275 tanks. It is possible to count at least by minimum, at least by maximum, all the same about such tank power, gathered in a single fist, Guderian and Manstein could only dream. And in the Kiev Special Military District in the event of war created the same strike group. Only stronger.

The difference was that the German tank groups had to break through the defenses themselves. In the Red Army this task fell to the armies of the first echelon, abundantly saturated with artillery and tanks NPP (direct infantry support), including heavy. They broke through the defenses. And mobile groups were introduced into the battle through a breach in the enemy's defense in the area where the advancing Red Army units achieved the greatest success.

Simply put, the German tank groups had to spend their forces to break through the defenses, while the Soviets entered the breakthrough with fresh forces and all their might.

Further Zhukov tells how he fought at Khalkhin-Gol, where the main striking and maneuvering force were powerful tank and motorized armor brigades.

This is how the process of debilization of our own people proceeds: on one page we are told that we were the first in the world to create powerful tank formations, the first to develop the theory of their combat use, the first to test the correctness of theoretical developments in exercises, the first to use powerful tank formations to defeat the Japanese army, the first to have the world's most powerful tank forces and the world's best tanks. But a few pages earlier we are told that our leaders did not see further than their noses and did not bother to create tank troops before the war.

On June 21, 1941, the Red Army had more than 20 thousand tanks. Even the newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" has to admit this in its issue of May 29, 2001. In second place in the world was Germany, which

threw 3,712 tanks against the Soviet Union. This is what is written in Zhukov's memoirs.

It turns out that only the wisest Hitler saw further than his nose. Or maybe Churchill saw further than his nose? In July 1940, he had 89 worthless tanks to defend the British Isles.

The 20,000 tanks that the Red Army had on June 21 was the greatest military power that had ever been at the disposal of a single country since ancient times and up to the end of World War II. No other country, including the Soviet Union, had such a large number of tanks at one time during the war: while some were coming from the factories, others were already turning into scrap. During the war, not even the Soviet Union managed to create such a powerful tank forces, which were in the USSR before the war. The availability of more than 20,000 tanks simultaneously in service with the Red Army remained an unattainable dream of the Soviet marshals until the end of the war.

The statement that the Red Army did not have powerful tank forces before the war is a slander on our country and its people. In any normal country slanderers, who have composed

The "original manuscript" of Zhukov's memoirs would have been found and ridiculed long ago. But the interests of Hitlerites and Communists in this matter coincided. It was profitable for both to present our people as morons. Is this why the magazine "Rodina" so zealously repeats fictions suggestive of our racial inferiority?

4

Let us now deal with Tukhachevsky's proposals and evaluate the stupidity of those who, as Zhukov put it, "could not see further than his nose" and did not create powerful tank forces before the war.

In 1929, Tukhachevsky sent a report to Stalin demanding that mass production of tanks begin immediately. In 1929, Tukhachevsky proposed to produce 50-100 thousand tanks.

It was nonsense. One might as well suggest that Stalin send an expedition to Mars and organize a communist revolution in the spirit of Alexei Tolstoy's novel

"Aelita." And now Tukhachevsky's admirers would exclaim in excited voices: ah, how far ahead he looked!

However, the Soviets could not have sent an expedition to Mars in 1929. Nor in 1930. I am not afraid to say that even in 1931 such an undertaking would have ended in failure. The call to build 50-100 thousand tanks in one year was similar to the call to fly to distant planets
- bold, but unrealistic.

The Soviet Union could not produce 50,000 tanks a year. Neither in 1929, nor in 1939, nor even in 1944, when the whole country worked only for the production of weapons. The Soviet Union could not produce such a number of tanks in one year, neither in peacetime, nor in wartime, neither under Stalin, nor under Brezhnev, nor under Gorbachev. And no one could. No other country in the world, with all the strain of the military economy, could build 50,000 tanks a year. Neither Germany, nor Great Britain, nor the USA. I'm not even mentioning 100 thousand a year.

That is how in 1929 this proposal of Tukhachevsky and was accepted in the Kremlin. True, Stalin did not use strong words. He tried to explain in rather mild tones that the strategist Tukhachevsky was in the wrong steppe.

But Tukhachevsky did not restrain himself. December 30, 1930, he wrote another letter to Stalin, in which he said: I do not exaggerate our ability to produce tanks, I underestimate! We should not be talking about 100 thousand tanks a year. We are capable of more!

Tukhachevsky's highest position was Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Armaments. All his activities in this position were to the detriment of the Soviet Union. The personal contribution of this "giant of military thought" can be traced in everything.

Tukhachevsky was a principled opponent of mortars and considered them "underdeveloped artillery". Under him, work on the development of mortars was completely curtailed. Equally zealous "giant of military thought" opposed high-speed anti-aircraft guns of small caliber. And that's exactly what the troops need. High-flying aircraft troops are not afraid of troops, but afraid of low-flying aircraft - it appears suddenly and fires accurately from a low altitude. To defeat such planes, small caliber guns with high rate of fire are needed.

Tukhachevsky considered submachine guns to be "police weapons", which were not necessary in our conditions, since we do not live in Chicago. The Degtyarev submachine gun (PPD), developed in the mid-1930s, was adopted despite the efforts of the "giant of military thought", but Tukhachevsky made himself famous by ordering the PPD. He ordered to demand for the army ... 300 pieces. The calculation was as follows: during the war the Red Army would have about 300 divisions, so let there be one automatic rifle per division - for each division commander for self-defense.

Tukhachevsky did not plan to use submachine guns in combat units. The submachine gun, he thought, was the personal weapon of the division commander. When the enemy stormed the command post, he would have a chance to fight back and not be captured.

The logic is admirable. But in this case, why not arm regimental commanders with the same weapons? And the chief of staff of a division, why not give a submachine gun for self-defense? To manage three hundred divisions, we must have a hundred corps directorates, thirty army and up to a dozen front-line directorates. Why are submachine guns important only for self-defense of division commanders? And corps commanders will fight back with sabers?

The personal contribution of Zhukov's favorite Tukhachevsky to the development of artillery had even more dire consequences. Tukhachevsky inexorably bent the line to completely rearm the army with recoilless guns by Kurchevsky, who proposed more than a hundred variants of recoilless guns for infantry, cavalry, artillery, tanks, airplanes, motorcycles, and warships. None of these guns have never passed not only military and state tests, but even factory tests. Immeasurable funds were spent, precious time was lost, and Kurchevsky's rivals were neutralized and crushed. The result of Kurchevsky's zealous activity was zero.

In the field of aviation, Tukhachevsky was an advocate of mass production of airplanes with a frame made of bamboo sticks.

One could laugh at his eccentricity, if the eccentricity did not smoothly develop into sabotage.

5

Tukhachevsky's theoretical views on the development of weapons are fundamentally flawed and flawed. "*Other things being equal, a wheeled tank has an advantage over a tracked tank. Just as an amphibian has an advantage over a non-swimming tank*," wrote Tukhachevsky in his work "New Questions of War" (Tukhachevsky M. N. Selected Works. In 2 volumes. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964. T. 1. C. 213). Tukhachevsky insisted that in any conditions a wheeled-tracked tank was better than a purely tracked tank, because it could run fast on roads like an automobile, and on off-roads like a tractor. He was an advocate of universal means: in aviation - fighter-bombers, in artillery - anti-aircraft anti-tank guns, and so on.

Theoretically everything seems to be correct: we need fighters at the moment - please, all our planes can fight as fighters. An hour later we need bombers, and again no problem - all our planes strike ground targets. After dropping bombs, the bombers turn back into fighters and fight off the invading enemies on their own.

There are anti-aircraft guns and there are field guns. Enemy airplanes are flying, but only anti-aircraft guns shoot at them. Ordinary field guns are silent because they can't shoot upwards. Or we have to suppress enemy batteries. Field artillery works, anti-aircraft artillery is silent. Why not make a universal cannon? Enemy planes are flying, and all our artillery is firing at them at once! If we need to hit ground targets - all artillery hits ground targets!

On the face of it, everything is wonderful.

However, if a designer is given the task of combining the characteristics of different types of weapons in one model, he has to chase two birds with one stone. Or even three. If you combine the qualities of a racing car and a dump truck in one design, this vehicle will lose both to a racing car during races and to a dump truck on a construction site.

That is why, all other things being equal, a fighter-bomber cannot be better in aerial combat than an ordinary fighter. Simply because it will be bigger, more complex, heavier. Hence, its maneuverability, speed,

The same fighter-bomber cannot be as high as a fighter built by the same designer using the same materials and the same technology. The same fighter-bomber cannot be better than a conventional bomber simply because it is lighter. In aviation, they used to joke that a fighter-bomber is neither a fighter nor a bomber.

The anti-aircraft anti-tank gun is much heavier, more expensive, more difficult to manufacture, maintain and repair than the conventional anti-tank gun and the conventional anti-aircraft gun. The anti-aircraft anti-tank gun has less maneuverability on the battlefield, higher silhouette, and therefore, vulnerability. The anti-aircraft gun requires more soldiers to maintain it, and a more powerful tractor for transportation: not only is it heavier, but it is also on two axles.

It is possible to fire at tanks from ordinary anti-aircraft gun if necessary, but it is expensive and unsafe. It is easier to put forward an ordinary anti-tank gun of the same caliber to a suddenly indicated tank-dangerous direction, easier to dig and camouflage a shelter for it, easier to change the fire position under enemy fire.

But the main thing is that no one needs anti-aircraft anti-tank guns. There are heavy enemy bombers working against the deep rear of the country; there are no enemy tanks in the deep rear. Why would you need an anti-aircraft anti-tank gun in the deep rear? And on the battlefield, the enemy uses attack aircraft and dive bombers. You can't fire big guns at them. Here you need a rapid-fire gun of 20-40 mm caliber. But the creation and development of such anti-aircraft guns was crushed and trampled by Tukhachevsky.

6

Tukhachevsky's views on tank design were equally erroneous. Other things being equal, a purely tracked tank is cheaper, easier to produce (especially in mass production), easier to operate and repair, and therefore more reliable than a wheeled-tracked tank. The tracked tank can carry heavy armor and powerful armament, while the wheeled-tracked tank is not capable of this. Wheeled Crawler Tanks

were needed for very specific tasks and conditions in a very specific war. They were good as long as the enemy armies were not saturated with anti-tank guns. As soon as such guns appeared and became widespread, heavy armor had to be put on tanks. This, incidentally, was the reason for the Red Army's abandonment of wheeled-tracked tanks in the late 1930s.

And the floating tank does not win in everything compared to the ordinary tank. It has the same disadvantage as the wheeled and tracked one. Floating means more expensive and more complicated. And no one will never be able to put on a floating tank as powerful cannon and the same heavy armor as on an ordinary tank. No one argues: a floating tank is a necessary thing. But you have to choose between the ability to float and powerful armor or the ability to float and powerful armament. On a floating tank it is better not to meet in a clear field with an ordinary medium tank of the enemy. Such a meeting can end badly.

Zhukov announced that history had given us little time to prepare for war. We will not argue with this "genius". But let us pay attention to how this time was used. Under the warm wing of Tukhachevsky flourished design bureaus under the leadership of charlatans like Kurchevsky. They devoured colossal state funds, flooded the industry with a lot of small-scale orders for extravagant fantastic weapons, which eventually turned out to be unsuitable for mass production or for arming the troops.

At the same time, the outstanding designers of military equipment Shavyrin, Shpagin, Degtyarev, Grabin, Petrov and many others were deprived of the opportunity to create what was actually needed in the war because of the whims of the illiterate baron Tukhachevsky. They were driven into technological dead ends, forced to create universal weapons like anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns.

The reason for this was Stalin's long patience in relation to Tukhachevsky. Stalin then suspended this one
The "giant of military thought" from leading the development of new weapons, then again entrusted him with this crucial area. "Krasnaya Zvezda" in its issue of May 29, 2001 writes about it as follows:

This happened because in his time was not fully neutralized military Khlestakov - Tukhachevsky, deputy commissar for armament and "red militarist" at the same time. In addition, was not eradicated "gigantomania" in the NKO (Stalin's expression on the report of the General Staff on the proposals of Tukhachevsky). This was one of the reasons for the dissipation of funds for largely unnecessary projects to create military-technical exotica instead of preparing the industry for the production of high-quality and modern weapons.

7

Our society is slowly coming to its senses from the raptures over the bold designs of the "giant of military thought".

As for the notorious "unpreparedness of the USSR for war," if Tukhachevsky's plan to build 100,000 tanks and maintain 250 manned divisions (as they say today - "permanent readiness formations") in the Red Army had been realized, the nation would indeed have been left without pants. 100 thousand tanks, as well as 150 thousand planes, were not built, Tukhachevsky's plans were rejected at Stalin's insistence (Krasnaya Zvezda. May 29, 2001).

Now let's crack open "the truest book on war" again and on page 141 read:

Long before the war, the very capable designer B. I. Shavyrin created mortars of 82 and 120 millimeters caliber. The real saturation of the army with mortar armament occurred later (Zhukov G. K. Memories and Reflections. Moscow: OLMA-press, 2003. Vol. 1. P. 141).

You see, we had a talented mortar designer. Long before the war, he created the world's best mortars. But for some reason the army was not saturated with mortar armament at that time. And mortars were so successful, simple, convenient, reliable that even at the beginning of the new millennium they are still in service and faithfully serve in many armies of the world, including the Russian one. Here

would Zhukov and call by the name of that "giant of military thought", who long before the war held the post of Deputy Commissar of Defense for Armament, who considered mortars "underdeveloped artillery" and in every possible way hindered the process of their creation and equipping the army with them on the grounds that they do not get to shoot at planes and fight tanks.

And here's another pearl from the same page of the same book:

Some military figures even thought to reduce cannon artillery to universal and semi-universal guns. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) drew attention to the fallacy of this trend (.).

Again, we would like to know the names of those military figures who took such a foolish stance on weapons development.

***

When Zhukov recalls Tukhachevsky's supposed merits, like his famous "warnings," he calls this "giant of military thought" by name.

But as soon as it comes to specific activities, such as the idiotic proposal to convert all artillery to universal or semi-universal guns, Zhukov completely "forgets" the name of the main and only ideologist of such an approach. Here he hides Tukhachevsky in the plural, among some unknown fools: "some military figures".

Once you have to name the one who put the brakes on the seething activity of "the star in the pleiad," the one who, according to Zhukov,
"he couldn't see farther than his nose," Zhukov has a clear allusion to Stalin.

But as soon as it comes to a concrete decision to stop the crazy projects of Tukhachevsky - then Zhukov has the wisest Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b), which "drew attention to the fallacy of this trend. Zhukov turns out that the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Stalin saw nothing further than his nose, but the far-sighted Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (under Stalin) saw everything, knew everything and found the right solutions for all problems.

CHAPTER 16.
Tukhachevsky's "tank raw material".

The construction of the Air Force followed the path of mass. By the middle of 1935 we had the most massive air force in the world. This did not seem enough. Tukhachevsky planned to have 40,000 airplanes and 50,000 tanks by 1937. The industry, choking, was building percale and wooden airplanes of old designs. All this was done instead of conducting research, creating new equipment, developing the aviation industry and systematically replacing old aircraft with new ones.

Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Air Marshal A. N. Efimov. N. Efimov. Red Star. May 6, 2006.

1

How did Tukhachevsky intend to build a truly incredible number of tanks? His proposal is truly crazy bold: all our tractors and automobiles should be turned into tanks! Tukhachevsky told Stalin: "*From each tractor and car can be built one tank*" (TsGANH of the USSR. Fond 7297. Inventory 41. Un. xr. 9. Sheet 155).

Tukhachevsky emphasized the word "every". In his opinion, every automobile is a potential tank. Including buses. And cars. And every tractor was a potential tank. Tractors and cars, according to Tukhachevsky, are "tank raw materials". Tukhachevsky included *all* cars and *all* tractors of the Soviet Union in his calculations and concluded: there are so many of them!

By the end of 1930, there were 98,400 automobiles and tractors in the Soviet Union. Tukhachevsky exults: the Five-Year Plan will give us more tractors and automobiles, and we will turn all of them into tanks!

The table of availability of tank "raw materials", made by me, shows that the resources already from the end of 1931 become quite impressive. If cars and tractors for the production of tanks were taken from the receipts for the year of war, and partly by mobilization from the available resources, it would be possible, apparently,

without much overstretchcountries have for tanks and tractor-trailers:

(a) In 1932, 40,000 from mobilization and 100,000 from annual production, and

b) in 1933 these figures could increase by a factor of one and a half (ibid.).

That's the scope!

2

But even Tukhachevsky was it was clear that on such amount "There is no armor steel in the country, and there is nowhere to get it. Therefore, he proposed to use boiler iron instead of armor and to switch the Taganrog boiler plant to the production of iron sheets.

The main truck of that time was the AMO-F-15. It could take cargo weighing a maximum of one ton. Wheel formula was 4x2 (rear wheel drive). Its off-road passability was very low. If you cover only the engine, gas tanks and driver's cabin with sheets of boiler iron, it is already more than a ton of additional weight. It is impossible to cover the body with "armor". If you mount an iron box in the body, then the engine, gas tanks and driver's cab will remain unprotected - the truck simply can't carry more additional weight. In either scenario, the driveshaft, suspension, and thin rubber wheels would remain exposed.

The armament of such a "tank" is a Maxim machine gun. Nothing heavier can be put on such a "tank". However, Tukhachevsky did not recommend installing anything else. It was possible to install a machine gun on such a "tank" only openly, as the armored turret needed a strong base, and there was no possibility to put it.

The main tractor of the time was the Fordson. The American company Henry Ford and Son[11] sold the Soviet Union a license to its production and built a factory. Of course, at us the original name of the tractor, giving away its bourgeoisie The tractor's origin was replaced by the euphonious proletarian one - STZ. The power of the tractor is 15 horsepower. From the moment of leaving

and until the end of the 1960s this power of the tractor was considered as a benchmark. So it was written: "*During 1933-1937, agriculture received more than 500 thousand tractors (in 15-horsepower calculation)*" (History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945. T. 1. C. 64).

This phrase needs to be clarified. Since 1936, in addition to the Fordzone, the Soviet Union has been producing other, more powerful tractors. And if one tractor with 30 horsepower came out of the factory gates, it was counted as two in the statistics. And a 60 horsepower tractor was counted as four.

But at the time when Tukhachevsky was composing his projections, there were no 30 and 60 horsepower tractors yet. There was an ordinary "Fordzon", and then - a reinforced power (22 horsepower). Tukhachevsky proposed to turn it into a tank. This tractor was a primitive engine, behind which a tractor driver sat on an iron seat with holes. This miracle of technology had two small iron wheels with spokes in front and two big wheels in the back. Also with spokes. It was possible to cover the tractor driver and some vital units with boiler iron. But not the wheels. Besides, the engine power had to be taken into account. Any increase of the load had a negative effect - the tractor speed decreased, the range and cross-country ability decreased. A machine gun could be attached, but it had to be mounted openly, because the armored turret had nowhere to be mounted.

3

There is another point to consider: if *all the* cars and tractors of the Soviet Union were converted into "tanks," what would be left for industry, transportation, and agriculture? What would happen to the country's economy if not even half of the tractors and cars, but not all of them, were taken away for military needs?

But in war and the army itself needs both tractors and cars. Let us imagine that army tractors and cars were turned into "tanks" according to Tukhachevsky's project. In this case, what will be used to transport millions of tons of ammunition, fuel, spare parts, food, engineering, medical and other equipment from the army?

How will we transport troops from supply stations to front-line, army, corps, division, division, brigade and regimental depots and into the battle lines of the troops? What will we use to transport troops, headquarters, communications units, hospitals, repair shops? How would we tow artillery? The army was already short of cars and tractors. And never in war can there be an excess of them. There's no such thing as a surplus of vehicles in war.

If you convert even half of the country's automobiles and tractors to "tanks," they simply won't be able to operate. The reason is simple. Following the column of tanks should be followed by anti-tank, cannon, howitzer and anti-aircraft artillery, not inferior to tanks in mobility, infantry, sappers, chemists, communicators, staffs, intelligence, topographers, repairers, medics. And all of these are vehicles, vehicles, vehicles. In addition, and for the tanks, and for all those who follow along with them, you need an uninterrupted supply of ammunition, fuel and lubricants, food and much more. Elementary calculations of that time showed that each tank should be followed by 4-5, or even more vehicles with supporting units and parts. In other words, if the obviously stupid decision to turn 15-horsepower tractors into "tanks" was made, then even in this case the barrier of 15-20 percent of the total number of army vehicles and tractors could not be crossed. Otherwise, the "tanks" will be left without ammunition, without fuel, without sappers, communications, control, without artillery support, without anti-aircraft cover, and so on.

Tukhachevsky clearly did not understand such things. And Zhukov, with his mouth open, listened to the nightingale trills of the "star of the first magnitude".

4

In the second half of the 1930s, the Soviet industry mastered the production of more advanced trucks GAZ-AA with a payload of 1.5 tons, ZIS-5 with a payload of 3 tons and caterpillar tractors of the Chelyabinsk plant. However, these trucks did not fully meet the requirements of the army, which needed vehicles with increased cross-country ability. If these ordinary trucks were covered with boiler iron, their already low cross-country ability would become even worse.

Closer to the war the production of three-axle trucks GAZ-AAA and ZIS-6 was organized. But their front axle was not driving. These vehicles were also not suitable for conversion into "tanks". And the army needed them urgently as cars. Even in peacetime there was a catastrophic shortage of them.

And the most powerful Soviet caterpillar tractor "Stalinets" was as suitable for conversion into a tank as all other tractors and cars.

Tukhachevsky's proposals are true technological barbarism. It is impossible to turn an automobile or a tractor into a tank, just as it is impossible to convert a bicycle into a dump truck, a motorcycle into a bulldozer, and a kettle into a coffee grinder. And why invent a bicycle first and then remake it into something? If, according to Tukhachevsky (and Zhukov), the country is able to live and fight without tractors and automobiles, why did they build automobile and tractor factories at all, why did they establish production? Wasn't it easier to build tanks instead of cars and tractors?

All attempts to turn tractors and cars into tanks ended in failure. During the tests conducted, the GAZ-AA, laden with boiler iron and thus transformed into a "tank", could not move from its place. And the armored "Fordzon" with its large rear iron wheels with teeth threw the ground out from under itself and buried its stern part in the ground.

And Zhukov is a pity: Stalin should have listened to the "giant of military thought" for nothing!

5

Now let's compare the "most obsolete" Soviet T-26 tank with Tukhachevsky's dreams of a Fordzone turned "tank".

On the worst T-26 the engine is 90 hp. And in the dreams of a giant of military thought - 15 hp. Or - 22 hp. T-26 - on tracks, it could move on any terrain, and "Fordzon" - on iron wheels. It, too, could move on any terrain, but only as long as it remained a row crop tractor. As soon as it was turned into a "tank", it could not operate on any terrain.

The vast majority of T-26s carry a 45mm gun, which in 1941 was capable of penetrating any German tank. Except for

and two or three DT machine guns. The crew, armament, ammunition, engine, fuel and everything else - under real armor. And on the "Fordzone" in the best case it was possible to attach one "Maxim" machine gun. It's doubtful that this machine gun could be provided with all-round fire. In this case, neither the gunner nor the machine gun could be covered even with boiler iron.

Already the first T-26, armed with two machine guns, in all respects.were superior to the Fordson in all respects, because there were two machine guns, the gunners were under armoru were able to fire fire в and could fire in any direction, covering all the space around. And now, imagine, Zhukov in his memoirs never once mentioned the T-26. This tank and many other tanks with much higher characteristics Zhukov called "light and obsolete" and crossed out of the statistics as not worth mentioning. Meanwhile, some T-26s left the factory gates in 1940 and even in the first half of 1941. But if according to the idea of the "giant of military thought" в 1929 or 1930 years cars AMO-F-15 were covered with sheets of iron and they would have stood in the open under snow and rain until 1941, that's when Zhukov would probably have been satisfied, that's when the Red Army under his leadership would have managed to to fight back!

In August 1939, in Mongolia, the 1st Army Group under Zhukov's command crushed the Japanese 6th Army. Zhukov had BT-5 tanks with a 400 hp engine and BT-7 tanks with a 500 hp engine. No one in the world at that time had anything like that. Thanks to this power Zhukov was always ahead of the enemy's actions. Japanese troops did not have time to react to the rapid rushes and lightning strikes of Soviet tank brigades. These tanks were armed with 45-mm guns, which at that moment had no equal in Japan, the United States, Great Britain or Germany. Only some French tanks at that time had 47-mm guns. The weight of their shell was decent - 1.65 kg; the weight of our 45-mm gun shell was 1.4 kg. However, the length of the barrel of the French 47-mm gun was 34 caliber, and in the Soviet "most obsolete" T-26 45-mm gun with a slightly smaller caliber had a barrel length of 46 caliber and therefore surpassed the French 47-mm gun in its power.

I like to admire Zhukov's actions in Mongolia, if instead of BT-5 and BT-7 he had to fight on Tukhachevsky's "tanks" with Kurchevsky's guns.

In June 1941, the Red Army had 7,549 fast-moving tanks from BT-2 to BT-7M. Zhukov also called them "light and obsolete". I wonder, if he had had to fight on half-trucks and "Fordzons", unable to move, what would he have called them? Would he call them heavy and newest?

6

In the 1930s, two diametrically opposed directions were clearly defined in Soviet tank construction. They were epitomized by:

1. Tukhachevsky with the idea of a "tank" converted from a semi-truck;
2. Pavlov with the idea of a sharp leap forward from the T-26 and BT to tanks with heavy armor, diesel engines, powerful armament and wide tracks.

The T-34 was "Pavlov's dream embodied in armor," and the "Fordson" with "Maximom" was Tukhachevsky's dream, which, thanks to Stalin's decisive intervention, could not be realized.

And so Zhukov in his memoirs, interviews and public speeches regularly and persistently trampled in the mud Dmitry Pavlov and praised the "giant of military thought" Tukhachevsky. It turns out that Zhukov considered the way of development of tank forces, which insisted on Tukhachevsky, the only right. Of course, if the Red Army was armed with "Fordzones", then Zhukov would have given Hitler and his generals a thrashing! I would like to see Tukhachevsky's "tanks" in the impenetrable mud in the fall of 1941, in the snowdrifts of the Moscow suburbs, in the counter-offensive at Stalingrad, in the Battle of Kursk, in the Belorussian offensive operation....

Zhukov praises Tukhachevsky's "mental foresight" and laments the fact that Stalin "could not see further than his nose" and did not allow Tukhachevsky to realize his brilliant plans. At the same time, Zhukov accuses the leadership of the Soviet Union - that is, Stalin - that the production of the T-34 and KV was deployed too late and on an insufficient scale. All his shameful

Zhukov explained his failures and defeats by the fact that he was not given enough of these, the best tanks in the world.

All through the war, from Dubno, Rivne, Yelnya to Poznan and Berlin, Zhukov fought on tanks that had been designed by Dmitry Grigorievich Pavlov. What would the "Marshal of Victory" do if he did not have a single KV and T-34?

***

Zhukov is not alone in his assessment of Tukhachevsky's outstanding abilities. Marshal of the Soviet Union Yazov advises young officers: read Zhukov! And Marshal of Armored Forces Losik, who fought the war on the T-34, recommends to the younger generation "the most truthful book about the war": believe Zhukov!

It turns out that Marshal of Armored Forces Losik is in solidarity with Zhukov that tank troops should have been developed not according to Pavlov's ideas, but according to the ingenious recipes of Tukhachevsky. Here would be to give the commander of the tank brigade Lieutenant Colonel Losik in 1944 a hundred armored "Fordzones" and gondola trucks, so that he, meeting some noble German division - "Dead Head" or "Viking," he showed us how to fight!

CHAPTER 17. Why Stalin let Trotsky go free.

On steel bayonets and Voroshilov volleys, on the mighty wings of the Soviets, we shall carry liberation to the working class of the capitalist countries and hoist the banner of communism on the other five-sixths of the globe.

Lev Mekhlis, army commissar of the first rank, chief of the Political Department of the Red Army. From the speech "On the assault of capitalism to the world commune". (Transcript of the report of L.Z.Mekhlis at the meeting of party activists of the Kiev Special Military District on April 4, 1939. Historical Archive. 2005. №3)

1

On August 21, 1940, Lev Trotsky was brutally murdered in Mexico. An agent of the Soviet secret police, Spanish communist Ramon Mercader del Rio (aka Jacques Mornar Vandendrain, aka Jean Mortan, aka Ramon Ivanovich Lopez) managed to infiltrate Trotsky's inner circle under the guise of an active ideological Trotskyist. Mercader wrote articles that Trotsky liked and became his own man in his house. On the day of the assassination, the two of them stayed in Trotsky's office. Trotsky, sitting at his desk, bent over an article. Mercader took out from under his cloak a mountaineering ice axe, swung around and with a terrible blow broke Trotsky's skull.

Mercader was arrested at the scene. He refused to testify. A Mexican court sentenced him to 20 years in prison. On May 6, 1960, he was released early for good behavior, falling three months short of the full term. Mercader was taken to the USSR and appointed a research associate at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee. This appointment eloquently characterized both the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the whole of Marxism-Leninism. For the further development of Lenin's immortal teachings, for strengthening the inseparable link between theory and practice, ideological fighters with such inclinations should have been sent to the front of the ideological struggle. And with such experience.

It was joked at the time that Mercader, having become a fellow of such an esteemed temple of science, was busy writing a multi-volume dissertation on "Alternative Uses of the Ice Axe."

The Communist authorities could show no special gratitude for Mercader's "feat". What is the value of a favor that has already been done? All the more so - rendered 20 years ago. But no! Immediately upon his arrival in Moscow, Mercader was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Golden Star medal and the highest state award - the Order of Lenin.

One point should be emphasized. Mercader committed the brutal murder under Stalin and on Stalin's orders. After Stalin's death, the new ruler of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, publicly exposed Stalin as the greatest criminal. And the same Khrushchev in the midst of the anti-Stalin campaign awards Stalin's agent, a hired assassin, with the highest insignia of the Soviet Union. This example shows that Nikita Khrushchev himself, the greatest fighter for peace, progress and democracy, not only was not a stranger to contract killings, but also paid for them at the highest rate.

2

Trotsky's assassination gave rise to many opinions. They said that this crime made no sense, because Trotsky had few followers, Trotsky lived in faraway Mexico and posed no threat. They said that the murder - Stalin's personal revenge, a manifestation of Stalin's paranoia.

But there are still uncertainties. Why did Trotsky end up in Mexico in the first place?

Trotsky's career reached its peak in October 1917.

It was under his leadership that the coup d'état was carried out and power was seized in Petrograd. Trotsky was the actual creator of the Red Army and its permanent leader throughout the Civil War. Already during the Civil War, however, he was not the most important. He shared supreme power with Lenin. Gradually Trotsky was relegated to second and third roles. The slide from the top of power gained speed until it turned into a fall. Already in 1923, Trotsky led the leftist opposition in the

Communist Party, that is, he was in the minority. By 1927 he had lost everything - he was not even a rank-and-file member of the Communist Party. He was expelled from all posts, stripped of all powers and positions. On November 7, 1927, Trotsky tried to make a speech in front of a column of demonstrators who were marching to Red Square, but empty bottles and stones flew at him. The cobblestone, as we know, is the weapon of the proletariat. And so is the bottle. To kill Trotsky was no problem at all. There would have been plenty of hunters. Why didn't Stalin kill Trotsky at that time?

In early 1928, Stalin sent Trotsky into exile in Kazakhstan. A year later he exiled him to Turkey. This begs the question: why? In Kazakhstan, Trotsky was completely isolated and under the control of Stalin's secret police. The borders of the Soviet Union were firmly closed, and it was very difficult to escape from the country. For Trotsky it would have been completely impossible as he was under constant surveillance. To escape from Stalin he could not - and he did not show any such desire. As a political opponent Trotsky was neutralized. He had no levers of power and influence, no means of communication. What he wrote, no one published. Trotsky's letters were checked, delayed for months, and in most cases simply disappeared. Trotsky's supporters were brutally persecuted. Brutal beatings of Trotskyists in dark back alleys and entrances were only the first timid manifestations of Stalin's disfavor. They were followed by exiles, prisons, torture, public trials and shootings. Millions turned away from Trotsky. Only a few remained loyal to Trotsky. People are so organized: they want to be friends with those who are rich, strong and powerful. But if a person has fallen from the heights of power to the bottom, the number of his friends and supporters is sharply reduced. On the contrary, there are many people who want to kick yesterday's idol.

Stalin exterminated millions of people whom he considered his enemies or potential enemies. He exiled his opponents Siberia, the Far East, Kazakhstan, Sakhalin and Kolyma, or even immediately thrown into firing squads, and only one of his enemies, the most important, Stalin for some reason from distant Kazakhstan suddenly sent to Turkey, to the paradise islands in the Sea of Marmara.

3

If Trotsky was dangerous, Stalin could isolate him the way he isolated Lenin in the last years of his life. *On* December 18, 1922, a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party was adopted, which stated: "*Comrade Stalin should be personally responsible for the isolation of Vladimir Ilyich both with regard to personal communications with workers and correspondence*" (Felshtinsky Y. Chiefs in Law. M.: Terra- Book Club, 1999. P. 290).

Security, food, Lenin's "treatment" - everything was under Stalin's complete control. Lenin was allowed to read only what Stalin authorized. Lenin knew about the situation in the country mainly from publications in the newspaper Pravda. And to keep him calm, a special issue was published for him. A single copy. Everything Lenin wrote was passed on to Stalin. However, concerned about his health, Stalin's doctors did not allow Lenin to work much.

Trotsky could die on the operating table as 1925 died Frunze, who succeeded Trotsky as head of the Red Army. Stalin at that time had three secretaries: Bazhanov - secretary for "light matters", Mekhlis - for "semi-dark", Kanner
- on "dark matters". Bazhanov recalls that Mikhail Frunze was put on the operating table almost by force - so much Stalin cared about the health of a battle buddy. Frunze did not fight back in vain. Death awaited him on the operating table. He must have known about it. Preparation for the operation for some reason was engaged in Stalin's secretary "on dark matters" Grigory Kanner. When the secretary of "light affairs" Bazhanov learned about it, it all became clear to him (Boris Bazhanov. Memories of Stalin's former secretary. Paris: Third Wave, 1980. C. 141). If Trotsky was dangerous to Stalin, it was possible to show concern for his health and also put him on the operating table, even if by force.

Trotsky could have drowned safely in the lake the way Efraim Sklyansky, Trotsky's deputy in charge of the Red Army during the Civil War, drowned in 1925. Bazhanov recounts how he received news of Sklyansky's mysterious death: "*Mehlis and I immediately went to Kanner and said with one voice: 'Grisha, it was you who drowned Sklyansky'...". Mehlis and I were firmly*

are sure that Sklyansky was drowned on Stalin's orders and that the "" was organized by Kanner and Yagoda" (. P. 91). By the way, Kanner was shot in 1937, Yagoda - in 1938.

In the mid-1920s, Stalin already had a well-established mechanism for political assassinations. In a dark alley or even in a bright corridor of Smolny Trotsky could meet an ideological fighter with an ice axe or a mentally unstable type with a gun. But for some reason Trotsky did not encounter such types in those years.

While in Kazakhstan, Trotsky could not publish a single line. By letting Trotsky out, Stalin gave him the opportunity to say and write anything he wanted - that is, even the most vile things about Stalin.

Why would Stalin do that? And why, after letting Trotsky go free, did Stalin delay his assassination for so long? In the 1930s, Stalin accused all his enemies inside the country of Trotskyism. Such an accusation meant death

— a slow death in the camps or an immediate death in the penitentiary. Trotskyists and those who were counted among them were shot by the thousands and tens of thousands, driven to the camps by the hundreds of thousands and even millions. At the same time, Stalin did not touch Trotsky himself. At the same time, Trotsky lived freely on islands of fabulous beauty in a resort climate, then - in the south of France, in Norway, in Mexico.

Then suddenly something happened, and the real hunt for Trotsky began. Assassination attempt followed assassination attempt until they all ended with a victorious blow with an ice pick.

If this is Stalinist paranoia, then why did it only apply to Trotskyists, overwhelmingly, for so long

— and Trotsky himself was shunned up to a certain point? And what happened then? Did the paranoia suddenly escalate?

After Stalin's death, the new master of the country, Nikita Khrushchev, explained that we had the best social and economic system in the world, and that certain shortcomings and distortions arose because of Stalin's bad character. Khrushchev's sycophants supported the idea, developed it and started talking about the fact that Stalin was paranoid. Under Khrushchev, Stalin's executioners were not pitied. Some were shot, some were imprisoned, some were thrown out of work. True, most of them got off lightly, but they were no longer awarded orders. And then suddenly Mercader, Trotsky's assassin and executor, appeared in Moscow.

of Stalin's criminal scheme, and receives from Khrushchev the highest honors of the Soviet Union.

If Trotsky's assassination is considered a manifestation of Stalin's paranoia, then we have to admit that Khrushchev was also paranoid, and this strange paranoia manifested itself only once and only in relation to Trotsky, who was assassinated 20 years ago. Otherwise, we must recognize that Trotsky on the eve of World War II and at its very beginning posed a real danger not only to Stalin, but to the entire Soviet leadership.

4

Trotsky was a fanatical supporter of the World Revolution. After his ouster from power, he furiously denounced Stalin, declaring to the world that Stalin had betrayed the cause of communism and the World Revolution. Trotsky did not realize that his revelations were necessary and extremely profitable for Stalin. His revelations Trotsky put to sleep the vigilance of the West, while Stalin, with the help of Western countries created in the Soviet Union the world's most powerful military industry, preparing his army and country to crush Western civilization. And Trotsky was declaring that there was no need to fear Stalin, that Stalin was gray and mediocre, that Stalin was capable of nothing, that his regime would soon collapse by itself. "*Stalin's personal dictatorship is clearly approaching sunset*," Trotsky announced in November 1931 (Bulletin of the Opposition (Bolshevik-Leninists). November 1931.№ 25-
26. C. 11).

Western politicians remembered Trotsky's role in the revolution and the Civil War. Everyone knew that it was he who had created the Red Army. His opinion was listened to. Trotsky was the detonator of the World Revolution, but the detonator was neutralized. And Stalin (if Trotsky is to be believed) was not a detonator.

Stalin not only let Trotsky out of the Soviet Union, but also provided him with worldwide publicity. At every political trial in Moscow, was recalled. Stalin could called his enemies by any name, but he persisted in calling them Trotskyists, thus giving Trotsky additional political weight.

If Trotsky had claimed otherwise, if he had said that Stalin was preparing a war of aggression, if he had warned the West of the

The danger of Stalin's perfidy, no one would have allowed him to leave the Soviet Union, and he would have received a fatal blow to the skull with an ice axe as early as 1927.

5

On the eve of World War II and at its very beginning, Trotsky suddenly stopped claiming that Stalin had betrayed the cause of the World Revolution. Therefore, he became unnecessary. He had accomplished his mission. Trotsky was no longer useful. Now he could be removed.

Not only that, Trotsky became dangerous. He realized Stalin's game and came out with revelations. He began to write that Hitler came to power thanks to Stalin's help. "*Without Stalin there would have been no Hitler*" were Trotsky's words. Here are some of Trotsky's revelations:

Hitler is preparing for war ... A strike against the West in the more or less near future could be realized only on condition of a military alliance between Nazi Germany and Stalin (Bulletin of the Opposition (Bolshevik-Leninists). №35. 1933. p. 15).

On September 4, 1939, Trotsky reminded the world that "the Kremlin fed oil for the Italian campaign in Abyssinia," and now feeds oil for Hitler's war against Europe. Trotsky asks a reasonable question: why did the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union turn into a war?

It is unclear why Hitler opened an attack on Poland immediately after Ribbentrop's embrace with Molotov? <...> Stalin knew well what he was doing. Hitler needed the benevolent "neutrality" of the USSR plus Soviet raw materials to attack Poland and to wage war against England and France. The political and trade treaty provides Hitler with both (Bulletin of the Opposition (Bolshevik-Leninists). September 1939, No. 79-80).

Trotsky warned Britain and France that the root of evil is not so much Hitler, as Stalin. Without
Stalin's "neutrality" toward Hitler, without Soviet oil, manganese, chromium, copper, tin, nickel, vanadium, molybdenum, tungsten,

platinum, iron ore, cotton, grain Hitler would not have dared to start a war in Europe.

Trotsky's words could have alerted Hitler as well. As early as June 1939, when few people in the world guessed that in a couple of months the Second World War would begin, Trotsky, showing amazing foresight, wrote that Hitler would strike westward, and Stalin would want to take advantage of it.

***

As long as Stalin himself was quite openly announcing his plans, no one paid the slightest attention to it. No one paid attention to these speeches. And suddenly Trotsky realized: Stalin is not kidding! This insight Trotsky very much disliked Stalin, and he made a decisive step to silence Trotsky.

CHAPTER 18. Why Stalin and Molotov sought control of the Dardanelles.

Stalin, as the greatest politician of our century, led a military-political game of historical proportions. He knew that the collision of the socialist world (USSR) and capitalism (Hitler's Germany) was inevitable. Such a clash was taken into account in his plans and was to be a turning point in the history of mankind, to finally decide the question of "who is who" on a global scale. Stalin had no doubt that if the timing was right, the issue would be resolved in favor of socialism once and for all.

B. M. Molotov (quoted from the source: Pravda newspaper, June 22, 1993)

1

Meanwhile, Trotsky's predictions began to come true. In May 1940, Hitler did indeed hit the main forces to the west, and Stalin decided to take full advantage of his position. On November 12, 1940, Vyacheslav Molotov, head of government and at the same time People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Stalin's right-hand man, the second man in the Soviet Union after Stalin, arrived in Berlin.

The servile Communist historians wrote that there were no negotiations between Stalin and Hitler on the division of spheres of influence in Europe and Asia, that Molotov's visit to Berlin was only a struggle to secure the western borders of the Soviet Union. The Communists explained that Germany was an aggressor, while the Soviet Union was a peace-loving power, and therefore such negotiations on the division of Europe and Asia, not to mention any agreements, were in principle impossible between us. They somehow forget that both the Soviet Union and Germany were countries with the same socio-political system and state structure. And if in 1939 they could divide Europe into spheres of influence, why couldn't they continue the dialog they started in 1940?

2

There are people who have studied this visit in great detail. Here is how Molotov's appearance in Berlin is described by independent historian Sergei Soldatov:

Molotov presented Hitler unbelievable in the imperialist sense of demands, which deserve to be described in detail. These demands were also confirmed by the Soviet Government's address of November 25, 1940, which set forth a plan for the division of the world between Germany, Italy, Japan and the USSR.

The Soviet Union claimed for itself:

1. From Finland, Petschengu and Porkkala-Udd.

2. strongholds in the Danish straits of Kattegat and Skagerrak for access to the North Sea.

3. Yugoslavia's strongholds on the Adriatic Sea.

4. Reference points in Greece (Port of Thessaloniki).

5. From Romania, Southern Bukovina.

6. From Bulgaria, the transition into the Soviet orbit and the conclusion of a corresponding pact.

7. From Turkey, strongholds on the Black Sea straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles.

8. Gulf strongholds.

9. The countries south of Baku-Batumi, i.e. Eastern Turkey, Northern Iran and Iraq, came under Soviet influence.

10. Japan's relinquishment of its concessions on Sakhalin.

Hitler and his government were maddened by these extortions and left Soviet claims unanswered.

But tacitly the fateful answer was still given, a month later and through other channels (The Sacrament of Retribution of History. Frankfurt am Main, 1995. P. 118-119).

The fateful response through other channels was the decision to launch a preemptive strike against the Soviet Union.

3

Some of the cipher exchanged between Stalin and Molotov during Molotov's visit to Berlin has now been accessed. On November 13, 1940, Molotov asks for Stalin's instructions "*about China, about Turkey, about our interests in relation to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea*" (OHR R F[12]. Fund 059. Inventory 1. Case 2314. Sheets 32-33).

Stalin responds with a cipher advising Molotov "*not to reveal our great interest in Persia.... If the Germans propose the partition of Turkey, in that case you can reveal our cards...*'" (AVP RF. Fund 059. Inventory 1. Folder 339. Case 2315. Sheets 35, 35a, 36, 38, 39. Cited from the source: Documents of External Policies. 1940 - June 22, 1941. Vol. XXIII: in 2 books. Book 2. Part 1. M., 1998. C. 61-62). In the same message, Stalin advises Molotov to seek German consent to one more move by the Soviet Union:

"*A peaceful resolution will not be realistic without our guarantee to Bulgaria and the passage of our troops into Bulgaria.*"

In November 1940, Germany was in an extremely difficult situation. The Second World War had been going on for over a year and there was no end in sight. Germany could win only in a short war, but the war took a protracted character, that is, Germany could no longer win. On the evening of November 13, at the time of the talks between Hitler and Molotov, the British air force made an air raid on Berlin, so the meeting, which began in a luxurious office, ended in a bomb shelter. With this air raid, Churchill showed both Hitler and Molotov that Britain had no intention of surrendering. For a protracted war, Hitler needed strategic raw materials in huge quantities, and Stalin had them. During the meeting, Molotov reminded Hitler several times that without Soviet neutrality and without supplies of raw materials from the Soviet Union, German victories in Europe would have been impossible:

The influence of the German-Russian agreement on the great German victories (USSR - Germany. 1939-1941. Compiled by Y. Felshtinsky. P. 112).

As for Germany, as a result of these agreements (1939), it received a reliable rear, which was of great importance for the development of military events in the West, including the defeat of France

(Foreign Policy Documents. 1940 - June 22, 1941. Vol. XXIII: in 2 books. Book 2, part 1. C. 45).

If we speak at this point about the outcome of the Soviet-German agreements, it must be said that Germany, not without the influence of the pact with the USSR, was able to carry out its operations in Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland and France so quickly and with glory for its weapons (ibid. P. 64.).

All this Molotov said to Hitler. Molotov emphasized: Germany could not have captured so many countries of Europe so easily and quickly without our help.

Realizing that Hitler was largely, if not entirely, dependent on the Soviet Union, Stalin and Molotov employed arm-twisting tactics. Trotsky predicted that Stalin would "want to take full advantage of his position." So Stalin used those advantages.

Hitler told Molotov that Germany had captured so much in one year of war that it would take her a hundred years to develop what she had captured, and suggested: if space is required, let us move southward
- Germany south of its borders, the Soviet Union south of its borders. Molotov agreed, but added that it would be necessary to discuss the problem of the Danish straits of Great and Small Belt, Zund, Kattegat and Skagerrak.

It was not Hitler who demanded living space in the East, but Molotov in the West.

Denmark was occupied by Germany. Hitler, of course, is a scoundrel and an aggressor, but what do you call Stalin and Molotov, who intended to take a piece of what Germany had already seized? For Germany, possession of the Danish straits is a strategic necessity, otherwise the German fleet operating in the Atlantic Ocean will be cut off from shipbuilding and ship repair plants and ports in the Baltic Sea. Why did the Soviet Union need the Danish straits?

Hitler told Molotov that as long as the war was going on, Germany was extremely interested in getting nickel and timber from Finland. Hitler asked whether the Soviet Union was not preparing a new war against Finland. And if , could it not be postponed to a later date?

To this Molotov replied that Finland was in the sphere of Soviet interests and that Germany should withdraw its troops from Finland. Molotov "*does not understand why Russia should delay the realization of its plans for six months or a year. After all, the German-Russian agreement did not contain any time limitations and within their spheres of influence neither side has its hands tied*" (USSR-Germany. 1939-1941. P. 115).

In other words, Hitler explained to Molotov that Germany could not live and fight without nickel and timber coming from Finland, and asked him not to touch Finland for the time being. To this Molotov replied: Finland is in our sphere; what we want, we will do.

Hitler stated that Germany was totally dependent on the oil that came from Romania, that Germany would defend the Romanian oil fields under any conditions. Hitler hinted that it would be a good idea for the Soviet Union to take the threat away from Romanian oil. The Soviets had already seized Northern Bukovina, a territory that belonged to Romania, and by this seizure the Soviets violated the agreements on the division of spheres of influence.

To this Molotov replied that the Soviet Union had indeed torn something away from Romania and had indeed thereby violated earlier agreements with Germany. But the Soviet Union does not intend to give up what it has seized, and what it has seized in Rumania is not enough for the Soviet side. It would be necessary to tear off not only Northern Bukovina, but also Southern Bukovina. And besides the pieces of Rumania, the Soviet Union wants to get all Bulgaria. "*The fate of Rumania and Hungary is also of interest to the Soviet Union, and under no circumstances can be indifferent to it"* (ibid. P. 125).

4

The Soviet Union had enough of its own oil for both domestic consumption and export. The Soviet Union does not need Romanian oil. And for Germany, Romania is the only source of oil. Hitler tried to negotiate about it, to which he received the answer: we claim it too. Hitler reminded Molotov: we agreed on the division of Europe in August 1939. Molotov replied: that is old business, it is time to arrange a new partition of Europe in favor of the Soviet Union.

The USSR considers last year's agreement to have been fulfilled, with the exception of the question of Finland.... Now it is time to talk about a broader agreement between the USSR and Germany (OHR of the Russian Federation. Fond 059. Inventory 1. Case 2315. Sheet 35).

The conversations continued in the same spirit. During the talks Molotov did not raise questions about the security of the Soviet Union. He was not interested in that at all. He was interested in Iran and Iraq, Finland, Soviet bases in the Black Sea straits and much more. Questions of security against the threat of Soviet invasion of Germany's vital territories were raised by Hitler, but he received nothing comforting in response.

On the morning of November 14, 1940, Molotov left for Moscow, and on November 25, a statement was made to the German Ambassador in Moscow that Germany should immediately withdraw its troops from the territory of Finland. In addition, all the demands that Molotov had expressed in conversations with Hitler and Ribbentrop were confirmed, up to the demand for the establishment of Soviet military bases on the Bosporus and the Dardanelles (Documents of Foreign Policy. 1940 - June 22, 1941. VOL. XXIII. Book 2. Part 1. C. 136-137).

Molotov did not demand in vain the withdrawal of German troops from Finland. On the same day, November 25, 1940the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko and the Chief of the Red Army General Staff, Army General K. A. Meretskov, prepared a directive to develop a plan for a new war of aggression against Finland (1941 . M.: International Foundation "Democracy," 1998. Book 1. C. 418-423).

We are told that Stalin was terribly afraid of war and tried his best to delay it. All his actions were allegedly dictated by the desire to strengthen the security of the Soviet Union, for which he lacked only control over Finland, Iraq, Iran, Bulgaria. He lacked military bases in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.

And he also wanted control of the Danish straits and the Dardanelles with the Bosphorus for complete safety.

***

In August 1939, Hitler and Stalin divided Europe between Germany and the Soviet Union. A year passed. The Soviet Union broke the agreement and seized more than it was entitled to. But even that wasn't enough for Stalin. Hitler was just preparing for a major war with Great Britain, and Stalin had already demanded new territories in Europe, and those on which Germany's economy and armed forces were completely dependent.

And when Germany is exhausted by the war against Britain, what will Stalin demand then?

Hitler found an answer to all of Stalin's demands.

After Molotov's departure, Hitler gathered some of his subordinates and made it clear to them that he was going to invade Russia (Liddell Garth B. World War II. Per. s Engl. M.: Voenizdat, 1976. C. 145).

CHAPTER 19. Why keep armored divisions at the frontier posts.

It is only necessary to map on the map of the border areas of the USSR locations of mehkorps, as the plan for the upcoming "Thunderstorm" will be revealed to us in all its brilliance.
Mark Solonin. Barrel and hoops. Drogobych, 2004. C. 32

1

Here is the fate of one man as an example. In this fate, as in a drop, the causes of the most grandiose and shameful military defeat of the XX century and all previous centuries were reflected.

Our hero was born on July 5, 1921 in the village of Verkhnyaya Lyubovsha, Orel region. (What a name! I have almost traveled around the globe, but I have never met such romantic geographical names as we have in Russia). December 21, 1939, our hero was called under the banner, and straight to the military school. Further he tells about himself:

On June 10, 1941 I graduated from the military infantry school in Grozny and arrived in the Kiev Special Military District. I was assigned to the 41st Tank Division, the headquarters of which was located in the border town of Vladimir-Volynsky. It was a short distance to the Western Bug - our State border.... I was appointed deputy commander of a reconnaissance company. In this position I met the war. On June 22 at 3 hours 15 minutes our military town sank in a sea of fire... (Krasnaya Zvezda. 5 July 2001). (Krasnaya Zvezda. July 5, 2001).

This short story consists of nothing but oddities. Beginning September 18, 1925, the Red Army drafted at the of 21. And not everyone was drafted, but only a third or even a quarter of the conscripted contingent. In 1941, the war began, as we were told, suddenly, like a thunderbolt. But since the war was not expected, this young man could not have been in the army at the time of the German attack, because in June 1941 he was only 19 years old. But it happened that he (for some reason) is already in the army, he has already managed to finish school, has already and officer, deputy commander.

of a reconnaissance company. Not just anywhere, but right on the German border! How could this have happened?

It's simple. In August 1939, Stalin and Hitler signed the Non-Aggression Pact with the hands of Molotov and Ribbentrop. It would seem that after that no one should be drafted at all - the Red Army should take volunteers, and the draft should be canceled. But no. Peace with Hitler meant not peace at all, but something opposite. "Non-Aggression Pact" Comrade Stalin signed, and immediately drafted not a quarter of the conscripted contingent, as in previous years, and not even a third, and not half, and all who turned 21 years old. And, in addition, everyone who had turned 20. And 19-year-olds, too. Those who were over 21 also went under the banner. Logic: you haven't served before - now it's time. Those who were eighteen were not forgotten. If you have no secondary education, wait for now. But if you are 18 years old and have already received secondary education, join the ranks.

The guy in question fell right into that category: 18 years old, 10th grade. And he got drafted. Not to a regiment, but to a military school. And it's not that he took it and went to take the exams himself, no. The reference books say that he was drafted into the army, not by his own choice. And someone clever made such wonderful plans to release tens of thousands of young men, drafted in the second half of 1939, right by the beginning of June 1941 from the schools. And without leave - to the troops.

Those who haven't been through it can't appreciate it: You were a disenfranchised cadet, you were trained at the level of world standards and in addition - fire, water and copper pipes, you were pressed and muzzled, you were soaked in cold waters, dried by the scorching sun and crackling frost, you were tested for stretching, for twisting, for bending, for breaking, and then suddenly - instant transformation from a cadet into an officer; you suddenly find yourself not just in another world, but in another spatial dimension. And then you get your first officer's allowance (aka "monetary pleasure"). Not so that you worked for a month and got it, no. The first paycheck - just like that. On the very first day. For becoming an officer. After the cadet's pennies - a fortune. What's the first thing you do? That's right: relax. First thing's first: graduation and vacation. That's the way it's always been done.

But in 1941, for some reason, this rule was abandoned.

Here's an example: our hero graduated from the school on June 10, had time to travel from Grozny to Kiev, to receive an assignment to the border at the district headquarters, to arrive at the division, to introduce himself, to accept his position. Where was a month of legitimate, deserved, earned, long-awaited vacation? The war was to catch the freshly minted lieutenant not on the border, but in the village of Verkhnyaya Lyubovsha. There he had to dance round dances to nightingale trills until morning dawn. And on June 22, on a beautiful Sunday, somewhere by noon he, sleepy, was to be roused: Molotov was speaking!

But a miracle happened. German attack was not expected, but tens of thousands of young officers graduated early without final examinations and immediately after graduation were sent not to the earned and deserved vacation, but to the troops. Not anywhere, but to the western border. To the border posts.

If Hitler's a friend, why the rush? Why weren't the lieutenants allowed to take their time off?

2

And so our acquaintance a few days before that fateful day of June 22, 1941 gets into the 41st Tank Division. The number is not taken from the ceiling. In the numbering of Soviet tank divisions was in full order: from the 1st to the 61st. Hitler rushed into World War II with 6 tank divisions, and to his borders peace-loving comrade Stalin put forward the 41st tank division and a number of others. A long line. On the same river Western Bug at the border posts - the 22nd tank division. On June 22, its military town, like many others, was also drowned in a sea of fire. Thousands of lieutenants went down, never having taken their leave. Of every hundred, three lived to see the end of the war. On the eve of the war, Comrade Stalin sent to the borders of 70 thousand young, freshly graduated from schools officers. Of these, only 3 percent survived the war.

Because not all of them died, because they were released by the tens of thousands, there was someone to tell about what had happened after the war. Their stories are remarkably monotonous. They repeat the same scenario: as soon as peace was signed with Hitler, I was taken to an officer's school, graduated a couple of weeks before the war, and - to the

the western border, and on June 22, 1941, war came like a thunderbolt.

Anyone who wishes to do so can collect such stories in abundance. I chose this one out of many similar narratives because the guy in question rose high after the war. Very high.

He became a member of the CPSU Central Committee, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, then Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states. Rank - Marshal of the Soviet Union. First name and patronymic - Viktor Georgievich. Last name - Kulikov.

3

On the morning of June 22, 1941, the 41st Tank Division, in which Lieutenant Kulikov fell, had 415 tanks. In addition, armored cars, guns and mortars, artillery tractors, tractors and motorcycles, 682 vehicles and so on and so forth. No German tank division had such a number of tanks. And no one in the world had such tank divisions either. Of the five German tank divisions that operated against the troops of the South-Western and Southern Fronts, the largest number of tanks was in the 19th Division - 149 vehicles. In other German tank divisions there were even fewer tanks, and in motorized and infantry divisions they were not at all. And none of the German motorized corps that operated south of Polesie had as many tanks as the 41st Soviet Panzer Division alone.

The picture of defeat is all too familiar. The same thing was happening all along the border. Familiar and the final chord: the commander of the 41st Panzer Division, Colonel PP Pavlov was identified as the culprit and put to the wall in the same way as his namesake, the commander of the Western Front, Army General D. G. Pavlov. G. Pavlov.

But let us try to imagine ourselves in the place of a division commander. What will we do if the enemy suddenly opens artillery fire on military camps, in which there are rows of tanks and cars? What would we do if we received an order from the greatest military leader of all

What are we going to do if we have a top-secret order on our desk that we are not to give in to provocations, not to respond to fire with fire, and not to carry out any measures without an order from Moscow? What will we do if on our desk there is a top-secret order that we are not to give in to provocations, not to respond to fire with fire, and not to carry out ANY activities without an order from Moscow? And those orders bear the signature of the same strategic genius.

In 1941, Lieutenant Kulikov was lucky. On the third day of the war around the 41st Tank and 87th Rifle Divisions and a number of other units of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front closed the ring of encirclement, in which they died. But Lieutenant Kulikov managed to escape.

4

In any normal country, after a war that started with such a defeat, a trial would have followed. The 41st Armored Division was not alone in 1941 near the border posts. Was the division commander to blame for the fact that in the first minutes of the war the military town of the division "sank in a sea of fire"? Did he himself choose a place for the division near the border? Is it possible in a few minutes (or even hours) to raise the division on alert, under artillery fire to bring thousands of people to the parking lots, take out of garages and parks 415 tanks and hundreds of other vehicles, to deploy the first and second echelons, control points, reserves and rear, to organize management, interaction, communication and repel the enemy offensive?

Why was the division not withdrawn from the border during the threatened period? And why was it moved to the borders in the first place? How to explain the strange neighborhood of the tank division with the state border? What was it doing there? How did it end up there? At whose fault, at whose command? Who determined the place of its deployment? Chief of the General Staff Zhukov? Where is he? Defendant Zhukov, stand up! Answer the court's questions! For what sabotage purpose did you move the 41st Tank Division to the border? Did Stalin order it? No, defendant Zhukov, it follows from your memoirs that Stalin not only did not order the advancement of mehkorps to the border, but was generally opposed to their creation. Mechkorps with numbers from 10 to 30 inclusive and their tank divisions with numbers from 19 to 61 were formed at your insistence and demand, defendant.

Zhukov. You determined the places of their creation and cantonment. It was according to your plan that the 41st Armored Division found itself where it could be covered - and was covered - on the first day of the war. For what purpose was it located in such an inconvenient place for defense? Was it planned to defend its native land? So why didn't this division (as well as all others) stand in defense? They would have dug trenches for tanks, artillery and infantry, equipped the main and reserve positions, dispersed supplies to units and subdivisions. Ten tanks per kilometer - that's forty kilometers of insurmountable defense. Not at the border, where the movement of every soldier can be seen from the other side, but somewhere deep in the Soviet territory. At least beyond the reach of enemy artillery fire.

But no one asked the Red Army command these questions. The 41st Tank Division of the 22nd Mechkorps of the 5th Army of the South-West.

of the front is just one of many examples. All along the border from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea on that clear morning, the same thing happened. The same scenario. Zhukov had put the Red Army in such conditions in which it was to perish when attacked by the enemy, unable to inflict even minimal damage on the enemy. Zhukov made such plans and gave such orders and directives, the implementation of which in the event of a German attack inevitably led the Red Army to defeat, and the Soviet Union - to collapse. Zhukov's actions can be considered an exemplary example of sabotage, treason against the Motherland, despicable betrayal, unless Zhukov was preparing an offensive operation.

5

The Kremlin ideologists should have either called Zhukov a traitor or explained the meaning of his, to put it mildly, unwise activities on the eve of the war. But none of the court historians has yet openly and loudly called Zhukov a traitor to the Motherland. Not only that, no one has explained his strange deeds. He himself, too, neither recalled nor reflected on the work done on the eve of the German attack, did not.

Instead, three generations of the inhabitants of planet Earth have had fictitious reasons for the shameful defeat of the Red Army hammered into their heads.

The first reason: Soviet tanks were obsolete.

Let's answer: does it matter whether the tanks are the newest or obsolete, if they are standing in rows at the border in the range of enemy artillery?

The second reason: the tanks needed repairs.

The third reason: the drivers were inexperienced in driving.

The answer to the second and third thesis is the same: does it matter in such a situation whether there is experience or no experience, whether tanks require repair or not? Let's imagine that the 41st Tank Division, like all the others, has only the best tanks in the world, and each driver has 100 hours of practice. What would change from this, if the enemy artillery hits the headquarters, barracks, warehouses and storage facilities, on the slender rows of tanks and vehicles in parks and open parking lots? If all this indestructible power has been drowned in a sea of fire since the first moment of the war? If the crews do not even have the opportunity to get into their tanks? If there is no ammunition or fuel in the tanks? If commanders do not have the ability to control their units and subdivisions? If

commanders of all ranks, from divided[13] to commanders of fronts and armies, have a strict instruction (under threat of execution) not to take retaliatory actions and do nothing at all!

The fourth reason: mechkorps, tank and motorized divisions in their composition, and in general all the main forces of the Red Army were too close to the border. But we are explained that they were there not for nothing, but with a cunning Zhukov's intention - to inflict counter-attacks on the arrogant enemy!

I answer with a question: why weren't they launched? And where are the pre-war plans for those counterattacks? If after June 22nd there were any counter-attacks, everyone can see for himself: it was purely impromptu, it was an action without any preliminary preparation. And if counterattacks were really planned before the war, why was the result suicidal? Who is personally responsible for such planning? Using the example of the same 41st Tank Division, let us try to understand: how could it make any counterattack in the position in which Zhukov put it?

There were many other explanations - Russia's centuries-long backwardness, for example. This, by the way, was also uttered by Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov.

Victor Georgievich, what's backwardness got to do with it, if the border pillars, as you put it, are within easy reach? If we had pulled the division a hundred kilometers away from the border, or even better - to the line of old fortified areas, we have dispersed it, buried the tanks up to their turrets in the ground, camouflaged them, then the influence of the factor of centuries of backwardness would have been sharply reduced.

6

This is a good time to recall Zhukov's story about how he and Marshal Timoshenko tried to persuade Stalin to give the order to put troops on alert. Timoshenko and Zhukov argued, stubborn Stalin did not agree. Then Timoshenko allegedly said:

We do not have enough forces on the borders even to cover. We can not meet and repel the German troops in an organized manner (Zhukov G. K. Memories and Reflections. Moscow: OLMA-Press, 2003. Vol. 1. P. 258).

These words of Marshal Timoshenko Zhukov cited in his memoirs as an argument in favor of increasing the readiness of troops. Zhukov is in full solidarity with Timoshenko's position and condemns the foolish Stalin.

The problem is that Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko himself never recalled anything like that, never wrote or told anyone anything like that. Timoshenko died, and then two decades later these words, allegedly said by him, appeared in the memoirs of Zhukov, who also died long ago. But since we are assured that we should believe only the tenth and subsequent editions of Memories and Reflections, let us believe it.

So, Zhukov and Timoshenko claimed that there were no troops even for cover. But on the example of the 41st Tank Division we saw that there were troops. If a lot of these tanks were not kept in a heap at the border posts, and would be taken away from the border at least ten kilometers, or better - a hundred, and dispersed along the front and in the

If they had dug trenches for tanks and other equipment and camouflaged them, the division could not have turned into a sea of fire overnight.

In order not to overload the narrative, I will simply remind readers of the sad story of the 22nd Panzer Division of the 14th Mechanized Corps of the 4th Army. This division was similarly defeated at the border pillars in Brest. The story of its ignominious death the reader will find in my book "I take back my words". Here is how Colonel-General L. M. Sandalov described it:

This town was on flat terrain, well viewed on the part of the enemy. Dead u got fro m injuries large amount personal composition This one ... contributed to the crowded location of the division's units..... The division also lost most of its tanks, artillery and vehicles, more than half of all tanker trucks, workshops and kitchens. The division's artillery store and fuel and lubricant depot caught fire and then exploded from enemy fire ... A significant part of the division's artillery was destroyed by enemy fire or due to lack of means of traction remained in the parks... (Sandalov L. M. The First Days of the War. M: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 76-77).

In the same memoirs Sandalov complains about the "unsuccessful dislocation of the division"; this is followed by bitter lamentations that it led "in *the first hours of the war to huge losses in personnel and to the destruction of most of the equipment and supplies of the division*" (ibid. P. 35).

This is a different section of the front, but the picture is the same. There, in Brest, two more rifle divisions and many other units were similarly "unsuccessfully" located. Here is some information for you to ponder.

As part of the 4th Army:

- two corps, one of them headquartered in Brest;
- two armored divisions, one of them in Brest;
- four rifle divisions, two of them in Brest;
- one motorized division;
- one aviation division;
- one fortified area, headquarters in Brest;

• the army is reinforced by one engineer-sapper regiment, it's in Brest. And the 33rd engineer-sapper regiment was not sitting in Brest for nothing.

In total, the 4th Army had 14 artillery regiments, 7 of them in Brest, a district military hospital, a huge number of warehouses of army, front and central subordination, a border detachment (regiment) of the NKVD and much more. The commander of the 4th Army was subordinated to 11 compounds, which were to be headed by generals (2 corps, 8 divisions and 1 fortified area). The headquarters of five of these formations were in Brest.

I'm not kidding myself, I declare: in Brest alone there were the main forces of the whole army - practically half of its combat personnel. In the city alone there were 18 full-blooded fully manned regiments, including 2 tank regiments, 6 rifle regiments, 7 artillery regiments, 1 motorized rifle regiment, 1 engineer-sapper regiment and 1 border guard detachment (regiment), not counting many smaller units and rear institutions, not counting the divisions that were in the immediate vicinity of Brest.

All of them were defeated and dispersed in a few hours.

The defense of Brest could have become a heroic page in the military history of Russia. Instead, it was a terrible indelible disgrace for centuries. At the mention of Brest and the Brest Fortress, Soviet marshals had to raise their collars to hide their ears burning with shame.

I repeat: if this mass of troops had been withdrawn from the border, dispersed and put in defense, the first period of the war would not have ended in such disgrace. Brest is the gate of the country. And in the area of the gate cover could have been organized. As we can see, there were forces for that.

***

We are told that the Germans were winning because their divisions were concentrated in narrow areas. That's true. But not all of it. It's only half the truth.

Here's the other half: the Germans were winning because the Red Army divisions were concentrated in narrow areas. This is convenient for the offensive, but deadly for the defense. If the Red Army had struck first, the same thing would have happened on the other side -

simply because, that German divisions were concentrated in in narrow areas: nails, you can't miss.

CHAPTER 20. How historical documents were falsified in the Soviet Union: the technology of falsification and its exposure on a concrete example.

The Stalinist period is one of the most interesting in human history. And an accurate and complete scientific description of it is almost impossible. Documents of those times have been destroyed or falsified. Many important things were done without documents at all. The little that has survived is inaccessible to scientists and writers. Memories, which are written now, are a falsification of the past in hindsight.

Alexander Zinoviev. Our youthful flight. Lausanne, 1983. C. 79

1

The Kremlin's court historians who write about World War II live well. They have access to all the treasures of the Russian archives, so it is not difficult for them to confirm and scientifically substantiate their hypotheses and theories. And all their theories are based on seven postulates:

1. The Soviet Union was completely unprepared for war with Germany.
2. Stalin was terribly afraid of war.
3. The outbreak of war was envisioned by Stalin as a German attack on the Soviet Union and no other way.
4. Stalin didn't plot anything bad against Europe - at least not in 1941.
5. Stalin's main concern was not to give Hitler a reason to attack, to buy time and delay the German invasion for a year, or better - for two years.
6. Intelligence reported to Stalin about preparations for a German invasion, but he did not believe it because he was afraid to face the truth.
7. Stalin surrounded himself with sycophants who reported only what the leader wanted to hear. And to hear he wanted only

comforting news.

How do you prove all this? Very simply: by relying on documents. Court historians take out papers from the archives and put them on public display: here! Admire!

And a document is a granite rock. Any argument is powerless against a leaf taken from the Kremlin vault. Here on the mast
"Icebreaker" should raise the white flag, admit defeat and surrender to the mercy of the victors.

In May 1985 I managed to push the first chapters of "Icebreaker" into the press for the first time, and in 1988, as if in response to these publications, official Soviet historians found a document of the greatest importance. On one page in seven sentences the proofs of all seven postulates, on which the whole official history of the Soviet-German war rests as an unbreakable monolith. This document is a denunciation, or rather a complaint by Beria
Sta linu[14]:

June 21, 1941 (...) I again insist on the recall and punishment of our ambassador in Berlin, who continues to bombard me with disinformation about Hitler's allegedly preparing an attack on the USSR. He reported that this "attack" will begin tomorrow..... Major General V. I. Tupikov, the military attaché in Berlin, also radiated the same. This stupid general claims that three groups of Wehrmacht armies will attack Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, referring to his Berlin agents. He insolently demands that we supply these liars with radios..... Lieutenant General Golikov, head of the intelligence department, where recently Berzin's gang operated, complains about the Ambassador and his lieutenant-colonelNovobraztsy, who also lies, that Hitler has concentrated 170 divisions against us on our western border....

But I and my people, Joseph Vissarionovich, firmly remember your wise predestination: in 1941 Hitler will not attack us!

This leaflet is a real find for serious historians. From this denunciation it is clear that Beria is a flatterer and a fool. Stalin looks even more foolish in the light of this document. He "wisely predetermined" Hitler's actions at least a year in advance. He surrounded

themselves as lackeys, cretins and sycophants, and here is one of them diligently repeating and amplifying Stalinist nonsense.

And when? June 21! That's day before tomorrow!

This complaint has a unique value, because it is the only documentary evidence that Stalin in 1941 was not going to war. That Stalin himself did not prepare to attack anyone, it goes without saying. But the fact that he was not expecting an attack, recorded in this document. The document is not written by Stalin, but it is addressed to Stalin, and it outlines Stalin's position. Could not Beria, addressing Stalin, to set out a wise Stalinist predestination, which did not exist!

This complaint of Beria was repeatedly quoted by Colonel General Volkogonov, advisor to the President of Russia, Karpov, head of the USSR Writers' Union, Army General Gareyev, and other officials. This document got into scientific circulation and quickly crossed the state borders of the Soviet Union. It is abundantly quoted in scientific research and publications. A certain citizen, writing under the pseudonym *Victor Surovov*, also did not fail to present this document to the public as proof of the complete failure of Stalin's leadership, as evidence of Stalin's animal fear in the face of the inevitable enemy invasion.

And I never cease to wonder why such responsible persons did not see any falsity in this "document".

2

Let us read the contents of Beriev's denunciation once again and ask the question: who is this writing designed for? After all, a surprising picture emerges.

In his note Beria raises a question of the greatest national importance: when does Hitler intend to attack the Soviet Union - in 1941 or later? Beria disagrees with the reports of the analyst of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, as well as with the reports of the Ambassador and the military attaché in Berlin. And this is not important. What is important is another thing: the note contains Beria's own opinion on the matter. And after all, he is a candidate member of the Politburo, Deputy Chairman of the SNK (that is, head of the government), Commissar of Internal Affairs, General Commissar of State.

security. And in addition to his own opinion, the note contains Stalin's own opinion on the problem.

The important thing is this. Let's assume that Hitler in 1941, Hitler was not going to attack, but if he suddenly learned that Stalin is completely relaxed and attack is not expecting an attack, he might have changed his mind. Such a note, if it fell into the hands of German intelligence, would be a document of extreme importance.

Or, say, Hitler has prepared for an attack, but does not know whether to decide on the last step or not. In the political calculations of the most terrible - uncertainty: waiting for Stalin to strike or not? It is extremely important to dispel this confusion. We need to know what the enemy thinks, what he believes in, what counts on what. To penetrate into the plans of the enemy, ally, partner - this means literally look into his cards and on the basis of this to build and adjust their designs and plans.

Beria in his note fully revealed Stalin's cards: Stalin does not believe in the attack! If Hitler somehow gets such a note....

So: the first oddity is that on a note of such importance is not a stamp of secrecy. Beria wrote it on a piece of paper and gave it to Stalin. Then the leaflet allegedly ended up in the archives, where it was found half a century after the war.

Here is a reason to wonder: was the Commissar of the NKVD, the General Commissar of State Security, the chief guardian of all the most important state secrets and secrets so negligent in their protection? And how, I would like to know, did Comrade Stalin react to such blatant negligence?

And the second oddity is this: why did Beria even need to write this note? Beria Lavrentiy Pavlovich was in constant contact with Stalin. They talked on the phone every day, in the evenings they ate kebabs and drank Georgian wine. Was there no opportunity to verbally express their view of the situation?

In addition, Beria and Stalin almost every day met in an official setting. Why on June 21, 1941 Beria decided to write a note to Stalin, if he, according to the log of persons received by Stalin, only on June 20, sat in Stalin's office for 4 hours and 25 minutes. And the next day, June 21, - another 3 hours 55

minutes! Is it impossible to put three or four short questions in those 8 hours and 20 minutes?

I wonder how Beria passed this note to Stalin? Probably long hours they discussed something with Stalin, and then Beria, leaving the office, passes the paper: here, Comrade Stalin, read at your leisure. Or during the discussion of other problems Beria suddenly sticks a piece of paper: here is something else to settle.

The weirdness doesn't end there, it just begins.

3

Let's turn to the content of the note. It shows that the military attaché in Berlin, Major General V.I. Tupikov allegedly reported some nonsense by radio to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, General Commissar of State Security, Comrade Beria Lavrentiy Pavlovich. Tupikov brazenly demanded that Beria provided his secret agents with a radio. The formidable People's Commissar of the NKVD himself on the insolent major-general for some reason did not growl, but instead wrote a complaint to Stalin: here is what a bad general - a liar and cheeky.

Complaining is the fate of the offended. If I can't cope on my own, I turn to the strongest: intercede. This is how a little boy complains to his mother about a neighbor's naughty boy. At the same time, he calls his offender bad words: yucky! It turns out that the same scheme operates and the powerful General Commissar of State Security: crying to Stalin, while calling the general, whom he himself is not able to besiege, calls stupid. Let's consider: and what, in fact, Beria counted on, what he wanted and expected from Stalin? Did he hope that the leader will scold the insolent general, and poor Lavrik sympathize? Or was he waiting for Stalin's approval: not to give the radio to the insolent general! So it could be withheld even without Stalin's instruction.

All those who encountered Lavrentiy Pavlovich testify to something else: Beria bent, broke, crushed and suppressed. He was hated, he was feared. He asserted his power over people in many ways and techniques. One of the simplest is to do everything in his own name, not referring to his superiors even if you follow their orders. In the old days, when Beria had not yet climbed to the dizzying heights of the Kremlin, all the instructions, wishes, and

he represented the orders of his superiors only as his own: listen to ME! This is MY will! I am the one who ordered it!

Lavrentiy Pavlovich's favorite saying: we'll gut your guts out! This is what he once promised Colonel-General of Artillery NN Voronov after the interdepartmental conflict in Stalin's office was not resolved in favor of the NKVD. And Army General Meretskov threatened to break the backbone. By the way, he did not throw words into the wind - he almost broke it, but the Master at the last moment pulled him away by the leash.

And in this "document" in front of us appears Beria-sleuth, who signs in front of Stalin in weakness and complete impotence.

But that's not the end of the weirdness, either.

4

In the summer of 1938, NKVD chief Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov, having exterminated the entire leadership of the 4th (Intelligence) Directorate of the General Staff, decided to head this structure personally. On a part-time basis. All the same (in Yezhov's opinion) there was no worthy candidate for such a responsible post.

In the post of chief of military intelligence Yezhov lasted two days. Stalin suddenly realized the bottomless depth of danger. All major decisions on matters of secret foreign activities of the state took Stalin. But he made them on the basis of information that came from two main sources:

1. from the NKVD, from Yezhov;

2. from the General Staff Intelligence Directorate from Berzin, and then suddenly... - from Yezhov.

Depending on what information Yezhov will present, will depend on Stalin's decision. All the secret operations of the Soviet Union's secret services were in the same hands - in the hands of Yezhov. So who controls whom in this situation?

No, this not do, Comrade Stalin decided.

From that moment the fall of Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov began. Stalin clearly divided the two structures: this is the Chekists, and this is the army. The leader immediately returned military intelligence under its native roof - in the General headquarters of the Red Army. In head put purely

an army commander without Chekist "impurities". And Yezhov was soon removed from all posts, and then shot.

From that point on, the Soviet Union's foreign secret activities were not concentrated in one hand. Stalin realized that in this area should not be a monopoly. The top leadership of the country in the person of Stalin should receive secret information from abroad not through one, but through several channels independent of each other. In other words, the NKVD intelligence and intelligence of the Red Army should independent of each other.

In June 1941, the head of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Red Army was Lieutenant General Golikov Filipp Ivanovich. Only all military intelligence officers were subordinate to him, only to him they sent their reports and only with him they solved the problems that arose in conducting and ensuring agent operations. And they were not subordinate to the NKVD.

Ezhov's ouster and destruction - a lesson to the new NKVD chief Beria Lavrentiy Pavlovich: military intelligence - not your fiefdom. Your business is to conduct intelligence yourself by the forces of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB NKVD). If there is a conspiracy in the army, including military intelligence, your task is to uncover. But do not dare to interfere in the operations of the Main Directorate of State Security.

But even this was not enough for Stalin. February 3, 1941, he withdrew the GUGB and a number of other structures from the NKVD. On their basis he organized a new People's Commissariat - the NKGB. At the head put Merkulov. And although Beria as a candidate member of the Politburo looked after the activities of the NKGB, still Merkulov had a direct access to Stalin and reported to him personally. And since May 1941, Merkulov was subordinate to Stalin even officially, as head of government. In the critical situation of July 1941, Stalin merged the NKGB and NKVD, but in 1943 again separated.

But this was not the end of the story either. To ensure that the secret activities of the state did not end up in the hands of one man, Stalin in October 1942 divided military intelligence into the GRU of the Red Army, which he subordinated to himself personally as People's Commissar of Defense, and RU GSH, which was subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff.

In that environment, it was absolutely the right decision. There was a war going on, so the Chief of the General Staff had no time for the USA

and Great Britain, Brazil and Uruguay, Iran or Australia. Stalin eased his worries: let for the duration of the war, the General Staff RI deal only with Germany and its allies, only with the front.

And Stalin himself did not lose interest in world problems. GRU, which was subordinate to Stalin personally, continued intensive work around the world, primarily against the United States. In 1943, Stalin withdrew military counterintelligence from the control of the NKGB, called it GUKR SMERSH and also subordinated to himself personally. He put Abakumov, Beria's main enemy, at its head.

Beria knew that Stalin operated on the principle of divide and conquer. Most of all, the leader feared the combined might of the security services, which were engaged in covert activities both at home and abroad. Stalin strengthened them, fragmented, and fragmented pieces again strengthened. And, in addition, they were fighting each other, preventing unification in every possible way.

With all this in mind, let's go back to June 1941.

5

Major General Tupikov is a military attaché. He is subordinate to the head of the 1st (Western) Division of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff. Above the head of the Intelligence Directorate is the Chief of the General Staff, above him is the People's Commissar of Defense. Above him - only Stalin. This is the line of command. Direct and clear. And only through this line the military attaché sends his reports and reports. Only through this line he reports on the results of his work, primarily on the results of agent extraction. He has the right - and the duty
- discuss the conduct and support of undercover operations only with their direct superiors.

Military intelligence neither under any circumstances could to "radio" the NKVD. Beria could be as powerful and strong as he wanted, but for a military intelligence officer he remained a stranger. Under no circumstances would a scout discuss the problems of his illegal activities with the first passerby on the street. In this situation, for the military intelligence officer General Tulikov Beria was no different from pedestrians on the sidewalk. Beria was a stranger. And if General Tulikov wanted to share top secret information with someone, why should he not send it to him?

the same message to the People's Commissariat of Agriculture or Education?

In the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, all received information was processed and analyzed in the Information Department, commanded by Major General S. N. Dronov. From this department intelligence reports and reports were sent to all interested authorities in a generalized form without indicating the source. The consumer always receives only impersonal information. He is not supposed to know from whom exactly it came. Information about the sources of any given specific information could only be requested by a higher direct superior: from the Chief of the RU GS - the Chief of the General Staff, from him - the People's Commissar of Defense, and from him - Stalin.

Data obtained by military intelligence, Beria could receive from Stalin, Timoshenko, Zhukov, from the head of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff, Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov. But he could not receive it directly from the military attaché.

If would military intelligence major general Tupikov foolishly "radioed" not to his superiors in the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, but in the NKVD, that is, in a foreign structure, Beria even under torture in this Stalin would not confess to Stalin. For him, it would be like death: it turned out that Beria, like Yezhov under the example of military intelligence, and military attachés report not to their superiors, and the Lubyanka. If Stalin found out about this, it would not be well neither Beria, nor Tulikov, nor Golikov.

6

And the story that a military attaché, i.e. a general from the RU GS, asked the NKVD chief for a walkie-talkie sounds like a real joke. And in fact, as it follows from the "document", he not only asked for it, but brazenly demanded it! And on what grounds?

Major-General Tupikov, an army commander, is not connected with the Chekists in any way. Beria is not his superior. Vasily Ivanovich Tupikov is a Red Army commander. He commanded a battalion and regiment, graduated from the Frunze Military Academy, was chief of staff of the 33rd Rifle Corps, then the Kharkov Military District. From this position he was sent as a military attaché to the

Germany. During the war he was Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front. He died in September 1941 when leaving the encirclement at the age of 39. Throughout his service he was subordinate to the military command, not to the Chekists. The Chekists could denounce him, but they could not order him to do anything. They had no right to arrest him either. This required Stalin's decision.

Imagine that an infantry corps of the Red Army is fighting at the front, and the commander of the corps makes a demand to the commissar of the NKVD: well, plant ammunition and shells! Can we imagine such a situation? You can't. The RKKA corps commander has his own line of command, which ends with the People's Commissar of Defense and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. That's what you should address to your commanders - report, report, justify, ask, demand. In the same structure served and Major-General of the Red Army Tupikov. And if the commander of a division or corps of the Red Army cannot ask or demand anything from the NKVD, the same applies to a military attaché.

But if it came to the point that the Intelligence Department of the General Staff its own agent radios, then the request from the very bottom, from the office of the military attaché in Berlin, had to go up, and the problem should be solved at the level of the first persons of the two departments - the People's Commissar of Defense appeals to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs: share, if you have extra.

But how could the NKVD have an agent radio? In June 1941two organizations were engaged in agent intelligence on a global scale in parallel: the RU GSh and the First Main Directorate of the NKGB. Both used a simple and reliable radio "North". It was developed for polar explorers, but it also appealed to scouts. And the NKVD at that time was conducting reconnaissance of the enemy only in the border area by the border troops. Radios of such power were not required there, and the NKVD did not have them.

For a Soviet military attaché in Berlin to address Beria with a request or demand to someone else's department would be like addressing the reindeer herders of Chukotka with a request or even a demand: Brothers, please give me a walkie-talkie, because my spies do not have enough. But there was at least some sense in appealing to the polar explorers. They would have sympathized with the unfortunate scout and, , helped him. But to turn to the NKVD -

an empty number. The NKVD at that time did not keep such equipment for lack of necessity.

It turns out that the military attaché in Berlin not only did not realize who his superior was, but also applied to a place where he could not be helped, even if he wanted to.

Speaking of agency communications. Foreign apparatuses of the Soviet military strategic intelligence dka[15] were fully provided with means of communication. The problems after June 22, 1941, did not arise
because there weren't enough radios, and not because they didn't work well, but because because the war was planned on foreign territory. The main reception center of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff was located in Minsk and already on June 28, 1941 fell into the hands of the German army. During the panic withdrawal of the Red Army, part of the equipment and piles of top secret documents were not destroyed. This led to the failure of a number of illegal residencies and agent groups. And those intelligence structures that continued to operate, were deprived of the opportunity to transmit to Moscow the extracted information: the front rolled back to the east for almost a thousand kilometers, and the radio "North" was not designed for such a range.

After the war it was necessary to explain why in the summer of 1941 the General Staff of the Red Army suddenly became blind and deaf, having lost contact with the most important sources of information. And a legend was born: we were so backward that we had no radios at all in our illegal residences, and to reinforce this fact, accompanying and supporting tales were composed - you see, the military attaché in Berlin asked Beria to send him a radio.

7

From the "note" of Beria to Stalin quoted at the beginning of this chapter, it follows that not only the military attaché in Berlin, bypassing his superiors, sent disinformation to the NKVD. It turns out that the Soviet ambassador was also "bombarding poor Lavrentiy Pavlovich with disinformation".

But this could not be, because it could never be. The official diplomatic missions of the Soviet Union abroad were directly and directly subordinate to the First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet People's Commissar for *Foreign Affairs*, People's Commissar for *Foreign Affairs*

of affairs to Comrade Molotov Vyacheslav Mikhailovich. Only to him they sent their reports. And they did not report to the People's Commissar of *Internal* Affairs, comrade Beria Lavrentiy Pavlovich. Therefore, the ambassadors could not and had no right to "bombard with disinformation" someone else's department.

And if the ambassador in Berlin wanted to leak top secret internal information to someone else, he would send it to Comrade Merkulov in the NKGB, since the First Main Directorate of the NKGB at that time was engaged in political intelligence in enemy capitals. And comrade Beria in the NKVD at that time did not have structures dealing with foreign policy of foreign countries. Such a task was not assigned to the NKVD at that time and was not solved by Lavrentiy Pavlovich's subordinates.

In June 1941 - as, indeed, before and during the war - Molotov was the second man in the Soviet Union after Stalin and had much more political weight than Beria. The most important of what diplomats reported to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Molotov personally reported to Stalin. But by no means to Beria.

But let us assume the unacceptable: the official diplomatic representative of the Soviet Union in Berlin suddenly decided to enter directly into correspondence with a foreign department to which he was not subordinate and which did not need this information. Not only that, he decided to send his reports to someone who was lower in rank than Molotov - the direct superior of all diplomats. And so Beria, infuriated by the insistence of the official Soviet representative in Berlin, appeals to Stalin with a demand to recall the disinformer from Berlin and roughly punish him.

Question: did stupid Beria not realize that his appeal to Stalin in the end was not a complaint about some ambassador in Berlin? After all, this is a punch in the jaw to Molotov himself: he is not capable of keeping order in his own farm!

In the summer of 1941, Beria was only a candidate member of the Politburo; he had not yet sat in his post as chief of the NKVD for two years. And Molotov had worked with Lenin. By 1941, Molotov gained such weight that he could openly in the presence of outsiders to quarrel with Stalin without fear of repercussions. In that environment for Beria was highly unwise to report directly

Stalin about the disorder in Molotov's department, especially in writing, especially from hearsay, himself without understanding. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich could regard such actions as an attack on his authority and respond to Lavrenty Pavlovich with a crushing blow.

Only two people could remove Molotov's subordinates from their posts: Molotov and Stalin. And if Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria had any plans regarding the deployment of personnel in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the only reasonable solution would have been to turn to Molotov and friendly warning about the malaise. But Beria's interference in the affairs of Molotov's fiefdom, Beria's direct appeal to Stalin about the state of affairs in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs without prior coordination with Molotov and through his head, could come out not only Beria, but his entire team.

***

Even the ancient Romans said: Docendo discimus - by teaching others, we learn ourselves. But the opposite is also true: by dumbing down the people, our leaders are dumbing themselves down. We can see that they are no longer able even to concoct a complete fake. "Beria's note to Stalin" is just one example. Court Kremlin historians have flooded scientific literature with such "documents": designed morons, but written by morons.

CHAPTER 21. How historical documents were falsified in the Soviet Union: the technology of falsification and its exposure on a concrete example (continued).

Access to classified documents has been closed again, priceless documents are going underground, many have disappeared forever.
Red Star. March 25 2000.

1

The Soviet ambassador in Berlin, as it turns out from the "document", which we discussed in detail in the previous chapter, fed disinformation not only to Beria in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but also to the head of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Red Army, Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov, and so fed up with the latter that he decided to complain.

Let us assume that this is exactly what happened. Let us assume that the ambassador in Berlin decided to report for his work not only to the all-powerful semi-powerful ruler Molotov, but also to Beria and, in addition, to Golikov. Let's assume that Golikov expressed doubts about the reliability of the information received from the Ambassador. What was he supposed to do?

First of all, if the Ambassador was really sending his reports from Berlin directly to the Intelligence Department of the General Staff, then he should have answered him through the same channel: Stop your rattling, you fool, you're annoying! You don't obey us, and we don't obey you, so don't clog our channels and annals with your garbage. But why complain?

Secondly, if the chief of the RU GS wanted to complain about the ambassador in Berlin, he should have addressed not to the NKVD, but on command
- to the Chief of the General Staff, to whom Golikov was directly and directly subordinated: Comrade General of the Army Zhukov, tell

to the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko, that suspicious information is coming from Comrade Molotov's department. With a stench. But, according to the "document", Golikov, bypassing his superiors Zhukov and Timoshenko, for some reason appealed to the NKVD, that is, to someone else's department, with a complaint against a third department.

Those who allowed such liberties, bypassing their direct and immediate superiors, violated the chain of command and introduced chaos in the work of the state apparatus. Such amateurishness could not like Stalin: generals of the General Staff of the Red Army, forgetting about their superiors, for the resolution of trifling problems turn directly to the NKVD. And could Stalin had doubts: is not too much "our Lavrentiy" allows himself? Is not too abundant weight fattened? And isn't it time to put him down?

Understanding apparatus ethics better than we do, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, even if he had received such an incredible complaint from the chief of military intelligence, was unlikely to rush to report it to Stalin, as he realized that the situation could be misinterpreted by the master of the Kremlin.

2

What do you get, citizens? A military attaché is obliged to send his reports to the RU GS, but he sends them to the NKVD. An ambassador is obliged to send his messages only to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, but he sends them to the NKVD and the GSH. The Chief of the RU GS is obliged to supply his subordinates with everything necessary for their illegal activities, but for some reason this is done by the NKVD. In case of problems, the chief of the RU GS is obliged to address his superiors, but he again addresses complaints to the NKVD. And after all, he is not only complaining about the ambassador in Berlin. From the "document" also follows that in the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army ran some unruly Lieutenant Colonel Novobranets, who persistently warns of an imminent German attack, that is, in Beria's opinion, lies nonsense. It is quite obvious that the head of the Information Department of the RU GS Major-General SN Dronov by his own efforts is not able to cope with his subordinate Lieutenant Colonel. And Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov, head of the Intelligence Directorate, can do nothing about the tenacious

I couldn't, so I decided to complain about the stubborn one to higher authorities.

But here's the strange thing! The higher authority for Golikov is the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Army General G. K. Zhukov. K. Zhukov. I should have turned to him: help me out, Georgy Konstantinich,
- the nasty lieutenant colonel, there's no control over him!

Here we should also remember the following moment. On July 26, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, in addition to the Internal Service Statute and the Disciplinary Statute, issued a special order № 227 "On the procedure for addressing official matters and bringing complaints by servicemen. This order was announced to all Red Army personnel, and to the command staff - against signature. The order categorically forbade for Red Army servicemen to address any organizations on official matters. organizations и institutionsthrough head of their direct superiors. This order was strictly followed, like any other order signed by Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko. Violators of his orders Timoshenko punished immediately and severely. And here we see that, contrary to the Disciplinary Regulations, orders and prohibitions. the chief of the Intelligence of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff for some reason complains not to his direct and immediate superior Zhukov, but again to the NKVD, personally to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. affairs General commissar Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria, to whom he is not subordinate: here, Lavrentiy Palych, we are in order here in the General Staff ourselves.
you can't make a mess, so do me a favor and help me out.

But it turns out that even the formidable People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria himself with Lieutenant Colonel Novobrantz can not cope, so complains to Stalin: that's what bad lieutenant colonels in military intelligence. They've gone wild, you see.

3

The style of this "document" also speaks volumes. Let me start with the fact that Stalin was indeed addressed by his first name and patronymic, but this was allowed only to ordinary people and only in letters:
"Dear Joseph Vissarionovich, I hasten to rejoice..." But if the letter was a collective one, then the leader should be called by his first name and patronymic.

was impossible. A clear form of address was defined once and for all: Comrade Stalin. He did not tolerate any other. Especially - in official documents. "*Stalin did not call anyone by name and patronymic. Even at home, he called his guests by their last name and necessarily added the word "comrade". And he was also addressed only in this way: "Comrade Stalin*"" (Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union NG Kuznetsov. On the Eve. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966. C. 280).

Published hundreds of eyewitness accounts and thousands of documents, in which the leader is called no other than "Comrade Stalin". Or still in the documents - a pseudonym: Comrade Ivanov, Comrade Vasilyev and so on. Stalin's secretary Poskrebyshev - and there is also enough evidence of this - specifically warned in the reception room of each new visitor, how to address Stalin. Did Beria not know about this? Did Poskrebyshev forget to warn him? Who allowed Lavrentiy Palych to call Comrade Stalin Joseph Vissarionovich? But this is how he addresses Stalin in the "document" in question!

Secondly, it was possible and necessary to flatter Stalin - but only on condition that this flattery was intended for consumption the masses. At conferences and congresses, in magazines, newspapers and books, in novels, poems and songs, flatterers of all stripes competed in the use of superlative degrees. But to flatter Stalin in person was stupid and dangerous. It was tantamount to trying to pet a tiger on the striped back. Stalin was prudent enough not to surround himself with court sycophants and do not listen to their praise. And Beria was not so foolish as to flatter Stalin so axe-headedly and insolently: "Your wise predestination!"

The documents that lay on Stalin's desk were always extremely brief, clear and understandable. There is no flattery in them. In them there is nothing superfluous - nothing that could be cut and discarded for unnecessary, only bare dry facts, only simple logical conclusions and concrete proposals. This was the style of Stalin himself. This is what he demanded from his subordinates. High-pitched phrases like "your wise predestination" in the documents sent to Stalin, it is impossible to find. And exclamatory

There were no signs in the service documents that were sent to Stalin. We did without it.

And why these declarations of power: "me and my men"?! Not yours, but the Sovereign's! Lavrusha, have you turned the NKVD into a private shop? Comrade Stalin used to tear out tongues for such words. Along with their heads.

And in the question about 170 divisions the authors of the "document" made a mistake. Soviet historical science has long established a false figure that 170 *Soviet* divisions were allegedly concentrated on the western borders on June 21, 1941. The guys who composed this
"document", without understanding, attributed to Beria Lavrentiy Pavlovich the statement that 170 *German* divisions are concentrated on the borders.

4

Now for the main thing.

Let us turn to the identity of the ambassador, whose recall from Berlin Beria allegedly insisted on. His name was Dekanozov Vladimir Georgievich. He was acquainted and friendly with Beria Lavrentiy Pavlovich since 1919 - they worked together in the underground in Baku, Beria - the leading, Dekanozov - the . In the same 1919 they served together.
musavatist am[16]. In 1920, both are in the intelligence of the 11th Army of the Reds. Again: Beria is in the lead, Dekanozov is following.

In April 1921 Beria is the deputy head of the secret-operational department of the Azerbaijan Cheka, and in June in the same institution subordinate to him gets and Dekanozov. Then Beria
- Deputy Chairman of the Azerbaijani Cheka and head of the secret-intelligence unit (SOCh), i.e. the lord of all snitches, and Dekanozov was the secretary of the SOCh. Since November 1922 Beria was deputy chairman of the Georgian Cheka and head of the SOCh. Accordingly, Dekanozov from the same November of the same year - secretary of the SOCh of the Cheka of Georgia. Further in the same order: Beria is the head of all the Chekists of Transcaucasia, Dekanozov is his deputy for snitching.

In November 1931 Beria became the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, that is, the full ruler of the sunny republic, and in December Dekanozov became the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia on transportation. The following year Beria is the lord of the entire Transcaucasus, and accordingly Dekanozov is in his government.

Under Dekanozov's wing are transportation, trade, supply, food industry, distribution of material and financial flows.

At the end of August 1938, Stalin transferred Beria to Moscow and appointed First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, head of the Main Directorate of State Security - GU GB NKVD. And on the 5th Department of the GU GGB Beria put Dekanozov. 5th Department of the GUGB in those glorious times - is the entire NKVD intelligence abroad. In November of the same year, Beria - People's Commissar of the NKVD, and Dekanozov
- deputy chief of the GHQ.

May 3, 1939 Stalin changed the entire leadership of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, appointing Molotov as People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and Dekanozov as his deputy. For the first time in 20 years Dekanozov was out of official subordination to Beria. It is clear that their relationship did not change in any way. Molotov was one of the most dangerous rivals of Beria in the struggle for power. Molotov by his position was higher than Beria, but in Molotov's entourage was now a loyal Berian Dekanozov, and in Beria's entourage there was no loyal Molotov.

November 28, 1940 Stalin sent Dekanozov plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany with the retention of his position as Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs. After that Dekanozov until the death of Stalin remained as if out of subordination to Beria, but in fact was the most firm Berievtsy. After Stalin's death Beria immediately returned Dekanozov under his command and sent to Georgia to deal with all his personal enemies. Soon, however, Beria fell into the bottomless abyss of Kremlin intrigue. Dekanozov followed. They were shot on the same day.

But here are the miracles: on June 21, 1941 Beria allegedly complained to Stalin about the behavior of the Soviet ambassador in Berlin, that is, the loyal Dekanozov, who allegedly bombarded him with disinformation. Beria allegedly suggested to Stalin that Dekanozov be removed and roughly punished.

And I will repeat: although Dekanozov was the most loyal and unbending Berievite, but in 1941, according to his position, he simply did not have the right
to "bombard with disinformation" Beria, who was in charge of internal affairs and under whose authority Dekanozov was not officially subordinated at that time. And if Dekanozov was really fed up

In the old friendship, one could shush Vovochka and shout: "Vovochka, be quiet, you're annoying!

But to complain to Stalin about his most trusted and closest associate - is it not madness? Is it not the height of madness to demand from Stalin the removal of his own man, embedded in Molotov's entourage?

5

The dashing guys who created this "document" did not know much history. But those who put this "document" into "scientific circulation" also showed no special interest in the history of the Fatherland. And it should have been known that on May 1, 1941, something extraordinary happened in Moscow, something that no one has yet explained.

Under Stalin, the leaders were listed not alphabetically, as was customary after him, but in the order of their place on the Kremlin Olympus. Stalin himself was named separately: "Comrade Stalin and Comrades Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich...".

The order in which the chiefs were listed was a barometer of extreme sensitivity. Sometimes the places of the leaders in the hierarchy could change several times a day. At the morning session of the Congress, Mikoyan could fifth on the list, and at the evening session he could be eighth. The next morning he could rise or fall even lower. Careerists of all shades and colors closely and jealously followed the position of the leaders in the lists, like moneychangers follow the exchange rates.

And the leaders appeared in public only in the order determined by Comrade Stalin. Every cricket knew its own nook and cranny. Seating and arrangement of leaders at official ceremonies were subject to the strictest regulation, which would be the envy of any tsarist steward or master of ceremonies. And again, after each public appearance of the chiefs, swindlers of all ranks and calibers scrutinized the first page of Pravda, determining and evaluating who was who and who was eating who.

Taking all this into account, let us open the newspaper Pravda of May 2, 1941. Who should be on the podium of the Mausoleum? Correct: Comrade Stalin, members of the Politburo and the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, who took the military

parade. And who else do we suddenly find there, rubbing our eyes? That's right: Vladimir Dekanozov. And where? Next to Stalin. At his right hand. Never, neither before nor later, has anything like this ever happened.

Stalin's Central Committee has a hundred of his closest associates. But none of them were allowed on the Mausoleum podium
- are not of rank and stature.

Stalin has five marshals. But only the one who is currently taking the military parade rises to the podium. We're not talking about generals and admirals. They have nothing to do there.

Stalin has a whole horde of people's commissars and ministers. But only those People's Commissars who have the Party rank of Politburo member are allowed on the podium, which is two or three people at best.

Stalin has official representatives in Washington, London, Stockholm, Tokyo, Rome and all the other capitals of the world. But all of them, for all their greatness, do not even remotely reach the heights that made it possible at least to approach the rostrum on which the Genius of Humanity and the Best Friend of the Polish People (as Marshal Zhukov of the Soviet Union put it at the celebrations in Warsaw on July 20, 1951) shone.

And only once, on May 1, 1941, Stalin suddenly invited the Soviet official representative in Berlin Dekanozov Vladimir Georgievich on the podium of the Mausoleum and put next to himself, pushing aside his closest associates. Why this was done, I do not know. I don't even have a guess. It is a mystery of history. It is clear that Dekanozov did something absolutely indescribable and outstanding, and Stalin for some reason decided to express his royal favor not secretly, but publicly, so that the whole world could see.

The most important Stalinist lever of control is the personnel lever. Personnel decide everything. Stalin knew whom to put in what post. And even better, he knew who comes from what clans. And Stalin shuffled the deck. He shuffled with understanding. Everyone knew that Dekanozov was a loyal Berievite. And Stalin was the best. Therefore, Stalin's favor could not fail to touch Beria: what a fine Bolshevik comrade Beria brought up and raised!

Was Lavrentiy Beria really so stupid to fight off his own glory the next month and fight back: Comrade Stalin, this Dekanozov is a disinformer! Kick him out! Throw him out! If Beria so behaved, it would be a blow to Stalin: here, Comrade Stalin, you are the greatest honor Dekanozov give Dekanozov, but he deserves just the opposite. You, Comrade Stalin, don't have a damn thing in

You don't know anything about human resources!

So I'm about what? I'm about what that guys who who created this "document", had no idea of the Kremlin's calculations in 1941 - not even a rough idea. They had not even bothered to look through Pravda for the last couple of months before the war.

6

The main reproach to my books is this: maybe everything is right in them, but I can't find any supporting papers. Simply put: where is the document?

I answer: by order of Colonel-General Volkogonov, only on April 13, 1990, 7 tons of military documents from 1941 were burned at the Institute of Military History. Only on June 10, 1991, 5 tons of documents relating to the same period were burned in the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. The reasoning: there was nowhere to store them. For half a century there was a place, and then suddenly there was not enough space. And the documents were burned not only under the curtain of the communist paradise.

Any scientific center in the world would have accepted these priceless treasures for safekeeping, any collector, any history buff. These documents could be sold at auction and millions could be made for them. But our glorious fatherland has nowhere to go for money. Russia is already drowning in money. And now I'm being told that everything is in "Icebreaker" seems to add up, but where are the supporting documents?

The question of where to find the supporting documents was answered exhaustively by former Politburo member Alexander Nikolayevich Yakovlev:

There's nothing to declassify - there are no more papers. I am afraid that everything has already been destroyed. In '41, they burned documents in the Kremlin for several days. And in '91, by the way, also (Vesti. October 5, 2000).

The main task of the Kremlin gerostrats is to turn the people into morons. They are easy to control. For this purpose, they burn the history of their army, their people, their country. A nation that does not know its own history is doomed to mental and physical degeneration and death. Therefore, the destruction of historical documents is treason against the Motherland.

The Kremlin traitors who are killing the history of their own people are filling the gaping voids with forgeries like Zhukov's "Memories and Reflections" and "Beria's notes" instead of destroyed documents.

Keeping historical documents in inaccessible archives is also treason. Does it make much difference if a document is burned or kept in a place where no one will ever read it, where at any moment it can be destroyed for uselessness without having to answer to anyone?

7

In order to prevent a repetition of the monstrous tragedy of 1941, our people need to know what the cause of what happened. Enemies of the people respond to this: no need to rake up the past, no need to deal with the causes, everything is clear: Stalin was a moron, he surrounded himself with cretins and sycophants. And as one of the proofs they present to the people "Beria's note".

And we will pay attention to a trifle: "Beria's note" walks around the world in many variants. In spirit and meaning, it is the same, but each time in different words. Sometimes Beria demands to recall some nameless ambassador from Berlin, and sometimes he calls him by name, sometimes he demands to recall and punish him, and sometimes - just to recall him....

Let's try to find the original. All serious historians quote the "note" without specifying in which archive, in which fund and in which case it was found.

To all true lovers of history, to all who are not indifferent to the past and future of their country and their people, I give a tool to denounce "serious historians": call, write letters, send messages to anyone who quoted "Beria's note" in their

the writings, demand an answer as to its origin. Try to find the original source.

Listen to responses to a question about the source from which the text is taken "notes," is a pleasure. The game is so damn addictive. When you get an answer, grab the next "serious historian" by the throat and pound him with a question: where is the document?

***

And here is a further creative development of the comedy about "Beria's note". Two very serious historians tell the world that the people of the Soviet Union, starting with the highest leaders, were terribly stupid and cowardly. The brainless Stalin put the matter so that no one dared to tell him the truth:

To somehow bring to him the real state of affairs, his subordinates had to go to absolutely incredible tricks. Lieutenant General Golikov, the head of military intelligence, for example, reporting on plans for German aggression, declared them disinformation, and at the end added: "But I and my people, Joseph Vissarionovich, firmly remember your wise predestination that in 1941 Hitler will not attack us!" (Arguments and Facts). (Argumenty i Fakty. 2001.
№25)

So, June 21, 1941, Beria from the NKVD sent Stalin a note on the wise predestination of the leader for 1941. Lieutenant General Golikov, of course, the content of Beria's note to Stalin could not know. But it turns out that Golikov from the RU GS on the same day sent Stalin exactly the same note. Word for word. With the same punctuation marks. That's how the leader was surprised by such a coincidence.

It would be possible to such twists and turns of our native historical science, if it were not for the signatures. Underneath this
"There are two of them: Sergei Osipov and Rudolf Pihoya. The name of Sergei Osipov says nothing to me, and the bells do not ring in my memory. And Rudolf Pikhoya in 1993-1996 was the head of the State Archive Service of Russia and the Chief State Archivist of Russia. Under his control were all the archives, starting with the former Politburo Archive, which is now called the Presidential Archive. As of the beginning of the new millennium, the Presidential Archive alone contained

215,000 "special folders" that have not yet been thrown into the fire - and that's not counting documents labeled "Secret," "Top Secret," and "Top Secret. Of Special Importance."

Is it really the job of the country's chief archivist in Russia to keep the people out of their own history, gradually turning history into smoke and ashes and the people into a pack of monkeys?

It is precisely from such figures that the authorities form a corps of serious historians. The authorities entrust such criminals to write the history of the country and its people.

CHAPTER 22. Order to collapse!

Readiness to repel [German] aggression also required that not only plans for defensive operations be developed, but that these operations be fully prepared, including in logistical and engineering terms, that they be mastered by commanders and staffs. It is quite obvious that in the event of a surprise attack by the enemy there would be no time left for the preparation of such operations.

Red Star. May 4 2000.

1

The most fierce fighter against the falsifiers of the history of World War II was the four times Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov Georgy Konstantinovich. His article "The Greatness of the Victory of the USSR and the Powerlessness of the Falsifiers of History" (Kommunist. 1970. No. 1) is a classic of the genre. No one could so powerfully and mercilessly nail the scholarly liars to the wall of shame as did the Marshal of Victory. He wrote:

The events of 1941 are mostly characterized by Western historians as a triumphal march of Hitler's army ... and our command is attributed to confusion and weakness .... As for the Supreme Command, it was never in a state of confusion, but firmly led the struggle of the Soviet people.

Die is the best way to put it.

What is Supreme High Command? That's right - it's Stalin. No one else, except for him, during the war, the title of Supreme Commander-in-Chief was not carried. But it's not even about titles. Zhukov writes that no important decision was made without Stalin. Zhukov said that Stalin on the eve of the war forbade to put troops on alert, and no one could reverse this decision, that from the beginning of the war there was no order from Stalin to respond to fire on fire, and the troops did not respond.

Simply put, everything was locked on Stalin. And even in the early days of the war, when the nominal commander-in-chief was Marshal Timoshenko, the actual was still Stalin. Supreme Command and Stalin are "twin brothers", as the Party and Lenin in famous poem Mayakovsky. We say
We say "Stalin", we mean "VGK". We say "VGK" - we mean "Stalin".

So he, the great Stalin, was never (according to Zhukov's statements) in a state of confusion.

Remember this, gentlemen forgers!

2

But how did the corrupt bourgeois perverters know about the weakness and confusion of the Soviet leadership? They didn't invent it themselves!

Ah, yes! That's right! Exactly one year before the release of Zhukov's exposing article was published his book, in which the great strategist told the world that in the early morning of June 22, 1941, Stalin in a state of complete confusion did not know what to do. Zhukov allegedly called Stalin, and he did not answer. Finally Zhukov got through, reported the situation, and Stalin in response was silent. Because he did not know what to do. All this was told to us by Zhukov.

But if Stalin did not know what to do, if Stalin did not give any instructions, then the entire top leadership of the country and the army did not act. Only Zhukov describes himself as a hero and clever: he met the war in the General Staff, at a combat post, clearly understood everything, made only the right decisions.

However, between the lines another picture peeps out. It was Zhukov who was at a loss. It was he who was completely unprepared for action. We read in his memoirs:

At 7:15 a.m. on June 22, directive No. 2 of the Defense Commissar was transmitted to the districts. But according to the balance of forces and the current situation, it was clearly unrealistic. (Zhukov G. K. Memories and Reflections. Moscow: APN. 1969. P. 248).

So it is written in the first edition of "Memories and Reflections", published during Zhukov's lifetime. In the "most truthful" tenth

edition of the directive went from "clearly unrealistic" to a "unreal." Let it be so, if this is the holy truth, if this is what was written in the "original manuscript" of the memoirs, inadvertently discovered by the military leader's clever daughter. But everything else in this short text, in these two simple sentences, is a lie.

Directive No. 2 was the very first document sent by the country's top leadership to the Red Army since the outbreak of war. Before that, Directive No. 1 had been in force, which ended with the dire warning: DO NOT carry out ANY OTHER MEASURES WITHOUT SPECIAL ORDER.

And so instead of the stupid Directive№ 1, the troops received the Directive № 2. Amazingly, in "the most truthful book about the war" the text of Directive No. 2, the very first combat order of the war, is not given. It says only that it is a directive of the People's Commissar of Defense. And we all read Zhukov's memoirs and resent the stupidity of the Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko, who sent to his subordinate headquarters an "obviously unrealistic", that is, impossible, that is, stupid and criminal order.

Two decades have passed since the publication of "the most truthful book about the war". On the wave of so-called "glasnost", a few months before the collapse of the "indestructible" Soviet Union, the Military Historical Journal (1991, No. 4) published a facsimile copy of Directive No. 2. Comrades from the editorial board of the honorable publication did not know what they were doing. By publishing this copy, they revealed a little secret to the world. And not just one.

It turns out that this document is not called a directive of the People's Commissar of Defense. It's not called anything. It's just a number. And under the document there are three signatures. The first and the largest - Malenkov. The second one is a little smaller - Timoshenko.

Malenkov, a member of the Politburo, shared with Molotov the second and third places in the Soviet Union at that moment, right after Stalin. Malenkov was at that moment and the war incomparably higher than Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko. Malenkov's signature means that this document is of a higher caliber than a directive of the People's Commissar of Defense.

And the third signature, small and crooked, belongs to some Zhukov. He composed this document and wrote it in his hand.

Here is the price of "sparing no one" memoirs. On the evening of June 21, the troops left the criminal Directive № 1, the meaning of which is as follows:
"no activities without a special order." This pernicious directive was personally composed by Zhukov and signed by him. But now the enemy went on the offensive along the entire front, and to replace Directive No. 1 in the subordinate headquarters flies "clearly unrealistic" Directive No. 2. One criminal order was replaced by another, impossible, i.e. equally criminal.

Zhukov forgot to inform us that he himself personally composed this idiotic directive, wrote it with his own hand. Zhukov called his abominable creation a directive of the People's Commissar, although the document is not called that. Thus Zhukov blamed his commander and old battle comrade Marshal Timoshenko. And in front of us appeared clean: in the morning of June 22, 1941 stupid cowardly Stalin did not know what to do. Marshal Timoshenko sent a "clearly unrealistic" directive to the troops, that is, he also did not know what to do.

Zhukov alone knew everything. Zhukov alone made the right decisions.

Neither in the first nine editions of Memories and Reflections, which were perverted by malicious ideological obscurantists, nor in the tenth, "most truthful" edition, which was radically revised in accordance with allegedly found
"the original manuscript," the strategist did not cite the text of this very first document of the war.

Zhukov decided that the time had come to tell about how Stalin fell from the Arabian horse, although Zhukov himself did not see the fall. But the time had not yet come to tell about the very first order to the Red Army troops since the war began, which Zhukov had personally composed.

3

Zhukov reported that Directive No. 2 was transmitted to the headquarters of the border districts at 7:15. We all believed it - believed it until a facsimile copy of the document appeared in the "Military History Journal".

Let's take a closer look. The document bears a secrecy stamp, mailing addresses, number, date, time - 7 hours and 15 minutes, followed by a confusing, repeatedly crossed out, dirty sloppy draft. 7 hours and 15 minutes is not at the end of the text, but at the very beginning. This is not the time when the directive went to the troops, but the time when Zhukov sat down to compose it. It takes time to compose. After that, the paper must be given to the cipher department. And encryption then was done manually, using cipher pads, and each letter had to be turned into several digits. Only after that the directive could be sent to the districts. Not at 7:15 a.m.

Draft testifies: on that beautiful morning, the great commander Zhukov was not overflowing with inspiration. Words and phrases clearly did not fit together, did not add up to a slender and strict text. Strategist scribbled written, the top inscribed such terms that no one has ever used in the preparation of combat documents. The style of the combat order should be simple, concise, clear - and no emotion. And Zhukov writes: "*In connection with the beginning of hostilities on the part of Germany and Romania on the Soviet Union*". This is nonsense: "started ... on the Soviet Union." The strategist crosses out "military actions", separately crosses out Romania. Suddenly, instead of a snaggy phrase, a new one is put down on the paper, which sounds not the wise commanding tone of the General Staff, but the hysterical cry of a hastily, by order of the district committee of the collective farm rally: "*In connection with the unheard of insolence of the attack...*".

Who ever wrote about unheard of insolence in a combat order?
Only Zhukov.

Directive No. 2 is impromptu. Before the German artillery hit our border outposts, the great Zhukov clearly did not think about what order should be given to the Red Army troops in the event that Germany first starts the war. Some words Zhukov crosses out, immediately emphasizes them in order to show: this word let it remain. Zhukov requires bombing strikes to the depth of enemy territory up to 100 kilometers. Why? Why these restrictions, if the war has already begun? Zhukov immediately crosses out this figure and writes a new one: 100-150 (kilometers).

These are completely arbitrary numbers. "From the street." They're not substantiated by anything. And if our plane flies 160 kilometers into enemy airspace? What's wrong with that? There's another restriction: "*No crossing the border until special orders from ground troops*." Why is that? And another one: "*No raids on the territory of Finland and Romania until special instructions*".

What does this have to do with Finland? On the morning of June 22, 1941, the Red Army General Staff received no reports that Finnish troops or German troops in Finland had attacked the Soviet Union. On our borders north of the Baltic Sea was quiet. Why did Zhukov suddenly remember Finland? Zhukov's head that morning was filled with some strange worries.

There are only two basic types of combat actions: defense and offensive. Everything else is either a variant of defensive or offensive actions (e.g., withdrawal, counterattack), or the provision of combat operations (reconnaissance, guarding, camouflage, etc.). So: in the very first document of the war, which was composed by Zhukov and sent for execution to the front headquarters, the word
"defense" is absent.

The Red Army was preparing a surprise attack on Germany, Romania and Finland, but Hitler was ahead. Therefore, Zhukov's main concern was that the Red Army offensive in different directions did not start at different times, on different days. Hence the requirement not to cross the border, not to bomb Romania and Finland - we will deal with the situation, then and give a general order for an offensive.

4

So, the great strategist Zhukov sat down at 7:15 a.m. to compose a directive to the troops. This circumstance alone says a lot, if not everything. Any lieutenant, having entered the guardhouse, the first thing announces the combat calculation in case of a sudden emergency: in case of an attack on the guardhouse.... in case of an attack on the first post... the second post... in case of fire at the protected object... and so on.

If something like this happens, the head of the guard has only to shout one word, and everyone acts in accordance with the instructions given earlier. The same is true on warships, in subdivisions and units, in workshops and collective farms. The chief of police of any run-down town, accepting a position, first of all delves into the combat schedule: who does what in the event of a terrorist attack, earthquake, flood, the appearance of an armed gang of visiting tourists, mass unrest of the population and the like. But it is not enough to get into it - the chief must make sure that all subordinates clearly know their duties and are ready to act on the first signal in any situation, no matter how unusual and complex it may be.

What about the police or the army? You get on an airplane and they tell you for the hundred and tenth time what to do in case of an emergency landing on water, what rope to pull and what whistle to blow.

But here is an illustration of Zhukov's personal readiness to repel an enemy invasion: the war has already counted down its first hours, and the Marshal of Victory has just sat down to compose an instruction on what the troops should do in case of enemy attack, in what whistle to blow.

Obviously, Zhukov himself did not have even a remote idea of how to act in the event of a surprise attack of the enemy. He did not any pre-prepared options in this regard. The first phrase of the first paragraph of this directive, this "masterpiece" of military thought, is worth only one thing:

ORDERED:

1. Troops to engage the enemy forces with all their might and means....

Zhukov says that before the war he "*worked 15-16 hours a day, often staying overnight in the office*. The entire staff of the General Staff worked 15-18 hours a day without weekends and holidays. And these were huge teams of the most highly qualified officers and generals of the Red Army. What was the result of this titanic work?

The result is as follows: on June 22, 1941 by 7 a.m. the city of Brest was abandoned by the troops of the 4th Army. In the other armies the situation was no better. The entire Red Army fled, not giving in to provocations, not daring to violate the orders of the wisest strategist. And the strategist himself at 7 o'clock
15 minutes came up with an ingenious order: *order to collapse*!

In his memoirs, Zhukov told gullible readers that on the evening of June 21, 1941, he "finally dispelled all illusions" and clearly understood that the Germans were about to attack. So could not he then, in the evening, to report his brilliant plan for the defense of the country to the commanders of fronts, fleets and armies? Why did he have to wait until 7 a.m.?

And another thing: was it worth it to work 15 or more hours a day for huge teams of generals and officers of the General Staff, if all the plans were finally concentrated in one phrase Zhukov: "to collapse with all forces and means"! Couldn't Zhukov, before the war, call the commander of the Western Special Military District, Army General Pavlov, to Moscow and tell him in confidence: "Dmitry Grigorievich, I work 15-16 hours a day, I don't sleep at night, but I can't compose any war plans. And neither is the entire General Staff. So here's what you do. As soon as they attack, attack them with all your forces and means, beat them in the tail and in the mane! Do you understand me?"

And the other commanders should have been informed in advance of this ingenious plan. That's all. Why torture yourself and your men? Why stay up all night? If the country's defense plan was reduced to an order to collapse, then, having communicated the central (and only) idea to the lower commanders, one could go fishing, hunting, drinking. And the General Staff could be released on indefinite leave with the order: as soon as the war starts, do not hurry back to Moscow; the fronts and armies know what they should do without our participation.

Here Zhukov's admirers and admirers of his talent, understandably, will protest angrily: how could the plan be disclosed? After all, Zhukov's ingenious plan to save the country could become known to the enemy!

I agree. Of course, this plan should not have been made public. We should have made red bags, written on them: "To be opened upon receipt of the signal 'Thunderstorm'." In each bag put a document of the following content: "Top secret. Of special importance. I order to collapse with all forces and means. Zhukov." After that, the packages should be sealed, sealed with sealing wax seals and put in the safes of the commanders of military districts, fleets and armies. In case of war it was only one word to be transmitted over the phone in plain text, the commanders would open the packets and it would be immediately clear to the entire Red Army what should be done: to collapse.

And what happened? Until 7:15 a.m. Zhukov did not respond to requests from the fronts at all. At 7:15 he sat down to write a directive, and while he was composing it, while it was encrypted and transmitted, a lot of time passed. Then this directive was deciphered at the front headquarters and they sat down to write their own directives to the armies and encrypt them. At the command posts of the armies they deciphered and sat down to write their directives to the corps. Some corps received their directives only in the evening. And many never reached them.

If the wisest directive had been in commanders' safes, everything would have been much simpler and quicker - a circular from the General Staff: all commanders and commanders up to and including regiments and battalions should open the packages, read the contents, and attack the enemy!

5

To decipher Zhukov's directive, in which he orders the Red Army troops to "cave in", can, in my opinion, only be deciphered in this way:

I don't have any plans at the General Staff. I haven't bothered to make any. I don't know how to fight. Interaction of aviation, fleets, fronts and armies on the plan, place and time to organize is not able to organize. I'm relieved of all responsibility. I wash my hands of it. I'm shifting all responsibility to you.

Orders:

1. Commanders of fronts and fleets to fight without any plans. Whatever they like. Who can do what they like.

2. If anyone wants to organize interaction in terms of purpose, place and time with aviation, fleets and flotillas, NKVD troops, neighboring fronts and armies, rear institutions, armies of the Second Strategic Echelon - then you yourselves somehow negotiate among yourselves, decide by voting.

Beetles.

P.S. Whoever doesn't succeed will be shot. It's not my fault who didn't hide. And after the war I will declare myself a genius, and the one who will not succeed - a fool and a traitor.

6

Jokes aside. If anyone has a more accurate decipherment of the mysterious term "order to collapse", I am ready to discuss and admit my mistakes, if I find my opponent's arguments convincing. And while let's agree on that that order
"to collapse with all forces and means" was essentially an order to fight as God would have it, without coordinating their actions neither with Moscow, nor with neighbors, nor with the Second Strategic Echelon, nor with the rear bodies.

But before you fight, you have to make war plans. Zhukov's directive was essentially an order to each front to begin planning its own war. Zhukov himself from January 13 to June 21, 1941 did not make any plans for a defensive war, but the commanders of districts (fronts) permission to plan independently did not give. If the commanders of fronts and armies had at least one last night to make their own plans or at least thirty minutes before the first bursts of enemy shells! But Zhukov gave the order to independently plan the war after it began. A genius, indeed.

If Zhukov is to be believed, on June 22, "at about 13 hours", he received a phone call from Stalin informing him that the front commanders were "a little confused". And after all was why. Having received an order Zhukov
"collapse" with no indication of when to collapse, exactly where to collapse, or for what purpose, who wouldn't be confused?

No one has ever given such an order to the army in the entire history of Russia - not even the most untalented military commanders. And if the First Strategic Echelon of the Red Army collapsed in the first days of the war, then the great Zhukov should be blamed for it: he ordered it himself.

7

So that's not all. In one day alone, June 22, 1941, the great Marshal of Victory dumbfounded the troops with THREE directives, and each subsequent one contradicted the previous one. If THIS is not confusion, what is?

But about his confusion Zhukov kept silent, he blamed everything on Stalin. This is one of the core scenes of "Memories and Reflections": it is not yet dawn, and Zhukov calls, Zhukov demands, Zhukov insists, Zhukov reports the situation, and frightened Stalin can not even a word to utter. Whether he was afraid of his fear, or confusion, or both at the same time.

This scene, as well as many others, in each new edition of Zhukov's memoirs becomes more and more vivid and exciting. I recommend that meticulous readers compare different editions of Memories and Reflections from the first to the next.

Zhukov in his memoirs with relish describes Stalin's confusion. And the same Zhukov in the magazine "Communist" a year later this confusion angrily refutes. Should the great strategist have accused the malignant bourgeois liars when he himself is the original source for them?

It is only a pity that Zhukov's stories about Stalin's short-sightedness (and about his own farsightedness) are placed in memoirs that have been translated into many languages, and Zhukov's statements that the Supreme Command "was never in a state of confusion" and "firmly led the struggle of the Soviet people", published in the magazine "Communist", which was read by a few, and then only in case of extreme necessity.

CHAPTER 23 Was Stalin afraid of Hitler's attack?

And why should Comrade Stalin, who understands everything perfectly well - he himself is a former urca - wait for the first blow from another urca? Why should he receive a blinding blow to the bridge of his nose, fall down and then on the ground get kicked in the kidneys, wondering whether he will be able to get up or it's all over? Maybe Comrade Stalin is a masochist?

Alexander Nikonov. Strike first. The main mystery of the Second World War. Moscow, St. Petersburg: Enas-Peter, 2009. C. 109-110

1

Proving to the damned falsifiers that Stalin firmly led the struggle of the Soviet people, Zhukov again repeatedly refuted himself, announcing to the whole world that Stalin was a coward and at the beginning of the war was in confusion:

To modern warfare, he [Stalin. - Author's note] was not prepared, and hence the confusion, and the inability to assess the situation, and gross miscalculations and mistakes (VIZh. 1995. № 3. P. 45).

Stalin was afraid of war, and fear is a bad advisor (Krasnaya Zvezda. September 19, 1995).

Read this, and everything finally falls into place: before the war cowardly Stalin trembled at the mere thought of a possible German attack, he was unable to overcome the animal fear and therefore could not adequately respond to the changing situation, make the right decisions and firmly lead the struggle of his people. However, everything remains in place only until we ask the question: and who in the first half of 1941 Stalin was afraid of?

Let's remember: Hitler is in a stalemate. Hitler could not win the war against Great Britain (and the USA - in the second echelon) under any conditions. He could not control conquered Europe for a long time either. There is industrial capacity in conquered Europe, but no significant natural resources in Europe . More likely early, than late

economic, financial, political, transportation, food, administrative, moral and military collapse awaited occupied Europe - even if there had not been intensive fighting. Hitler clearly did not have the means to control conquered Europe, and to fight against Great Britain (and the United States), and on top of that, to attack the Soviet Union.

And Stalin had the world's most powerful tank, aircraft and artillery industries in the first half of 1941. The Soviet Union at that moment was producing more tanks and guns than Germany and Great Britain combined. At the same time, Germany and Great Britain were at war, while the Soviet Union was living a peaceful life and, as we are assured, was not going to attack anyone. The military industry of the Soviet Union (and there was no other industry in the USSR) from the second half of 1940 was fully mobilized and brought to the wartime regime.

Stalin has huge human resources and the ability to spend them freely without accountability to anyone.

Stalin has a territory that is impossible for any external enemy to seize.

Stalin has all-powerful allies in the form of Britain and the United States.

Documents have now been found and published which show that American and British military supplies began to flow to the Soviet Union from the end of 1940. There is also German evidence to this effect.

Great Britain and the United States urgently demanded the immediate entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Germany and promised unlimited political, propaganda, economic, military and any other assistance. The British government even blackmailed Stalin: if you do not attack Hitler, then look how you will not be left with him. Hurry up, or we will get tired of waiting and sign peace with Hitler.

The British government frightened Stalin with just such a prospect. Here is one of many examples. On April 19, 1941, Ambassador of Great Britain Cripe handed to Deputy Commissar of the People's Commissars

foreign affairs to Vyshinsky a memorandum for Molotov, which contained an ominous warning:

It is not impossible, in the event of the war being stretched over a long period, that Great Britain (especially certain circles in Great Britain) might smile at the idea of making a deal to end the war ... (1941. Book 2. pp. 94-95).

And here are some excerpts from many recently discovered documents published in the collection "Soviet-American Relations. 1939-1945" (Moscow: International Foundation for Democracy, 2004).

On September 26, 1940, the head of the Soviet government V. M. Molotov had a conversation in Moscow with the U.S. Ambassador L. Steingardt. The American ambassador reported top secret information: the United States is deploying a fleet of 20 aircraft carriers, 32 battleships, 100 cruisers (some of which have a displacement of more than 20 thousand tons), 400 destroyers, as well as other ships. A similarly large-scale deployment of aviation is being prepared: one hundred thousand future pilots have already begun training. The U.S. Army has 140,000 men, but is preparing to draft 12 million.

To assess the American scale, let us compare: in 1941, the Soviet Union did not even have aircraft carriers in the projects, battleships - three, all built under Tsar Nicholas. There were seven cruisers, three of which were laid down under the tsar, but were completed under Stalin.

The land forces of the Soviet Union were the most powerful in the world. In terms of quantity and quality of tanks, artillery, mortars, and small arms, the Red Army was the most powerful in the world. Equally powerful in 1941 was the Soviet aviation. But the development of the fleet Stalin pushed back to a later date. First of all, it was necessary to take control of the continent.

A situation arose in which the Red Army outnumbered all the armies of the world combined in terms of tanks and other land armaments. It was the same kind of superiority on the seas and oceans that the United States sought. Fulfilling the shipbuilding program meant that the U.S. fleet would be

more powerful than all the other navies in the world combined. Simply put, America began a mobilization unprecedented in the history of mankind, which in its scope surpassed even the mobilization of the Soviet Union in 1939-1941. And mobilization is war. This power must either be used, or all these battleships and cruisers will rust and become obsolete, and America will fall back into depression, but this time not into the Great Depression, but into the Greatest Depression.

The American ambassador said that all the sins of the Soviet Union in seizing some territories in Europe are forgiven, that the U.S. begins to lift all restrictions on the supply of strategic goods to the Soviet Union, which were imposed in connection with the Soviet
"liberation campaigns" in Europe. This is done in spite of the fact that the United States itself requires these materials in huge quantities due to the unprecedented leap in the development of its army, air force and navy.

Steingardt stated that "*Russia and the United States have been the closest of friends since the establishment of U.S. independence*," adding that "*Germany can be a friend of the USSR only until it conquers all of Europe*" (Soviet-American Relations. 1939-1945. pp. 93-95).

Simply put, the American ambassador frankly informed the head of the Soviet government that the United States intended to go to war against Germany in the near future. He did not hesitate to lure the Soviet Union to his side. To make it more convincing, the U.S. ambassador added that Germany was doomed, that it was in danger of starvation: Hitler had no money to buy food and no navy to take it by force. In conclusion, the U.S. ambassador outlined his vision of the postwar situation: "*Europe will be in a state of bankruptcy and starvation, as in 1919, and much will depend on what position America takes*" (ibid.).

This conversation between the American ambassador and the head of the Soviet government laid a solid foundation for the coming anti-Hitler coalition. Hitler had not yet approved a plan of attack on the Soviet Union, and no warning had yet been given to Moscow to that effect, but the Soviet leadership had already received an official invitation to to cooperate with Hitler and to switch to the side of the United States and the United States of America.

Great Britain with guarantees of unlimited military and economic aid and a share in the division of Europe after the war.

2

On April 9, 1941, A. A. Gromyko, advisor to the USSR Plenipotentiary Mission to the United States, future member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, reported to the head of the Soviet government, V. M. Molotov, that the U.S. policy in 1940 was directed at

"*all possible assistance to England*" with "*simultaneous economic pressure on the USSR*" in an effort to "*influence the foreign policy of the USSR in relation to other countries, and above all Germany*" (ibid. P. 123).

Translated into plain language, this means that the United States government was not only persuading Stalin, but was already pressuring him: stop being friends with Hitler, it is time to make new friends. In a political report for 1941, the Soviet Embassy in the U.S. reported to Moscow: "*The line of the U.S. government, held by it until June 22, 1941 in relation to the USSR, was an expression of the negative attitude of the U.S. to the U.S.S.-German relations maintained at that time. The American bourgeoisie and the American government were eagerly awaiting the USSR's involvement in the war. In its policy towards the USSR, the American government took measures of economic pressure*" (ibid. P. 213).

The Americans put the question as a question: here, Stalin, get aluminum, nickel, molybdenum, tool steel, aviation gasoline, precision machine tools, measuring equipment, leather and leather shoes, communications equipment, steel cables, medicines, food, rails, steam locomotives, navigational equipment for ships and aircraft, periscopes for submarines, surgical instruments, and so on and so forth. But if you delay in attacking Germany, we will stop deliveries. This was the economic pressure.

And here we should consider this: if the U.S. government expected a German attack on the USSR, then why twist Stalin's arm? If America wanted a war between

If the U.S. assumed that the Soviet Union and Germany would be an innocent victim of an impending attack, but it was assumed that Germany would be the attacker, then push Germany, hurry Germany up and push Germany to attack. And if the U.S. assumed that the Soviet Union would be an innocent victim of an impending attack, then no matter how much pressure you put on the USSR, it would not start a war.

From all this we can draw only one conclusion: it was necessary and possible to exert economic pressure on the Soviet Union only if it was assumed that the possible initiators of the beginning of the Soviet-German war were sitting in the Kremlin, that the beginning of the war depended on Stalin. So he was pressed. Here he was hurried up.

Digging through old British newspapers, I found a curious cartoon. In the drawing, with his back turned to Stalin, Hitler is leaning over a map. Stalin, rubbing his hands together, is looking questioningly at Hitler's ass. The British press encouraged Stalin: such a convenient, such a unique position - why are you, fool, slow?

3

But that's a joke. But here is a more serious testimony. On June 22, 1941, the head of the Press Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, N. G. Palgunov, reported to Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky that the day before, i.e. on June 21, he had held a meeting with a group of American, British and French journalists representing the leading Western news agencies, including Reuters and Associated Press. One of them, on behalf of the entire group, stated that the journalists " *they are representatives of countries that consider themselves allies of the USSR*" (ibid. p. 130).

The war has not yet broken out, but the Allies are already expressing solidarity, and their journalists are ready to go to the areas of combat operations to describe the war from the Moscow bell tower. And this is not a coincidence or a typo in the document. Here is another piece of evidence:

On June 21, 1941, European Division of the U.S. Department of State prepared a memorandum entitled "Policy on

Soviet Union in the event of the outbreak of war between the Soviet Union and Germany" (ibid. p. 133).

The leitmotif of the document: we will help Stalin.

Recently, Kremlin propaganda has concocted a new version of those pre-war events, the gist of which is as follows: Stalin wanted Hitler to attack him because then the Soviet Union would become a victim and then the U.S. would help the Soviet Union. However, Stalin had no reason to play the victim. Hitler had already done untold atrocities in Europe. The attack on Hitler was the right thing to do and did not require justification. Europe and the world would have applauded such a development.

Stalin did not need to invent any pretexts and explanations to attack Germany. American documents of that time are categorical: we helped Stalin and will continue to help. In this case, no one demanded that the Soviet Union appeared as a victim - on the contrary, Stalin was under pressure, and Stalin had to find excuses as to why the Soviet Union had not yet attacked. All of Hitler's conquered Europe was completely on Stalin's side and waiting to be liberated. So what did Stalin have to worry about?

4

So why did our scientific luminaries remain silent when Zhukov told marvelous stories about Stalin's fear? After all, it was so easy to siege Zhukov with a single question. It should have been asked: why did you, Georgy Konstantinovich, why did not you use Stalin's fear?

Let's assume that Stalin was really afraid of war, and you, Comrade Zhukov, understood this and saw Stalin's condition. So you should told the coward: Come on, Comrade Stalin, let's pull millions of tons of ammunition from the borders over the Dnieper. Then in case of an attack we will simply crush the Nazis with artillery fire. We have so many cannons and howitzers, so many shells for them! And if we keep thousands of wagons of ammunition near the border, all this good will be lost, the army will be left without shells and ammunition. Not only that, the Nazis will seize the army.

and hit us with our own captured tanks and cannons.

By the way, we should have written a report to Stalin demanding to sort out and punish the scoundrel who was chasing ammunition to the borders. Stalin should have been advised that the best Soviet divisions, corps and armies are concentrated in the areas of Bialystok and Lvov-Chernivtsi protrusions, that is, they are in traps. It was urgent to withdraw them from there. Then the threat of grandiose encirclement of Soviet troops in case of a sudden German attack would be eliminated. And again it was necessary to demand from Stalin a meticulous investigation and severe proletarian retribution to those swindlers who these best compounds and associations of the Red Army put under encirclement and defeat.

Zhukov had to explain to the cowardly Stalin that the location of Soviet airfields is extremely unfortunate: they are close to the border. Therefore, in case of a surprise attack they will be covered by German aviation, they will be crushed by tank wedges and then used by German aviation, which follows the attacking tank groups. The Germans will fly from our concrete runways, fuel the planes with our aviation gasoline and drop hundreds of thousands of our bombs on the heads of our people and our army. Again, if Zhukov was an honest man, he should have demanded an immediate investigation and punishment of those who ordered the building of airfields near the borders.

Well, let's leave the airfields alone. Some enemy of the people wants to build 254 new airfields, most of them in the border strip and in close proximity to it. Let him build them. But at least the aviation should not be kept there - after all, some airfields had 100-120 airplanes! If the German strikes, our planes will not even have time to take off. If we spend 30 seconds for each airplane to take off, how much time will it take to lift 120 airplanes from one runway? That's right.

It was necessary to prompt the cowardly Stalin that all the main forces of the Red Army should be pulled back to the line of the old state border, and there the army should be put on the defensive, using fortified

areas of "Stalin's Line" as a steel frame around which the troops dug thousands of kilometers of trenches and trenches.

We should have mined roads and bridges and dealt with the villains who ordered them to be mined.

It was necessary to form partisan detachments and groups and identify the one who made the decision to disband them.

It was urgent to return river ships from the Danube delta and the Belarusian marshes to the Dnieper. In a defensive war, their place was on the Dnieper to prevent the Germans from forcing this powerful water barrier.

We should have stopped the formation of airborne corps. No one needed them in a defensive war. Paratroopers should have been used in partisan formations and in case of a German offensive leave them in the forests on the territory occupied by the enemy.

It was necessary to make plans to repel possible aggression, and if there were no such plans and Zhukov was unable to make them, the initiative should have been placed in the hands of lower commanders - commanders of military districts and armies, commanders of corps, divisions, brigades and regiments: a surprise German attack is possible, here is your area, think for yourself, how you will fight back.

But Zhukov did not bother to draw up war plans, and all lower commanders and commanders under threat of execution forbade any independent action.

But Zhukov acted against logic and common sense - or rather, guided by a completely different logic. It was he who moved

airfields to the borders. It was he who drove river ships to places where their use for the defense of the country was impossible. It was Zhukov who placed the best Soviet divisions, corps and armies in traps. It was on his orders that airfields were built on Soviet territory, which immediately after the German attack were used by German aviation. On these airfields, on Zhukov's orders, bombs were imported in huge quantities, which soon rained down on the Red Army.

***

So what's the result?

It turns out that Stalin is not guilty of anything. Stalin could not have destroyed his fortified areas out of fear of a German attack. He could not have given the order to demine bridges. He could not in panic disband partisan detachments, prepared already in peacetime. The fearful do not behave like that.

Only someone who was clearly not afraid of Hitler could have done all this. And after reading "the most truthful book about the war" there is only one such brave man. He is the brave, wise, far-sighted one to answer to.

CHAPTER 24. Did Zhukov have the opportunity to put troops on standby in June 1941?

Having taken the oath, commanders of all ranks - from the front commander to platoon commanders - are obliged to keep the troops in combat readiness. This is their professional duty, and to explain the failure to fulfill it with references to Stalin is not in the soldiers' face.

Marshal of Artillery ND Yakovlev. Red Star. May 25 - June 12008.

1

After the war, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, until his death, told the masses nothing about the beginning of the war and everything that preceded it. Timoshenko rejected the suggestions of the country's leadership to put his signature under the memoirs, which a bunch of hard-working "literary negroes" were ready to compose and obligingly submit to the Marshal for approval. And Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko himself categorically refused to write memoirs.

This gap was filled by Zhukov. He described the pre-war period both on his own behalf and on behalf of Marshal Timoshenko. Among the many incredible stories that the strategist told the world, a special place is occupied by ballads about how Zhukov himself and Timoshenko on the eve of the war allegedly demanded that Stalin give permission to put troops in readiness.

Here is how it is described in "Memories and Reflections": On June 14, 1941, Timoshenko and Zhukov once again allegedly appeared before Stalin and again tried to explain to the incomprehensible leader that the troops should be brought to readiness. To which Stalin allegedly replied:

- Are you suggesting that we mobilize the country, raise the troops now and move them to the borders? This is war! Do you both understand it or not?! (Zhukov G. K. Memories and Reflections. Moscow: APN, 1969. P. 241)

Zhukov's stories were picked up and widely disseminated by Kremlin propaganda. Two decades after Zhukov's death, Academician Anfilov announced that he had met with Zhukov on several occasions,
had long conversations, encrypted his for pisi[17], and now decrypted. And allegedly Zhukov told Anfilov the following:

Since June 12, day after day, we asked Stalin and S. K. Timoshenko that he give permission to bring the troops into full combat readiness, but we did not receive such permission until late in the evening on June 21 (Krasnaya Zvezda. June 22, 1996).

Legends that Zhukov asked, and stupid Stalin did not allow, long ago traveled around the world and firmly embedded in the minds of serious historians. And I tried to imagine this picture. Every day Zhukov in Stalin's office begging: Comrade Stalin, let me bring the troops in readiness! And Stalin says: No! I won't allow it! Keep the troops not ready!

It's a good time to ask: What does Stalin have to do with it? Why ask his permission? There are oaths, there are charters, there are job descriptions. Keep the troops in readiness, in accordance with the oath. You do not need to ask anyone's special permission for this.

2

My many detractors have found the answer to all the questions posed in "Icebreaker": it's all true, they say, but is there a supporting document?

Let's give the critics a chisel counterblow: are there documents that Stalin did not allow to bring the troops in readiness? I will answer the question myself: there are documents, but only of the opposite nature. From Moscow to the headquarters of the border military districts rushed fierce orders Zhukov (TsAMO. Ф. 48. Op. 3408. D. 14. L. 425. Documents published in
book: 1941. M.: Demokratia, 1998. C. 341):

June 10, 1941: "*Report to the People's Commissar of Defense on what grounds the units of the fortified areas of the KOVO received the order to occupy the pre-field. Such actions may immediately provoke*

and are fraught with all sorts of consequences. Cancel such an order immediately and report who exactly gave such an arbitrary order".

June 11: "*Do not occupy the pre-pillar zone with field and level units without special instructions. The orders you have given me should be immediately rescinded*.

June 18: "*Without the authorization of the Commissar of People's Commissars, you gave an order to the Air Defense Ministry to introduce the situation number two .... I demand to immediately cancel this order and give an explanation for a report to the People's Commissar*".

Under each of these orders there is only one signature: Zhukov.
There is no Stalin's signature under these sabotage orders.

The crown of all these orders was Directive No. 1, transmitted to the headquarters of the fronts at 0 hours 30 minutes on June 22, 1941: do not give in to provocations, no activities without permission .... And again - these are not Stalin's orders. These are Zhukov's creations, written by his hand.

3

How did the admirers of the great strategist react to all these strange orders? Very simply: Zhukov was not to blame, they said. Above him stood stupid Stalin, who did not allow to bring the troops in readiness. Zhukov was forced to.

A certain Vladimir Karpov has composed a book about Zhukov (Marshal Zhukov. His associates and opponents in the days of war and peace). Karpov calls himself a Hero of the Soviet Union. True, he forgets to specify that he chickened out to defend his beloved Soviet Union. And now the "hero" Karpov tells us about Zhukov's "heroism":

Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, contrary to his desire and conviction in the need to bring the army to full combat readiness was forced to give such instructions.... This is how Zhukov and many other of our military commanders had to act contrary to their understanding of the situation.

And here is how Zhukov himself after the war assessed his cowardice, his desertion, evasion of duty, his sabotage. Listen and memorize:

Every military commander, who has allowed wrong actions, has no moral right to evade responsibility and refer to superior officers. Troops and their commanders in any situation in accordance with the joint must always be ready to fulfill the combat task. However, on the eve of the war, even on the night of June 22, in some cases, the commanders of formations and associations that were part of the echelons of covering the border, until the very last moment waited for instructions from above and did not keep the units in proper combat readiness (Zhukov G. K. Memories and Reflections. Moscow: APN, 1969. P. 262).

That is, the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Zhukov, by his directive categorically forbade the troops to occupy defensive lines on the border, to respond to enemy fire, to shoot down enemy aircraft and generally to do anything without orders from above. And after the war announced that the commanders of fronts and armies, commanders of corps, divisions, regiments and battalions, their chiefs of staff have no moral right to avoid responsibility and reproach Zhukov that he forbade them to occupy defense lines and respond to enemy fire. I forbade them to do anything without my orders, and they obeyed them! But they should have disobeyed my orders! They should have acted against my orders! They should have thought with their heads and acted in accordance with the regulations, without waiting for permission, without listening to my commands and orders, without obeying the regulations and military discipline. Only Zhukov has the moral right to blame his superior.

In the evening of June 21, Zhukov, as he himself says, quite clearly understood that the next morning Germany will attack the USSR, "all doubts finally dissipated", and then he sent a directive to the troops demanding not to give in to provocations. But instead, he could have composed a directive that could have saved the country and the army from defeat, the people - from extermination, but the superior stupid Stalin did not allow the great commander to act as the situation demanded. This superior cowardly Stalin should be held responsible for the criminal actions of Zhukov.

"The *troops and their commanders in any situation in accordance with the statute must always be ready to fulfill the combat task*," - Zhukov teaches us, but he himself did not follow the requirements of the statute, all waited until Comrade Stalin gives permission to put the troops in readiness. And sent to the troops such orders, which undermined the readiness of troops to repel the enemy invasion.

4

Now let's imagine the situation for a few minutes: On June 14, 1941, Zhukov demanded permission from Stalin to put troops on standby. Let's assume that stupid and cowardly Stalin gave permission to the wise and brave Zhukov: let it be your way, put them on standby. Let's assume that Zhukov gives the order: put troops in readiness!

Let's see: what would have come out of it? Well, nothing could have come out of it anyway.

First and foremost: the Red Army had no plan for the defense of the country. It didn't take much intelligence to give an order. But how to carry it out? Imagine that we were ordered to be in readiness, but they didn't specify what it was for.

And now let's paint a grandiose picture in our imagination: we have to build a hydroelectric power plant on the great Siberian river. We have gathered hundreds of excavators and bulldozers, thousands of dump trucks, prepared a couple of million tons of cement, gravel and rebar, recruited tens of thousands of workers. We give the order: to be in readiness! Drivers started their engines, mighty machines roared. Everyone is in full readiness.

But there's no construction plan. What good is that readiness?

So: a year before the German invasion, on June 7, 1940, Army General Zhukov was appointed commander of the Kiev Special Military District. The Kiev Special Military District (KOVO) was a super-powerful grouping of troops; in 1941 there was nothing equal or even similar to it on planet Earth. By quantity and quality of tanks, artillery, aviation, armored trains, cavalry, airborne troops, the Kiev Special Military District surpassed all German troops that Hitler had allocated to attack the Soviet Union. As of June 22, 1941, the Kiev Special Military District had 5,530 tanks, including:

278 - KV-1 and KV-2;
561 - T-34;
84 - T-40;
201 - BT-7M;
51 - T-35;
215 - T-28.

In all the countries of the world there was not a single tank equal to ours "obsolete" T-28, T-35 or BT-7M, let alone T-34, T-40 or KV-1.

The KOVO had one and a half times more tanks than Hitler had on the entire Soviet-German front. With the overwhelming qualitative superiority of Soviet weapons. Besides, at the moment of war outbreak it was envisaged to sharply reinforce the KOVO troops with the troops coming from deep inside the country, and Hitler had nothing to reinforce his troops with.

In terms of artillery and aviation, the ratio was about the same. In , there were 15 fortified areas on the territory of the KOVO.

Let's take as an example one of them - the Kiev one. On a front 85 kilometers wide there were 225 fortifications made of reinforced concrete. The fortified area covers Kiev in a horseshoe; the flanks of the fortified area rest on the Dnieper. In front of the front are fortification barriers that can be reinforced with mines and landmines at any time.

Even more powerful SD - Letichevsky: 363 concrete defensive structures on a front 125 kilometers wide.

Korosten UR is even more: the front is 185 kilometers wide, 455 combat structures.

In 1941, a line of fortified areas was being built on the new state border. Behind it, 200-300 kilometers away on the old border, there was another double (and in some places - triple) line of fortified areas. Behind these lines of defense, the entire territory of the district from north to south crosses the mighty water barrier Dnieper, blocking the way of any aggressor. On the Dnieper is the most powerful river flotilla in the world. On the right bank of the Dnieper - a fortified bridgehead near Kiev. On the way of any enemy - bridges and tunnels prepared for explosions, hidden in the forests

weapons stocks for guerrilla formations deployed in peacetime.

To overcome the zones of destruction and barriers, to break 15 insurmountable fortified areas with the Red Army's multiple superiority in all types of weapons and military equipment, to reach the Dnieper, much less to force it, is not even theoretically possible.

The trouble was that the Kiev Special Military District had no defense plan. If someone had given an order to be in readiness, nothing could change. Let's give an order to thousands of builders to be ready to erect a grandiose dam across the Angara or Yenisei, but give them no construction plan. And we will admire the result of the fulfillment of our wisest and so timely order.

No one ever presented a defense plan for the KOVO after the war. No one has ever explained what such a plan consisted of. Decades passed, but the KOVO defense plan could never be found.

Zhukov was commander of the KOVO until January 13, 1941. What did he do to bring the troops of the KOVO in readiness to repel the German invasion? Where is the plan according to which Zhukov intended to crush the enemy in such favorable conditions for defense?

During the period when Zhukov was commander of the KOVO, nothing was done for the defense of this direction, which both Stalin and Zhukov allegedly considered the most important. On the contrary, there was intensive and systematic destruction of everything related to defense: the Dnieper Flotilla was disbanded, partisan detachments were dispersed, bridges and tunnels were demined.

On January 13, 1941, Army General Zhukov was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. His main task
- the preparation of war plans. First of all - plans for the defense of the country. Now Zhukov was responsible not only for the defense of one district, but also for the defense of the entire country. This strategist did not bother to draw up any defense plans.

That's why Zhukov reproaches Stalin for nothing. In vain tells stories that Stalin did not allow to bring the troops in readiness. If

Stalin gave the order, then it was still impossible to fulfill it - due to the fault of Zhukov.

The Red Army is a cohesive mass of many millions of men armed with the most sophisticated, most modern and diverse instruments of warfare. But no one had ever explained to millions of soldiers and commanders what they were to do if the enemy attacked. The commanders of companies and batteries, squadrons and battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions and corps did not know this. The commanders of armies and fronts did not know this. If all of them had received the wisest order of the great commander Zhukov demanding that the troops be brought to readiness, no one would have been able to fulfill it.

Prepare for the defense of the state? On what frontiers? By what forces? What means? Zhukov himself did not know this. Not for nothing on June 22, 1941 at 7:15 a.m. he sat down to compose a directive to the troops instead of giving one simple signal in plain text: WAR! And then everyone would have acted according to the previously approved plans.

But the plan for the defense of the country 70 years after the German attack, no one has yet managed to track down.

5

Shameless people who wrote Zhukov's memoirs, wanted to show Stalin a complete idiot: see, he was afraid to mobilize and move troops to the borders. But the idiot appears not Stalin, but Zhukov, and here's why.

First, on June 14, 1941, when Timoshenko and Zhukov allegedly in Stalin's office seeking permission to put troops on alert, neither Timoshenko nor Zhukov, according to the log of persons received by Stalin, was not in Stalin's office. They were not there on two preceding days, nor on the three following days. So Anfilov's stories that, "starting from June 12, day after day" Zhukov allegedly demanded, and Stalin allegedly did not allow - is not based on anything fiction.

Second, Stalin allegedly stated, "Are you proposing to mobilize the country, raise troops now and move them to the borders? This is war!" The thought here is correct: if we mobilize,

it would be inevitable and immediate to enter the war. Let us question only the indignant tone of Stalin. Could not Stalin on June 14, 1941 outraged at the proposal of his commanders to mobilize, because the secret mobilization of the Soviet Union at that time continued for almost two years and, rapidly gaining momentum, approaching its explosive-like completion.

As early as July 13, 1939, the decision of the Defense Committee under the USSR Council of People's Commissars№ 199ss was approved for the deployment of the Soviet Union.

"In the event of mobilization, each such division was to be transformed into three divisions. In accordance with this decision, on August 15, 1939, the USSR People's Commissar of Defense signed eleven directives No. 4/2/48601-4/2/48611, according to which the formation of departments of 18 rifle corps began in eleven military districts, cadre divisions were transferred to the new reinforced staff, and 36 divisions of "triple deployment" began such deployment. Examples:

- The 41st Rifle Division of the Kiev Special Military District became the 41st, 151st and 176th Rifle Divisions;
- The 62nd Infantry Division of the same district became the 62nd, 135th, and 187th Infantry Divisions;
- 98-я rifle division of the Ural military District became the 98th, 170th, and 186th Infantry Divisions.

And so on.

Let us note that on July 13 and August 15, 1939, when such decisions were taken, Molotov and Ribbentrop had not yet signed the Non-Aggression Pact, also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. But the Soviet Union had already begun mobilization, which the Soviet leaders firmly believed could not be partial, but could only be general and irreversible. The result of mobilization could only be a total war - as total as the mobilization that gave rise to it. Marshal of the Soviet Union Shaposhnikov expressed this thought clearly, categorically and precisely: "Mobilization is war, and we can think of no other understanding of it."

On September 1, 1939, universal military duty was introduced in the Soviet Union, which increased the size of the Red Army from 1.5 million to 5 million men and prepared the

conscription of tens of millions of reservists on "M Day," the moment of the Red Army's first crushing blow to the enemy.

In the summer of 1939, when Hitler was a mortal enemy, there was not a single general army in the European part of the Soviet Union, there were none in the Urals or Siberia. But on August 19, 1939 Hitler became a friend, and in less than two years the number of armies in the European part of the country increased from zero to sixteen, and in addition, each of the seven internal military districts was ready at any time to allocate from its composition of one army and send to the western borders of the country. This was done on June 13, 1941.

In these incomplete two years, the number of units and formations in the Red Army has increased dramatically:

- the number of rifle corps - from 25 to 62;
- tank and mechanized corps - from 4 to 29;
- airborne corps - from zero to 5 with the possibility of deploying 5 more corps;
- rifle and mountain rifle divisions - from 96 to 198;
- tank divisions - from zero to 61;
- air divisions from zero to 79;
- artillery regiments from 144 to 900, and so on.

Already after Zhukov became Chief of the General Staff, the country carried out grandiose, unprecedented in world history mobilization activities. By a single decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) and the USSR Council of People's Commissars of February 25, 1941, 106 new aviation regiments with 64 aircraft each were created. This decree alone increased the strength of the Air Force by 6,784 combat aircraft.

From Zhukov's memoirs we learn that "*in March 1941 it was decided to form our requested 20 mechanized corps*. This is in addition to those corps that already existed. 20 mehkorps is 60 new divisions: 40 tank and 20 motorized. However, Soviet motorized divisions were also essentially tank divisions, for each such division had 258 tanks, not counting floating tanks, and 49 armored cars. Germany in 1941 had no tank divisions. Not a single one. By the name they were listed as tank divisions, but is the usual German one

ostentation. German generals did not understand the role of tanks in the war, so the German so-called tank divisions had in 1941, as a rule, 150-170 tanks. In the course of the war, this number was constantly decreasing, until it came to quite ridiculous numbers.

20 mehkorps, which at the request of Zhukov and in spite of Stalin's doubts began to be created in the spring of 1941 - 260 new regiments: 100 tank, 80 motorized, 60 artillery, and
20 motorcycle.

20 Mehkorps is 721600 fighters and commanders, 20620 tanks, 5320 armored cars, 3440 guns, 3720 mortars, 240 aircraft,
103,300 automobiles, 7040 tractors, 34,200 motorcycles, hundreds of thousands of pistols, rifles, machine guns, machine guns, hundreds of thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel and lubricants, spare parts, engineering equipment, food, and uniforms.

And then there are five airborne corps, and ten anti-tank brigades, and new rifle divisions by the dozens.

If it's not mobilization, what is it?

The entire economy of the Soviet Union was put on wartime mode. Before the German attack, the Soviet aircraft industry was already producing 50 combat aircraft per day. Tank, artillery and other military industries were not lagging behind, and for the production of ammunition in peacetime was deployed a whole ministry - People's Commissariat of Ammunition. Tractor drivers were already taken somewhere in peacetime, and women replaced them on collective farm tractors. Teenagers already forced into the so-called "labor reserves" - to work at military factories, to "master their skills", while meeting the norms.

But from "the most truthful book about the war" it turns out that all this was done by someone without Stalin's knowledge. Not only that - in spite of Stalin. On June 14, 1941, Stalin allegedly indignantly forbade Timoshenko and Zhukov to carry out mobilization: You propose to mobilize the country ... This is war!

And mobilization had already entered the stage of deployment of the main forces of the Red Army on the western borders of the country.

And mobilization has already approached its inevitable final stage - the open phase that must follow the sudden first crushing blow of the Red Army.

6

On June 13, 1941, the day before Zhukov allegedly asked Stalin for permission to put troops on standby, the Soviet Union began the most powerful regrouping of troops in human history. In addition to the 16 armies that were already concentrated on the borders of Germany and its allies, troops were being secretly moved westward:

- from the North Caucasus Military District - Lieutenant General Konev's 19th Army;
- from the Orel Military District - Lieutenant General Remizov's 20th Army;
- from Volga military of the Volga Military District - 21-я army Lieutenant General Gerasimenko;
- from the Ural Military District - Lieutenant General Ershakov's 22nd Army;
- from the Siberian Military District - Lieutenant General Kalinin's 24th Army.

In addition, Lieutenant General Lukin's 16th Army was already on its way. Due to the fact that the 16th Army was transferred from Transbaikalia, its advancement began earlier. In the Arkhangelsk Military District, parts of the 28th Army of Lieutenant-General Kachalov were moving to the loading stations. In total, 58 rifle, 13 tank and 6 mechanized divisions, a huge number of individual regiments and battalions participated in the transfer and were preparing for it.

In the same days, two armies suddenly appeared in the Odessa Military District - Colonel-General Cherevichenko's 9th and Lieutenant-General Smirnov's 18th. Simultaneously with the armies, separate corps were transferred from the far frontiers of the Soviet Union to the west - for example, the 31st Rifle Corps from the Far East, the 27th Mechanized Corps from Central Asia.

To staff all this mass of troops in May 1941 on the railroads to the places of deployment was secretly transferred 800 thousand reservists.

Simultaneously with the advance of armies, corps and individual divisions from the internal districts, those divisions moved to the west

of the first strategic echelon, which had not yet been advanced to the very border pillars:

On June 12-15, an order was given to the western military districts: all divisions located in the depths, to advance to the state borders (Kommunist. 1968. № 12. P. 68).

And that's another 114 divisions.

8,500 rail tank cars with fuel for tanks and planes, hundreds of thousands of tons of ammunition were transferred to the borders; already at the beginning of July the railroads accumulated 47 thousand cars with military cargoes, which were sent to the western borders before June 22.

And now those who composed the imperishable memoirs of Zhukov, inform us that Stalin did not know about all this. No one in the world had neither such military masses, nor such a number of military equipment, nor such long distances of their transportation. There was the most grandiose in the history of mankind transfer of troops, and we are told that Stalin allegedly objected to Zhukov: what are you, to the border of the troops decided to move the troops? This is war!

The writers of Zhukov's memoir aimed at Stalin, but hit Zhukov. It turns out that the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Zhukov also knew nothing about such a grandiose movement of troops. He had millions of armed masses from the Far East and Transbaikalia, from the Urals and the Volga region, from the far North and the North Caucasus secretly moved to the western borders of the country, and Zhukov came to Stalin to ask permission to conduct such a transfer. It turns out that Zhukov did not suspect that it is already in full swing, that all 77 divisions of the internal military districts moved to the western borders, and in addition to them - 114 divisions of the First Strategic Echelon.

7

Before Zhukov settled in the General Staff, each rifle division had its own tank battalion. In defense, this battalion was the steel skeleton on which the division commander could in any situation

The commander of the rifle division, in addition to three rifle regiments, had two artillery regiments and his own tank battalion. The commander of a rifle division, with two artillery regiments and his own tank battalion in addition to three rifle regiments, could launch a powerful counterattack on the enemy who had broken through.

But at Zhukov's insistence tank battalions were taken away from the rifle divisions, drastically weakening their striking power and reducing their defensive potential. Almost all of these tank battalions were turned to the formation of monstrous mehkorps, which was impossible to control.

Let's assume that on June 14, 1941, Zhukov got Stalin's permission and introduced a state of heightened readiness in the Red Army troops. But without tank battalions, the rifle divisions were much weaker than before, and the idiotic mehkorps, into which thousands of tanks had been assembled by Zhukov's order, were completely unsuited for defensive warfare.

Whether or not to declare the Mechkorps ready, such monstrous troop formations were suitable only for strikes on enemy territory. They were too cumbersome for any other tasks.

***

Now let us imagine that the cowardly and stupid Stalin did not know that in his country for two years was the most powerful mobilization in the history of mankind and that on June 13, 1941, millions of troops have already moved to the borders. But Stalin still agreed to the demands of the wisest Zhukov and authorized to bring the troops to readiness.

But how to bring them to readiness, if the best divisions, corps and armies are pushed by Zhukov's efforts into the Bialystok and Lviv-Chernivtsi protrusions right up to the border posts? If the troops are far from the border, they have time to raise personnel and military equipment on alert and withdraw them from military camps. If the troops are close to the border, they have no time to do so in the event of an enemy attack. Both protrusions are already surrounded by enemy troops from three sides in peacetime. In the event of a surprise attack, the Red Army troops will be surrounded and suffer huge losses in the first days of the war.

How to put troops in readiness if the rest of the Red Army was either moving in columns to the borders or packed into railroad cars?

How could they be put in readiness if Zhukov didn't bother to draw up plans for the country's defense?

CHAPTER 25. Were plans of cover plans of defense?

The fact that by the beginning of the war our western border was not covered even by ordinary field defenses is a fact! The fact is regrettable and shameful, because the military leaders standing next to Stalin were obliged to tell him that the war is at the threshold (and they knew it!), that without a prepared defense of the enemy can not stop, and he will roll all the way to Moscow. Now they, in particular Zhukov, explain their position by the fact that their faith in the genius and foresight of Stalin exceeded common sense, and they agreed with him ... And now they are getting out of it, blaming everything on Stalin.

Lieutenant General artillery P. Nikitenko. Journal "Military History Archive". 2011. №7. C. 58

1

Colonel-General Y. A. Gorkov twitched the map. He published plans to cover the border districts and announced: plans to cover the state border are proof that no aggressive plans and designs of Comrade Stalin was not! The Red Army was preparing to repel the enemy invasion! The plans to cover the state border are the plans for the defense of the Soviet Union!

On this я objected: It's not strangeisn't it to issue a plan of covering the national border as a plan for the defense of the country? Was the whole defense plan of a great country reduced to covering the border? Did the war plans consist only in supporting the border guards at the outposts with the forces of advanced battalions? Cover - is not defense, it's it's one of one of of of combat support. A relatively small force is assigned to cover in order to support the main force. The covering force operates only until the main force enters the battle.

"*Cover troops perform their tasks only until the main forces approach*" (Soviet Military Encyclopedia. In 8 vol. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976-1980. T. 2. C. 316).

Question to Colonel General Gorkov: where are the plans for the use of the main forces of the Red Army? What were the main forces supposed to do?

What role did the country's leadership assign them in the coming war?

2

Even with a quick glance at the cover plans, we note an interesting detail: on the eve of the war, the headquarters of each border military district, in accordance with the directives of the General Staff, drew up its own cover plan. But none of these plans assigned the troops the task of burrowing into the ground.

Defense in the twentieth century is primarily trenches and trenches. A classic example: In the fall of 1941, German troops were stopped on the outskirts of Moscow, then pushed back from it and went on the defensive - that is, they dug single trenches, connected them with trenches, the walls of trenches and trenches were covered with boards and logs, some sections of the trenches were covered over, machine guns were hidden in dugouts with ceilings in three trenches, the trenches were covered with earth and camouflaged, dugouts with log ceilings were built for the personnel, the approaches to their positions were covered with wire and mine-explosive barriers.

The Red Army stormed these simple field fortifications for more than a year, from the beginning of 1942 until March 1943. The result: "*Total losses of the Red Army in the operations near Rzhev amounted to 1,325,823 men*". I didn't make that up. And not even Goebbels. This was reported by the Central Organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" on December 6, 2009.

A little earlier, on the Smolensk land, the Germans were advancing. They broke through the weak Soviet defenses and closed the encirclement ring. In the ring there were four Soviet armies, 37 rifle divisions, 9 tank brigades, 31 artillery regiments of the reserve of the Supreme Command. More than 600 thousand soldiers and commanders of the Red Army were captured.

Why such different results in battles on the same terrain, in the same conditions? Why did the Germans hold firmly on the foreign land for a year and a half and thrashed the Soviet soldiers by hundreds of thousands, while they themselves did not suffer heavy losses? Why Soviet soldiers could not hold the same land for a single day, while suffering losses in the hundreds of thousands?

Because the Germans buried themselves in the ground, and ours didn't bother to do it. During the war they didn't bother. Before the war, even more so.

In the pre-war cover plans - not a word about trenches and trenches. That is, these plans are not defense plans.

3

Anyone who has served in the military knows that cover and defense are different. I'm referring to an old adversary:

The disadvantageous position of our troops was aggravated by the fact that the troops of the border military districts were not tasked with defensive operations, but only to cover the deployment of troops (Army General M. Gareev. Courage. 1991. №5. P. 256).

That is, they did not prepare for defense, they did not think about defense, they did not plan defense, they only prepared to cover.

Cover what?

According to Colonel-General Gorkov, they planned to cover the state border. And according to Army General Gareyev - they planned to cover the deployment of troops.

Here I express my double gratitude to Army General Gareev and ask the reader to pay attention to the last three words. With these words Mahmut Akhmetovich Gareyev struck me down and made me think.

Colonel General Gorkov's attempt to make the cover-up plans look like the country's defense plans is a double lie. The first level of the lie is easy and simple to uncover. One should only remember: cover is one thing, defense is something else. The second level of lies is hidden deeper. Colonel-General Gorkov announced: here they are - the plans to cover the *state border*. Not everyone figured out the general's trickery. Many fell for it. Many repeated these words. Your humble servant was also among the rascals. I apologize, I take it back.

How does it follow that the cover plans were plans to cover the *border*? All plans of military districts begin with the words: "In order to cover the immobilization, concentration and deployment of troops

districts..." I repeat: not for the purpose of covering the border, but for the purpose of covering *immobilization, concentration and deployment*.

I'll explain with an example what this means. The pakhan of a gang of right guys has decided to carry out some action. Neighboring, not so correct guys claim control over the same territories. They need to be reined in. And the pakhan announces a big gathering. While the right guys are gathering, while they are removing grease from their rifles, while they are filling magazines, a couple of juveniles are on the lookout.

This is the cover-up. If a pakhan put out a couple of ogoltsy "for atas", it is not proof of his peaceful intentions and does not indicate his good nature.

4

That the cover plans were neither plans to cover the border nor plans for the defense of the country is best illustrated by the actions of the top Soviet leadership before the German attack and in the first hours after it began.

If there was a plan to cover the border, these plans had to be put into action in the threatened period. As soon as the situation became extremely acute, as soon as reports were received from the frontier that the noise of engines and the clanking of tracks was heard on the other side, as soon as defectors reported that enemy artillery was about to hit our frontier outposts, as soon as the enemy's artillery would hit 1 our frontier outposts. "last doubts cleared", we need to put the cover plans in place.

However, during the threatened period, no one put these plans into effect. I wonder why? Instead, Zhukov sent a directive demanding not to give in to provocations.

What good are these cover-up plans? Why were they even made up in the first place?

And when an attack has begun, the border and the entire country must be *defended*, not *covered*. Once an attack has begun, it is too late to put cover plans in place.

By the way, when the attack began, Zhukov did not put the cover plans into effect either. Instead, he sat down to compose another directive. So why did compose cover plans, which

utterly unsuited either to be acted upon in the threatened period or to be acted upon in the first hours and days of the war?

Let us assume that in the last days and hours before the invasion cowardly Stalin did not allow initiative, principled, wise and brave Zhukov to act in accordance with the requirements of the oath and statutes, obeying military duty, the call of conscience and common sense. But now the enemy has attacked, and the German ambassador announced to Comrade Molotov: this is war. Why didn't Zhukov even after that put into action the cover plans? Why did he sit down to compose a directive? After all, in the headquarters of each district lies a long-worked cover plan, known to the district commander and his chief of staff. Pick up the phone and say in plain text: Enact the cover plan!

But the cover-up plans were never put into effect. Then why were they drawn up? Who needs them? If these plans were not suitable either for a situation when the enemy was clearly preparing to attack, or for a situation when he attacked, then for what situation were they developed?

This question makes us reopen the plans, scrutinize them carefully, and shriek in amazement at the occasional passerby outside the window: how could we have missed the elephant!

5

Looking at the Odessa Military District cover plan. Section VII defines the tasks of the Air Force:

1. By a sudden attack on enemy aircraft on his airfields and by inflicting maximum losses in air battles from the first days to win air supremacy.

This is a task to be carried out:

(a) By successive strikes of combat aviation, destroy the enemy's aviation at its airfields and bases in the areas:

1) Botoshani, Dorohoi, Kympuluna, Pyatra, Roman;

2) Tecuci, Buzau, Constanta, Brailov;

3) Brasov, Ploiesti, Bucharest;

b) by fighters in air battles to destroy the enemy's planes during the escort of their bombers and in the division extermination zones;

c) systematically destroy oil depots and refineries.

So the "cover" in the understanding of Zhukov, on whose instructions the headquarters of military districts prepared plans, is a surprise strike on enemy airfields, and in the territory of Romania - also a strike on the objects of the oil industry.

Let's look at the cover plan of the Kiev Special Military District, in which aviation tasks are defined in Section V. In total, there are the following on the territory of the district:

- 6 long-range aviation divisions (ADD) subordinate to the Red Army Main Command;
- 3 air divisions subordinate to the district commander;
- 9 aviation divisions subordinated to the commanders of the four general armies that are part of the district (the 5th Army has three aviation divisions in addition to the main forces, the 6th, 12th and 26th Armies have two each).

In accordance with the cover plan, in the first three days of mobilization, 8 more air divisions are to arrive from the internal military districts. All of them will be subordinate to the district commander. That is, on the third day of mobilization each of the four army commanders will be at the disposal of 2-3 aviation divisions, the district commander - 11 aviation divisions, subordinate to the Red Army Main Command in this direction - 6 aviation divisions. Taking into account the ADD divisions and the divisions arriving in the first three days of mobilization, there should be 6,760 combat aircraft on the territory of the KOVO.

Before the six divisions of the ADD, which were on the territory of the KOVO, but subordinate to the Red Army Main Command, the cover plan set only two tasks:

(a) Destruction of the railroad hubs of Breslau, Kreuzburg, Oppeln;
b) systematic raids on military-industrial facilities.

There were also ADD formations in other military districts, their tasks under plans cover were

similar.

The cover plan set four tasks for the aviation forces subordinate to the commander of the KOVO and the commanders of the armies that were part of the district.

The first and the main: "*By strikes of combat aviation on established bases and airfields, as well as actions in the air to destroy enemy aircraft and from the first days of the war to win supremacy in the air*".

The fourth and final task: "*By destroying railroad bridges and junctions Czestochow, Katowice, Krakow, Kielce, as well as actions on the enemy's groups to disrupt and delay the concentration and deployment of his troops*".

So, citizens: the plans that Colonel-General Gorkov presented to us as plans to cover the border, as plans for the defense of the country, are in fact a plan for a surprise strike against Germany and its allies.

It's a plan to start a war. It is the overture of a crushing blow to an enemy who is not ready to fight.

Its conception: while the main forces of the Red Army are simultaneously advancing from the rear areas of the border districts and from the interior of the country, thousands of combat aircraft are covering the unloading and concentration of troops by solving the central task of any aggressive war - to gain air supremacy by defeating the enemy's aviation on its airfields, as well as in air battles. At the same time, aviation solves the task of destroying the enemy's railroad junctions and bridges in order to "disrupt and delay the concentration and deployment of his troops".

Why were the cover plans never put into effect? Because Hitler struck first. And this option was not part of the Soviet leaders' calculations. A German attack on the Soviet Union was not expected and was not taken into account. According to Zhukov's orders and directives, war plans - including cover plans - were created not for the defense of the country, not to repel a German invasion, but to invade the territory of Germany and its allies.

Cover plans were supposed to be put into effect when the enemy was not ready to fight, when his troops were not yet.

concentrated and not deployed. The enemy cannot attack an army that has not yet concentrated and deployed. This was the task of the Soviet aviation: *to disrupt and disrupt the concentration and deployment*.

These cover plans were not plans for reinforcing border defenses in a threatened period or plans for retaliatory actions. They were plans for a surprise strike by the Red Army. Or rather, overtures for such a strike.

On June 22, 1941 it was necessary either to stop the enemy with a pre-prepared defense or by retaliatory strikes. Neither of these was even in the plans.

6

Let us recall Zhukov's words that he "*worked 15-16 hours a day, often staying overnight in his office*". He worked from the beginning of 1941, when he was appointed Chief of the General Staff, until June 21, 1941. And even on the night of June 22 he also worked. He did not work alone - he led a team of many thousands of officers and generals of the General Staff.

Where are the results of the righteous labors? Did the General Staff under Zhukov's wise leadership during all these months merely draw up cover plans, which, as we can see, were completely unsuitable for the defense of the country?

First, cover plans in defensive warfare proved unnecessary.

Secondly, the cover plans were not developed in the General Staff - they were developed in the headquarters of the border military districts: in Leningrad, in Riga, in Minsk, in Kiev, in Odessa. They were developed on Zhukov's instructions, but still not by Zhukov himself and not by the General Staff.

What was Zhukov doing? What was the General Staff

doing? We'll never know. But we can guess.

It is clear that both Zhukov and the many thousands of officers of the General Staff worked with exceptional tension. It is clear that they were plotting something, planning something. But on June 22, 1941 at 7:15 a.m., after the enemy attacked, Zhukov sat down to compose a directive to the troops on what to do if the enemy attacks. This

means only one thing: everything that for several months of hard labor was created by the General Staff of the Red Army and personally by Zhukov, was not suitable for the defense of the country and was never used for the defense of the country. Instead of acting on June 22 according to pre-determined plans, they had to improvise, composing the stupidest impossible directives on the fly.

The art of war, I remind you, knows only two types of military action: offensive and defense. The General Staff under Zhukov developed some plans that were not suitable for the defense of the country, and which even 70 years after the German invasion should not be shown to anyone - they remain secret.

Colonel-General Gorkov decided to crush the "Icebreaker" not just with wise reflections and irresistible arguments. He decided to hit with documents - but he did not cite any General Staff documents. He published only documents developed in the headquarters of the border districts, but even among these documents for some reason there were no defense plans. Instead of them - only cover plans, but even in the cover plans clearly reflects the general idea of the grandiose plan for a sudden crushing blow to Europe.

7

And here academician Anfilov tells us that Zhukov, starting from June 12, 1941, allegedly every day demanded Stalin's permission to put troops on alert.

Ready for what? For the defense of the country? But it was impossible to make the Red Army ready for defense because there were no defense plans. Zhukov was personally responsible for the development of plans. He was obliged to develop plans for the defense of the country, and then demand from Stalin to put these plans into effect.

So there is nothing to blame on Stalin, if he himself did not bother to develop defense plans.

Speaking of Academician Anfilov. He is not an official academician. He is, to put it in modern terms, a self-made one. One day six hundreds of military figures and established

Academy of Military Science. And they have elected themselves academician ami[18]. Military science thrives from that.

Here is an example of such a flourishing: the former Chief of the General Staff, Doctor of Military Sciences, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Professor, full member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Chairman of the public commission "Memory of the People" Army General V. N. Lobov speaks and says amazing things. N. Lobov and reports amazing things. From the brave general we learn that "*at the initial stage of the war in the fighting involved three fronts ... Ten armies participated in the battles of the first months, ten!*" (Krasnaya Zvezda. December 6, 2009).

What three fronts are we talking about? What ten armies are we talking about? The general is talking about the first months of the war, that is, at least two months, that is, the period from June 22 to August 21, 1941.

So: already in the first week of the war on the Northern Front fought three armies (7th, 14th and 23rd), on the North-Western Front - three (8th, 10th and 27th), on the Western Front - four (3rd, 4th, 10th and 13th), on the South-Western Front - four (5th, 6th, 12th and 26th), on the Southern Front - two (9th and 18th). Already on July 2, German troops faced the advanced units of the Second Strategic Echelon, and this is another seven armies. Along with this, newly formed armies entered the battles. For example, the 37th Army (commanded by Major-General Vlasov Andrei Andreevich) heroically defended Kiev from July 7, 1941. In August, the number of armies that fought reached three dozen and steadily increased.

This is how we study the history of war. This is our "people's memory". Such nonsense was uttered not by anyone, but by a four-star general, and not just any general, but the former Chief of the General Staff.

And where did this general, this doctor, candidate, professor and full member gain such knowledge? The answer is simple: he opened a map in "the most truthful book about war" and counted the armies depicted on it. And even then with mistakes. Does Army General Lobov not realize that Zhukov's memoirs were written by completely illiterate people? Was it not interesting for the Chief of the General Staff, being in a high position, to look at least one eye into the documents of wartime?

And Lobov's words are published by the central body of the Russian Ministry of Defense. And no one objects. And hundreds of academicians of the Academy of military sciences remain silent. This is the price of that "academy" and topics.
"academics."

CHAPTER 26. Hitler's half-billion fighters.

It's not even math, it's arithmetic.
Sergei Ivanov, Russian Defense Minister. Krasnaya zvezda. March 4 2005.

1

For a long time, communist propagandists thought about what would support the writings attributed to Zhukov about Stalin's fear. An unspoken but fierce competition was launched in the Russian press. Nezavisimaya Gazeta won. The tactic chosen was the right one: it was necessary to press not only on emotions, but, in addition, to hit with figures and facts. And Nezavisimaya did it. On November 19, 1993, an article by Grigory Baranovsky about Hitler's untold hordes was published. Baranovsky reported that "*by June 1941 Hitler had subjugated over 500 million people capable of taking up arms*".

It was a sensation, from which serious historians froze in admiration: Zhukov's statement about Stalin's cowardice finally received confirmation. In light of this figure, Stalin's cowardice is not only understandable, but even forgivable.

By the beginning of 1941, the U.S. population was 129 million people. The U.S. government was preparing a draft of 12 million, unprecedented in the history of the country, that is, it planned to completely, without a trace, select the entire mobilization resource. And Hitler had an opportunity to put 500 million people under arms in addition to his army! How could the poor USA compete with such an army!

The population of the Soviet Union at the beginning of 1941 was 191 million. However, you cannot put all of them under the gun. 20 million are Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Moldavia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, which with the beginning of World War II voluntarily, as we are told, joined the fraternal union of Soviet peoples, but for some reason were not willing to shed blood for this union. Of the remaining 170 million, almost a third are residents of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Asia, which for some reason did not show any desire to fight. For the most part, the inhabitants of these republics were illiterate, had little or no command of the Russian language and did not want to master it. You can't mold an excellent fighter out of such material.

Half the population in any country, and even a little more than half — women. And from the male population we should subtract boys under the age of 18 and men over fifty. Then we subtract the sick, the disabled, the insane, the alcoholics, the consumption addicts and syphilitics. We also subtract those without whom the state apparatus cannot do without, and those without whom industry and transportation will stand up. If we understand, it turns out that there are not so many men in the Soviet Union who are fit to be drafted: some are on the run, some are in jail, and some are guarding a camp, some are working in a mine, and some are in the taiga pulling a pipeline. Take a miner into the Red Army and the production of coal would fall, and, consequently, coke, armored steel, tanks, warships, and many other things.

The experience of the last two centuries shows that in peacetime no country can keep more than one percent of its population under arms. After the war, cunning people in the USSR State Planning Committee proposed a beautiful move: only the army and navy should be included in this one percent, and many other organizations and structures that wear epaulettes and arms should not be included in the statistics. They reassured themselves and the wise elders from the Politburo: border guards guard the borders, but it is not the army, it is the KGB. Camps and prisons are also not guarded by the army. These are the troops of the Interior Ministry.

But the economy does not understand entreaties and incantations. All paramilitary structures cannot have more than one percent of the country's population, otherwise the country will burst like the Soviet Union burst. Or like the frog in Krylov's fable.

In wartime, 10 percent of the country's population can be drafted. One out of ten fights. But not for long, and you can't draft all 10 percent at once. Otherwise, there will be no one to clothe, clothe, feed and arm those who are fighting. Conscription should be done in waves: five million have died for nothing, and we call up the next.

In World War II, Stalin broke all records for conscription rates. For the sake of this, all men capable of bearing arms had to be raked out of towns and villages. And from the camps, too. We had to

to put women on tractors. They were driven into the mines, too. And they carried the ties and rails. They put grandfathers, camp wastrels and youngsters at the machines. And there was nothing to eat. At the same time some kind overseas uncle drove to the USSR stew and condensed milk by hundreds of thousands of tons, leather shoes by millions of pairs, fur jackets for pilots, parachutes, woolen fabric by thousands of kilometers. Without this, Stalin's conscription records would have been impossible.

And the record-breaking appeals have had the effect of irrevocably undermining the vitality of the nation. The nation is dying out.

In the first half of 1941, the situation was as follows. The Soviet Union lived a peaceful life, was not expecting an attack and, as we are assured, was not going to attack anyone. Therefore, in the Red Army, in the Navy, in the troops of the NKVD and NKGB combined could not and should not be more than 1.7 million soldiers and commanders. But Comrade Stalin has
On June 21, 1941 for some reason there were 5.5 million mouths in the Red Army alone. And some meticulous researchers say about 8 million.

If not counting on the help of a kind uncle and not to drive the nation to suicide, in the event of war Stalin could call in the Red Army, NKGB and NKVD troops at most 6 to 11 million people (6 million - this is 10 percent of 113 million (2/3 of 170 million) minus 5.5 million already mobilized - if we do not take into account the population of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Moldavia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, the Caucasus and Central Asia; 11 million - 11 million).
— if drafted from these regions as well). Stalin, breaking the laws of economics and demography, from the fall of 1939 to the spring of 1945 drafted twice as many - 34 million (in total, based on the maximum allowable number of mobilized in 10 percent of the total population, it would have been possible to draft in this period a maximum of 5.5 million + 11 million = 16.5 million people).

And Hitler' in the spring of 1941, according to Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
— own German army, in addition to which Hitler could allegedly put more than 500 million more fighters from his occupied Europe under arms.

Clearly, Stalin was frightened.

2

Grigory Baranovsky, who was the first in the world to announce the data on these 500 million, immediately became a celebrity: he was quoted, he was invited to conferences and symposia, he was praised, he was awarded, his bright head was crowned with laurels. You bet: he had found the proof!

Baranovsky's discovery has entered the golden fund of Russian military science, the clip of irrefutable evidence of Hitler's readiness for war and the complete inability of the Soviet Union to resist. This discovery is a pearl of Russian historical science. In 2002, an "anti-Suvorov" book about the beginning of the war was published, in which on page 105 it is repeated word for word: "*By June 1941 Hitler had subjugated over **500 million** people capable of taking up arms*". The only difference is that the figure has now been bolded.

It is a pity that the authors of this work covered themselves with pseudonyms and did not wish to reveal their names, but on the title page they thank for their help the President of the Academy of Military Sciences, Army General M. A. Gareyev, Colonel-General Y. Gorkov, Major-General Y. Solnyshkov, Academician V. Anfilov, Messrs. G. Baranovsky, Y. Mukhin and other responsible comrades.

The names of the authors are not known to me, therefore I address a question to those whom these authors thank, to those who stood behind the backs of these unknown "historians". Citizens of Generals Gorky-Gareyev, this is what I do not understand: if Hitler subjugated more than 500 million people capable of taking up arms, then they should have been put under this very gun. Why didn't the mighty and wise Hitler, who is praised by you generals, use such an opportunity? I wish he had. What's the problem?

3

By the time of the attack on the Soviet Union there were 11 countries under German occupation. The largest of them were Poland, France and Yugoslavia. Let's try instead of Hitler to unfold the plan of conscription by military committees: from Poland 100 million soldiers, from France - 100, from Yugoslavia another 100. From the rest of them all together - another 200 million.

On paper, it looks smooth. But let's get into the details: in September 1939, Hitler crushed Poland and, let's say, 100 million Polish soldiers decided to include them in his armed forces. The problem I see is this: will the Poles fight under Hitler's banners?

During World War II, puppet governments and local authorities sprang up in many occupied countries from Norway to Slovakia to France. But not in Poland. And Poles did not rush to join Hitler's army. There was not a single Polish division or regiment in Hitler's army.

And the second problem: how would Hitler have controlled 100 million Polish soldiers? After all, the entire population of Germany in the fall of 1939 was 68.4 million people, including women, old people, children, the sick and cripples. How to control 100 million young, healthy, armed Polish men, if the mobilization resource of Germany is 6.8 million people? And at full suicidal overstretch - 13 and a half million? Then we would have to conscript gray-haired old men and thirteen-year-old boys (which, by the way, was done in Germany at the final stage of the war).

In 1940, Hitler crushed France and occupied half the country. Let's say that from half of France he would have amassed 100 million French soldiers. But in that same 1940, the world saw what kind of soldiers they were. If they would not fight for their country, would they shed blood for Hitler?

In 1941, Hitler took over Yugoslavia. Hitler would have taken, let's say, 100 million fighters under his command. But immediately a civil war broke out there. Serbs slaughtered Croats, Croats slaughtered Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins were not lagging behind. They had
— and Albanians, and Gypsies, and Turks, and Bulgarians, and many other people. People's heads and bellies were cut off not only on the basis of nationality, but also on the basis of religion and politics; land was divided and grievances of centuries were recalled. The cauldron, overflowing with problems and contradictions, exploded. The German invaders also suffered from that massacre.

Okay. 300 million Poles, French and Yugoslavs Hitler, let's say, somehow recruited. But where to get the other 200 million fighters? Norway? Belgium, Greece or Luxembourg? There's no way

there will be 200 million fighters. But Baranovsky and his scientific patrons are not talking about 500 million, but more than 500 million.

If Hitler had fielded an army of half a billion men, who would have fed that army? And who would clothe it? Hitler didn't have an overseas uncle. And even if he had, no America could feed such a horde. And how many weapons would such an army need?

4

Let's ask a question to the president of the Academy of Military Sciences, Army General Gareyev, who advertises Baranovsky's discoveries to the whole world: do you have any idea how many people lived in Poland, France, Yugoslavia at that time?

I hasten to report: the population of Poland on September 1, 1939 was 34 million 662 thousand people. (Goralski R. World War II Almanac. 1931-1945. London, 1981. P. 89). But not all of them fell under Hitler's rule. These millions were divided between Hitler and Stalin. 17.2 million Poles fell under Hitler's control. So 100 million Polish soldiers under Hitler's banner are obviously unrealistic figures.

The population of France in 1940 was 41.6 million, of which 23 million were under German occupation and the rest were outside the German zone of occupation. Even if all female infants were put under the gun, even then Hitler would not have been able to gather 100 million French fighters.

The population of Yugoslavia in 1941 was 17.2 million. So in Yugoslavia Hitler could not get 100 million fighters.

And in Norway, the Netherlands and Greece the people for the Gareyev-Tretiakov scale are not even scraped up at all.

This is the true depth of Russian military-historical thought. It is precisely such calculations that our serious historians and independent newspapers scare progressive humanity. The respected authors care about only one problem: how to sell such creations to the reader. The newspaper was read and thrown away, so it is necessary that people could read these revelations in a book. But if the scholarly brethren signed their names, who would buy their books? And the rulers of minds have thought of: book to make exactly so same, as

"Icebreaker." And give the appropriate title - "Icebreaker-2", and hide the authors behind the pseudonym "Viktor *Surovov*". People grab the book and then spit.

Our historians and editors behave like a small farce. Back in the old days, when socks were not sold in Soviet stores, much less decent socks, I bought some wonderful socks in an alley on Khreshchatyk. In a foreign package. Shine. Money and tobacco allowance for a second-year course in those days - 10 rubles 80 kopecks a month. So I put the whole ten rubles in. 80 kopecks saved for toothpaste and shoe polish. In the barracks I gutted the crispy package proudly, and there were pieces of beautiful cloth neatly folded.

There were other tricks. In the dark alleys of republican capitals and port cities, clever peddlers sold real jeans. In the 1960s, an engineer received 100-120 rubles a month, a platoon commander with the rank of lieutenant in the first year of officer service - 180 rubles. And real jeans could cost 150, and 200 rubles, and more. They were also sold in a package. But in order not to be deceived, the edge of the package was slightly torn, you could feel the material and rivets with your hand, you could wet the material with water to see if the pants were fake, if the paint would leak from them.

What about trying it on? Obviously, it was impossible to do that for the sake of preserving the foreign packaging. Buy it, then try it on. Sew them on if you need to. Or soak them in water. Size
— it's not a problem. Just as long as you have the thing. And then we'll make it work.

But even here you could get into trouble. I was already a scientist, I had no more dealings with boxers, but my friend, Guards Lieutenant Valera Arbuzov, took a chance on the package, unbuckled the lieutenant's salary, printed the package at home, and there - real American jeans, even with a leather egiketochka in the ass area. A minor inconvenience was that these overseas pants were not in a complete set: one pant leg in the presence, the other - in the complete absence. If we knew to whom the second pant leg was sold, we could get out of the deadlock: we could sew the pants together and wear them one by one. But how would you find the second sucker?

This is exactly how our historians and propagandists carry their brilliant ideas to the masses. Like farcery dealers from Moldavanka, Begovaya or

Nevsky. They are not smart enough to write a sensible book of their own, so they put their writing in someone else's package. They're trying to look like Suvorov.

By all international standards, such actions are pure theft: in the civilized world, a manufacturer who counterfeits someone else's product or produces his own crap in the same or almost the same packaging as someone else's good-quality product is considered a thief. If someone framed the generals and their learned servants, they were all supposed to protest. But years go by, and not a single one of them has claimed not to have been involved in the theft.

***

I was about to get angry at these petty thieves, but then I realized: this is a white flag! So this is an untalented and shameful surrender of all kinds of Anfilovs, Gorky, Ivanitsky, Lanshchikovs and other mukhins! I don't use their covers. They have to adjust and adapt to me. It's a compliment!

That's the honor I've received, the recognition I've lived to see.

CHAPTER 27 It was all Goebbels' idea!

I read a report on Russian Communist radio propaganda. These guys are going to give us a lot of trouble. Russian broadcasts are not as stupid as British broadcasts.

Joseph Goebbels. June 211941.

1

I thought that "The Icebreaker" would come out and I would be hit with a rockfall of criticism. But I was wrong. I miscalculated. There was no rockfall. No stonefall - nobody threw a pebble in my garden. That's a shame.

There were, however, some articles, seemingly crushing: "'Icebreaker' in a spring puddle", "Icebreaker goes to the ram", Stoker from the 'Icebreaker'",
"'Icebreaker' by historical truth", "Stuck in the ice of the Cold War", "Icebreaker" in sheep's ", "The author of 'Icebreaker' was let down by sheep", "The hole puncher", "It's time to sink 'Icebreaker'" and many others. There have been debunking academic conferences. There have been trashing books and destroying movies. "Icebreaker" was refuted by the first (aka the last) president of the USSR and seven chairmen of the Government of the Russian Federation one after another.

In response to "Icebreaker," Russian Defense Minister Army General Grachev issued a thunderous order to improve the process of studying military history in the armed forces. It didn't help - the minister had to issue another order, even more formidable. And what is there Minister - the President of the Russian Federation reacted to the "Icebreaker", by his order № Pr-319 of February 28, 1995, ordering to fight the falsification of history to the detriment of Russia's interests. In fulfillment of the will of the popularly elected scientist comrades surprised the world with multi-pood volumes. The State Duma adopted the resolution of May 27, 2005, and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine even created a law in defense of historical truth!

I have been accused of trying to rewrite history. To this I humbly reply: if only there was something to rewrite. But rewriting--

there's nothing!

An official history of the war cannot be written. Despite the efforts of many thousands of scientific teams, billions spent and decades lost. The official version does not exist and is not expected. But the people's elected representatives call the peoples who elected them to defend the truth of history, which does not exist. Which cannot be composed. And the cry rattles over the country: let's protect what does not exist! Legislatively! Fight the detractors! Let's build new state structures! Let's spend another ten railroad cars of money for this holy cause! Let's feed foreign like-minded people!

And they, foreign lackeys, are eager to feed. To Moscow. And having fed themselves, they destroy the sides of my "Icebreaker" with their clean hands and cold heads, hitting it with all calibers.

Any visiting foreign hunter who volunteers to drown the "Icebreaker" is given a red carpet in Moscow from Sheremetyevo to the Faceted Chamber. For some reason, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the SVR, the GRU and other equally venerable organizations open the impregnable doors of their top-secret archives before the foreign subversives. And the anti-icebreaker waves are boiling, foaming, but they cannot overturn the "Icebreaker".

Isn't that a criticism?

2

Of course, it's not a criticism. I wrote "Icebreaker" for the sake of one question. That question is in chapter 26. The preceding chapters are just a storybook. I capitalized the main question of the book. For those who do not understand, I also added: here it is, the central question. I asked my future critics not to brandish trifles, but to take the bull by the horns - to answer the main question. Now I do not repeat this question as a matter of principle. Anyone who has read the book knows what it is about.

So: in hundreds of articles, in 47 "anti-icebreaker" doctoral dissertations that I know to date, in 52 refuting books, in many TV and radio programs, not a single one of my opponents has answered the question posed. I'll say more: not a single one about the central question of "Icebreaker" did not say a word. So can all this research be considered criticism, if my respected opponents are ready to argue about but the main thing, if they

only picking on trivialities, but dashing around the central issue?

And one more thing: if the world's leading luminaries from institutes and universities in London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Munich, Rome, Washington, Edinburgh, Bonn, Moscow, Berlin have not dared to even mention the main question posed in the book for twenty-five years, is this not evidence that "Icebreaker" has broken through the hummocks of lies?

The gauntlet is thrown down. Scientists, gentlemen, gentlemen, gentlemen, gentlemen and comrades are walking around, spitting, swearing, sending curses on my poor head, declaring me disproved, broken, drowned, sizzled, exterminated and wiped on the floor, but nobody dared to pick up the glove. Gentlemen generals and marshals, presidents, prime ministers and intelligence officers, journalists and scientists dodged the battle.

The correctness of any theory is judged by its ability to explain what is happening. My theory explains much of what was previously unexplainable. "Icebreaker" gives a key to understanding even those problems of the initial period of the Soviet-German war, which are not touched upon in my books.

Opponents don't need to expose or incriminate me. They need to find another simple, clear, logical explanation for what happened in 1941 . As long as they another theory will not come up with, "Icebreaker" will continue its victorious voyage.

But I keep getting letters - the new subversionists are calling for a fight. They've written all over the Internet: come out! Under the TV cameras they demand: let's argue!

What's there to argue about, citizens? It is for you to accept my challenge. It is you who should answer the central question I posed in "The Icebreaker". If you don't dare to discuss the central question, what is there to argue about? And if you have not read "The Icebreaker" and do not know what I consider to be the central question, then we have nothing to argue about.

3

And here is the picture: hordes of my opponents are calling for a battle, but they themselves are avoiding it. But I want to hurt, to prick, to bite. That's why I need an argument that would be, so to speak, outside the "Icebreaker". We need

An argument that would allow opponents to stomp on me, yet not get into a substantive argument.

And it hit someone in the head: Goebbels made up this version! It was his doing! Hitler needed a justification for the invasion, and so early in the morning of June 22, 1941 Goebbels lied into the microphone. And Rezun-Suvorov repeats.

A marvelous argument. It's a lifesaver. Now you can call me a fascist without arguing about the essence of the book. Without going into it, so to speak.

The Goebbels argument was liked. The argument was picked up. The argument is repeated. And the accusation sounds terrible. Imagine what it would be like to be in the same company as Goebbels!

But the horrible accusation seems only at first glance.

History is written by the victors. That's why it's so common: if Goebbels said it, it's a lie. This leads to a seemingly inescapable conclusion: then everything that the Kremlin agitprop has been feeding us is crystal clear truth. And more than that: since Hitler is an aggressor, invader, enslaver, therefore, we are liberators. Hitlerism is darkness, and we, as Comrade Stalin said, have light from the east.

However, Soviet communist propaganda, to put it mildly, was not particularly truthful either. We had our own Goebbels. His name was Alexander Sergeyevich. No, not Pushkin, but Shcherbakov. So, even before the German attack on the Soviet Union, Goebbels himself became despondent: it seemed unimaginable, unthinkable and unbelievable to defeat San Sergeyevich at the competition of liars. Comrade Shcherbakov was very talented. Goebbels did not put British propagandists in anything: the level is not the same. But how to defeat the Kremlin opponent?

By the way, Alexander Sergeyich beat Goebbels already with one title. Goebbels is the Minister of *Propaganda*. Already from this title it follows that the task of him and his subordinate department - to bend the line pleasing to the regime, to propagandize certain ideas, that is to puff up the brains of the masses, to hang noodles on their ears. But comrade Shcherbakov is the head of the Soviet *Information* Bureau: we report only facts, no propaganda.

And that's the way it was organized in everything. The newspaper is Izvestia: we inform about what happened, and that's all. Or Pravda. Pravda

it is the truth. A clear, bright spring. No mud or impurities.

Their SS symbol is a skull and bones, while our Chekist has ripening ears on his sleeve. Such small stones make grandiose mosaics. Hitler exterminated millions of people because he was a villain. And the fact that our comrades with warm hearts exterminated many millions more - so it is for the sake of progress.

That is why today you can walk around any city in the world with a hammer and sickle, and no one will spit in your face. It's not a swastika. And you can erect a monument to the Chekist with people's money. It's not an SS man!

And after all, a monument to a Chekist is worse than a monument to an SS man. The SS man is a beast from the outside. He exterminated those he considered the enemy. And the Chekist is a homegrown scoundrel. He exterminated everything around him. His own and others. Tens of millions. And the difference is that in the Gestapo they tore their fingernails in order to identify the real accomplices, in the NKVD - to fulfill the order, the extermination plan sent down from above. The Chekist knew in advance that he was torturing the innocent. Protocols of fictitious confessions guys with ardent hearts among themselves called "novels", and the most talented bone-throwers, teeth, eyes and jaws - "novelists". Here from their ranks and came Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov.

He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1918. The Bolsheviks won, and then he joined them, and then he was imbued with great ideas. He climbed up the mountain, jumping over ten steps. Comrade Stalin saw the most talented thousands of versts away and acted on the principle: young people everywhere we have a way.

Death sentences in those heroic times were passed without a trial. The execution lists were drawn up and signed locally by so-called "troikas". The composition of the "troikas" was always standard - the first secretary of the local communist authorities, the prosecutor and the chief local Chekist. Shcherbakov in the compilation of firing lists showed a special zeal and prowess. He personally signed hundreds of such lists, sending thousands of people to death without trial. For such diligence in the work Stalin threw Shcherbakov in the breakthrough - where the volume of work could not cope.

During the years 1937-1938 alone, Shcherbakov visited the main party boss (and therefore a member of the "troika") in Leningrad, in

Eastern Siberia and Donbass. In the number of shootings Shcherbakov tried to keep up with the main champion in this case - Nikita Khrushchev. And often came very close to the Stakhanov work of Nikita the Bloody.

Shcherbakov was not respected among his workmates. Even Khrushchev described Shcherbakov's character as "poisonous, snake-like" (Stalin's Empire. P. 501). This is such a fighter for bright ideals Comrade Stalin a month and a half before the war put at the head of the most powerful ideological machine in the world - May 4, 1941 Shcherbakov became secretary of the Central Committee, his duties included control over all means of propaganda.

In order not to return to this later, I inform you: Shcherbakov and died with the war. He was a heavy drinker. He drank not just a lot, but a terrible lot. On May 9, 1945 on joy on the occasion of the victory loaded so that on the night of May 10, without regaining consciousness, went into the next world, at the 45th year of life. Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria said about him: he got drunk and died.

But we're getting a little ahead of ourselves. Let's go back to 1941.

4

From 1922 to 1941, Stalin did not hold any government positions. He ran everything without being responsible for anything. He was just the *General Secretary of* the Party. And the party is not a state or a government. It is an alliance of like-minded people. Nothing more.

But on May 4, 1941, Stalin on the eve of the victorious war of liberation took the post of head of government, so that the glory of the great liberator with no one to share, to be able to give the main order of his life not from behind the scenes, and officially.

On the same day, Stalin put Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov as lord of all Soviet writers, artists, composers, musicians, actors, directors, choreographers, journalists, editors, censors, athletes, circus workers, poets, singers, and so on and so forth. Under the full and undivided control Shcherbakov got all the creative unions, publishing houses, film studios, theaters and cinemas, circuses and stadiums, newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasting and everything else of this kind. Shcherbakov had many positions: secretary of the Central Committee, head of the Sovinformbureau, during the war

— Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Chief of the Main Political Directorate and the like.

The calculation is as follows: Stalin gives the main order of the XX century, and Shcherbakov is responsible for propaganda support.

On the front of the ideological struggle Shcherbakov unfolded in full force, in all its breadth. True, the war went the wrong channel. But he coped even here. Here, for example, a miniature Shcherbakovs masterpiece — a short excerpt from the Sovinformburo report of August 22, 1941:

In the last three weeks alone, our troops have been defeated:
(a) The 3rd, 4th, 7th, 10th, 11th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 16th, 18th, 19th, 20th armored divisions...

Taking into account that on the Soviet-German front in 1941 operated 19 German tank divisions, and taking into account that in other weeks German tank divisions also suffered losses, it should be unconditionally recognized that the tank troops (if we believe Shcherbakov) Hitler by the end of August 1941 was not left.

In the same message in paragraph "b" Scherbakov listed the numbers of thirty-seven German infantry divisions, allegedly completely defeated during the three weeks of August.

In point "c" Alexander Sergeyich named 2, 8, 14, 17, 18, 20, 25, 27 motorized divisions, allegedly destroyed in August. If we remember June and July, there is no doubt that Hitler, after two months of fighting, had no motorized divisions left either.

Also in the message was item "d", which referred to the defeat of SS divisions and item "e" about the defeat of individual regiments of different divisions. Hitler could still scrape together some forces, of course, but, according to Shcherbakov, "many German divisions retained only their numbers".

But that was not enough. San Sergeyich did not stop there and continued:

For two months of fighting, the German army lost over two million men killed, wounded and captured ... According to revised data for the two months of the war, the Germans lost about 8,000 tanks, 10,000 guns, over 7,200 airplanes... In fierce and continuous

two months of fighting, the Red Army lost 150,000 killed, 440,000 wounded, 110,000 missing, and a total of 700,000 men, 5,500 tanks, 7,500 guns, and 4,500 airplanes (ibid.).

Now we know that in two months of fighting the pre-war five million man Red Army was almost completely dispersed through the forests, defeated and captured. Only reservists remained. And German losses of a million a month - this is, to put it mildly, a strong exaggeration of Alexander Sergeyevich.

From the first day of the war, Shcherbakov and his like comrades have been composing incredible tales, printing them and, having announced them to the whole world, stowing them away in archives[19]. And today our scientific luminaries are carefully,
as if sacred relics, retrieve old typewritten
and, having cut off obvious nonsense and undoubted lies, support their theories with Shcherbakov's pearls. And they proudly declare: one should write with the support of archival documents!

It's convenient. Based on the "documents" of Shcherbakov's office, you can prove anything they tell you to prove.

5

So, they have the bullshit Goebbels, we have the truthful Scherbakov. Goebbels lied, Rezun-Suvorov repeats.

As long as the reference to Goebbels was used by not the most prominent personalities, I kept silent. But now people with big stars on their shoulders started talking: Colonel General Volkogonov, advisor to the President of Russia, Army General Gareev, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and Colonel General Pavlov, First Deputy Chief of the GRU. And all — in one voice: the preparation of the Soviet invasion of Europe is a fantasy Goebbels, Suvorov not original, primary source "Icebreaker" - in Goebbels' office.

Since the heavy siege artillery has spoken, I am compelled to respond.

Official Kremlin propaganda has been saying for decades,
that the war on the part of the Soviet Union was just, domestic, liberating, great, that Hitler's wolves attacked our peacefully grazing flock for no reason and without a

declaring war, justifying their treachery with the fabrications of the delusional Goebbels.

If so, then the Kremlin ideologists should have refuted Goebbels' fabrications: here are the words of this confused man - and they are false words! Here he lied, here and here. With Goebbels' revelations should have begun any study of the war, these revelations should have opened six-volume and twelve-volume books with the official version of the history of the war. If we were attacked using a false pretext, the main task of the Soviet government, the ruling party, the ideological apparatus, diplomacy, intelligence, the General Staff, historians, veterans, propagandists and agitators was to refute the false pretext for war.

But no one in our great country and no one outside of it has exposed or attempted to expose Goebbels' statements.

Goebbels is a scoundrel. Goebbels is a criminal, one of the greatest criminals in history. Goebbels is a liar, the son of a lie and its father. His name has become an epithet: he lies like Goebbels. But why is it that Goebbels' speech, delivered on the morning of June 22, 1941, has not been published by us as a sample of malicious fictions? Why did not one of our marshals, generals, admirals, diplomats or academicians dare to contradict the dead Goebbels?

We have a habit of saying Goebbels' name - that's enough. You don't have to explain anything further - if it's Goebbels, it's a lie. As if our San Sergeich Shcherbakov lied less.

I repeat the question: why is our historical science silent? Why our science does not refute or even comment on the speech made by Goebbels on June 22, 1941?

Goebbels has not been exposed. Until now. That surprises

me. And you, citizen generals?

***

On June 21, 1941, the last day before the attack on the Soviet Union, Goebbels was not in vain saddened. He was certainly no match for Shcherbakov.

The empires of Stalin and Hitler are twin brothers. Both there and here lies were the binding material, the cement that turned the building of the state into an indestructible monolith.

The empire that Hitler created collapsed and crumbled into dust. One of the main reasons for the collapse is that the concentration of lies was insufficient.

The empire that Lenin, Trotsky, Dzerzhinsky and Stalin created is alive and well, albeit in a reduced form. Our concentration of lies is at the proper level.

CHAPTER 28. The Nuremberg Tribunal as an operation to cover up the crimes of the Soviet Union.

Hitler deceived Stalin? But as a result of this deception, he was forced to poison himself and Stalin became the head of half the globe!

Vyacheslav Molotov. June 13, 1974 (Chuev F. I. Molotov. Semi-powerful ruler. C. 42)

1

Now I'll show you where the meanest dog is buried.

So here it is: Goebbels does not need to be refuted. Goebbels made his statement on the radio on June 22, 1941 at 5:30 a.m. And an hour and a half before that, at exactly 4 a.m., the imperial Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop handed the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. G. Dekanozov a memorandum, which outlined the reasons for Germany's attack on the USSR. The handing over of this memorandum was an act of declaration of war.

We now know that the memorandum was handed over, and precisely at 4 a.m., thanks to the scientific feat of the courageous historian Yuri Georgievich Felshtinsky. It was he who tracked down the relevant documents and in 1983 published them in the collection "USSR-Germany. 1939-1941".

We've been told for decades that Hitler attacked the USSR "treacherously, without a declaration of war," and now even the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in its central body is forced to admit: Germany declared war (Krasnaya Zvezda. November 25, 1998). The same newspaper in the issue of June 23, 2001 specifies: "*The official accusations against the USSR were voiced in a memorandum handed by Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to the Soviet ambassador in Berlin on June 22, 1941 at 4 a.m.*".

It's interesting, though: they tell us about Goebbels' fiction, but Goebbels is just an agitator, albeit a very high ranking one like

our Shcherbakov. Our attention is diverted to Goebbels' propaganda speech, leaving the official Ribbentrop document in the shadows.

But Ribbentrop was not acting on his own volition, but on orders from the German government. Ribbentrop's memorandum was not his personal pranks, not amateurish, but a government document of extraordinary importance.

What's the significance? It's that they didn't just declare war on us, they accused us of something. And they handed us an official paper with accusations. So does a nation that has lost tens of millions in this war not have the right to know what they have been accused of, for what reason they have been attacked?

2

Other questions arise. Why were we lied to for half a century about the fact that war was not declared? Why was that memorandum never brought up? By the way, where is it now? Why isn't it quoted? What does it contain? The text of this document is posted on the Internet, its original is gathering dust in the Presidential Archive, but the Russian government does not publish it, does not comment on it, does not expose it, does not call it a fake.

The German government has declared war on the Soviet Union and has given numerous examples to justify its actions as the only possible action in the current situation. Why does no one react to this? What do the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Academy of Sciences, the Academy of Military Sciences, the Institute of Military History and other structures with such big names do in general?

Why were our brilliant commanders silent? Why Zhukov in his memoirs for many pages described the negotiations of the delegations of the USSR, Great Britain and France, to which he personally had nothing to do, but did not say a word about what justified the actions of the German government, having attacked? After all, by the beginning of the war Zhukov was Chief of the General Staff and he - who else? - had after the war to give a rebuke to the delusional, if the memorandum of the German government contained lies. And the Russian generals kept quiet. Citizens Generals, you, your fathers.

and grandfathers accused of a crime, and you don't say a word. Ten years you keep silent, twenty years, thirty years, fifty years, seventy years.

Another thing is also surprising: if the war is great, just and liberating, why be cunning? Why distort the truth, hide and conceal documents? And why is a great war shrouded, entangled, braided with lies? Why our rulers perverted and continue to pervert the history of the war from its first moment, right from 4 a.m. on June 22, 1941? Why did our rulers, when describing the beginning of the war, become so twisted that they surpassed Goebbels?

To all these questions there can be only one answer: Comrade Stalin and other Kremlin comrades had nothing to object to the accusations of the German government, as set forth in the memorandum, neither in the early morning of June 22, nor ten years later, nor twenty years later, nor half a century later. If there had been something to say in reply, they would have said it long ago.

But there was nothing to say. Therefore, instead of objections, Comrade Stalin declared that the Soviet Union was not guilty of anything, that no one had brought any charges against it, that it had not received any memorandum from the German government. Immediately the propaganda wording "treacherously, without a declaration of war" was put into circulation. And for decades it was repeated: without declaration, without declaration, without declaration. And then

- they had a bad word for Goebbels' fabrications.

Although it is not Goebbels who should be remembered, but Ribbentrop.

3

In Nuremberg, Ribbentrop was sentenced to death and executed. The Soviet prosecutor Vyshinsky, Andrei Yanuarievich Vyshinsky, insisted most of all on his confession of guilt. However, in reality, Vyshinsky was Ribbentrop's chief defense counsel.

Vyshinsky's position, that is, the official position of the Soviet Union, was that Ribbentrop was not guilty of anything and that he should be hanged. And so it happened. All charges against Ribbentrop were dropped, and... hanged. Formally, he was found guilty of directly and directly participating in unleashing a war of aggression. And no one asked: what war? World War II?

Nothing of the sort: Ribbentrop merely signed in the Kremlin a pact of *non-aggression* between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Objection: but this pact provided for the partition of Poland. As a result of this partition, the Second World War broke out!

That's right. But Ribbentrop didn't sign the pact alone. First Comrade Molotov signed it, then Herr Ribbentrop. Then in September, on the map of the partition of Poland, Comrade Stalin happily scribbled a signature 58 centimeters in size.

If Ribbentrop signed the pact (officially a non-aggression pact, but in fact a pact for the partition of Poland), he should, of course, have been condemned to death. But then Comrade Molotov should also have been hanged next to him. And between them, to be fair, also Comrade Stalin. The pact was signed in the Kremlin. And who's the master of the Kremlin? Not Ribbentrop.

So, in order not to get into Ribbentrop's company, neither Stalin, Molotov, Vyshinsky, nor the cooperative Western allies charged Ribbentrop with signing the Moscow Pact. So Ribbentrop was not officially involved in the partition of Poland and everything that followed.

Today we know that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact consisted of two parts:

1. an openly innocent non-aggression pact;
2. secret additional protocols on the division of Europe.

The Soviet Union categorically denied secret collusion with Hitler and declared: There was no collusion! There were no additional protocols! Everyone from Molotov to Gorbachev inclusively declared this.

After the collapse of communism, for a short time the official Kremlin propaganda admitted that there had been a conspiracy. But soon everything went back to normal: "*On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression pact was signed with Germany - the same as Poland, Denmark and a number of other countries had with it*" (Krasnaya Zvezda. March 21-27, 2007). Andrei "Jaguarievich" Vyshinsky held exactly the same position: it was an ordinary non-aggression pact! We did not share Europe with Hitler. There were no secret agreements.

Let's agree with Comrade Vyshinsky and Red Star, but then explain to me what is Ribbentrop's fault?

What was Ribbentrop's fault with Great Britain and France? Ribbentrop didn't declare war on them. He's clean before London and Paris. It was just the opposite: Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. If declaring war is a crime, then the French and British leaders should have been on the gallows at Nuremberg.

Then we are told that in 1941 Ribbentrop, on behalf of the German government, declared war on the Soviet Union. That was his guilt. For this he should have been subjected to a shameful and painful death!

That's . But nobody brought such a charge against Ribbentrop at Nuremberg. On the contrary, Comrade Vyshinsky lied with gusto that war had not been declared by Germany. Simply put, he was defending Ribbentrop here as well.

Here are the grimaces of Nuremberg "justice". Major-General Paulus (later General Field Marshal) personally prepared a plan of attack on the Soviet Union. It was known about it. No one hid it. This is a clear and undeniable guilt. His noose Paulus honestly deserved. The Soviet prosecutors have put forward also the invented accusation: ostensibly according to plans of Paulus in violation of all international norms, rules and customs of warfare the attack on the Soviet Union has been made without a declaration of war. For such things, the main developer of war plans should have been sentenced to capital punishment. But Paulus was not even tried.

But German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, on behalf of the German government, declared war on the Soviet Union. But the Soviet side denied this in every possible way. According to the Soviet Union's version, war was not declared.

But then it turns out that Ribbentrop and his ministry had nothing at all, even formally, to do with the attack. Nevertheless, Ribbentrop was hanged at the insistence of Soviet prosecutors.

So where's the ironclad Stalinist logic in that?

5

Don't worry. Stalin's logic did not fail at Nuremberg either: if Ribbentrop is charged with declaring war on the Soviet Union

Union, then the memorandum of the German government, which Ribbentrop handed to Dekanozov at 4 a.m. on June 22, 1941, would have to be presented. And then the question would arise whether the memorandum contained truth or slander. The Soviet government did not want to answer such questions. That is why Ribbentrop was never charged with anything, and the memorandum of the German government was not shown to the court. Instead, the Soviet prosecutors deceived the court by claiming that Germany had attacked without a declaration of war.

If the "international tribunal" was looking for the real , the generals should have been tried and Ribbentrop acquitted. But Stalin started the comedy at Nuremberg not to find and punish the guilty, but to cover up his own crimes against Europe, because the main culprit of the Second World War was himself and the system of self-destruction of the country, its people and the world created by Lenin.

6

Even the central body of the Russian Defense Ministry had to admit that not everything was clean *at Nuremberg*: "*At the Nuremberg trial, our delegation concluded a gentleman's agreement with the American, British and French delegations: they do not mention the 1939 Pact, we - the Munich Collusion*" (Krasnaya Zvezda. March 21-27, 2007).

And this is justice? If the judges themselves participated in the crimes of the accused? If there was a conspiracy among the judges - a conspiracy not to remember their participation in the very crimes for which they are going to sentence their own yesterday's friends and associates to death?

So that's not all. On November 30, 1939, Stalin published in the newspaper "Pravda" text read as follows:

(a) It was not Germany that attacked France and England, but France and England attacked Germany, taking responsibility for the present war;

b) after the opening of hostilities, Germany approached France and England with peace proposals, and the Soviet Union

openly supported the German peace proposals, for he believed, and continues to believe, that an early end to the war would be a radical relief to all countries and peoples;

c) the ruling circles of England and France rudely rejected both German peace proposals and the Soviet Union's attempts to bring the war to an early end.

Stalin did not later retract these words.

What is the result? In 1939, Stalin announced to the whole world that Germany was not guilty of starting the war, and now he is judging Germany and its leaders for starting the war! According to Stalin's declaration, Britain and France were the perpetrators of the war. So why the hell did the judges from these countries put on their robes? Who put them in judicial chairs? On the basis of what and by what right? And what are Soviet judges doing at that court? How did they find themselves in the company of warmongers? And why are they trying the Germans, who, as Comrade Stalin declared, were not guilty of starting the war?

7

Stalin, hiding behind the authority of the "international tribunal", had to eliminate unwanted witnesses of his own crimes and protect false witnesses who were ready to go to any forgery to save their own skin.

That is why they hanged the indomitable Ribbentrop, having previously dropped all specific charges against him, but did not bring any charges against the much more guilty but cowardly and corrupt Paulus.

This is why our historians do not like to mention the official memorandum of the German government declaring war on the Soviet Union. That is why the Kremlin ideologists do not refute it - it is impossible to refute it.

Germany attacked the Soviet Union. The German government officially announced the reasons that made it decide to take this step. This was done at the highest diplomatic level. The Kremlin leaders were left to either recognize the justice of the accusations made, or to dodge and lie. They chose

the second way. This is the lie they have been following for over sixty years.

Discussing the reasons for Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, the Kremlin leaders have moved from the official diplomatic level to the level of propaganda rhetoric, refuting propaganda minister Goebbels' speeches in vain. But even at this lower level, Kremlin propaganda is incapable of delivering a qualified rebuttal. Instead, it incantations: Goebbels lied, Goebbels lied, Goebbels lied. Without specifying how, where and when.

CHAPTER 29. holy cause.

Stalin was quietly preparing to carry out a gigantic plan that even Lenin had not dared to undertake.

Avtorkhanov A. The Origin of Partocracy. Frankfurt am Main: Posev, 1973. T. 2. C. 361

1

Hitler attacked first and thus imposed his will on Stalin, seized the initiative and thwarted all that Stalin had planned, but did not have time to accomplish. Hitler did not allow Stalin to act in accordance with his plans and designs.

And it is time for you and me to deal with the question: what were Stalin's plans for the near future in the spring of 1941? Well, at least for a few months or, say, for a year ahead.

This question has been answered by Marshals of the Soviet Union Akhromeev, Zhukov, Kulikov, Ogarkov and Yazov. This question was answered by presidents and general secretaries, government chairmen and ministers, generals and admirals, academicians and all sorts of other serious comrades. In other words, we have received an official answer. It breaks down into three components and sounds like this:

1. In 1941, Stalin did not expect Germany to attack. He wisely predetermined that Germany would not attack in 1941.

2. Stalin did his best to delay the outbreak of war. Stalin's main concern was not to annoy Hitler and not to give him an excuse to attack.

3. The Soviet Union was a peace-loving power. The intentions of the country's top leadership and the Red Army were reduced to plans to cover the state border: in the event of a German attack, the border guards were to shoot back with rifles and machine guns and hurl grenades, while the main forces of the Red Army were to move to the front lines to support and assist the border outposts. Apart from the plans to cover the border, according to responsible comrades from the Ministry of Defense, no other

plans the Red Army did not have, and if Zhukov's "newly found" manuscripts are to be believed, the Red Army did not have enough forces even for that.

Let us agree with this official answer - but only for a few moments. What then, citizens?

It turns out that Stalin wished to remain a loyal ally of Hitler, tried his best to help him keep occupied Europe in check, to provide him with a reliable rear in the fight against Britain, to supply Germany with strategic raw materials in full. According to the needs, so to speak, as under communism.

It turns out that under the leadership of Stalin, the Soviet people were ready to work in the sweat of their brow, undernourished and sleep deprived, in order to provide Hitler with bread and lard, leather boots of the Kungur factory and automobile tires of the Yaroslavl plant.

It turns out that our people were pulling railroad lines in the taiga and deserts to take all the wealth from under the ground and lavish it on Hitler.

It turns out that Stalin extended his hand of friendship to the Nazis and generously poured Yakut diamonds into Hitler's pockets so that German craftsmen would have something to drill gun barrels with.

It turns out that our people in the mines and mines plunged into the bowels of the earth to give Hitler manganese, chromium and nickel: let the armor of Hitler's tanks will be even stronger.

It turns out that our country was giving Hitler tungsten so that Hitler's armor-piercing shells could penetrate any armor.

It turns out that Stalin was chasing Baku oil to Germany for Hitler's fighter planes and bombers, cruisers and submarines, tanks and self-propelled guns: souls, my dear, all in a row!

The official ideologists tell us that the entire conquered Europe worked for Hitler. They forget to add to this: the sovereign Soviet Union as well. Europe - by compulsion. The Soviet Union - voluntarily.

2

Official Kremlin propaganda screws into our heads the idea that both the peoples of the Soviet Union and Stalin himself are so

The Kremlin ideologists told the whole world that to save their lives the Soviet people were ready to give Hitler everything they could: let Europe drown in blood, just so long as he would not touch us. The Kremlin ideologists told the whole world that the Soviet people were ready to give Hitler everything they could to save their lives: let Europe drown in blood, as long as he did not touch us.

Were the peoples of the Soviet Union so weak, stupid and cowardly that for the sake of an extra day of their despicable lives they were ready to go to any vile, meanness, treason and betrayal? Were our people ready to sacrifice their reputation and the principles of proletarian internationalism while watching neighboring peoples give up their freedom and perish? We are told that the Soviet people and their leaders were guided by the desire to delay the beginning of the war or to avoid it altogether, to hide behind the backs of others.

And we are used to this. No one in Russia has long been outraged by this interpretation of events, no one is embarrassed by such an explanation, no one is embarrassed by such meanness.

Petty criminal scum lives by the principle: you die today, and I will die tomorrow. This principle is sometimes misinterpreted in the sense that a petty criminal does not value other people's lives at all, and does not particularly value his own. This is a misinterpretation. The principle has another meaning: today a scoundrel is ready to sacrifice anyone, anyone's life in order to postpone his death, only to live until tomorrow. But tomorrow will be another day, and this principle will be used again. And then another and another. Every day. Until the last day of life.

It is very important for the people who ruled the Soviet Union after Stalin, and now rule Russia, to turn the people into cattle. It is easy to keep them in a pigsty. It's easy to rob. It's easy to control the bulls. Tukhachevsky's methods are openly used to stun and bitch the people. This "giant of military thought" believed that in order to rule occupied Russia, the entire population of the country should be turned into scoundrels. Let everyone think only about themselves, only about their salvation. Let everyone live according to the principle of petty criminal scum. Tukhachevsky himself considered himself an occupier of Russia, so he wrote about himself in his brilliant creations. The main thing

for him was to teach people to think for themselves, to trust in each other and the desire to help friends, brothers, neighbors [20]. An ultra-powerful ideological machine of modern Russia uses Tukhachevsky's methods. In order to prevent people from uniting, everyone is indoctrinated: think only of yourself! Save only yourself! There are many ways to foster meannessincluding fostering on historical examples. Here, they tell us to us, how nicely we did: we gave Europe to Hitler to be torn to pieces, but we ourselves stepped aside. Here you are, citizens, an example of state wisdom. Hitler exterminated millions of people in concentration camps, while we supplied him with everything he needed to continue the war. That's how it is we're sneaky.

The Kremlin propaganda quite deliberately puts the Russian people and other peoples of the collapsed Soviet Union on the same board with petty crooks, with scoundrels of the lowest grade. After all, to tear neighboring countries into pieces, to give them into slavery to an ogre in order to gain time, in order to delay the hour of their entry into the war or to avoid it altogether - this is a classic example of using the wisdom of the Maidan bargainer: cut, strangle, shoot anyone, just let me live another day.

3

The rulers spend enormous sums of money on programs to stun the people. One of the main directions is disguised as so-called "patriotic education", during which people are indoctrinated with two fairly simple ideas.

First: the heroic Red Army liberated Europe from the "brown plague" at the cost of incredible sacrifices.

Second: the Soviet Union was a reliable ally of Hitler. The Soviet Union correctly supplied Germany with strategic raw materials, that is, in Hitler's war against the rest of Europe it stood firmly on Hitler's side, was his partner, assistant and accomplice in his crimes. It turns out that neither the Soviet people nor the Kremlin leaders intended to liberate Europe from fascism at all. Their goal was not to liberate Europe from Hitler, but to help Hitler to drive Europe into concentration camps, to keep the peoples of a dozen countries in a bloody state.

in check. To remain Hitler's obliging servants forever, to feed Germany with molybdenum and manganese, to feed it with oil - that is what the cowardly Soviet people and their frightened leaders wanted.

There are people into whose heads both of these thoughts have been inserted, and they coexist peacefully. The authorities can trust such people with anything and allow them to do anything, even presidential elections. Really, it is interesting:

The Soviet Union had liberated Europe from Hitler! But he didn't want to do it and he wasn't going to do it. It was not part of our plans. We were worrying more and more about how to put someone under the axe instead of ourselves, how to dodge ourselves, how to hide behind other people's backs.

Hooray for the liberator and his valiant army!

4

Communist ideologists, famous marshals and generals, authoritative men of science say: you, the peoples of the Soviet Union, are incapable of anything. You are Hitler's lackeys. No plans, therefore, Stalin could not be. He was more and more inclined to sit out the war quietly and peacefully in a corner. Our house is not in the center.

Well, Mr. Historians, I disagree with your answer to the question about Stalin's plans. Here's my answer: Stalin was preparing an attack on Germany. And he supplied Hitler for a number of reasons. Not the least of which was to put his guard down and use Hitler's hands to take over Europe, which would then accept Stalin as a liberator. Stalin was preparing to open a second front. According to my calculations - in mid-summer 1941. July 6 to be exact. Maybe even earlier. But not later. Not one day later.

For this I have been scolded, pecked at, cursed, exposed, refuted, ridiculed for 25 years. Let me timidly justify myself.

Stalin was preparing an attack on Hitler and by doing so saved the honor of our nation. The preparation of such a turn of history should be proud. To attack Hitler is a holy thing.

If Stalin had not prepared the attack, then he would have been considered Hitler's villein. Then our fathers and grandfathers should have been regarded as voluntary helpers of the Nazis, their henchmen, traitors and cowards.

Anyone who tries to indoctrinate my people into thinking that we are stupid, cowardly and inferior is an enemy of the people. Anyone who tries to prove that Stalin did not prepare the attack betrays his own people. It is quite clear that my main critics are working against their own people not out of conscience, but for pay - after all, normal people can not completely lose their common sense. They all pretend to be patriots. They all claim that the Red Army saved Europe. They all talk about the great liberation mission of the Soviet Union. And the same people fiercely prove that the Red Army did not want to liberate anyone, did not plan, did not intend to, that the Soviet Union was a reliable supplier of strategic raw materials for Germany, that the Red Army was a reliable cover for Hitler's rear in the fight against the rest of Europe.

This position of my critics is deeply immoral. Even if we were to assume for a moment that Stalin did not prepare an attack, we should have invented a beautiful legend: friendship is friendship, but Comrade Stalin had his own thoughts on the matter.

Fortunately, we don't have to make anything up. Stalin was preparing an attack! He came to Europe not because Hitler attacked first and thus forced Stalin to retaliate, but because the defeat of Hitler's Germany was planned from the beginning.

5

If we believe the official Kremlin ideologists, then our fathers, grandfathers, and now great-grandfathers were not fighters against Hitler at all, but his comrades-in-arms and even battle buddies. They wanted to continue to live in peace and friendship with Hitler, to organize joint parades with the Nazis, to march together with SS battalions through the streets of conquered cities, to exchange experience in building concentration camps, to conduct joint punitive operations against partisans, to hang swastika flags in Moscow, to kiss Hitler, Goering, Himmler. And let Europe burn with fire! As long as we're happy!

The Kremlin ideologues tell us that our fathers and grandfathers were despicable, cowardly Hitler's lackeys, volunteer intendants and supply men in Hitler's concentration camp, which

spread across Europe. If they then became the liberators of Europe from the brown plague, it was not of their own volition. They didn't intend it, it just happened. It was the scoundrel Hitler who made them liberators. Without Hitler's heinous attack on the Soviet Union, the Soviet people would never have freed anyone of their own free will!

There are unintentional, unintentional murders in life. And liberators, as it turns out, are the same - without intent. This is how our people are portrayed by order-bearing memoirists and scholars crowned with laurels: yes, they became liberators, but they had no such intention. Liberators willy-nilly. Liberators by misunderstanding.

The official position of the Kremlin propaganda is so wildly contrary to logic and common sense that even some of the leading ideologists began to realize little by little the abomination of their own explanations. Therefore, in recent years put forward a softened version: Stalin, they say, the war planned to push back the war to 1942, and then, having rearmed his army, he would certainly enter the war. Simply put, even at the highest official level began to recognize that Stalin was still preparing to oppose Hitler. Just, they say, he had no strength for it in 1941. And having accumulated forces, he would have turned around ...

I'm not arguing. I agree. But then what do you get? It turns out that I have with the official ideologues almost no differences and and no. Our differences concern only the time when Stalin planned to oppose Hitler. I prove that Stalin was preparing an attack in 1941, and they - that in 1942. That's the difference.

But this, as they used to say in my youth, is nothing compared to the World Revolution. Otherwise, everything else is the same: Stalin was preparing an attack. Does it matter whether it was in 1941 or 1942?

Those who believe that 1942 was better suited for an attack on Germany than 1941, should take into account the possibility that in the second half of 1941 the war between Britain and Germany could have ended as completely futile for both sides. Stalin would then have been left alone

to face Hitler alone. And then all the benefits of delaying the start of the war would have turned into a terrible loss.

Serious historians should consider another question: what would Hitler have done while Stalin delayed the start of the war and rearmed the Red Army? Would Hitler not have rearmed his army at that time? Would the Soviet Union have rushed forward and Germany would have remained at the same level?

Let us try to answer these questions, and 1942, as the optimal date for an attack on Germany, will fall away by itself. And 1941 will remain.

6

It should be said that my idea so simple and so, at first glance, strange, is gradually breaking through, like a blade of grass through a crack in the asphalt. On June 21, 2000 the central military newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" habitually called me a falsifier, announced as habitually that all my theories have been disproved and that they have nothing to do with real science. And after that, a short phrase slipped into the defamatory article: "*If the Soviet Union had launched a preemptive strike against Germany, it would have been magnificent!*".

The thinking is sound: there was and could be nothing wrong with attacking Hitler. It was Hitler! The only pity is that the Kremlin's ideological servants have managed to taint even such a seemingly correct and beautiful idea with monstrous lies.

What is this "preemptive strike"? Who invented it? And why? Who needs this wretched and stupid falsification?

I know who. Serious historians, realizing that the truth can not dodge, that "Icebreaker" them to refute will not benefit, invented a kind of "preventive strike", which Stalin and his generals allegedly planned to inflict on Germany. Where did this idea come from? What is it supported by?

That's a load off the top of my head. It's not supported by anything.

Stalin's preparation of a preemptive strike against Germany is a malicious slander. No preemptive strike neither Stalin, nor his generals did not prepare, about such a blow did not think. Stalin did not expect an attack by Germany, in such a possibility did not believe. I do not have to prove that even after Hitler struck, Stalin still could not come to terms with this idea.

The official and very serious historians get nonsense: Stalin was preparing a preemptive strike to repel the German invasion, in the possibility of which he categorically refused to believe.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, who on the eve of the war was the Chief of the General Staff, announced loudly, orally and in print, to the whole world that he knew nothing about the preparations for a German attack, that no one had reported to him anything about such preparations, that Lieutenant-General F. I. Golikov, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, Ambassador V. G. Dekanozov and all others who were involved in the collection and processing of intelligence information had reported only false, calming information. G. Dekanozov and all others who were involved in the collection and processing of intelligence information, reported only false, reassuring information.

It turns out that the brilliant Zhukov knew nothing about the preparation of the German invasion, but was preparing a preemptive strike to prevent and disrupt this invasion.

I repeat: no preemptive strike was prepared by Stalin or his generals. They were preparing an attack on Germany and its allies regardless of Hitler's designs and plans. I will say more: they were preparing an attack on Germany precisely because they considered a German attack improbable and impossible. They prepared an attack on Germany because logic told them: Hitler must strike Britain, he must turn his back on the Soviet Union.

Intensive preparations for an attack on Germany, and with it the whole of continental Europe, were already underway in December 1940, when the top command staff of the Red Army at a top-secret meeting discussed quite specific actions for a surprise attack on its sworn friend, and in January 1941, when two staff games were held on maps for the final choice of the best course of action.

One could argue that on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan of attack on the Soviet Union, Soviet intelligence obtained these plans, and now the Soviet generals gathered in Moscow to discuss the question of how to pre-empt.

This issue will not pass - first of all, because intelligence, as we are informed, got information about the content of the German plan
"two weeks" after Hitler approved the plan, i.e., in the

at the very end of December or in the first days of January 1941, and the meeting and strategic games had been prepared since the summer of 1940, when Hitler had no plan of attack on the Soviet Union yet.

I will say more: intensive preparations for an attack on Germany were already underway in August 1939, when the Soviet Union began a secret mobilization that could only end in war. Stalin understood this better than anyone. At that time, Stalin had no reason to launch a preemptive strike against Germany. But the outbreak of World War II had already been planned in the Kremlin just as much as the Soviet Union's entry into that war.

We can go even further back - to 1933, when Stalin ensured Hitler's election victory. Already at that moment the fate of Europe was sealed. The matter was to be resolved by war and the triumphal march of Communist power across the torn Europe and beyond.

You can dig even deeper.....

Serious historians were forced to admit that the attack was being prepared, but immediately found a justification: it was a preventive attack, if Stalin what and started, so only for the purpose of self-defense, in order to prevent and thwart the imminent enemy attack. An attack on Germany was being prepared, but only for the sake of saving his country and its dearly beloved by the Leader of the people.

But this bold idea has not yet been supported by historians.

7

" The USSR's "holy" war against Hitler was nothing but a heartbreaking struggle for the right to sit not in a foreign, but in its own concentration camp, nurturing hopes of expanding just it to the whole world." Anatoly Kuznetsov wrote this in his great book
"Babi Yar."

There were in our country passionate supporters of the idea of extending the communist concentration camp to the whole world. Unfortunately, they are still around. Among the official ideologists of Russia there are those who secretly regret that Stalin missed the chance to drive Europe into a communist pigsty.

One can easily imagine the fate of Europe if Comrade Stalin had not missed this chance. Look at the South

Korea and North Korea. Compare. If you look at the side of our planet plunged into night from Earth orbit, you can see it all glowing with the lights of cities, ports, and roads. How beautiful it is! And only the territory of North Korea looks like a black spot. That's it
— our work. Internationalist soldiers did their best. Protected North Korea from the bourgeoisie. We made sure that the light - excuse me, the dark -
— the future.

Comrade Brezhnev, the head of the socialist camp, praised the advantages of socialism to the whole world but he liked to drive a bourgeois Mercedes. No one has ever seen him driving a Trabant. But these cars were made by the same Germans. Same generation. Same upbringing. The same training. Only some of them were liberated by the Red Army, and they immediately lost all their creative abilities and labor skills. And others remained under the oppression of capitalism - and after World War II were able to rebuild a great industrial power on the ruins of the country. Sometimes they, overflowing with compassion (and contempt), sent humanitarian aid to those who hoisted the Victory Banner over the Reichstag. So that the victors would not starve to death.

If the Red Army had taken advantage of the unique situation that developed in Europe in the spring of 1941, if it had cut Germany off from Romania with a sudden blow, we would now all be living in one grandiose collective farm. One zone. With the wisest leader at the pinnacle of power. With a great party that never makes mistakes. With tens of millions of snitches. With grandiose crowds at demonstrations. And with equally grandiose crowds in endless lines for kerosene. Our whole nation would become not only a people-liberator, but also a people-liberator. And who would then send humanitarian aid to poor old men with orders on their chests?

Nothing great in such a turn of fate was not and could not be. Let us be grateful to fate that Stalin did not have time to take his chance.

On the other hand, there was an even more terrible version of the development of history. Let us imagine for a moment that Stalin really did not plot or plan anything against Hitler. And our people except for friendship with the Nazis did not think of anything else. And our leaders

the only ambition was to remember to wish the Führer a happy birthday. To meet the Nazi leaders with a guard of honor and the highest order. To drink champagne with Ribbentrop. And live by the principle: If Germany doesn't attack, we won't touch it. And let Hitler drink the blood of the conquered peoples of Europe - we will wish him a pleasant appetite and provide him with everything he lacks to keep Europe in a tight grip.

Such a development would be our greatest national shame. This is the kind of scenario that everyone should be ashamed of.

Preparing an attack on Hitler is still better than not preparing one.

С	with this exclusion	caveat	и	subject to	subject to
		words			

"preventive" I agree with Red Star's position earlier in this chapter.

***

When I read in a central military newspaper the statement that it would be a good idea to hit Hitler on his own initiative with an armored sledgehammer on the back of the head, my first thought was that British intelligence had infiltrated its agents into the editorial office of Krasnaya Zvezda. For up to that moment, the numerous publications of this newspaper had given the impression that its authors and editors were incapable of analyzing common knowledge and making reasonable conclusions on that basis. For up to that moment it was believed that only the wisest British intelligence was able to compare the facts and draw a conclusion about the preparation of the Soviet Union to strike Hitler's Germany, because only the brilliant James Bond is able to read the books of Voenizdat about the beginning of the war and comprehend them.

Then, after reading the passage, so unusual for Krasnaya Zvezda, again, and being lukewarm from what I had read, I decided: we are not shoddy either. We, too, are capable of reaching such a conclusion with our own minds.

What a beautiful thing to say: IF THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HIT GERMANY, IT WOULD BE GREAT!

Dear Red Star, let me second your wise thought and subscribe to it.

Viktor Suvorov, aka Vladimir Rezun.

Bristol, August 23, 2007
The book is revised, corrected and updated in
November 2012

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Notes

1

Technically, this is *author* content of the book *(from electronic version)*

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2

The duties of Stalin's three secretaries, Bazhanov, Mekhlis, and Kanner, were divided so that among themselves they referred to Bazhanov as secretary for light matters, Mekhlis as secretary for semi-dark matters, and Kanner as secretary for dark matters. - *Author's note.*

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3

In all my books, I've only made one gross mistake. There are many minor ones. For I did not write as an angel of God, but as a sinful man, filled with ignorance. The good reader will forgive me the minor mistakes.

I try to take into account comments and correct mistakes when reprinting my books. In this case, however, it was a big mistake. I did not take into account the change of generations. In my time (and it was in the last millennium) there was a little joke: the question "Do you know how to play the violin?" was followed by the answer "I don't know, I haven't tried". I secretly used this joke here, not taking into account that the century has changed and the joke has been forgotten. And the musicians took offense at me.

Fellow musicians, I apologize to all of you. This joke is not about how easy it is to play the violin. On the contrary, it is about the fact that this skill is available only to very gifted people after many years of training. The joke is not about those who can play the violin, but about those morons who don't realize that it is devilishly difficult.

My books, all of them, are written to music, to songs. To Vysotsky, Krug and Professor Lebedinsky, to Okudzhava and Bernes, Gorodnitsky and Magomayev. Without you, singers, guitarists and violinists, without your music, without your songs, I cannot work. Everything is written thanks to you. Please accept my earthly bow and gratitude. And forgive me. - *Author's note.*

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4

A "cadre" unit is a partially deployed unit in which the number of enlisted and junior commanders is kept to a minimum and which is fully manned only when mobilized. Army witters called such divisions "apiaries without bees". - *Ed.*

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5

Hitler's personal photographer. - *Editor's note.*

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6

To stand on the fringes (jarg.). - *Editor's note.*

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7

The canter is characterized by an even and calm pace of movement, the rider sits straight and deep in the saddle. A horse galloping in a field gallop moves noticeably faster, the rider sits in a field stance, standing up on the stirrups and leaning forward. - *Ed.*

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8

When trotting, the horse's legs move diagonally (crosswise), i.e. the right front and left hind legs step together, and then the left front and right hind legs step together (two legs can be in the air at the same time). Sprawling is called a trot at the fastest pace; the highest speed of trotters on short distances can be up to 50 km/h, with the horse putting the hind legs ahead of the traces of the corresponding front legs. Sprawling is the movement of a horse when its legs are "scattered" ("spread out") on the sides when riding, as if the horse, having no will over itself, moves not in a coordinated way, but as it is comfortable. - *Ed.*

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9

Viktor Suvorov analyzes in detail Zhukov's memoirs (including those monstrous inconsistencies and changes that were made in later editions of "Memories and Reflections") and the closely related "official version" of the history of the Second World War in his book "I take back my words". A new, expanded and revised edition of this book has been published by "Good Book" in 2012. - *Editor's note.*

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10

Article о Maslov и on research C. A. Buturlin was published in the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, March 21, 2003; author of the article
- Colonel Moroz Vitaly Ivanovich, deputy editor-in-chief of the newspaper.
- *Author's note.*

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11

Henry Ford and Son ("Henry Ford and Son") - an independent company created in 1916 by Henry Ford and his son Edsel specifically for the production of tractors, because the minority shareholders of Ford Motor Company, owning at that time 41.5% of the company, blocked any attempts by Ford to invest in the development and production of tractors. The company manufactured tractors under the Fordson brand name. - *Ed.*

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12

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. It is a part of the Historical and Documentary Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and provides permanent storage of documentary materials created as a result of the activities of the Russian Foreign Ministry and its predecessors (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR). - *Editor's note.*

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13

Branch commanders. A squad is the primary (lowest) tactical unit in the armed forces of most nations, consisting of 6-15 men. - *Editor's note.*

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14

The source of the quote below will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. - *Author's note.*

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15

The foreign apparatus of Soviet military strategic intelligence in a particular country included illegal and diplomatic residencies (there could be several in one country), agent groups, and separately acting agents. - *Author's note.*

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16

From name of Azerbaijani nationalist party "Musavat" ("Equality"), formed in Baku in 1911 and ceased to exist after the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan in April 1920. - *Editor's note.*

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17

Anfilov claimed that since Zhukov had communicated to him secret data about the outbreak of war, he felt it his duty to encrypt this data. I note that the mention of the encrypted text relieves Anfilov of the unpleasant obligation to provide notes as proof of the meetings with Zhukov and the information he received from him. - *Author's note.*

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18

The Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) is a Russian non-governmental research and development organization. interregional public organization. - *Editor's note.*

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19

Read more about the contribution of Soviet propaganda and Sovinformburo reports to the defeat of Soviet troops in the first months of the war in Chapter 9 ("With Reliance on Documents") of the new edition of Viktor Suvorov's book "I Take Back My Words" (Moscow: Dobryaya Kniga, 2013). - *Editor's note.*

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20

Read more about it in Victor Suvorov's book "Purification. Why Stalin decapitated his army". - *Ed.*

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Document version: 1
Document creation date: November 29, 2014
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